Part III. Defense of the Taman Peninsula

A new super project by a leading military historian.

From Manstein’s breakthrough through Perekop positions to the failure of the first assault on Sevastopol, from the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation and the unsuccessful offensive of the Crimean Front to the Kerch disaster and the fall of the Main Base of the Black Sea Fleet, from the long German occupation of the peninsula to the rapid (in just a month) liberation of Crimea in the victorious spring of 1944 years, when our advancing troops lost four times less than the defending enemy - this book analyzes in detail all the operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in the struggle for Crimea.

Separately, the actions of our ground forces - tank crews, infantry, artillery - and the combat work of the Soviet Air Force and the Black Sea Fleet are considered.

Sections of this page:

The general counteroffensive of the Red Army, which began in November near Tikhvin and Rostov and continued near Moscow in December 1941, could not leave the Crimean peninsula aside. The interception of the strategic initiative by Soviet troops in the winter of 1941/42 followed a single pattern: a strike on the extended flank of the enemy strike group. Accordingly, in Crimea, a blow was struck on the coastal flank of the 11th Army. The coast of the peninsula was a fairly long area that needed to be defended, even in sparse formations. The concentration of the main efforts of German troops in the Crimea against Sevastopol made the defense of the entire coast almost formal. She concentrated on several areas.

The plan for landing sea and airborne assault forces on the Kerch Peninsula appeared at the command of the Transcaucasian Front at the end of November 1941, shortly after the abandonment of Crimea by Soviet troops. The first report outlining the main ideas of the operation was sent to the Supreme High Command Headquarters on November 26, 1941. The proposal was received with interest, and on November 30, a detailed report was sent to the Supreme High Command Headquarters by the Front's Military Council detailing the plan and calculating the number of troops to be allocated. Initially, it was planned to capture the landing force only in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and move further to Feodosia. In this document, for the first time, two armies appear, which subsequently carried out the landing - the 51st A and the 44th A. The first was supposed to involve three infantry divisions and one brigade, the second - three infantry divisions with reinforcement units. Accordingly, the first aimed at capturing Kerch, and the second - further south, at the Chongelek Tatar region. Also in the plan dated November 30, for the first time, a landing in the area of ​​​​Opuk (by the forces of one civil service unit) appears. At the same time, the front command planned an airborne assault in the area of ​​the Salyn and Bagerovo stations with the aim of capturing the Turkish Wall and preventing the approach of enemy reserves. In the first days of December, there were already relatively detailed studies with the outfit of forces and specific landing sites. Planning for the 51st Army was led by General P.I. Batov, later replaced by V.N. Lvov. Already in the plan dated December 2, 1941, Tarkhan, Khroni and Mama Russkaya appear as landing sites on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula.

Landing on the cruiser "Red Caucasus". On December 28, 1941, the cruiser had to land infantrymen at night, moored to the Feodosia pier.

Landing on board the "small hunter". Kerch-Feodosia operation, December 1941

At the beginning of December, the front command issued preliminary orders, in particular regarding artillery. The landing was supposed to be supported by artillery from the triangle of Akhileon, Kosa Chushka, Batteryka. It was also envisaged that artillery and mortars would be landed in the first echelon of troops, without means of propulsion, relying on manual rolling. At the same time, orders were given to prepare rifle units for landing and conduct exercises involving boarding and disembarking from ships and vessels.

Transports from the Temryuk pier went to sea at 14.00-17.00 on December 25, from the Kuchugury pier - at 19.00, from the Taman and Komsomolskaya piers - at 2.00-3.00 on December 26, 1941. Already during the landing period, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov changed his decision, reducing the Ak-Monai detachment to 500 people, and ordered it to be landed not at Ak-Monai, but in the Kazantip Bay. Due to this detachment, the landing at Cape Khroni was intensified. However, late in the day the weather worsened, seriously hampering the landing. As the commander of the AzVF S.G. later recalled. Gorshkov: “Due to the large difference in speed and different seaworthiness, the marching order of different types of ships and vessels was disrupted, many of them fell behind and were forced to travel alone. Seiners, canoes and boats towed by landing ships were overwhelmed by water, and sometimes torn off and carried out to sea.” Due to the storm, headwind and rolling waves, the landing forces were late in approaching the landing sites from two to six hours and landed already in daylight.

The 1st detachment, delayed by a storm, did not reach the Kazantip Bay and the landing force was landed somewhat to the west of the 2nd detachment. As a result, instead of an ambitious landing at Ak-Monai, it was landed in the high area. 43, 1 (3 km west of Novy Svet) incomplete battalion of the 83rd infantry brigade under the command of Lieutenant Kapran (193 people), which took up defense 2 km from the coast.

The 2nd detachment approached the shore in the area west of Cape Zyuk at 7.00 on December 26. A 47-mm cannon, suppressed by the Don gunboat, opened fire from the shore. The seiners could not get close to the shore because of their draft; the boats were thrown ashore and broken. As indicated in the naval report, the landing soldiers went ashore in chest-deep icy water. It was not possible to unload artillery and tanks. Towards the middle of the day the situation worsened due to the appearance of enemy aircraft. The self-propelled scow "Phanagoria" was sunk, taking about 100 people with it. Already in the dark, the Khoper barge was placed closer to the shore, a gangplank was made and three tanks and artillery were unloaded onto it. According to the order for the defense of the coast of the 46th Infantry Division, the entire section from Cape Zyuk to Chelochin was entrusted to... the connection's communications battalion. Accordingly, resistance to the landing on the shore was less than in other areas where infantry units were defending (see below).

A collision occurred at the landing site of the 2nd Detachment, showing how important it is to use specially trained units for landing operations. When about 1000 people had already landed, the commander of the 224th Infantry Division, Colonel A.P. Degtyarev demanded to carry out... a return landing. He motivated this by the impossibility of completing the task with the forces landed in a day (according to the plan, 2,900 people were supposed to land). They did not begin to replant. As a result, in the region of high 43, 1, 878 people, 3 tanks, 2 37 mm guns (anti-aircraft), 9 120 mm mortars, 2 76 mm guns were landed west of Cape Zyuk. According to the operational report of the 51st Army, a rifle company of the 185th rifle regiment, a battalion of the 143rd rifle regiment and 200 marines landed.

To fend off the landing at Cape Zyuk, the German command had to advance the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 97th Infantry Division of the 46th Infantry Division, located in the depths and on the coast of the Kazantip Bay. Their first task is to form a barrier at the dominant heights west of Lake Chokrak. The estimate of the number of those who landed in the report on the actions of the 97th brigade, I must say, was quite accurate - 1000 people.

At Tarkhan, the 3rd detachment, under fire from the shore and air strikes, landed only about a platoon, according to the army report. The Voroshilov dredger of the 3rd detachment, which was delayed in landing, came under air attack and was sunk, killing 450 people. 200 people were rescued by the Uragan ship, the Dofinovka tugboat and CL No. 4 and Dniester. The boat minesweeper, crowded with people picked up from the Voroshilov, returned to Temryuk due to the obvious disruption of the landing.

The most successful operation on the first day of the landing was the 4th detachment at Cape Khroni, which landed with the help of the Taganrog barge (bolinder), which was later used as a pier. “At Cape Chroni” here means that it was actually landed at the heights. 71, 3 west of Cape Khroni with a battalion from the 143rd rifle regiment, the 160th rifle regiment and the 83rd infantry brigade (1556 people) and three tanks. The landing was led by the commander of the 83rd infantry brigade, Colonel I.P. Leontyev, who immediately launched an offensive in the direction of Adzhimushkai. The landing force manages to reach Bulganak, where it enters into battle with soldiers of the German rear units.

As indicated in the report on the actions of the 72nd brigade, already at 3.30 a strong noise of battle was heard in the area of ​​the neighboring 42nd brigade (where the KVMB landing force landed). Soon the division command reports that “the Russians landed at Kamysh-Burun.” To carry out a counterattack, the 1st battalion of the regiment is withdrawn from positions in the Kerch region, but the counterattack does not begin immediately, but only closer to 15.00. The action report notes that the attack, supported by artillery, is “not in the direction of the bridgehead, but in the direction of height 164.5 into the deep flank of the enemy.” The army report on the results of the operation indicates that units of the 143rd rifle regiment “began to flee, throwing away their weapons and surrendering.” However, the disorderly retreat was stopped, and the detachment fortified itself on the northern slopes of the heights for the night. 154, 4. According to German data, the counterattack really does not achieve a decisive result. According to the report of the 72nd PP, “The left wing was stopped by large forces of the enemy, who entrenched themselves in well-equipped old field fortifications and are offering fierce resistance.” Also, the German strike group is fired from the flank from the sea (the gunboats remaining off the coast). The capture of any significant number of prisoners on December 26 does not appear in German data; probably, the army report was somewhat ahead of the events.

The 5th detachment did not land at all. Due to strong resistance in the Yenikale area, it was redirected to Cape Khroni, but ultimately stood at Cape Akhileon. According to the naval report, the minesweepers of the detachment lost the canoes and boats in tow, and the storm also disrupted the movement of the seiners. The detachment commander turned back to search for boats and seiners, and as a result, the detachment’s landing on December 26 did not take place.

As a result, on the first day of the operation, about 2,500 people were landed on a wide front, with very rough observance of the landing areas; some of the ships returned to Temryuk with the landing force. Essentially, this can be called, if not a failure, then a great failure of the landing force landed by the Azov military flotilla.

On the same day, December 26, the Kerch naval base began landing in the Kamysh-Burun area. According to the KVMB plan, it was planned to land at the points of Stary Karantin, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen, the Nizhne-Burunsky lighthouse and the Initiative commune. Kamysh-Burun was chosen as the direction of the main attack. The first drop at each landing point, consisting of 325 soldiers, was supposed to be made from 2 torpedo boats and 4 seiners. In total, 1,300 soldiers and commanders landed in the first rush. The 302nd Infantry Division, allocated by the army for the landing, had no combat experience, but still managed to receive minimal landing training. Since December 15, its fighters have conducted 10 exercises on boarding and disembarking from seiners and a minesweeper.

Just as in the case of the AzVF, the KVMB ships allocated for the landing were divided into detachments, there were three of them. The landing began at 16.00 on December 25th. As noted in the naval report: “Despite a pre-developed plan, the landing was slow and unorganized.” At the appointed time, only the 1st detachment completed the landing of the troops (by 1.00 a.m. on December 26). This was due to the fact that the seiners approached the piers from the roadstead at their own discretion, outside the plan, as well as the delay of some parts of the landing force. In total, 1154 people were accepted by the 1st detachment, 744 people by the 2nd detachment and 3327 people by the 3rd detachment.

The disorganization of the landing was aggravated by stormy weather; as a result, only the 1st detachment reached the landing site in a timely manner. Accordingly, the 2nd detachment was late in leaving by an hour, and the 3rd detachment - by 2 hours. The situation was aggravated by the need for detachments to follow through the ravine between Tuzlinskaya Spit and Tuzla Cape, which was difficult in terms of navigation due to the shallow depths and narrowness of the fairway. However, following another route between Pavlovsky Cape and Tuzla Spit was excluded due to the danger of enemy shelling. The passage at night in stormy conditions, with the fencing of dangerous areas torn down by the storm, led to the grounding of some of the ships. Transports, barges, and “bolinders” were refloated before 11.00 and followed to the shore already in the light of day.

As a result, by 5.00 on December 26, almost according to schedule, only the 1st detachment consisting of 20 seiners and 8 torpedo boats reached Eltigen, Kamysh-Burun and Stary Karantin. According to German data, the landing begins around 4.45 am Berlin time. The report on the actions of the 42nd Regiment reports a report from the 1st Battalion at 4.45: “Several large and small ships are trying to land on the Rybatsky Peninsula near Kamysh-Burun. At the same time, the boats are trying to enter the bay near the shipyards.” At 4.50 a message follows from the III Battalion: “The enemy, numbering 70 people, has landed in the southern part of Eltigen.” At that time, the 42nd Regiment of the 46th Infantry consisted of 1,461 soldiers and officers and defended a 27 km long coastline. The 1st and 3rd battalions of the regiment were the main opponent of the landing by the KVMB forces, the 2nd battalion was located in Kerch and the surrounding area.

The most effective was the landing at Kamysh-Burun, where the first attack secured a foothold on the Kamysh-Burun spit and the pier of the ship repair plant. The landing was supported by artillery, the Germans especially note this: “During the entire time, the entire coast is under fire from the enemy’s heavy and heaviest guns from the opposite bank.”

The fate of other units is much more dramatic. Due to strong opposition in Old Karantina, only 55 soldiers were able to land, led by the commander of the landing point, Quartermaster Technician 1st Rank Grigoriev. The rest of the landing party went to Kamysh-Burun. This is confirmed by the report on the actions of the 42nd brigade, which says about the landing in the 1st battalion zone: “Most of the enemy boats were forced to turn back under concentrated fire.” Regarding those who landed, the German report provides testimony from prisoners, according to which “the boat approached the shore several hundred meters, and the soldiers were forced to wade through shallow water.”

Grigoriev’s group was quickly defeated, which is confirmed by both the naval report and the report on the actions of the 42nd paragraph. The latter states: “Units of the 3rd company destroy the enemy who landed on its site and capture an officer and 30 soldiers. One commissar was shot.” According to Soviet data, the detachment split into two groups and tried to break through to Kamysh-Burun, a group of fighters led by Grigoriev was surrounded and died, the second group led by senior political instructor Grabarev found a boat and retreated to their ships. The 19 people who landed in Eltigen, led by the commander of the landing point, Major Lopata, fought surrounded by battle. The report on the actions of the 42nd brigade about the resistance of this small group says: “In the zone of the 3rd battalion, the enemy manages to gain a foothold in the southern houses of Eltigen. Fierce street battles are unfolding. The last stubborn resistance was broken closer to noon, 2 commissars were shot.” The scrupulous notes on the commissars are most likely associated with the implementation of the notorious order on the commissars.

The cruiser "Red Caucasus" at sea. The cruiser was a completed ship, laid down before the First World War under the name “Admiral Lazarev”. The cruiser's main caliber was four 180-mm cannons in single-gun turrets.

The next wave of landings approaches the shore already in daylight and is expected to be met with a barrage of fire. Some of the seiners turn back to Taman under fire. The second detachment of 12 seiners arrives at 7.00. Moreover, the newly arrived German anti-tank guns opened fire; even a slight delay worsened the situation. The main part of the landing force lands on the Kamysh-Burun Spit and the pier of the ship repair plant, where the first attack took hold. Here, at Kamysh-Burun, the landing achieved partial success, encircling and defeating the 2nd and 12th companies of the 42nd infantry regiment, which were making their way to their own, abandoning transport. Another partial success was the landing south of Eltigen (it was not possible to land in Eltigen itself). As indicated in the report of the 42nd brigade, “the enemy manages to capture an iron plant not occupied by our troops, located west of the Kamysh-Burun - Eltigen road.” Here, by all indications, there was a lapse in the organization of German coastal defense.

The 3rd detachment, consisting of 9 seiners, 3 tugs, a “bolinder” and 2 barges, arrived only at 13.00. According to German data, this happened a little earlier, around noon. The main forces of the 823rd Guards Regiment of the 302nd Guards Division on the “bolinder” (refloated, which it ran into in the dark) reached Kamysh-Burun Bay. Here he becomes a victim of artillery fire and air strikes, killing up to 300 people and almost all the material. As stated in the report of the 42nd PP: “One large tug takes a hit and lists. About 200 Russians jump overboard and swim or wade to the Fisherman's Peninsula." The sinking of the "bolinder" by an air strike is confirmed by the report of the 42nd brigade. According to the army report, part of the landing force actually reached the shore by swimming: “the personnel rushed into the sea, to the shore.” As the commander of the 51st A, V.N., later testified. Lvov during negotiations with front headquarters, most of those who escaped from the “bolinder” did not have weapons. It was apparently thrown into the sea as it made it difficult to swim to the shore. The barge with the main forces of the 825th Guards Regiment (up to 1000 landing troops) caught fire and was returned back to Taman.

As a result, as stated in the naval report, on December 26, the KVMB landed about 2,200 people. Of these, 1,500 people are in Kamysh-Burun, 120 on the Kamysh-Burun Spit, 500 people south of Eltigen (in the area of ​​the Initiative Commune) and 55 in Old Karantina. Small detachments were almost immediately destroyed. As it is plainly written in the army report: “The main forces of the 302nd Guards Division did not land.” Simultaneously with the landings by the AzVF and KVMB forces, on December 26, an attempt was made to land Detachment “B” at Mount Opuk. However, already at sea the ships were scattered in the darkness by the wind. Arriving at the scene on the gunboat “Red Adzharistan”, the detachment commander, Rear Admiral N.O. Abramov did not find the remaining ships and decided to return to Anapa, gather the detachment together and land on December 27. Essentially, the landing was disrupted. Summing up the events of December 26, we have to admit that the successes of the first day of landing were extremely limited.

On the second day of the operation, the Soviet troops failed to turn the situation in their favor. On December 27, the landing was practically not carried out due to a strong storm (7–8 points). The German command, in turn, tried to throw troops into the sea with counterattacks. The gathering of forces of the 97th brigade for a counterattack on the units landed at Cape Zyuk (more precisely, height 43, 1) was completed only on the morning of December 27; as a result, the counterattack on the bridgehead took place only at 13.00. The landing party responded with a counterattack with tanks, but all three vehicles were hit by the Germans. Also, this detachment was isolated from other landing groups by mining the isthmus near Cape Zyuk (which was a consequence of a mistake with the landing site).

Despite the lack of reinforcements, Colonel Leontyev’s detachment tried on the morning of December 27 from the high area. 154, 4 resume the attack on Adzhimushkai. According to German data (report of the 72nd PP), he manages to achieve initial success with competent actions: “Shortly before dawn, the enemy passes between the positions of the 2nd and 3rd companies and, with the forces of about two companies, attacks the anti-aircraft gun positions on the northern outskirts of Adzhim-Ushkai.” . However, this attack was eventually repulsed by the Germans. At the same time, Leontyev’s attack forces the Germans to postpone their own counterattack on the bridgehead; it begins after 9.00 am. According to the report of the 72nd brigade, the Germans deployed two battalions against this bridgehead (which coincides with the Soviet assessment). The detachment turns out to be quite a “tough nut to crack”; the report on the actions of the 72nd brigade notes “stubborn resistance from a well-entrenched enemy and artillery fire from ships.” Later, when summing up the results in the report of the 72nd brigade, it was noted: “The frequent fire of enemy naval artillery created great difficulties for our troops.” Enemy pressure and the threat of encirclement force the detachment to retreat to the sea to a height. 106, 6. Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran is attacked, but holds his position, suffering minor losses.

Destroyer "Nezamozhnik". The ship was one of the “novik” destroyers inherited from the tsarist fleet.

The Germans' attempt to drop KVMB troops into the sea was also unsuccessful. The counterattack on the detachment in the Eltigen area (Comune Initiative) fails. The report of the 42nd brigade states: “On terrain completely devoid of shelter, in conditions where the enemy has dug in for more than a kilometer, it is possible to advance only slightly. The enemy is supported from the other side of the strait and from ships by guns of heavy and extremely heavy caliber.” In general, an unstable balance remains in the bridgeheads.

At the same time, due to the pause that has arisen, German defense in the Kerch region is being strengthened. South of Kerch, 88-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns are placed on Cape Ak-Burn, which can flank both the approaches to Kerch and Kamysh-Burun. The 2nd Battalion of the 97th Regiment of the 46th Infantry, removed from Feodosia, arrives in Kerch.

Disembarkation resumes on December 28. In the area of ​​Khroni Cape, the landing is carried out early in the morning by the forces of the 3rd detachment; it is possible to land about 400 people (according to the army report, 300 people of the 143rd joint venture). The report of the 72nd brigade confirms the fact of the landing, despite the shelling: “The Russians are landing up to the battalion and are trying to advance in a southern direction.”

In general, the pause that occurred on December 27 had a negative impact on the position of the detachments on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. They did not receive additional forces, and the enemy received time to assemble strike forces and provide them with artillery support. Attack of two battalions of the 97th infantry regiment on the hill. 43, 1st detachment begins on the morning of December 28, and by noon the landing force is pushed into a narrow space near a steep bank. Here the paratroopers take their last stand. The report of the 97th PP stated: “Here he defends himself especially stubbornly in crevices and between cliffs. Sometimes enemy soldiers stand in the water, they have to be killed one by one, since for the most part they do not surrender." Soon the main landing forces are defeated. The Germans claimed 468 prisoners (including one officer), 300 killed and wounded Soviet soldiers. Their trophies were unloaded guns, including two 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 5 tractors. The remnants of the detachment held several resistance nests on the shore, in which, according to the prisoners interrogated by the Germans, there were about 200 more people. This is quite consistent with the size of the detachment of 878 men mentioned in the naval report. It should be said that the army report says nothing about the fate of this detachment that resisted to the end.

On December 28, Leontyev’s detachment was knocked out of its position, suffered heavy losses, and began to retreat to Cape Tarkhan. As a result of the counter-offensive, the Germans manage to take the landing site. The report of the 72nd PP states: “The remnants of the enemy are still holding out on the very shore and in the quarries just east of Hill 115.5.” Detachment Art. Lieutenant Kapran was cut off from the sea and surrounded, although his destruction did not take place.

Events developed somewhat less dramatically south of Kerch. On December 28, the KVMB at 4.00–5.00 landed 678 people of the 827th Guards Regiment in Kamysh-Burun. The landing at night is confirmed by the enemy. However, attempts to develop an offensive from the bridgehead held at Kamysh-Burun to the west and connect with the landing force at Eltigen were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Germans' attempts to liquidate the bridgeheads ended in nothing. The factory in the Kamysh-Burun area changes hands. Only in the area north of Eltigen do they manage to somewhat limit the size of the Soviet bridgehead; in the report of the 42nd Infantry Division this is described as follows: “The offensive is developing well, the enemy is thrown back to a small coastal strip and is forced to huddle in a narrow space.”

Detachment “B” of the 44th Army (2393 people) was redirected here, to Kamysh-Burun, on three gunboats, originally built as landing craft, and another “bolinder”. However, this landing was not particularly successful. The gunboats ran aground 50–150 m from the shore, and the landing force had to be transported by boats. "Bolinder" is out of order.

As a result, by the morning of December 29, the landing force of the 51st Army found itself in a difficult, close to catastrophic, situation. In the ZhBD of the 11th Army, the assessment of the situation near Kerch was quite unambiguous: “The army command believes that as of December 28, the situation on the Kerch Peninsula is under control, the destruction of enemy units still on the peninsula will take place on December 29.” Considering the difficult situation of the landing forces, this statement does not look like empty boasting. In the report on the actions of the 42nd brigade, the situation on the morning of December 29 is assessed as stable: “In the first half of the day on December 29, both enemy bridgeheads were reliably blocked, after receiving reinforcements, counterattacks were launched, and the first successes were noted.” During negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky, held on the night of December 28-29, D.T. Kozlov admitted: “The situation at the end of the day today on the front of the 51st Army was not in our favor.” At this moment, the situation changed sharply in favor of the Soviet troops - a landing took place in Feodosia, deep in the rear of German troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Another Black Sea “novice” is the destroyer “Shaumyan”.

While fighting was going on on the Kerch Peninsula with landing forces pressed to the sea, at 13.00 on December 28 in Novorossiysk the first landing force began landing on the cruisers "Red Caucasus" and "Red Crimea", the destroyers "Zheleznyakov", "Shaumyan", "Nezamozhnik" and transport "Kuban". At 17.00, 300 fighters of the assault groups and a hydrographic party were received on 12 patrol boats. As part of the first landing, 5419 soldiers and commanders, 15 guns and 6 mortars, 100 tons of ammunition and 56 tons of food were loaded. As stated in the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters: “Despite the fact that the ships were placed in the Novorossiysk port according to a pre-approved disposition, well known to the leading command staff of the Red Army units, the loading and landing of troops was not organized enough.” The units arrived late and the names of the ships were confused. Some ships were loaded with more troops than planned.

Despite the removal of the 79th Brigade from the troops planned for the landing, the front command tried to select the most well-prepared units for the first strike. As expressed by D.T. Kozlov in negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the night of December 28-29, 1941: “The first echelon is one regiment of the 9th State Duma, a personnel regiment trained for amphibious assaults, a battalion of marines and one regiment of the 157th division, staffed by Kuban soldiers.” In general, the formations of the 44th Army were well equipped by the standards of December 1941 (see Table 1).

In advance, on the evening of December 26, in Novorossiysk, loading of materiel and horses began on the transports of the 1st detachment (“Zyryanin”, “Jean Zhores”, “Shakhtar”, “Tashkent”, “Azov” and “Kr. Profintern”). Two more transports, “Serov” and “Nogin”, were busy with transportation to Sevastopol and began loading on the morning of December 28 and the evening of December 27, respectively. The loading of troops of the 44th Army onto transports began at 17.30 and ended at 23.00 on December 28. The 1st transport detachment was loaded with the 236th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Detachment with the 63rd State Guards Division (minus one regiment). As a result, the 1st transport detachment received 11,270 people, 572 horses, 26 45-mm guns, 18 76-mm guns, 7 122-mm howitzers, 199 vehicles (mostly lorries), 18 tractors, 20 light tanks, ammunition, food fodder and other property. At 3.00 on December 28, loading of materiel and horses began in Tuapse, and then the embarkation of personnel of the 63rd State Duma on the transports of the 2nd detachment (“Kalinin”, “Dimitrov”, “Kursk”, “Fabricius” and “Krasnogvardeets”). The detachment's transports carried 6,365 people, 906 horses, 31 76-mm guns, 27 122-mm howitzers, 92 vehicles, 14 tanks, ammunition, food fodder and other property. Thus, by the evening of December 28, the Soviet command had assembled sufficiently large infantry and artillery forces capable of radically changing the situation in Crimea.

Scheme from the report of the commander of the 46th engineer battalion. It is clearly visible that at night the battalion was two steps from the harbor.

It would be expected that the non-simultaneous landing of troops in Crimea would have a negative impact on the conditions of the landing in Feodosia. However, the situation was very ambiguous. On the one hand, the landing in the Kerch region weakened the German defense in the Feodosia region due to the withdrawal of reserves. According to the defense plan of the 46th Infantry Division, the II Battalion of the 97th Infantry Division formed the Feodosia coastal defense sector from Koktebel to Dalniye Kamyshi (including populated areas). With the beginning of the landing of the 51st Army, he was removed from Feodosia and hastily set off for the eastern tip of the Kerch Peninsula. The German defense of Feodosia is deprived of units that had the opportunity to explore the city and its surroundings. On the other hand, in the last days of December, the regrouping of the 11th Army was in full swing with the common goal of countering the landings, both those that had already landed and those yet to be planned. To strengthen the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, the command of the 11th Army advanced the 46th engineer battalion (a separate motorized unit) under the command of Captain Streit, which had previously been involved in the assault on Sevastopol. He was then, even before the landings, called “the last reserve of the 11th Army.”

Moreover, it should be emphasized that Streit’s battalion was not intended to organize the defense of Feodosia. As indicated in the report on the actions of the 46th Sat, the final point of the route was Ak-Monai: “Here the battalion was supposed to take over coastal defense and, together with 6 companies of various construction battalions, which were planned to be subordinated to it, build a position at the narrowest point of the peninsula Kerch from Ak-Monai in a southern direction." That is, the task of the 46th SB was to re-equip the Soviet Ak-Monai positions in the event of a radical change in the situation on the Kerch Peninsula. On the afternoon of December 28, while in Novorossiysk the landing of Soviet troops on ships and vessels took place with varying degrees of organization, the 46th Rifle Brigade was on the march from Karasubazar to Ak-Monai. The battalion reaches the Feodosia area in the afternoon.

A night march to a designated area in an unfamiliar area on bad roads was considered impractical, and the 46th Sat made a stop. As stated in the report on the actions, “the battalion, with the permission of the commander of the sapper units of the corps, settled down for the night in Feodosia in order to resume the movement to Ak-Monai the next morning at dawn.” That is, by and large, the battalion ends up in Feodosia by accident. Later it was joined by two companies of the road construction battalion. The city commandant's office indicates the location to sappers and builders.

A very significant issue for assessing subsequent events is the action plan of the German units in Feodosia. In his report on what was happening, the commander of the 46th Sat, Captain Streit, wrote the following on this issue: “... there was no information about the alarm plan, there were no instructions regarding the actions of the battalion in the event of an enemy landing or other attack. As it turned out later, there was a plan of action for alarm and defense for the units located in Feodosia; in addition, a few days earlier, everyone should have been put on high alert. In this situation, the fact that the relevant orders were not brought to the attention of the units arriving in Feodosia had a negative impact.”

Here Streit most likely has in mind the plans of the 46th Infantry Division and its bringing into combat readiness at the “Christmas Man” signal (see above). This allows us to conclude that, firstly, the command of the 11th Army did not undertake a targeted radical reinforcement of troops in Feodosia after the landings in the Kerch region, and secondly, that local commanders showed a general careless attitude towards the organization of defense. Orders and defense plans were not communicated to units transiting through Feodosia. The situation was aggravated by the fact that German sappers arrived at dusk in an unfamiliar city. At the same time, despite the blatant facts of negligence in the organization of defense, the very fact of the presence in the Feodosia region of the 46th Rifle Brigade, which had extensive combat experience, worsened the conditions for the landing of the planned Soviet assault. Also in Feodosia there was a heavy weapons company of the 186th infantry regiment of the 73rd infantry division, a division from the 77th artillery regiment and the 54th artillery regiment, and the 902nd assault boat team (100 people), one anti-tank company, one coastal battery. Another factor influencing the situation in the Feodosia region was the presence in the city of a senior commander in the person of Colonel Boehringer, chief of the sapper units of the 11th Army. He could subjugate any units in the city.

At 3 a.m. on December 29, a detachment of warships approached Feodosia. At night, orientation for entering the port was provided by the lights of the Shch-201 and M-51 submarines, which were advanced to the port in advance; this was typical for navigation support for Soviet landing forces. Under the cover of naval artillery fire, specially designated boats burst into Feodosia harbor and landed a group of reconnaissance officers on the protective pier, who captured a lighthouse and two anti-tank guns. Not only was the harbor not mined, but the boom gates were open on the night of the landing. In total, 266 people from the assault force were landed in the harbor by boats.

Following the boats, destroyers broke into the harbor: according to the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, the first to enter the port was the EM “Shaumyan” at 4.40, followed by the EM “Nezamozhnik” at 4.56 and the EM “Zheleznyakov” at 5.00. The first landed 330, the second - 289 and the third - 287 people. The destroyers completed the landing by 5.35–5.51 (“Shaumyan” and “Nezamozhnik”), the last was “Zheleznyakov” by 7.00.

For the reasons described above, the beginning of the landing of Soviet troops becomes a very unpleasant surprise for the German sapper units located in the city. On the one hand, all units of the 46th Brigade were located approximately in the center of the city, partly near the harbor (according to the map attached to the report, south of the harbor). On the other hand, they were completely unfamiliar with the area and did not have a clear plan of action. At the first, most important moment of the landing, they only took up the defense of their location. There was no contact with construction companies in the southern part of the city.

With an experienced ear, sappers define “the firing of a large number of Russian automatic weapons,” i.e., a landing by large forces. In the documents of the 11th Army (appendices to the ZhBD) there is evidence that Boehringer contacted army headquarters. It sounds like this: “At 7.00 a call from Colonel Boehringer from Feodosia. He established contact with the field commandant (Lieutenant Colonel von Kohler). Fierce fighting in the harbor of Feodosia." The response to Boehringer's report was an order to "defend every block."

However, the head of the engineering service of Manstein’s army did not carry out this order. On the contrary, he makes a radical decision to withdraw sappers from Feodosia (which threatened to become a mousetrap) and gives the order to withdraw the 46th brigade to the fork in the Kerch-Simferopol road (on the outskirts of Feodosia). The order is immediately transmitted to the companies, in addition, an order is given to immediately withdraw transport from the city. By that time, some of the vehicles located in the immediate vicinity of the harbor were lost. The purpose of such a maneuver was, as the commander of the 46th Rifle Brigade later wrote, “to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to advance both to Simferopol and Kerch.” How justified was the failure to comply with the order? Moreover, artillery battalions of the 46th Infantry Division remained in the city.

Actually, it was the German artillery divisions located in Feodosia that provided the first resistance to the landing. At 5.08, the cruiser "Red Caucasus" was hit in the area of ​​the first pipe, which caused a fire. At 5.21 a.m. a German shell hit the cruiser's turret, pierced the armor and caused a fire. On the cruisers and destroyers there were killed and wounded from fire from the shore. Boehringer himself reported all this to the headquarters of the 11th Army by telephone: “Fierce fighting in the harbor of Feodosia. German artillery takes an active part in them. One enemy ship is on fire."

However, the pace of the landing left much to be desired. At 5.02 the cruiser "Red Caucasus" approached the wide pier from the outside and began to moor. At the same time, part of the landing force began landing by longboats. The cruiser's mooring took place in extremely difficult conditions due to strong squeezing winds. To moor the cruiser, the tugboat “Kabardinets” was included in the detachment, which promptly arrived at the landing site from Anapa. However, seeing the intense shelling of the ships, the captain of the tug became afraid and returned to Anapa (was put on trial).

"Red Caucasus" managed to unmoor and set the gangplank only at 7.15. Due to the cluttered pier No. 3, only soldiers and commanders landed; unloading artillery and vehicles turned out to be impossible. Under these conditions, several companies with combat experience could significantly change the situation in the harbor. Instead, Boehringer leaves the city and takes them with him. The height of cynicism in this regard appears to be Boehringer’s report already from Karasubazar (on the road to Simferopol) at about 15.00: “The coastal artillery fired until the last shell, then the artillerymen picked up carbines.” The question of why Boehringer’s subordinates did not stand shoulder to shoulder with the artillerymen remained unanswered.

The reaction of the command of the 11th Army to the landing in Feodosia was quite quick. Already between 6.30 and 8.00, orders were given to send the Romanian 4th mountain brigade and 3rd infantry brigade (Cornet regiment) and the 240th anti-tank division to Feodosia. That is, either closely spaced or motorized units were advanced first. Aviation was ordered to operate only in Feodosia. At 8.00 a meeting was held with the participation of Manstein. The head of the operations department, T. Busse, receives the task of finding out what forces, primarily artillery, can be released for Feodosia on the west coast and in the XXX AK zone. Artillery is requested, including from near Kherson (210 mm howitzers). At 9.30, Manstein made a decision to immediately withdraw one regiment of the 170th Infantry Division from the front and send it to Alushta at night, as well as prepare the withdrawal of another regiment from the front.

On the morning of December 29, when the battle had been raging in Feodosia for several hours, attempts by units of the 46th Infantry Division to drop landing troops into the sea were still ongoing in the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula. A surprise for the Germans was the attempt of Kapran’s detachment to break through to the sea. This forced the 97th Regiment to go on the defensive. Thus, the attempt to eliminate 200 brave souls holed up in the coastal rocks was stopped. Leontiev’s detachment, according to the Soviet version of events, tried to advance, but later “the detachment fought surrounded by battle.” According to the German version of events, the detachment was defeated. The report of the 72nd PP states: “At 9.15, List’s group and the 2nd battalion jointly destroy the last enemy forces (300 prisoners). The enemy’s landing site has been completely cleared, the enemy in the regiment’s sector has been eliminated.” The Soviet detachment at Kamysh-Burun itself tried to advance; there were battles with varying success on the territory of the factory. The Germans considered the attack on the bridgehead at the Commune Initiative to be very effective; the report of the 42nd brigade states: “The offensive is developing well, the Russians are suffering heavy losses. They amount to at least 100 killed and 200 wounded, 60 people were taken prisoner.” At the same time, it is not stated that the bridgehead has been eliminated.

However, the psychological effect achieved by the very fact of the landing in Feodosia exceeded even the wildest expectations. Boehringer's disregard for a direct and unambiguous order paled in comparison to the actions of the XXXXII AK headquarters. While at the headquarters of the 11th Army the mood was far from panicky, on the ground things reached the point of outright arbitrariness. Closer to noon on December 29, Manstein gives the order to the command of XXXXII AK: “The 46th Infantry Division must destroy the landing enemy. Concentrate the main forces on the northern shore. I forbid leaving. The army takes over the holding of the isthmus near Feodosia. The orders given there to the Romanian CBD and MP remain in force.” The order is transmitted at 11.09 on December 29. However, already at 10.00 on December 29, the commander of the XXXXII Corps, Count Sponeck, ordered the 46th Infantry Division to leave the Kerch Peninsula. This infuriated Manstein and Sponeck was suspended and subsequently arrested and imprisoned in a fortress. Later, in his memoirs, E. von Manstein wrote: “The case of Count Sponeck shows how tragic the conflict between the obligation to carry out an order and his own opinion about operational necessity can be for a military leader.”

Aerial photograph of Feodosia Bay.

What infuriated Manstein most was that Sponeck gave the order to withdraw and turned off the radio, that is, he acted in such a way as not to hear a response ban. Such “tricks” were periodically performed by various German commanders, but in this case for Sponeck it had the most far-reaching consequences.

The losses of the 46th Infantry Division in the rapid retreat across the snow-covered Kerch Peninsula amounted to 9 heavy field howitzers, 12 light field howitzers, 4 heavy and 8 light infantry guns, 14 heavy and 73 light machine guns, 12 heavy and 25 light mortars, 3 heavy and 34 light VET. Casualties from December 25 to January 3 were moderate, with 152 killed, 429 wounded, and 449 missing.

While the scandal with the withdrawal of the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch was unfolding, sappers withdrawn from Feodosia tried to hold the crossroads of roads north of the city. However, they were soon outflanked and knocked down from their original position. Command of the defense in the Feodosia region is taken by Lieutenant Colonel von Alphen (commander of the 617th Engineer Regiment). The artillerymen are leaving the city, abandoning their equipment. Meanwhile, Soviet units are moving forward, covering the positions of the 46th Sat.

The idea of ​​defending the crossroads was finally buried with the landing of a small detachment (a reinforced company) in Sarygol, on the road from Feodosia to the east. According to the report of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters, he was landed at about 23.00 from BTShch-26. The detachment fires at the positions of the 46th Brigade with mortars. At night, Lieutenant Colonel von Alphen orders a perimeter defense around the village of Nizhnyaya Baybuga. This is quite consistent with Soviet data, which speaks of the advance of the landing force to the town of Lysaya to the north-west of Feodosia and nearby heights with the right flank 5–6 km and the left flank 3–5 km from the city. In Feodosia itself at that moment, small scattered groups of Germans were destroyed. By the morning of December 30, Feodosia was completely liberated from the enemy. 2,000 Red Army soldiers were released from captivity. Judging by the report of the Oberquartermaster of the 11th Army on losses dated December 31, 1941, during the previous ten days 7 leFH18, 3 sFH18, 1 10-cm K18 and 2 sFH M/37(t) were lost. In all likelihood, most of the losses relate specifically to Feodosia (the losses of the 46th Infantry Division were higher and were dealt with later). During the night, units of the Romanian mountain brigade approached the Near Baybuga area.

The counterattack planned for the morning, the striking force of which was to be the Romanian units, ended in complete failure. As the commander of the 46th Sat later reported: “It was impossible to induce the Romanians to take even one step forward. The Romanian officers were not with their units, but in a house located in the rear.” The artillery was lost, so not a single shot was fired as artillery preparation.

Meanwhile, the units that landed in Feodosia went on the offensive. The decisive advantage was gained through the use of tanks. As stated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army: “The Russian tanks that broke through caused the same panic among the Romanians as in September during the breakthrough north of Melitopol. The panicked retreat of the Romanians, unfortunately, carried away the German soldiers with it.” As the commander of the 46th Brigade later wrote, two anti-tank guns he had jammed due to frost, and the Romanians did not use their anti-tank guns. An attack by Soviet tanks pushes back the Romanians and the 46th Rifle Brigade 1.5 km west of the village of Dalnie Baybugi. There are Romanian units here, reinforced by German artillery.

In the period from December 29 to 31, 23 thousand people, 1,550 horses, 34 tanks, 109 guns, 24 mortars, 334 cars and tractors, 734 tons of ammunition and 250 tons of other cargo were transported and landed in the Feodosia area. By the end of December 31, the troops of the 44th Army that had landed in Feodosia managed to advance 10–15 km from the city and capture Vladislavovka. The Romanian units that pulled up to Feodosia, although they were not able to drop troops into the sea, were still able to hold back their advance until the German divisions arrived. On the morning of December 31, the chief of staff of the 11th Army, in a conversation with the chief of staff of the GA “South,” uttered a phrase that largely determined the further development of events: “The situation near Feodosia may pose a danger to the Crimea and the 11th Army.” Accordingly, it was proposed to stop the attack on Sevastopol and strengthen XXXXII AK at the expense of forces withdrawn from LIV AK. As a result, Hansen receives an order to stop attacks on Sevastopol.

During January 1, 1942, the troops of the 44th Army were unable to advance northward. By the end of January 2, Soviet troops reached the Kiet-Nov line. Pokrovka, Izyumovka, Koktebel, where they met organized enemy resistance. The losses of the landed 63rd Guards Division, 236th and 157th Divisions, 251st Guards Regiment and the naval detachment of the 44th Army during this period can be assessed as moderate. From December 30, 1941 to January 2, 1942, they suffered 431 killed, 161 missing, and 705 wounded.

The landing of the 51st Army continued, and the landings began pursuit. Commander of the Caucasian Front D.T. On January 1, 1942, Kozlov reported to the Supreme High Command Headquarters a plan for the liberation of Crimea with a strike on Perekop, which was approved the next day.

During negotiations with the Chief of Staff of the 44th Army on Christmas Day, January 2, D.T. Kozlov said directly: “The question is this: who will concentrate the troops faster and more, I want General Pervushin, you and all your workers to understand this.” However, the conditions of the troop concentration race were extremely difficult. During negotiations with A.M. Vasilevsky on the evening of the same day, the front commander admitted: “The ice situation on the Kerch p/o [probably still the “strait.” – Note auto.] does not make it possible to transport anything.”

In the vicinity of Kerch, the 51st Army took rich trophies, but some of the weapons and equipment were domestic models captured from the enemy. So, as of January 10, 1942, ABTU 51st A reported the capture of 232 domestic and 77 German trucks, 44 domestic and 41 German passenger cars, 35 tractors and 12 Soviet-made tanks. All this equipment was faulty.

The trophy of exceptional value was 4 OV brand locomotives and 80 wagons and platforms. They were repaired and brought into a condition suitable for movement. The seizure of 10,000 tons of coal in Kerch was a serious help. This made it possible to organize the railway. transportation in the interests of front-line troops, albeit on a limited scale. This was another omission on the part of the command of the XXXXII AK and the 46th Infantry - Railway. the transport was not taken away or destroyed.

Transports lost in Feodosia. In the foreground is “Zyryanin”, behind it is “Tashkent”.

However, in addition to the obvious advantages, the idea of ​​landing in Feodosia also had obvious disadvantages. The large distance from the front's aviation bases did not allow for reliable air cover. As a result, the transports in the port were hit by German bombers. The first to die was “Tashkent” (5552 GRT), which managed to unload. The next one, on January 4, was “Zyryanin” (3592 brt), transporting liquid fuel and shells, hit by bombs while pumping fuel. On the same day, the Nogin (2150 GRT) was attacked and sunk. On January 9, the Spartakovets and Chatyr-Dag were sunk. On January 16, he was blown up by a mine “Jean Zhores” (3972 brt). Cargo was also slowly removed from the piers of Feodosia, and therefore a lot of ammunition was destroyed during the bombing of the port by enemy aircraft.

All this led to a decrease in the rate of accumulation of troops on the bridgehead near Feodosia and a shortage of the most necessary supplies. On the contrary, the Germans hastily concentrated the troops withdrawn from the group aimed at Sevastopol. This allowed them to achieve a quantitative and qualitative advantage and launch a counteroffensive. E. von Manstein writes: “It was to be waged by three and a half German divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade against the enemy, whose forces had now increased to eight divisions and two brigades. While the enemy had tanks, albeit in limited numbers, we had none.” Here Manstein is being somewhat disingenuous, since the strike force assembled near Feodosia included assault guns. In reality 1941–1942 they were an extremely problematic example of German armored vehicles for Soviet anti-tank defense and light tanks. Already as of January 8, XXXXII AK had two platoons of assault guns under its command: 4 self-propelled guns from the 197th battalion and 2 self-propelled guns from the 190th battalion. The main forces of these two assault gun battalions remained under the command of LIV AK near Sevastopol.

The German offensive began on January 15, and by January 18 the attackers had completely occupied Feodosia, encircling part of the forces of the 44th Army. It was announced that 10 thousand prisoners, 177 guns and 85 tanks had been captured. The remnants of the 44th Army retreated to the Parpach Isthmus. The army commander, General A.N., was seriously wounded. Pervushin, member of the Military Council A.G. died. Komissarov, the chief of staff, Colonel S.E., was shell-shocked. Christmas. General I.F. took command of the army. Dashichev. The main consequence of the German counterattack was the loss of Feodosia as a supply port for Soviet troops in Crimea.

The condition of the troops of the 44th Army after Feodosia can be assessed as depressing (see Table 2).

Entrusted to the ill-fated D.T. Kozlov’s troops tried to recapture the peninsula during a difficult period for the Red Army in peculiar natural conditions. The landing in Feodosia on December 29, 1941 was a “knight’s move” that dramatically changed the operational situation in Crimea, but this success was not consolidated. The accumulation of troops, ammunition, and fuel in Feodosia proceeded slowly. The advance of the 51st Army along the muddy roads of the Kerch Peninsula due to the thaw was also late. All this allowed the German 11th Army to counterattack on January 15, 1942 and soon reoccupy Feodosia.

Already on the evening of January 17, order No. 0183/OP of the front headquarters follows: “The Caucasian Front, on the morning of January 17, goes on the defensive on the line of the Ak-Monai positions.” Accordingly, Tulumchak, Korpech, Koi-Asan and Daln were designated as cover positions. The reeds, and the Ak-Monai positions became the main line of defense.

In the middle of the day on January 17, a conversation took place between D.T. Kozlova with A.M. Vasilevsky, at which the front commander firmly and consistently defended the expediency of the measures taken. Kozlov motivated his orders as follows: “I did not decide to risk the final loss of the divisions and proposed to retreat to the Ak-Monai positions in order to tighten up and wear down the enemy.” Moreover, he bluntly stated: “The situation that has developed today does not necessitate a revision of the decision made.” In a conversation with Moscow, the front commander also assessed the enemy’s intentions as the most decisive: “Throw our units into the sea with a strike from the right and left.” Ultimately, Vasilevsky, who began the conversation with Kozlov with a rather shady assessment of the enemy near Feodosia, by the end of two hours of rather intense negotiations agreed with the arguments of the front. As a result, the troops retreated to the Ak-Monai positions.

Faced with a serious crisis in Crimea, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent its representatives to Crimea - Army Commissar 1st Rank L.Z. Mekhlis and Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Major General P.P. Eternal. Mehlis arrived at the front on January 20, 1942. A new stage of the struggle for Crimea began.

Conclusions. The Kerch-Feodosia operation and the subsequent struggle for Feodosia gives rise to polar assessments, both positive and negative, in domestic historiography. An important issue is the viability of the bridgeheads formed as a result of the landing of troops of the 51st Army by the forces of the AzVF and the KVMB. A study of the documents of the parties leads to the disappointing conclusion that by the morning of December 29, 1941, most of the landed troops were either defeated or were on the verge of defeat. On the other hand, it cannot be said that all bridgeheads were close to collapse. The most stable position was for the units of the 302nd Guards Division at Kamysh-Burun. The liquidation of this detachment on December 29 (as indicated in the ZhBD of the 11th Army) seems unlikely. Unlike other bridgeheads, it was also supported by the artillery of the 51st Army. At the same time, the liquidation of other bridgeheads made it possible to free up at least two or three infantry battalions for an attack on the bridgehead. This would be a serious test for him, if not a disaster.

The tragic fate of a significant part of the landed troops makes us think about the viability of the plan for the landing operation on the Kerch Peninsula as a whole. Here, the study of German documents leads to the conclusion that the positions of the 46th Infantry Division near Kerch were not at all an impregnable fortress. The area of ​​Cape Zyuk, defended by signalmen, could become a gap in the defense of the 46th Infantry Division and the XXXXII Corps as a whole. However, this required a massing of landing craft to land and supply large forces. For example, the involvement of gunboats (formerly “epildifors”) from the Black Sea Fleet for landing in the Sea of ​​Azov.

At the same time, failures in the Kerch region simultaneously became a magnet drawing together German reserves. In particular, the battalion of the 97th PP, placed on defense in the Feodosia area. This created the basis for the success of the landing in Feodosia, which made it possible to seize the initiative from the enemy for a long time.

However, as practice has shown, it was not enough to land troops; they still had to be fully supplied. In this regard, the assessment made hot on the heels of the events in 1943 in the “Collection on the Study of War Experience” is indicative. An unsightly picture was given of the release of weakened formations onto the peninsula: “Some division, weakened in artillery and without convoys, was loaded and transported, and its “rear” (as it was customary to call the remnants of the division, although these rear included 7/8 artillery regiment) with several thousand horses and a hundred (sometimes more) vehicles remained on the Caucasian coast." As a result, the transported units could not “really fight or live” for a long time. The 44th Army, in the face of the concentration of large enemy forces, needed to really fight.

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“...Examples of the vulgar, for all their instructiveness, must be constantly and critically processed to harmonize them with the conditions of our time...” Alexander Nilus. "Firing of field artillery", France, 1910.

The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation is still one of the most secret operations of the Soviet-German front of World War II. All research on this topic in the former “Soviet Union” is carried out exclusively on Soviet sources and according to Soviet chronology, ignoring the fact that the “Soviet Union” in World War II fought not against some virtual enemy, but against Germany.

I will not consider this operation based on Soviet sources on principle. Soviet “historical” and archival sources require “permissions” and “approvals.” German archives of the Second World War are completely open and accessible to any researcher. And any researcher can independently study and draw their own conclusions.

By and large, the presence of German maps of that war is quite enough to draw conclusions. Based on them, it is possible to restore the chronology of events down to the day. The second source is the memoirs of the commander of the 11th Army Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South), Erich von Manstein, which also agrees with the information on the maps.

The material associated with the Kerch-Feodosiya landing and offensive operation is so extensive that its full consideration can be divided into three parts (and I repeat once again, I do not at all adhere to the chronology of events that is established by the official neo-Soviet “historiography”):

• - the first part - the course of the landing operation itself, the defense of the Germans and their counter-offensive to return Feodosia, as well as the stabilization of the front on the Kerch Peninsula: December 24, 1941 - January 17, 1942;
• - the second part - the participation of the local population (primarily the Crimean Tatars) and their influence on the course of hostilities, as well as the conduct of operations against Soviet “partisans”: December 24, 1941 - May 6, 1942;
• ‒ the third part - the preventive German offensive operation Trappenjagd (“Hunting for Bustards”): May 7th - May 15th, 1942.

The Kerch-Feodosi operation, from the point of view of the Germans and their defensive actions, is the clearest example of combat operations in a 3rd generation war. Since then, the principles of warfare have not changed. Weapons, communications, and technical reconnaissance equipment have not changed significantly. Therefore, consideration of this Soviet landing operation as a defensive operation of the Germans, methods of stopping the Soviet “troops,” as well as the subsequent German offensive, has not lost its relevance to the present day.

Soviet landing operation, German defense and their counter-offensive to recapture Feodosia, as well as measures to stabilize the front on the Kerch Peninsula: December 24, 1941 - January 17, 1942

1. Approaches of the Soviet command to planning the operation.

Official Soviet “historiography” reports that the Soviet command was given two weeks to plan the landing operation. Maybe that was the case. This information cannot be verified because Soviet sources are closed.

However, it can be noted that the Soviet command, when calculating the planning of the number of landing troops, proceeded from the number of 100% losses (1st accident). This is evidenced by the fact that during the landing not a single medical hospital or medical battalion was landed either in Kerch or in Feodosia. This is not a planning “mistake” - this is the approach of the Soviet leadership, since in addition to medical institutions, air defense systems were not taken into account during the planning of the operation (2nd accident).

Air defense systems were not taken into account, just as the response actions of the Germans were not taken into account in general and in principle (3rd accident). The influence of the terrain in the Feodosia region was not taken into account (4th accident). The planning of the operation did not take into account the verification of intelligence information at all (5th accident).

And most importantly, there was no training of personnel to carry out the operation (6th accident). Only the number of Soviet troops was taken into account, that is, those recommendations that were written by V.K. Trianafillov and N.E. Varfolomeev. In total, 6 accidents occurred at once, which influenced the course of the operation.

Official Soviet “historiography” proves that these 6 above-mentioned accidents are the consequences of “fatal errors” in planning. The concepts of “fatal mistakes” and “heroic actions” are the main terms with which she operates. For this reason, it makes no sense to consider this or that operation of the Second World War through the prism of Soviet “historiography.”

War is too serious an undertaking beyond the banal “fatal mistakes” and “heroic actions” and requires serious preparation. There are no coincidences, and especially not in war. In war there are only regularities associated with the training of personnel conducting military operations. The lack of success during the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, as well as the entire Crimean epic of the Red Army in 1942, is not due to “fatal mistakes”, but to the lack of real military training not only among the rank and file, but also, to a greater extent, among the command staff. It is impossible to explain otherwise the fact that there were no medical facilities during the landing.

Another bright moment that Soviet “historiography” does not see. Allegedly, planning for the operation begins on December 7, 1941, after a certain meeting at the “VGK headquarters.” However, if you look carefully at the German maps of December 1941, you can pay attention to the map for December 1, 1941 (diagram 1), which indicates the preparation of the Soviet command for the landing operation, and which took place in front of the German intelligence. Thus, (and most likely) the date of “planning” of the operation is mid-November 1941.

So, let’s move on to the progress of the operation or its beginning - December 24, 1941 (for clarity, we look at the diagrams that are parts of the German maps of the Heeresgruppe “Süd” for December (according to the corresponding dates) 1941).

The first - not entirely successful phase of the operation: December 24 - December 26, 1941 (schemes 2 and 3)

During this time, a total of 7 landings were landed in the area of ​​the city of Kerch. The first landing is on December 24th, troops land on both sides of the city of Kerch. Unfortunately, we do not know the number of these landings. But the presence of their number equal to four suggests that in terms of strength it was, no less, an infantry division.

The German map does not show that the landing Soviet units achieved a tactical result. Second landing - December 26, 1941. The landing force lands in the same place where the landing force had previously landed on December 24th. Like the previous landing, the landing on December 26 was not successful. All three landing sites have been localized. In just two days, the Soviet side landed two rifle divisions, totaling 21,716 people. Losses - 20,000 people.