Unknown leaders. Beria and Malenkov

Who overthrew Stalin. Khrushchev did not start the debunking of the cult of personality

Archival documents indicate that Georgy Malenkov was the first to attack the legacy of Stalinism.

I unexpectedly discovered this document on Old Square. Unexpected because it is dedicated to the arrest of Beria. However, during the plenum convened in connection with the arrest, back in 1953, the question of Stalin’s personality cult arose, which in the circumstances then turned out to be unacceptable. And the solution to the issue that arose was buried.

As a result, until this day no one paid attention to the fact that the main thing among the materials about Beria is the document about the first thorough attempt to expose the cult of personality. Meanwhile, the document left unattended cancels what is laid down in the history textbooks, namely: the exposure of the cult of personality began 3 months after death Stalin. And the author of the report was not Khrushchev, and the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR GGeorgy Malenkov!

However, judging by the transcript of the meeting, none of the members of the Central Committee, except Khrushchev, supported him. The proposed resolution on the cult of personality and its consequences was not adopted. Three years later, almost the same report, supplemented by quotes from Lenin and examples from life, was read by Nikita Khrushchev from the high rostrum of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev ensured that the resolution, rejected in 1953 by the plenum, was adopted by the congress in 1956. It turns out that the real story of exposing the cult of personality is this: the first to attempt this historical step was an accomplice Lavrentiy Beria Georgy Malenkov in removing Stalin from power. Moreover, the impetus for the preparation of this report was given by Beria. The very next day after Stalin’s funeral (March 10, 1953), he initiated the first critical speech about the dangers of the cult of personality at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee...

So, I present for public consideration Malenkov’s speech from 60 years ago, which testifies to what was going on at the top of the Soviet leadership in the most intense days of the troubled summer of 1953.

“They saw and understood, but were silent”

Malenkov: ...Here, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, they spoke about the cult of personality, and, I must say, they spoke incorrectly. I mean the speech of Comrade Andreev. Similar sentiments on this score could be discerned in Comrade Tevosyan’s speech. Therefore, we are obliged to clarify this issue.

Khrushchev: Some non-speakers harbor similar thoughts.

Malenkov: First of all, we must openly admit, and we propose to write this down in the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee, that in our propaganda in recent years there has been a deviation from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the question of the role of the individual in history. It is no secret that party propaganda, instead of correctly explaining the role of the Communist Party as a leading force in the construction of communism in our country, has veered into a cult of personality. Such a distortion of Marxism undoubtedly contributes to belittling the role of the party and its leadership center and leads to a decrease in the creative activity of the party masses and the broad masses of the Soviet people. But, comrades, this is not just a matter of propaganda.
The question of the cult of personality is directly and directly related to the question of the collectivity of leadership. I already said in my report that there is no justification for the fact that we have not convened a party congress for 13 years, that the Plenum of the Central Committee has not been convened for years, that the Politburo did not function normally and was replaced by threes, fives, etc. working on behalf of Comrade Stalin separately, on separate issues and tasks. Didn’t all of us, members of the Politburo and members of the Central Committee, if not all, then many, see and understand the wrongness of this situation? They saw and understood, but could not correct it. We are obliged to tell the Plenum of the Central Committee about this in order to draw the right conclusions and take measures to improve the leadership of the party and the country.
Declassified documents shed light on secret battles within the Soviet leadership. Resolution on the document: “Original with amendments by Comrade Malenkov G. M. D. Sukhanov (Head of the Office of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee - Ed.). 09.28.1953."

You should know, comrades, that the cult of personality of Comrade Stalin in the daily practice of leadership took on painful forms and dimensions, methods of collectivity in work were discarded, criticism and self-criticism were completely absent in our highest echelon of leadership. We have no right to hide from you that such an ugly cult of personality has led to the peremptory nature of individual decisions and in recent years has begun to cause serious damage to the leadership of the party and the country. This must be said in order to decisively correct the mistakes made in this regard, draw the necessary lessons and in the future ensure in practice the collectivity of leadership on the principled basis of Lenin-Stalin teaching.

The Plenum must know - and no one gave us the right to hide from our highest party leadership body between party congresses the fact that the ugly manifestation of the cult of personality and the destruction of methods of collectivity in the work of the Politburo and the Central Committee, the lack of criticism and self-criticism in the Politburo and the Central Committee entailed a number of mistakes in the leadership of the party and the country. Sad examples in this regard are not isolated.

We all have the following fact in mind. After the Party Congress, Comrade Stalin came to the Plenum of the Central Committee in its present composition and, without any reason, politically discredited Comrade Comrade. Molotov and Mikoyan. Did the Plenum of the Central Committee, did we all agree on this? No. But we were all silent. Why? Because the cult of personality was taken to the point of absurdity, and there was complete lack of control. Do we want anything like this in the future? Definitely not. (Voices: “That’s right.” Stormy applause.)

During the work of this plenum, you, comrades, became aware of the following fact. In connection with the task of increasing livestock farming in February of this year, Comrade Stalin persistently proposed increasing taxes in the countryside by 40 billion rubles. After all, we all understood the blatant wrongness and danger of this event. We said that all cash income of collective farms is slightly more than this amount. However, this issue was not discussed, the collectivity in the leadership was so belittled and suppressed that the evidence presented to Comrade Stalin was categorically rejected by him.

Let us take, further, the decision on the Turkmen Canal. Was the need for the construction of the canal clarified in advance, was a calculation of the necessary costs and economic efficiency of this construction made, was this issue discussed in the governing bodies of the party and state? No. It was decided single-handedly and without any economic calculations. And then it turned out that this canal with an irrigation system would cost 30 billion rubles. People will have to be resettled from the populated areas of Central Asia, where we still have a lot of unused land that is exclusively suitable for the development of cotton, to the completely uninhabited area of ​​the canal. Comrades from Central Asia and agricultural workers can confirm this. (Voices: “That’s right.”) Isn’t it clear that we must correct such mistakes, which were the result of an incorrect attitude in the leadership team, the result of belittling the collective nature of work and switching to the method of individual, peremptory decisions...

Or take Comrade Stalin’s well-known proposal on product exchange (between industrial enterprises of cities and agricultural producers. - Ed.), put forward in the work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.” It is already clear that this provision was put forward without sufficient analysis and economic justification. This provision on product exchange, if not corrected, can become an obstacle to solving the most important task for many years to come - the comprehensive development of trade turnover. The question of product exchange, the timing and forms of the transition to product exchange is a large and complex issue that affects the interests of millions of people, the interests of our entire economic development, and it had to be carefully weighed and comprehensively studied before being put forward to the party as a program proposal.

As you can see, comrades, we are obliged to tell you, members of the Central Committee, that decisions on the most important international issues, issues of state work and economic development were often made without proper preliminary study and without collective discussion in the leading party bodies. The presence of such abnormalities in fact led to insufficiently substantiated and incorrect decisions, and led to a belittlement of the role of the Central Committee as a body of collective leadership of the party.

As you see, comrades, even great people can have weaknesses. Comrade Stalin had these weaknesses. We must talk about this in order to correctly, in a Marxist way, raise the question of the need to ensure collective leadership in the party, criticism and self-criticism at all party levels, including primarily in the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee. We must say this so as not to repeat the mistakes associated with the lack of collective leadership and with an incorrect understanding of the issue of the cult of personality, for these mistakes in the absence of Comrade Stalin will be three times dangerous. (Voices: “That’s right.”)

We are obliged to raise this question sharply... If mistakes were possible under Comrade Stalin, then all the more fraught with great dangers are their repetition in the absence of such a leader as Comrade Stalin. (Voices: “Correct.”) In the draft resolution proposed for your consideration, we consider it necessary to remind the party of Marx’s views on the issue of the cult of personality. In a famous letter to Wilhelm Blos in 1877, Marx wrote: “I am not angry, and neither is Engels. Both of us will not give a penny for popularity. Here, for example, is proof: out of hostility towards any cult of personality, during the existence of the International I never allowed the numerous appeals in which my merits were recognized and which pestered me from different countries to be made public - I never even responded to them, except occasionally reprimanded them. The first entry of Engels and myself into the secret society of communists took place under the condition that everything that promotes superstitious admiration for authorities would be thrown out of the rules...”

Article from the newspaper: Weekly "Arguments and Facts" No. 34 08/21/2013
Source: http://www.aif.ru/society/history/kto_nizverg_stalina_razvenchanie_kulta_lichnosti_nachal_ne_hruschev

In general, nothing new. There are still debates about whether the “enter” was poisoned or whether he himself finally threw back his hooves. One thing is known: from March 1953, the communist jackals immediately continued the squabble for power, which was temporarily suspended after Stalin finished off their opponents - Trotsky, Kirov and everyone less - of whom Dzhugashvili was afraid in his maniacal delirium. Let’s not forget that some communists, there are so many varieties of them, even today, like our Finnish commari - they tell how Lenin tried to fight with him: " The imperial Stalinists have been trying very hard lately."
Original taken from commari in the book

B.F. Slavin. Lenin against Stalin. The revolutionary's last stand.
I would like to immediately ask some nervous comrades not to tell me what should and should not be scanned and posted on the Internet. I'm an adult.

The history of the relationship between Lenin and Stalin, in my opinion, is very confused, sometimes openly falsified, sometimes mythologized. Including comrade. Trotsky. ..
______________________________

But the most famous denunciation of Stalin’s extrajudicial crimes against the population of the Union, committed in the dungeons of the NKVD, was done even earlier on April 4, 1953, as everyone knows very well, by his faithful henchman Beria, we enjoy:

"...in the investigative work of the MGB bodies there weregross perversions of Soviet laws, arrestsinnocent Soviet citizens, unbridled falsification of investigative materials, widespread use of various methods of torture - brutal beatings of those arrested, round-the-clock use of handcuffs on hands turned behind the back, lasting in some cases for several months, prolonged sleep deprivation, imprisonment of those arrested naked in a cold punishment cell, etc.

At the direction of the leadership of the (former) USSR Ministry of State Security, the beatings of those arrested were carried out in premises equipped for this purpose in Lefortovo and internal prisons and were entrusted to a special group of specially designated persons from among prison workers, using all kinds of instruments of torture.
Suchsavage “interrogation methods”led to the fact that many of the innocently arrested were brought by investigators to a state of loss of physical strength, moral depression, and some of them to the loss of human appearance.
Taking advantage of this condition of the arrested, investigators-falsifiers slipped them fabricated “confessions” in advance about anti-Soviet and espionage-terrorist work.
Such vicious methods of conducting investigations directed the efforts of the operational staff onto the wrong path..."
from the Order of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria on the prohibition of torture.

Of course others devout Stalinists and today they shout, choking on yellow foam from rage, that the crimes of their pockmarked ghoul are exposed, so colonelcassad for help to himself Mao Zedong rushed:

Everyone knows very well that, without exception, every next leader of the Communist Party swore to forever keep the behests of Marx-Lenin: “The greeting to Khrushchev from the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was practically a clone of the greetings to Stalin in 1929, 1939, 1949. In the said greeting Khrushchev was called: “a faithful Leninist; outstanding figure; courageous fighter; a glorious son of the heroic working class; revolutionary Leninist." In the greetings and toasts of the leading fraternal communist and workers' parties, published in the same issue of Pravda on April 17, 1964, Khrushchev was idolized with the following epithets: “beloved party and state leader; prominent figure in the international and communist movement; great fighter; the most consistent and ardent internationalist..."
http://www.stihi.ru/2012/01/20/4456

Here is another wonderful justification from a Stalinist, but this time blaming the “Leninist Guard”:

"For Lenin and his modern followers in the democratic world, the Great Russians are “oppressors, holdovers.” In fact, Lenin unequivocally insisted: internationalism must consist in the inequality of rights of the Great Russians...

There are other behests of Lenin, to which almost all “independent” Leninists are still faithful. This is the international policy of the USSR, which remains practically unchanged in Russia and the observance of which is monitored by the entire “world community”. Those who demolish man-made monuments to Lenin do not notice where the hand of the leader they are following is extended. And this is “the path to a bright future.” The guiding thread of internationalism was indicated by Lenin in his letter “On the question of nationalities or “autonomization” dated December 31, 1922:

“Internationalism on the part of the oppressor or the so-called “great” nation (albeit great only by its violence, great only in the way that the government is great) must consist not only in observing the formal equality of nations, but also in such inequality that would compensate on the part of the oppressing nation , a large nation, the inequality that actually develops in life..." (V.I. Lenin, PSS, 5th edition, vol. 45, pp. 356-362)...

Of course, many claims can be made against Stalin. But one should not see only him in all the troubles of the Russian people. The active destruction of the Russian people began precisely after Stalin's death. Since the second half of the 1950s, the Kremlin's rulers have claimed that they are continuing "Lenin's policies." This policy led to a demographic decline specifically among the Russian people, which was due to two factors in the policy of the “faithful Leninists.”

The period of the “interregnum” of Stalin and Khrushchev was practically not fixed in the people’s memory. Meanwhile, after the death of Stalin, the Country of Soviets entered a five-year period of endless political battles, when careers were broken, destinies were crippled, when leaders of the highest rank had to show all their skills and miracles of resourcefulness. Thank God, unlike recent Stalinist times, removal from a high position no longer meant inevitable execution. This period of time, with its exciting political struggle, in the spirit of Shakespearean tragedies, is of little interest to today. But in vain!

For the bulk of the population, the Khrushchev period began immediately after the Stalin period. The creative intelligentsia had a hand in this. Where do people get basic historical information from? From movies and detective stories. Authors and screenwriters, who themselves have never been particularly interested in history and know it at the level of historical anecdotes, spread their flawed idea of ​​history with mass circulations and multi-part series.

So, for example, the popular author Daria Dontsova, in her stunning detective story “The Tender Friend of the Oligarch,” through the mouth of a police major (a positive hero), holds Khrushchev responsible for the release of a mass of criminals from the camps. Although this was initiated by Beria back in March 1953 to create criminal terror in the country in order to establish his personal power under the pretext of fighting crime. Khrushchev at that time was engaged in party work and was not even among the top five leaders of the country.

In one series, Abdulov, who played a certain intellectual, spends a long time condemning Khrushchev for his voluntarism during the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine. He says that Khrushchev did not take into account either the cultural traditions or the opinions of the Crimean population. Crimea was ceremonially transferred to Ukraine in January 1954. Not even a month had passed since Beria’s execution. The struggle for power in the country of the Soviets was in full swing. Khrushchev, who at that moment was making colossal efforts to subjugate the cumbersome party apparatus, had no time for Crimea. There were enough candidates for the position of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. There was also a tense struggle for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, no one disputed Stalin’s decision made in 1952 to transfer Crimea to Ukraine. There was no time for that.

IfStalindied two weeks later.

Who was on the political Olympus of the country of the Soviets in the last days of Stalin’s life? This is Stalin himself, who held the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Secretary General. The most important post of Secretary General in the USSR was, strange as it may seem to hear, unofficial, not written down in any documents. The second person in the state and the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers was Malenkov. Khrushchev held a prominent, but not decisive, post as First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee and City Committee of the Communist Party. Stalin, due to his age, sought to get away from the daily routine, which required a lot of time to work with documents. Therefore, the right to facsimile signature was delegated to Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin. Stalin seemed to give these confidants a little “steer.”

First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus Panteleimon Ponomarenko.

The head of state was intensely looking for a successor. And I found it! If Stalin had died two weeks later, then Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, who worked as the leader of Belarus from 1938 to 1948, would have become the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. P.K. Ponomarenko headed the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement during the war. And from 1948 to 1953 he was Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. And our whole history would perhaps have taken a completely different path. (Without corn and even, most likely, without man's flight to the moon). To approve a high-ranking party official in a new position, the corresponding document, according to the then rules, had to be signed by 25 members of the Presidium. There were 4 more signatures left. And then Stalin died.

Happy heirs.

The happy heirs of the deceased leader began to divide portfolios. Malenkov became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the second person in the country automatically became the first). Beria became the first deputy and minister of internal affairs. Bulganin was appointed Minister of Defense. The veterans who had been relegated to a remote corner by Stalin returned to duty: Molotov and Kaganovich. Both became Malenkov's First Deputies. In addition, Molotov received control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Kaganovich control of several important ministries. P. Ponomarenko received the “consolatory” post of Minister of Culture. Khrushchev was instructed to focus on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was to be governed collectively - the post of General Secretary was abolished. That is, Nikita Sergeevich’s prospects were very vague, his rivals were not going to let him take over the leadership of the state.

At Stalin's tomb. In the first row (from left to right) Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Beria and Malenkov. Khrushchev and Mikoyan can be seen somewhere behind.

1953Deadly games.

The people of the country of the Soviets perceived Malenkov as Stalin's successor. Meanwhile, the brutal war for power continued. Beria gained control over all punitive structures and his “comrades-in-arms,” who lived in an atmosphere of constant fear after the recent executions in the fabricated “Leningrad” case, considered that the time had come not to wait for possible reprisals, but to eliminate their potentially dangerous “colleague” themselves. Many sources point to Khrushchev as the initiator, who received the favorable support of the party and state elite of the USSR. On June 26, 1953, the unsuspecting Beria was arrested, and on December 23 he was shot.

Successful “operation” of Khrushchev.

The rivals carefully monitored the “punctures” and mistakes of their colleagues. The decisive “mistake” in May 1953 was made by Malenkov. He halved the salaries of party officials, which caused great discontent among this privileged caste. This allowed Khrushchev, who had secured the support of the “offended”, to establish the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee, similar to the post of the General Secretary, in September. Nikita Sergeevich followed in the footsteps of Stalin, who gained absolute power in the country, being in the position of party secretary. Position is position, but the opponents are also very experienced, having gone through the Stalinist school. So the struggle was intense and without rules.

1954 – 1955The behind-the-scenes fights are expanding and intensifying.

The cleansing of the theater of political struggle continued. In February 1954, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, a failed Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was sent away from Moscow and became the head of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. A year later he found himself in Poland as an ambassador. In February 1955, Malenkov was removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and appointed to the post of Minister of Power Plants. Bulganin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In May 1955, Kaganovich lost his position and was transferred to the State Committee for Labor and Wages. (Where he did probably the only good deed in his life - he introduced pensions for city residents. Before that, the vast majority of people survived in old age as best they could After 8 years, Khrushchev took care of the collective farmers). In June 1956, Molotov was removed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

February 1956. XX Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev's desperate move.

At one time, highbrow Marxists, who quoted Marx almost by heart, underestimated the tongue-tied Caucasian with a primary education. And they paid for it with their lives. A similar situation arose with Khrushchev, whom his colleagues perceived as Stalin’s buffoon. The precarious balance that had developed in the Communist Party at the time of the congress was violated by Khrushchev in his favor by using an unconventional move. His current competitors occupied leadership positions under Stalin and were involved in all Stalin's crimes. On the last day of the congress (so that opponents would not have the opportunity to respond), Khrushchev unexpectedly made an emotional denunciation of Stalin's crimes at a closed meeting. (However, we tried to ensure that this information was known to as many people as possible throughout the country). Although Stalin was blamed for everything, the main blow was dealt to the old Stalinist guard, primarily to Molotov, who was tipped for the post of First Secretary. Many wavering delegates, already accustomed to a prosperous and calm life, no longer wanted the turbulent Stalinist times and sided with Nikita Sergeevich.

May 1956. Conversing (from left to right) Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Bulganin and Khrushchev. Behind them are Zhukov, Kirichenko, Malenkov and Molotov.

1957The struggle for power has reached its climax.

Khrushchev, in his rapid ascent to Olympus, pushed aside many highly respected people. In the end, they launched a powerful counterattack. On June 18, 1957, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to remove N.S. Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Khrushchev and his supporters managed to delay the resolution of the issue. The message about Khrushchev’s removal from the post of First Secretary, transmitted by Bulganin to the media and the State Committee on Radio and Television, was not published. Meanwhile, members of the Central Committee began to be urgently transported from all over the country by military planes. Khrushchev took timely measures and did not allow the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to take power over the country. The meeting of the Presidium dragged on for several days and took on such acute forms that not everyone’s nerves could withstand it - L.I. Brezhnev, for example, lost consciousness and was carried out of the hall.

Kaganovich, Molotov. Malenkov and Shepilov, who “joined them.”

On June 22, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee opened and worked until June 29. The KGB clearly supported Khrushchev. Both sides desperately seduced the army, trying to attract it as a very powerful argument. The Minister of Defense, G.K. Zhukov, eventually took Khrushchev’s side, which finally broke the resistance of the “old party members.” Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov were expelled from the Central Committee. These events showed the great role of the leadership of the Armed Forces. Marshal Zhukov allowed himself a number of careless statements that impressed Nikita Sergeevich, and Khrushchev considered it best, four months after the Plenum, to remove Zhukov from his position.

1958Khrushchev receivedyesfull power.

In March 1958, Bulganin and N.S. were dismissed. Khrushchev became Chairman of the Council of Ministers in addition to his title of First Secretary. Thus, he had as much power in his hands as Stalin had. Old enemies have been eliminated, but new ones are not yet visible. Now it was possible to grow corn, launch space rockets, give Crimea to Ukraine or Chukotka to Belarus. But the Belarusians did not need Chukotka, and Crimea had been part of Ukraine for the fifth year.

However, Khrushchev’s active nature gushed with more and more new ideas, which were immediately implemented. Good deeds alternated with bad ones, which the famous sculptor Ernst Neizvestny reflected very well in his black and white monument to Nikita Sergeevich. On the one hand, Khrushchev made enormous efforts to finally feed the people (the development of the Virgin Lands), and on the other, he closed almost all the churches that had escaped destruction in the dashing 30s. For the first time in the USSR, Khrushchev took up solving the housing problem, albeit with unsightly “Khrushchev buildings,” but still on an industrial scale. On the other hand, he almost plunged the world into a terrible nuclear missile war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, failing to assess in advance the possible reaction of the United States.

There is a new government in the country.

The Khrushchev era, often called the “thaw,” ended on October 14, 1964. The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee removed Khrushchev from power while he was on vacation. Brezhnev proposed organizing a plane crash or car accident for Khrushchev. But the majority of members of the Central Committee did not support this idea. Nikita Segheevich died on September 11, 1971, having worked in his dacha garden for almost 7 years. Exactly 30 years after Khrushchev’s death, twin skyscrapers were destroyed by terrorists in New York. But this has nothing to do with Nikita Sergeevich.

I shared with you the information that I “dug up” and systematized. At the same time, he is not at all impoverished and is ready to share further, at least twice a week.

If you find errors or inaccuracies in the article, please let us know. My e-mail address: [email protected] . I will be very grateful.

Class: 11

Class: 11

Lesson type: Formation of new knowledge

The purpose of the lesson:

• show the historical background of political changes in the country,
• alternatives for the development of the USSR after the death of I.V. Stalin,
• power struggle between party and state leaders,
• the role of N.S. Khrushchev in the democratization of the political system.

Basic concepts: totalitarianism, state, CPSU Program, CPSU Charter, rotation, voluntarism, subjectivism.

Main dates:

Equipment:

• Didactic material, tables
• portraits of L. Beria, G. Malenkov, N. Khrushchev.
• Computer, media projector

Lesson Plan

1. Reasons for reforming the political system.
2. Stages of the struggle for power: L. Beria, G. Malenkov, N. Khrushchev. Alternatives to the political development of the USSR.
3. XX Congress of the CPSU. Criticism of the cult of personality.
4. Political reforms of N.S. Khrushchev.

1. Reasons for reforming the political system

(students, with the help of the teacher, make notes in notebooks and give arguments)

A piece of Whatman paper contains a table with the following contents (become familiar with the contents of the table)

Working with the table, commenting on the main provisions, writing in a notebook.

Question to the class:

• Why do you think that in the USSR after the death of Stalin there was a struggle for power in the country's leadership?

The struggle for power after the death of Stalin unfolded between three main political figures: N.S. Khrushchev, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, behind each of them there were certain forces.

• Who will come to power? Under these conditions, how will N.S. Khrushchev build his political line in order to remove his rivals from power?

We are working on these questions throughout the study of the entire topic.

Students who received advanced assignments introduce the class to the political portraits of G.M. Malenkova, L.P. Beria, N.S. Khrushchev).

Stages of the struggle for power.

Alternatives for the country's development (tables for each table).

Stage I. March-July 1953

• G.M. Malenkov – Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
• L.P. Beria is the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
• N.S. Khrushchev - Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. (On the board are portraits of these political figures.)

If L. Beria was at the top of power, a temporary continuation of Stalinism was possible, which would create a serious threat to the lives and well-being of millions of people and entire nations (see table).

Rivals in the struggle for power

The second possible option is G.M. Malenkov, some softening of the Stalinist regime while maintaining the general political course.

The third contender for power was N.S. Khrushchev. This was a turn towards de-Stalinization. This process did not mean the elimination of the totalitarian regime. Society as a whole was not yet ready for this. We could only talk about an initial cleansing from the legacy of Stalinism: the liberation of the repressed, a turn to solving the most pressing agrarian issues, the weakening of the dogmatic pressure in culture.

At the first stage of the struggle for power, fearing the strengthening of L.P. Beria through control over the state security organs and troops, N.S. Khrushchev took the initiative to unite members of the leadership for an action against L.P. Beria. He achieved the return to Moscow of G.K. Zhukov, who was entrusted with leading the military side of Beria’s arrest, appointing him Minister of Defense.

In June 1953, at one of the meetings, N.S. Khrushchev made accusations against Beria. He was accused of careerism, nationalism, and connections with the British and Musavat intelligence services. Beria and his entourage were arrested. Of course, this action was carried out by force, but there was no alternative then.

So Beria was removed from the political arena and shot (working with portraits).

Strengthening Khrushchev's position - weakening Malenkov.

Removal of G.M. Malenkov from the post of head of government. How did this happen?

September 1953 Khrushchev was elected first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but he did not hold a government post; the chairman of the Council of Ministers was Malenkov.

At this time, an amnesty for political prisoners began in the country, Khrushchev was organizing a trial of the MGB leaders guilty of fabricating the “Leningrad case,” and one of the organizers of this case was Malenkov. This served as the reason for his removal from the post of head of government, N. Bulganin was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Working with portraits and moving them.

Stage III. “Anti-Party Group”

Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich - their actions.

Summer 1957, using his majority in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, which decided to abolish the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee and appoint N.S. Khrushchev as Minister of Agriculture.

Khrushchev demanded that this issue be discussed at the Plenum of the Central Committee, because, according to the Party Charter, only the Plenum can resolve this issue.

The plenum, the majority of whose members were proteges of Khrushchev, supported him, the oppositionists were dismissed, N. Bulganin, as having supported the opposition, was removed from the post of head of state!

In March 1958 Khrushchev - First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

We have now seen how, after Stalin’s death, the struggle for power followed the same scenario as in 1942. after the death of V.I. Lenin.

Why?

Students can suggest answers...

Conclusion: neither in the Charter of the CPSU, nor in the Constitution of the USSR there was a mechanism for re-election or appointment to senior state and party positions.

By 1958 the struggle for power is over.

Khrushchev - First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, i.e. leader of the ruling party and state.

Question. How democratically did N.S. Khrushchev come to power?

2. XX Congress of the CPSU. Criticism of Stalin's personality cult.

Even before the congress, the leadership took steps to condemn Stalin's personality cult:

First wave of rehabilitation;

Attempts to redistribute the powers of the Central Committee and government bodies;

The “doctors’ case” was terminated.

02/25/1956 N.S. Khrushchev made a report to the delegates of the 20th Party Congress, in which he criticized Stalin, cited examples of the lawlessness of the Stalinist regime, and condemned the “cult of personality.”

Question to the class: What charges would you bring against Stalin?

Work in groups. Game "Loto".

Each group is offered a set of events, to determine which period of history, which events belong to?

Nikita Sergeevich believed that it was enough to cleanse social society of Stalinist abuses, and the party leadership would lead the people along the path to communism.

Having laid the blame for the repressions on Stalin, Beria, and Yezhov, the author in the report did not raise the question of dismantling the totalitarian system itself, which by its nature could only rest on force and fear.

This removed the question of the guilt of the top party leadership in abuses against their people, including the guilt of N.S. Khrushchev himself.

The 20th Congress marked the beginning of widespread rehabilitation, but not all categories of innocently convicted people were rehabilitated. It did not affect millions of dispossessed peasants and expelled from their villages who resisted collectivization, party leaders convicted in the 20s and 30s, some victims of war, etc.

Wanting to ennoble and humanize socialism, Nikita Sergeevich contributed to changing the legislative framework and improving the conditions of prisoners. The “Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation” were updated, the concept of “enemy of the people” was abolished, the use of violence during the investigation was prohibited, and the presence of the accused and his lawyer at the trial was a mandatory condition.

Khrushchev chooses the path of moderate liberalization and equally moderate repression (not affecting the highest party and state apparatus).

Work according to the table.

Political reforms of N.S. Khrushchev

At the XXI Congress of the CPSU (January-February 1959) the conclusion was made about the complete and final victory of socialism and the transition to the extensive construction of communism.

Conclusion: all these initiatives, if implemented, would contribute to increasing the openness of society.

Homework assignment. Paragraph 62, prepare messages about cultural changes.

Literature.

1. History, teacher's reference book, M. “Exam” 2008.
2. Report by N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU “On the cult of personality and its consequences.”
3. Program and Charter of the CPSU adopted at the 20th Party Congress.
4. N.S. Khrushchev. Materials for the biography. M., 1989

The process of overcoming the crisis of power caused by the death of Stalin and the promotion of Khrushchev as the sole leader went through four stages in its development: 1) the period of the triumvirate - Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev (March - June 1953); 2) the period of formal leadership of Malenkov (June 1953 - January 1955); 3) the period of Khrushchev’s struggle for sole power (February 1955 - June 1957); 4) the period of Khrushchev’s sole leadership and the formation of the opposition of the “young” apparatus (June 1957 - October 1964).

Stalin's death opened the way for reforms, the need for which was felt by society and some of the leaders immediately after the end of the Second World War, but which were hardly possible during the life of the leader. The economic and political situation within the country and the Cold War situation in the international arena formed a number of key problems (a kind of “pain points”), which any leadership that took the helm of government in 1953 would have to solve or respond to the existence of which in one way or another .

The first set of problems was associated with the development of repressive policies of the late 40s and early 50s, which turned the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security into a special system of total control, covering almost all spheres of public life and all layers of society - from the bottom to the highest echelon of leadership. The law of self-preservation required the ruling layer to make certain adjustments to this system in order to avert the threat of further personnel purges. The next question, the solution of which also required reforming the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, was the question of the Gulag system, the preservation of which in an unchanged form not only did not meet the objectives of economic feasibility, but also created a threat to political stability. The death of Stalin set the Gulag in motion: reports from the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed about “mass disobedience”, “riots” and “uprisings” in camps and colonies, the most significant of which were in the summer of 1953 in special camp No. 2 (Norilsk) and special camp No. 6 (Vorkuta), in May-June 1954 - in special camp No. 4 (Karaganda region, “Kengir uprising”).

The revision of repressive practices could not be limited to simply changing the regime in the camps and colonies or partial personnel changes in the internal affairs bodies; ultimately, it was about the possibilities of liberalizing the political regime as a whole, although the question of the limits of these possibilities remained open.

An equally important set of problems requiring urgent solutions has emerged in the field of agricultural policy. Twice during the post-war period, in 1948 and 1952, the agricultural tax was increased, the process of consolidation of collective farms proceeded at an accelerated pace, which created many problems for village residents, and the post-war wave of repressions did not bypass the collective farmers. As a result, by the beginning of the 50s. flight from the countryside, despite the passport regime in the cities, became a mass phenomenon: in just four years - from 1949 to 1953 - the number of able-bodied collective farmers on collective farms (excluding the western regions) decreased by 3.3 million people. The situation in the countryside was so catastrophic that the prepared project to increase the agricultural tax in 1952 to 40 billion rubles, which was absurd at its core, was not adopted. At the same time, the basic principles of agrarian policy during Stalin’s life remained unchanged, they were adhered to and very consistently implemented into reality even by those people from Stalin’s entourage who, after his death, would become the initiators of a completely different line in solving the agrarian issue.

Serious problems for the Moscow leadership were created by the situation in the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine, as well as in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The policy of Sovietization still met resistance here, although not as active as in the first years after the end of the war; during 1952, the CPSU Central Committee discussed issues related to the situation in these regions several times.

Finally, a large range of issues that the new leadership would have to resolve, no matter who would be at its head, concerned the area of ​​foreign policy: Moscow’s dictates regarding the countries of Eastern Europe and open confrontation with the West did not add authority to the Soviet regime.

Thus, the directions of possible changes, in a certain sense, were, as it were, predetermined. In this case, the interest of the ruling stratum coincided with broad public interest, therefore, the implementation of reforms, in addition to the practical one, promised a great propaganda effect, i.e. worked for the authority of the new government both within the country and abroad. However - and this is especially important - only the direction of movement and search was given. The main question - in what forms and how consistently the new political course will be carried out, how its specific content and pace of implementation will be determined, as well as the question of whether the reform policy will take place at all - in its decision depended on the balance of forces in the country's leadership and on the choice of leader (or group of leaders). When carrying out reforms from above, the personal factor plays a key role.

The protracted nature of the power crisis of 1953, the long struggle for leadership among former Stalinist comrades had a fairly obvious reason: the absence of an official (formal) leader with real power. It is no coincidence that the first redistribution of roles in the top echelon of management (March 1953) did not solve the question of the leader. In reality, power was then concentrated in the hands of the “troika” - Beria, Malenkov and Khrushchev, who occupied three key posts: Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Beria became the Minister of Internal Affairs (the Ministry of Internal Affairs was merged with the MGB), Khrushchev headed the secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee.

Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev belonged to that generation of Soviet leaders whose pedigree began from the times of the revolution and civil war. Almost all representatives of this generation owed their rise to the personnel purges of the 20s and 30s; they formed the backbone of the “Stalinist guard,” the elite of the new layer of the party nomenklatura. The common origin and professional advancement formed not only the general status of this stratum, but also a certain commonality of thinking and mode of action of its representatives. If the Bolsheviks with pre-revolutionary party experience began their activities in conditions of a certain party pluralism, then those who joined the Bolshevik party after the revolution already belonged to the ruling party, and the ruling party with a monopoly. Political movements of non-Bolshevik orientation were liquidated, and subsequently various groups within the Bolshevik party were destroyed. For those who remained in its ranks after internal party discussions, the principle of autocracy of the party and hostile attitude towards any opposition turned into stable stereotypes of consciousness.

Formed as a political elite under the regime of Stalin’s personal power, representatives of this generation of party nomenklatura internalized precisely the Stalinist model of organizing power as personal experience; they simply did not know any other. Personal experience, as we know, largely determines the limits of what is possible in the future: it is important to keep this in mind when characterizing the reform capabilities of a given stratum. It was difficult to expect significant progress in this direction from people who had not internalized democracy as a personal experience. The burden of the past is obvious, which had to be taken into account when choosing between the public good and personal responsibility for the lawlessness committed in the country.

Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov. According to formal characteristics, he was more suitable than others for the role of Stalin's successor. Malenkov made a report on behalf of the Central Committee at the last party congress in 1952; in Stalin’s absence, he chaired meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers; after Stalin’s death, he inherited his post as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Already from the end of the 30s. Malenkov worked in close proximity to Stalin, first heading the Personnel Department of the Central Committee, then the secretariat. For him, who came from a noble family and had a classical gymnasium behind him, this was an unusual career. Malenkov was distinguished from Stalin’s other associates, mostly “practitioners,” by his rather high educational level for this environment (he studied at the Moscow Higher Technical School) and a special style of communicating with people, which more than once gave reason to reproach him for “softness” and “intellectuality.” He was called a good organizer. Malenkov can hardly be considered a self-sufficient leader at all. By character he was not like that; he could play the role of the first, remaining essentially the second. This was the case in his relationship with Beria, and this could have happened (but did not work out) in his relationship with Khrushchev. And yet, it is Malenkov who stands at the origins of those reforms that are associated with the concept of “thaw”.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. In terms of character, he is the complete opposite of Malenkov. Sharp, decisive, careless in words and actions, he went through all levels of party work and headed large party organizations (Moscow, Ukraine). Having never studied anything seriously, Khrushchev compensated for his lack of education with an amazing political instinct, almost always correctly guessing the main trend of the time. Unlike Malenkov or Beria, Khrushchev entered Stalin’s “inner circle” only in 1949, when after a 10-year break he was again elected head of the Moscow communists. When the roles were distributed in March 1953, Khrushchev was clearly relegated to the background and he was forced to take a wait-and-see attitude. However, after the activation of Beria, in whom Khrushchev saw a threat to his position, he began to act. The result of these efforts was the elimination of Beria, after which the solution to the issue of a sole leader remained only a matter of time.

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. The most mysterious figure among Stalin’s “successors”. Undoubtedly, naturally gifted, intelligent and calculating, he was for a long time the chief of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence. However, Beria went down in history not as the “chief intelligence officer,” but primarily as the head of the punitive department, whose name is associated with the repressive policies of the late 30s and early 50s. (although in 1946 Beria did not head, but only supervised the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs-MGB). After Stalin's death, Beria's "finest hour" struck.

During March-June 1953, he made a number of proposals, the main of which were aimed at reforming the MVD-MGB system. Beria’s proposals included the following main positions: transfer camps and colonies from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice (except for special camps for political prisoners), limit the scope of forced labor in the economy and abandon the unprofitable “great construction projects of communism”, review fabricated cases, abolish torture in conducting an investigation, holding a broad amnesty (the latter should also not apply to those convicted for political reasons), etc.

In May-June, Beria addressed the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee with three notes on the national issue - “The Question of the Lithuanian SSR”, “The Questions of the Western Regions and the SSR” and “The Questions of the Byelorussian SSR”. In these notes, Beria substantiated the need to revise the principles of national policy, which consisted of abandoning forced Russification and promoting national personnel to leadership positions. Beria in this case acted within the limits of his competence, since his proposals related primarily to changing the leadership of the internal affairs and state security bodies. Subsequently, after Beria’s arrest, it was his position on the national issue that would become one of the main points among the charges brought. Meanwhile, during the discussion of these notes in the Central Committee, Beria received almost unanimous support.

Attempts to resolve the issue of promoting national personnel in the republics were made before 1953, however, the practice that existed since 1936, according to which any appointment to a nomenklatura position required mandatory approval through state security agencies, made these attempts obviously unsuccessful: in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus or in the Baltics it was difficult to find a person with a “clean” profile, from the point of view of an NKGB official, i.e. who was not in the occupied territory, has no relatives abroad, etc. In February 1952, the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) specifically discussed this issue in connection with the report on the work of the Vilnius regional committee of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Lithuania. Malenkov, who chaired that meeting, spoke about the need to change the policy regarding national personnel and, above all, the procedure by which it turned out that “the bandits at home trust each other more than our employees in the MGB.”

Beria's notes corresponded to the decisions made back in 1952, concretizing and expanding them. Taking an initiative on the national issue certainly promised great political dividends. Therefore, Khrushchev, who always sought to act in the spirit of the times and was concerned about the growth of personal popularity and personal influence, also decided to support Beria’s proposals. In June 1953, Khrushchev, following the example of Beria, himself prepared a note to the Presidium of the Central Committee “On the state of affairs in the Latvian SSR” and a draft resolution of the Central Committee on this issue. A textual comparison of Beria’s notes on Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania with Khrushchev’s note on Latvia proves not only the commonality of the approaches of both leaders, but also the fact that Khrushchev, when compiling his note, was directly guided by Beria’s materials, and possibly used them.

At the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in July 1953, dedicated to the “Beria case,” not only was Khrushchev’s initiative not mentioned, but Khrushchev himself, in his speech at the plenum, spoke of Beria as the only author of all notes on the national question, including in Latvia. Another interesting fact is that at the plenum, the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania spoke out condemning Beria’s proposals for this position. There were no such revelations from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia.

This case is very indicative of the time when the fate of initiatives, even progressive ones at their core, was made dependent on the outcome of the struggle for political leadership. The new line in the sphere of national policy, of course, had its costs (this was evidenced, for example, by complaints about infringement of rights received from the Russian-speaking population), but it was rejected not for this reason, but because it was associated with the name Beria. Perhaps for the same (personal) reason, Khrushchev subsequently abandoned the implementation of Malenkov’s agrarian policy. Subsequent experience seems to confirm this assumption: as much as Khrushchev was indifferent to “other people’s” ideas, he just as actively sought to implement his own. It must be admitted that Khrushchev was very sensitive to the problem of primacy. Molotov, for example, recalled that after Malenkov’s speech with the agrarian program in August 1953, Khrushchev was literally indignant: he, Khrushchev, should have been the first to say so.

Khrushchev’s fears of losing his championship, it seems, played an important role in Beria’s removal. Some documents from Khrushchev's secretariat indicate that he closely monitored changes in the balance of power and was wary of the strengthening of the positions of other members of the “troika” - Beria and Malenkov. One of these documents is a radiogram obtained by radio interception and sent to Khrushchev for information from one of the leaders of the national underground in Ukraine (OUN), V. Kuk. The author of the radiogram commented on the situation in the Moscow leadership in June 1953 as follows: “...Beria is far from being the master of the situation in the Kremlin. He is forced to share his power with Malenkov and others, and was even forced to cede primacy to him... In these personal changes, it is necessary to expect more various revolutions; they will continue for a long time, until one wise leader appears again, for the whole THE USSR. Who will it be? I think that it is not Malenkov, but Lavrentiy (Beria - E.3.) - this is because he has a concrete and reliable force in his hands, and this, in any policy, is the strongest legal argument.”

The last phrase of the text was specially highlighted - by Khrushchev himself or for Khrushchev, but it was precisely this that contained the main meaning of the information: the first contender for the place of “leader” was named. This is the first thing. And secondly, the name of Khrushchev is not mentioned among top officials at all. Such an assessment of the situation in the Moscow elite, apparently, was quite consistent with reality. Khrushchev decided to change it. He began the struggle for power, having the most unfavorable formal chances compared to other contenders, but the authority of the position and the change in the balance of forces after the liquidation of the “troika” allowed Khrushchev to ultimately emerge victorious from this struggle.

Beria as the sole leader did not suit not only Khrushchev, but also other former Stalinist confidants; suspicions of his desire for a personal dictatorship decided the fate of this politician. After Beria's arrest (June 1953), power passed into the hands of Malenkov for a short time.

Khrushchev decade.

Everyone is against Beria.
Distribution of forces.
The Stalin era ended on March 5, 1953. That day, closer to lunch, it became clear that Stalin was dying. Even before his death, which followed in the evening, his entourage began division of inheritance. They decided not to give Stalin's main post - the General Secretary of the Central Committee - to anyone, but the first of the Central Committee secretaries was still singled out. Became the first secretary of the Central Committee Malenkov. He also received the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov's deputies on the Council of Ministers were: Beria(he at the same time returned to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reunited with the MGB); Molotov(he regained the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, which he had lost in 1949); Bulganin(at the same time - Minister of Defense) and Kaganovich. So, the strongest position was found in Malenkov, who combined party and economic leadership; Beria received a powerful punitive apparatus. The top team included two more “veterans” - Molotov and Kaganovich. And the youth of the last wave of Stalin’s promoters found themselves relegated to the background. This is the most seemingly promising Bulganin, and Khrushchev, who became one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. Saburov and Pervukhin were generally “removed to the reserves,” leaving them with only minor ministerial posts. Saburov became Minister of Mechanical Engineering. For Pervukhin, the Ministry of Power Plants and Electrical Industry, disbanded back in 1940, was specially recreated.
However, the existing balance turned out to be unstable. A week later, the rivals realized that Malenkov’s position did not quite correspond to his actual strength. Malenkov was forced to resign from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee. And this was the chance Khrushchev. Formally, all secretaries in the Central Committee remained equal after Malenkov left; in fact, Khrushchev became the first. So, among the leaders were Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev, as well as Molotov, whose position strengthened after Stalin’s death. Bulganin and Kaganovich, who, it would seem, were also included in the number of deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers, hardly showed themselves in the future.
Beria as a reformer.
Beria was the first to show activity. Apparently, he wanted to back up his high position in power circles with authority among the people. It was on Beria’s initiative that on March 27, 1953 it was announced amnesty for prisoners sentenced to less than five years. True, political prisoners and those imprisoned under the 1947 law on the protection of state and public property were not included in this amnesty. Mostly criminals were released.
On Beria’s initiative it stopped "the doctors' case", and they publicly announced that this case was fabricated using “unacceptable investigative methods.”
In foreign policy Beria proposed an unconventional move - to unite Germany, allowing a single state to be non-socialist. In addition, he tried to start, in addition to the Foreign Ministry, negotiations with Yugoslavia in order to restore relations.
Turning to union center relations with the republics, Beria began the “struggle for the equality of peoples.” This meant replacing Russians in leadership positions in the republics with national personnel - of course, from among Beria's supporters.
Conspiracy of the weak.
Such activity by the all-powerful Minister of the Interior increased the fears of his rivals. It is not known for certain who initiated conspiracy against Beria- Malenkov or Khrushchev. However, all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee (at that time there were fifteen people) supported them. On June 26, 1953, right at a meeting of the Central Committee, Beria was arrested. Everything happened like in a detective story. The arrest itself was carried out by specially summoned marshals led by Zhukov, who took Beria out of the Kremlin secretly from the guards. On July 10, an official announcement appeared about the arrest of the “English spy and ardent enemy of the people” Beria; in December of the same year - a message about his execution on charges of treason and similar crimes: “in the best traditions” of the 30s.

Khrushchev versus Malenkov.
Now the main struggle was between Malenkov and Khrushchev.
Malenkov's program.
Like Beria, each of them sought to come up with popular reform proposals. First, Malenkov took the initiative. Speaking to the Supreme Council in July 1953, he proposed strengthening material incentives for peasants. In August, he also made statements about the need to improve the standard of living not only of peasants, but also of the country as a whole, and therefore move to priority development "Group B". These proposals earned Malenkov significant sympathy from the population, especially rural ones.
Implementing the new line, during the second half of 1953 the government significantly increased purchase prices for peasants (for meat - 5.5 times, for milk - 2 times); reduced obligatory supplies to the state; reduced taxes on peasants. The fifth five-year plan that began in 1951 was revised in favor of light industry.
Khrushchev's victory.
However, Khrushchev managed seize the initiative, appropriating Malenkov’s peasant slogans. He tried to use this tactic even under Beria. Then he actively took up his idea of ​​equality of nationalities, but after the removal of Beria, he was accused of these proposals, so Khrushchev quickly fell silent about his note. And at the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev spoke, essentially, with a repetition of Malenkov’s July proposals - but on his own behalf. Now both of them - Malenkov and Khrushchev - could consider ordinary people their allies.
It turned out that the rivalry was not between programs, but between two leaders, one of whom relied on party bodies, the other on economic ones. And the outcome of this rivalry depended on two things. Firstly, it depends on which bureaucracy (party or government) turns out to be stronger. Secondly, which of the competitors will be able to receive more ardent support for their bureaucracy.
On the eve of the aforementioned Plenum of the Central Committee, in August 1953, Khrushchev was able to return to party workers "envelopes". “Envelopes” are semi-unspoken rewards for loyalty, introduced into practice by Stalin. The size of the monthly payment “from the party treasury” could fluctuate arbitrarily, but in any case it was a significant increase in salary. Three months earlier, Malenkov canceled the "envelopes"; Khrushchev not only restored them, but also paid the victims the difference for these three months. As a result, the September Plenum, having restored the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee, gave it to Khrushchev.
After this new election of Khrushchev, the confrontation lasted another year and a half. What’s interesting is that it would seem that there were no major events that changed the balance of power at that time. Perhaps in January 1954 Abakumov was shot- the same former Minister of State Security who was kept under arrest since Stalin’s times. The main accusation in the case against Abakumov was the fabrication of the “Leningrad case,” which weakened Malenkov, who was actively promoting this case, but only indirectly. Considering initially b O Malenkov's greater significance (both under Stalin and in the first months after Stalin) and his initiative in carrying out reforms, in this situation one could consider him a favorite.
However, in January 1955, at the next Plenum of the Central Committee, Malenkov was criticized. He was criticized for right-wing deviationism - the revival of the ideas of Bukharin and Rykov under the pretext of the preferential development of light industry. Moreover, Malenkov himself admitted his “mistakes” and repented that he was not yet experienced enough for such a high leadership position. On February 8, he was replaced as chairman of the government by Bulganin (Malenkov became one of his deputies). This meant Khrushchev's victory over his main enemy.
Of those who took power as a result of the first partition of the “Stalinist legacy”, two more remained - Kaganovich and Molotov, but since Khrushchev dealt with Malenkov, these two did not pose any difficulties. In March 1955, Kaganovich was removed from the leadership of industrial planning. In July (and then in October) 1955, Molotov publicly repented of his “erroneous” statements (he had previously expressed disagreement with Khrushchev’s course of reconciliation with Yugoslavia and, moreover, had the imprudence to raise the question of the degree of development of socialism in our country) . “Organizational conclusions” for Molotov followed in 1956, when he lost his ministerial post. As for Bulganin, Khrushchev, as we have seen, considered him his ally.
So Khrushchev, in essence, repeated Stalin’s maneuver in the first half of the 20s and proved the most important role of the party nomenklatura in the leadership of the country. Having secured the support of the party bureaucracy, he managed to defeat an initially stronger opponent without any visible mistakes on his part.
In connection with the history of Khrushchev’s rise to power, there arises question about alternatives. This question began to be raised especially actively in the second half of the 90s in connection with the declassification of new documents on this period and the publication of memoirs of the children of Malenkov and Beria. They portray their fathers as hidden reformers who, if they were in power, would radically change the course of Soviet history. Of course, it is difficult to say anything when speaking in the subjunctive mood, but both Beria and Malenkov still managed to do enough to make it possible to compare their undertakings with the actions of Khrushchev. This means there is an opportunity to think about how significant the difference between these alternatives was.