Economic coercion - economic dictionary reference book. The meaning of economic coercion to work in the large Soviet encyclopedia, BSE See what “Economic coercion to work” is in other dictionaries

95 scientists kindly agreed to answer the questions. Few of them agreed unequivocally that such a law actually meant coercion. More than half claimed that there were no significant elements of pressure.

However, the minimum wage law (and subsequent steps to enforce it) inevitably involves the threat of physical aggression against employers who pay their workers less than the minimum wage. That is, we are talking about the threat of physical aggression against people participating in certain types of voluntary exchange. In my opinion, this is coercion in its purest form. Imagine that your neighbor decides to impose a minimum wage law on you. I think we can all agree that he is trying to put pressure on you. But if such actions on the part of an individual are considered pressure, then why should they be assessed differently if they are carried out by the state?

Well, maybe you’ve already thought: “Okay, I’m interested in economics. I do not want to get into the jungle of semantic differences in terminology of a moral and political nature. Let philosophers do this."

But no. Understanding the essence of the difference between voluntary and compulsory actions is necessary to determine the meaning of the concepts of “free market” and “government intervention”. This is necessary to determine the degree of “economic freedom”. We use this distinction to develop a typology of actions, drawing theoretical parallels between various industries and forms of political organization of society. We use it when formulating reform projects. In our theories about human interaction, the most important question is whether it is carried out voluntarily or not. We believe that an individual improves his situation through voluntary interaction with others, but no such conclusion is made with respect to coerced interaction. The distinction between voluntariness and coercion is an integral element of many important analytical theses in economics. Thus, it is very important that we clearly understand the essence of this difference.

It is equally important to know the extent to which others reject this distinction. And in this sense, the question of the minimum wage is a very typical example. Surveys were conducted among economists regarding their point of view on this problem. Their “weighted average” opinion turns out to be neutral - neither for nor against. However, if you present the entire range of points of view expressed in the form of a diagram, you will not get a flat line with a “peak” in the middle. This graph will more likely resemble the letter U. Many economists are against the minimum wage, many are in favor, and those who adhere to the “middle line” are much smaller. Thus, in reality, opinions are seriously divided. And, in my opinion, these discrepancies are most closely related to the “semantic” question that I raised at the beginning of the article. The distinction between voluntary and coercive action is at the heart of much controversy in economics. As already noted, most economists who support the introduction of a minimum wage do not view this measure as an attack on individual freedom. And most opponents of such a step undoubtedly adhere to the opposite point of view. The connection between economics and semantics is obvious.

In my opinion, from the point of view of economic science, opponents of the minimum wage are right. In “proper” economics, the distinction between voluntariness and coercion is central to the research process. The result of such studies is a comparative analysis of the consequences of economic activity in conditions of greater or less freedom. And the main method of studying the situation in a particular industry or sector is to draw analogies with other industries and sectors, often in other periods and in other countries, which allows us to understand how organizations that differ in the degree of freedom operate.

However, not everyone sees things this way. Perhaps someone does not understand that the introduction of a minimum wage will lead to negative consequences, because they do not share our “semantic” ideas.

The essence of the difference

Coercion is physical aggression or the threat of such aggression against your property. Property is what belongs to you, including your body, and ownership means everyone recognizes your “claim” to that property. Thus, we are talking about a claim, a “point of reference”, and not an absolute and inviolable right.

Voluntary interaction is our agreement (without any pressure) to change the situation with our property through an agreement, such as a contract. As for the question of who owns what, there are generally accepted norms on this subject - starting with the fact that the soul owns the body, and ending with property relations in the family, trade, production, or in the process of donation. Freedom means a situation where others do not interfere with your property affairs. And restricting free interaction is an attack on freedom.

Of course, there are gaps and gray areas, and the forms of such relationships vary depending on social norms. However, the fundamental principles of property, tenure and mutual consent are undeniable and apply so widely that deviations from them are regarded as exceptions to the rule.

Within the framework of liberal civilization, this difference is natural.

The distinction between voluntary and coercive is natural in the sense that within the framework of a liberal civilization it is defined intuitively, is constantly made and is universally recognized. Moreover, in a liberal civilization, institutionalized coercion by private individuals (not associated with the state) is almost never tolerated. One exception to this is the "neighborhood" rule in Montana and some other areas, which gives your neighbors the right to graze cows on your land if it is not fenced. Thus, if you do not want to allow other people's cows onto your land, you will have to build a fence. Another exception, in my personal opinion, is the noisy Harley-Davidson motorcycles. But in general it is considered natural that coercive actions should be the prerogative of the state.

This distinction has been on the agenda of our intellectual discussions for centuries. It is subject to analysis even if the conditions that surround you are highly coercive.

Natural maxim versus natural axiom

So, when it comes to relations between private individuals, the principle of freedom is raised almost to an absolute, i.e. works in almost 100% of cases. However, in matters related to the state, the situation is different. The state plays a unique role in society, and this uniqueness is secured by relevant rules and regulations. We are ready to tolerate coercive actions from the state that we would never allow private individuals to commit - and not only because the state is stronger and better armed. In practice, the principle of freedom is not an axiom. It operates as a maxim: when faced with a choice between two policy options (or reforms), preference should be given to the one that allows for greater freedom. But this is just an unwritten rule, an assumption that we expect to be true ninety-odd percent of the time.

The distinction between voluntariness and coercion is an expression of the principle of freedom, and it is often presented as a moral axiom. As a result, one of the main obstacles to clearly establishing the distinction between voluntary and coercive in economics is that you will be easily suspected and accused of making freedom an axiom. Free-market economists have to explain that this distinction does not equate to a complete rejection of coercion. One can recognize this difference and, at the same time, in certain cases, the need for coercion.

Walter Block exclaims in polemical fervor: “Coase, get your cattle off my land!” Blok is right about “my land,” but not always about “drive.” After all, perhaps the “surrounding lands” rule is a good and legitimate norm.

If we can somewhat loosen the connection of this distinction to the principle of freedom as a “mandatory recipe”, we will have more opportunities to use it as an analytical “locomotive” to answer the main question: In what cases should we support the axiomatic nature of the principle of freedom, and in what cases? which ones are missing?

Many people are not happy with this distinction.

Thus, if an economist uses this distinction in his research, he has a problem with people confusing a maxim with an axiom. But this is not yet the most serious difficulty. Even if everyone realizes that this difference should be taken as a maxim, it gives rise to a picture of the situation in society that most economists will completely reject. After all, it turns out that we live in a state where coercion reigns. Minimum wages, occupational licensing, Federal Drug Administration restrictions, gun control, drug prohibition, all forms of taxation, and a host of other government regulations are clearly coercive. If we turn to history, then, using our distinction, we can come to the conclusion that the turning point in terms of institutionalized coercion was Roosevelt's New Deal. This fact becomes obvious to everyone. Of course, an economist using a similar technique may try to reassure his listeners: “Just understand that if I call a measure coercive, this does not necessarily mean that it is bad.” But people will still feel offended. In our everyday life, the word “coercion” has pronounced negative connotations.

Those who don’t like our difference try to get around it by reinterpreting the fundamental terms: property, consent, freedom, rights, justice, equality, fairness. The main idea of ​​their concept is that the state is like a huge social organization where all rules are adopted by mutual agreement. Nobody forces you to be within its boundaries. Thus, when the government imposes a minimum wage law on you, it is not infringing on your property and freedom, but only restructuring the rights relating to your property. According to this view, your property is a collection of rights that the government defines. In fact, this approach is based on the assumption that all your property actually belongs to the government, organization, state, and it can be considered “yours” only in the sense that the latter delegates certain powers to you in relation to this property. The state is the ruler of everything, the real owner of all property in the country, and we are only residents in it.

The concept of "state - social organization" allows many economists to get rid of the distinction between voluntary and coercive. If a scientist openly advocates the use of this distinction as a fundamental analytical category, thereby signaling that we live in a coercive society, he risks being ostracized by economists who hold different views. Sometimes his concepts are labeled as “ideologized” and his access to scientific journals and institutions is denied.

Competing concepts in economics

The deep contradictions that exist between theories based on the idea of ​​free markets and the prevailing political culture make it clear why even free-market economists try to avoid the distinction between voluntary and coercive in their concepts. Lionel Robbins advocates the idea that economics comes down to purely logical choices, effective ways to achieve externally specified goals. In a similar vein, George Stigler and Gary Becker argue that economics is about maximizing utility within a theoretical equilibrium. In my opinion, these concepts are empty and artificial and only lead to the sterility of economic science. But one of the reasons they remain in circulation is because they allow free-market economists to skirt the reefs of political culture. George Stigler not only downplays the distinction between voluntariness and coercion, but directly challenges its necessity, arguing that the principle of freedom has been replaced by concepts such as welfare, maximum utility and efficiency, with the result that the principle has become a meaningless and unimportant idea.

“Spontaneous” means voluntary

Taking our difference into account allows us to clarify economic theories. Hayek is famous for his ideas of "local knowledge" and spontaneous order. The lessons he formulated about the shortcomings of central planning were learned. But if everyone agrees that the state should not engage in central planning, many, nevertheless, do not object to a thousand other types of “tuning” of the economic mechanism by the hands of the state, such as, for example, the minimum wage. They say: let people act spontaneously, but the scale and form of their actions must be influenced. In this way, they say, we will be able to use the principle of “local knowledge” and, at the same time, smooth out externalities, the consequences of information asymmetry, etc.

However, the distinction between voluntariness and compulsion helps us understand that “spontaneity” essentially means freedom. Although restrictions like the minimum wage cannot be classified as centrally planned, they are an attack on spontaneity. Hayek's conclusions also lead to a critical attitude towards government intervention. Those who advocate such intervention lose sight of the fact that the problems which are said to justify it will in any case become a cause of concern, will be recognized, and then the opportunity will arise for the emergence of new methods and institutions. Aberrations create new opportunities for win-win solutions, opportunities that allow our entrepreneurial spirit to eliminate or avoid the original aberration. Thus, licensing of professional activities is justified by the need to protect consumers from incompetents and charlatans. However, in private medicine, for example, there are many institutions and ways to determine the professional qualifications of doctors and ensure quality services. Economists who study the problem of licensing unanimously come to the conclusion that it does not protect the consumer, but damages his interests by limiting the range of such services and competition.

Our scientific “gut” on this issue is based on a well-reasoned, reasoned belief in the potential for convergence of interests, and this principle is partly predetermined by the distinction we discuss in this article. By the way, in his concepts Hayek attaches fundamental importance to this difference, but it should be noted that he acts very diplomatically, often making it clear “between the lines.” To smooth out rough edges, Hayek often uses terms such as “competition,” “decentralized action,” “market,” and “spontaneous order.” Moreover, in his work on political philosophy, he does not clearly state that freedom is based on the principle of ownership, but instead characterizes it in terms of a number of important and attractive correlations for the reader. Sometimes deliberate obscurity is appropriate in the discussion, but at other times we must defend a clear definition of freedom and its central role in the creation of sound economic concepts.

Scientific judgment depends on instinct

Recognizing that 100% freedom is impossible, you are faced with the need to determine whether a particular case of government intervention is a valid exception to the rule. What should be guided by when deciding that in a given case the maxim of freedom does not apply?

This requires scientific sensitivity and consideration of possible consequences, including moral and cultural ones. We try to determine, within reasonable limits, the logic of this instinct, but we do not try to give it a complete and final definition or develop some kind of algorithm. Sometimes others demand from us a “solid foundation”, a standard for all occasions. Of course, we should, as far as possible, formulate and clarify our deepest values ​​and criteria. But the deeper we penetrate into the essence of the problem, the more blurred and banal this “foundation” becomes. Sensitivity regarding economic policy cannot be defined more clearly and definitely than aesthetic sensibility. No one requires a “solid basis” for evaluating films and poetry. One should get used to the same uncertainty in the criteria for assessing economic policy.

The expressed judgments are consistent with the concept of Adam Smith

The direction of economics that we are talking about can be called “Smithian”, since all our most important judgments find support in the works of Adam Smith:

- George Stigler criticized Smith's political economy for not being “Stiglerian” enough. Indeed, as Ronald Coase has demonstrated, Smith would be unlikely to accept that the scope of economics is utility maximization, “rational choice,” and the like. Smith viewed political economy "as a science concerned with statesmen and legislators."

- Central to his “Wealth of Nations” is the “evident and simple system of natural liberty,” which Smith most closely associated with justice. Smith adhered to the classical, intuitive, "strict" understanding of property, and his idea of ​​freedom was based on the ideas of property and unfettered voluntary agreement. The conceptual status of natural freedom does not depend on the rules established by the state. The system of natural freedom “establishes itself.”

- The Wealth of Nations contains a comprehensive analysis of economic policy issues. At the same time, these issues are assessed from the point of view of their compliance with the principle of natural freedom. Smith's general approach is to explain when the principle of freedom should be followed and when it should not. Natural freedom is the basis of Smith's economic concept.

- Smith viewed the principle of freedom as a maxim, not an axiom. In The Wealth of Nations, he specifically and clearly states that in some specific cases he supports a departure from the principle of natural liberty (incidentally, J.B. Say did the same). Essentially, Smith emphasizes that the distinction we are discussing in some cases compatible with the endorsement of coercion. He said that the rules of commutative justice are similar to the rules of grammar, meaning that sometimes an incorrect grammatical phrase is appropriate - but the fact that it is used does not make it a correct grammatical phrase.

- Smith would be horrified by the undermining of liberal terminology based on the implicit premise of the omnipotence of the state. He found similar legal positivism in Thomas Hobbes, and showed the fallacy of “such an odious doctrine.” He also condemned Colbert for his methods of managing the French economy, modeled on the management of the departments of a public institution, believing that it was necessary, on the contrary, to "allow everyone to pursue his own interests in his own way, on the basis of the general liberal principles of equality, freedom and justice."

- Smith's scientific assessments strengthen the argument for a culture based on the presumption of freedom. The maxim of freedom is true in more than ninety percent of cases, and therefore it is useful to use it as an analytical criterion and tool of critical analysis, and theoretical categories should be developed taking into account the fact that this maxim operates with some exceptions. But even if a policy of government intervention is already in place, its proponents must constantly prove its justification. A distinctive feature of Smith's political economy is the presumption of freedom - rather than the preservation of the status quo. At times, Smith supports existing interventions (especially, I think, in relation to Scotland at the time), but at the same time considers it his responsibility to convincingly argue for its necessity. (Whether he always succeeds is another question.)

- Smith would also reject demands for a clear definition of our scientific sense. Such intuition does not fit into simple rules like grammar; it rather meets the same criteria as literary excellence, being defined as “loose, vague, and indeterminate.” Yes, Smith drew analogies between commutative justice and the rules of grammar, but the basis for the unambiguous presumption of such justice and the general adherence to its principles are the free, vague, indefinite - but not meaningless and arbitrary - criteria of political-aesthetic sense. Smith needed two large, repeatedly revised works to understand and express the nature of his own scientific instinct.

Conclusion

Smith clearly recognized that economics should have a purpose: to analyze the most important problems of economic policy and to equip practitioners with the knowledge gained. Assessments of the most important issues naturally form an element of any science. However, the formulation of these questions is one of its primary tasks. Again, he viewed freedom as a natural concept whose status was completely independent of assessments of specific political issues, so there was nothing improper in using this concept to formulate problems and analyze them.

This concept is naturally used in the analysis of minimum wage laws and other specific economic policies. But that's not all: there are different ways to structure and develop economics as a whole. And in this respect, the decision to use the distinction between voluntariness and coercion - both as a basis and as a research tool - is partly related to the judgment of the comparative value of science as a whole that becomes its result. This judgment is extremely important, and therefore also part of science.

In my view, it would be helpful to the professional and general public's understanding of economic processes if economists would more actively: (1) use the distinction between voluntariness and coercion in their formulation, analysis, and discourse; (2) were not shy about this use, but, on the contrary, clearly stated it; (3) specifically reflected on the essence of this distinction, especially in terms of filling gaps and eliminating ambiguities; (4) made it clear that, while they supported the principle of liberty, they did not regard it as a basis for condemning coercion in any possible situation.

If economists in the tradition of Smith and Hayek acknowledge that coercion is sometimes useful, thereby reducing the fundamentally negative nature of the concept, they may be able to persuade others to support the distinction between voluntariness and coercion. It would be very helpful if participants in economic discourse agreed on this distinction - recognized, for example, the establishment of a minimum wage as an act of coercion - and argued about when, why and to what extent coercion can be considered justified.

Notes

Klein D.B., Dompe S. Reasons for Supporting the Minimum Wage: Asking Signatories of the ‘Raise the Minimum Wage’ Statement // Econ Journal Watch. Vol. 4. No. 1 (January 2007). P. 125–167. Gwartney J., Lawson R. Economic Freedom of the World: 2006 Annual Report, Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2007; Kane T., Holmes K.R., O'Grady M.A. 2007 Index of Economic Freedom. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2007. High J. Is Economics Independent of Ethics? // Reason Papers. Vol. 10. No. 1 (1985). P. 3–16. Klein D.B., Dompe S. Op. cit. P. 132. Friedman D.D. A Positive Account of Property Rights // Social Philosophy and Policy. Vol. 11. No. 2. P. 1–16. Ibid. Block's acuity is mentioned and assessed in North G. Undermining Property Rights: Coase and Becker // Journal of Libertarian Studies. Vol. 16. No. 4. P. 75–100; Block develops his idea in the work: Block W. Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights // Journal of Libertarian Studies. Vol. 1. No. 2 (1997). P. 111–115. Stigler G. J. Wealth, and Possibly Liberty // Journal of Legal Studies. Vol. 7. No. 2 (1978). P. 213–217. Hayek F.A. Law, Legislation and Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. Vol. 1. Rules and Order [Hayek F. Law, legislation and freedom. M.: IRISEN, 2006]. Hayek F.A. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960; Klein D.B. Mere Libertarianism: Blending Hayek and Rothbard // Reason Papers. No. 27 (2004). P. 7–43. Stigler G. J. Smith’s Travels on the Ship of State // History of Political Economy. Vol. 3 (1971); included in Stigler's collection of works, The Economist as Preacher and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). P. 136–145. Coase R.H. Adam Smith's View of Man // Coase R.H. Essays on Economics and Economists. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 95–116. Smith A. The Wealth of Nations. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981. P. 138. Merrill Th.W., Smith H.E. What Happened to Property in Law and Economics? // Yale Law Journal. Vol. 111. No. 2 (November 2001). P. 357–398. Smith A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982. P. 80. Smith A. The Wealth of Nations. P. 687. Ibid. P. 324. Smith A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. P. 318. Smith A. The Wealth of Nations. P. 664. Smith A. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. P. 327.

Economic dependence and coercion between wage workers and capitalists. Its economic basis is the monopoly of private ownership of capitalists over the means of production. Deprived of material conditions for the application of labor and means of subsistence, legally free workers are forced to sell their labor power to the owners of the means of production and work for capitalists. Thus, material labor conditions become a means of subordinating the labor of others for the purpose of exploiting it. The capitalist commands labor, manages it, determines its duration, intensity, organizes and controls it. With the growth of the scale of production, capitalists transfer these functions to a special hired administration that manages labor on behalf of capital. As the owner of the means of production, the capitalist becomes the owner of the entire product produced by the labor of the workers. Relations of economic dependence and coercion are reproduced throughout the continuous process of production: the product of the worker’s labor is constantly removed from him as someone else’s property and returned back only partially, in the form of wages; the other part is constantly transformed into means of production and income for the capitalist. Labor is reproduced as wage labor, the means of production as capital. In contrast to non-economic coercion, characteristic of slave-owning and feudal societies (based on relations of direct subordination), . . Thus, outwardly it appears as the attitude of free, legally equal commodity owners, and the labor of workers appears as voluntary. In reality, the labor of a worker for a capitalist means wage slavery. In the context of the modern scientific and technological revolution, capitalism uses science and technology to strengthen and expand the relationship of economic coercion. Capital intensifies labor, displaces some workers from production, and places demand only for educated and highly qualified labor. Knowledge workers - scientists and engineers - are increasingly drawn into the orbit of capitalist exploitation. This proves the inconsistency of modern bourgeois theories of “harmony of interests”, “social partnership”, “collective”, “people’s” capitalism, which try to present the relations of domination and subordination, objectively inherent in capitalism, as equal cooperation. The economic system cannot be destroyed under capitalism. For this it is necessary that the means of production pass into the hands of the working people, i.e. . abolish private ownership of the means of production. Lit.:

Non-economic coercion

Non-economic coercion is direct form of forced labor, based on the personal dependence of the direct producer (producers) on any person (group of persons). The direct form of forced labor is characteristic of the slaveholding and feudal periods of social development. As a form of exploitation, it is due to the low degree of development of the productive forces of these periods. The ownership of the direct producer by slave owners and feudal lords is a condition and prerequisite for their appropriation of the main results of the labor (product) of slaves and serfs.

Elements Non-economic coercion arose back in the primitive communal period, when all able-bodied community members were forcibly involved in some public works (construction of roads, irrigation structures, military fortifications, etc.). In addition, at the end of the existence of primitive society, after the emergence of economically isolated families and individuals, some brothers, for not repaying debts, became economically dependent on lenders, and were forced to work off these debts for a long time, and sometimes for life, becoming, in fact, temporary or permanent slaves. Of course, at the beginning of their appearance, such “slaves” were more like family members, but as these relationships developed, these workers increasingly turned into a powerless labor force. And already under the slave system Non-economic coercion performed in the crudest, naked forms (which is especially characteristic of ancient Greece and Rome). Slave labor was used mainly in quarries, quarries, and in the construction of palaces, temples, and luxurious tombs of pharaohs and kings. Slaves were actually turned into draft animals and were subjected to the most merciless exploitation. Along with forms of complete slavery in a slave society, there were other forms of dependence with varying degrees Non-economic coercion(for example, the dependence of the helots in Ancient Sparta, who were considered the property of the state, had their own farm and paid rent in kind; the laoi in Hellenistic Egypt, who were primarily engaged in cultivating the royal land and preserved the remnants of the communal structure).

During the period of feudalism Non-economic coercion was determined by the nature of the relationship between the serfs, who had land allotment and their own tools, and the feudal lord (landowner), who owned all these lands. And therefore, the peasant had to be personally dependent on the feudal lord and was obliged to work most of the time on the lands of the feudal lord or on his farm. Thus, feudal land ownership was economically realized in the form of rent (working out) in favor of the landowner, being Non-economic coercion. The most severe forms are Non-economic coercion had during the period of dominance of labor rent and gradually weakened with the transition to food and cash rent, in which the peasants became less and less economically dependent on the feudal lord. With the predominance of money rent, the personal dependence of the serfs receded into the background in comparison with land rent. However, the relationship between serfs and feudal lords did not lose their coercive character. The full judicial and administrative power of the patrimonial owner and the class inferiority of the peasants were preserved.

With the advent of capitalist relations, the hired worker is no longer an object Non-economic coercion, but becomes only economically dependent on the employer. Capitalism presupposes the personal freedom of the worker, but at the same time the deprivation of any means of production. Thus, economic coercion appears for the majority of citizens under capitalism. However, it is worth noting that under capitalism, no one is prohibited from becoming an entrepreneur, even if it is a solo entrepreneur, and working only for himself and, of course, the state. But the role of an entrepreneur, firstly, is not suitable for everyone, and, secondly, not everyone wants to be one, since the work of an entrepreneur is not so simple and carefree, unless, of course, you count the actual and conditional rentiers . Therefore, to say that the proletarian, supposedly in order not to die of hunger, is forced to sell his labor power to the capitalist, is experiencing the oppression of exploitation, is simply unfair. In the conditions of a developing economy of any state, most of the mercenaries also receive a certain income when hired, and not just the capitalist. But, in times of crisis, significant inflation and high unemployment, exploitation (appropriation of part of the result of labor) takes place, since the exchange (hiring) between a worker and an entrepreneur, as a rule, is not equivalent, infringing on the economic benefit of the mercenary.

Non-economic coercion, however was inherent in many ways to the so-called socialist system, especially in the USSR, which was massively manifested in the direct exploitation of political prisoners who erected most of the victorious new buildings of socialism. With the help of ideological covers, the Soviet government simply massively used unpaid labor in the most severe conditions of heat, cold and hunger. Mass death from the unbearable conditions of exploitation in no way stopped this method of using a significant part of the citizens by the rulers of the “bright future”, who in words were ardent opponents of any exploitation in accordance with their communist programs, but in practice, far from an outside observer, were engaged in the most brutal exploitation, which neither the slave owner nor the feudal lord even thought about. Therefore, it is worth remembering that the most cruel Non-economic coercion can only be created by the state itself, and not by an individual (slave owner, feudal lord, etc.), who still has certain legislative restrictions, unlike the state itself, which can itself come up with the necessary laws for this Non-economic coercion.

Economic coercion to work, the relationship of economic dependence and coercion between capitalists and wage workers characteristic of capitalism. Its economic basis is formed by the monopoly of private ownership of capitalists over the means of production. Deprived of the material means of subsistence and working conditions, legally free workers are forced to sell their own labor power to the owners of the means of production and work for the capitalists.

Thus, material labor conditions become a means of subordinating the labor of others for the purpose of exploiting it. The capitalist directs labor, directs it, determines its duration, intensity, organizes and controls it. With the growth of the scale of production, capitalists transfer these functions to a special hired administration that manages labor on behalf of capital.

As the owner of the means of production, the capitalist becomes the owner of the entire product produced by the labor of the workers. Relations of economic dependence and coercion are reproduced throughout the entire process of production: the product of the worker’s labor is always removed from him as someone else’s property and is returned only partially, in the form of wages; the second part always turns into the income of the capitalist and means of production.

Labor is reproduced as wage labor, the means of production as capital. In contrast to the non-economic coercion characteristic of slave-owning and feudal societies (based on relations of strict subordination), economic labor to labor appears externally as a relationship between free, legally equal commodity owners, and the labor of workers as optional. Ultimately, the labor of a worker for a capitalist is evidenced by wage slavery.

In the context of the modern scientific and technological revolution, capitalism uses science and technology to expand and strengthen the relationship of economic coercion. Capital intensifies labor, displaces some workers from production, and places demand only for literate and highly skilled labor. Knowledge workers - engineers and scientists - are increasingly drawn into the orbit of capitalist exploitation.

This substantiates the inconsistency of modern bourgeois theories of harmony of interests, social partnership, collective, people's capitalism, which try to present subordination and relations of domination, objectively characteristic of capitalism, as equal cooperation. The totality of economic activity cannot be wiped off the face of the earth under capitalism. To do this, it is necessary that the means of production pass into the hands of the working people, that is, to eliminate personal ownership of the means of production.

Lit.: Marx K. and Engels F., Works, 2nd ed. t. 23, dep. 3, 4, 5; Archive of Engels and Marx, vol. 2 (VII), M., 1933, p. 5¾146, 167-77; Lenin V.I., criticism and the economic content of his populism in the book of Mr. Struve, Complete. collection cit., 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 459-60; see also lit. at Art. Capitalism.