Why Stolypin's activity is characterized as Bonapartism. IN
Despite favorable economic, ideological and political circumstances, Stolypin nevertheless made a number of mistakes that put his reforms in danger of failure. Stolypin's first mistake was the lack of a well-thought-out policy towards the workers. As the experience of Prussia showed, in order to successfully pursue a conservative policy, it was necessary to combine harsh repression against revolutionary parties with simultaneous efforts in the field of social security for workers. In Russia, however, despite the general economic upsurge, not only has the standard of living of the workers not risen in the slightest in all these years, but social legislation has taken its first steps. The 1906 Ten Hours Act was hardly enforced, as was the 1903 Workers' Insurance Act for workers injured in the workplace. Permitted trade unions were under vigilant police control and lacked confidence among the workers. Meanwhile, the number of workers was constantly and noticeably growing. The new generation turned out to be very supportive of the perception of socialist ideas. Obviously, Stolypin was not aware of the significance of the labor question, which arose with renewed vigor in 1912.
Stolypin's second mistake was that he did not foresee the consequences of the intensive Russification of non-Russian peoples. Stolypin made no secret of his nationalist convictions; once at a meeting of the Duma, he sharply answered a Polish deputy that he considered it "the highest happiness to be a subject of Russia." He openly pursued a nationalist Great Russian policy and, naturally, turned all national minorities against himself and the tsarist regime. For example, Finland has become a haven for many oppositionists. Stolypin resented the fact that the Seim of Finland consisted predominantly of socialists and liberals. In 1908, he unsuccessfully tried to limit the powers of the Sejm, dissolved it twice, and then reintroduced the old dictatorial methods in the country. by 1914, the hostility of the Finns to the "Russian occupiers" had become widespread. As for Poland, the situation there was more complicated, since the attitude of the Poles towards Russia was not unanimous. Some Poles tried to achieve greater autonomy for their country. The other part demanded complete independence. Stolypin closed the Polish-language schools, and planted municipal institutions in the cities with a predominance of Russian employees. In Ukraine, where the press and higher educational institutions were subjected to forced Russification, the national identity of the Ukrainian elite grew, based on an understanding of the economic power of the region, which became the breadbasket and industrial center of the entire empire. The tsarist authorities severely persecuted Ukrainian nationalists who organized the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine and found refuge in Galicia, which is part of Austria-Hungary. The Austrian authorities willingly patronized the Ukrainian nationalists, wanting to interfere in every possible way with the Russian authorities in retaliation for supporting the anti-Austrian sentiments of the small Slavic peoples in Bohemia and the Balkans. For the same reasons, the Turkic minorities on the territory of Azerbaijan, united in the Mussavat (Equality) party, resolutely went for rapprochement with Turkey, renewed after the Young Turkic revolution. Part of the Muslim intelligentsia of Tatar origin, living in the Crimea and on the Lower Volga, tried to revive the Turkic-Tatar civilization, seeking its recognition on a par with the Russian one. The tsarist government, of course, did not want to make such concessions, considering the Muslim peoples to be underdeveloped. It also encouraged the penetration of Russian colonizers and settlers into Central Asia no less harshly than other European conquering states did in relation to the countries of Asia and Africa.
Stolypin also made a mistake on the issue of establishing zemstvos in the western provinces (1911), as a result of which he lost the support of the Octobrists. The fact is that the western provinces continued to depend economically on the Polish gentry. In order to strengthen the position of the Belarusian and Russian population in them, which constituted the majority, Stolypin decided to establish a zemstvo form of government there. The Duma willingly supported him, but the State Council took the opposite position - class feelings of solidarity with the gentry turned out to be stronger than national ones. Stolypin asked Nicholas II to suspend the work of both chambers for three days, so that during this time the government would urgently adopt a new law. Duma sessions were suspended and the law was adopted. However, this procedure, which demonstrated the state's disregard for its own institutions, led to a split between the government and even the most moderate liberals. The autocracy placed itself in isolation, from now on it was supported by representatives of the extreme right-wing nationalist circles. Stolypin, on the other hand, lost the support of Nicholas II, who was clearly disgusted with having such an enterprising minister, who was accused by extreme right-wing opponents with influence at court of wanting to "expropriate all the landowners in general" with the help of agrarian reform.
Figuratively speaking, the political death of Stolypin as a reformer came much earlier than D.G. Bogrov mortally wounded him on September 1, 1911. at the Kiev Opera Theatre. This is evidenced by the fact that the prime minister's stay in Kiev began with insults, he was clearly given to understand that he was superfluous here and that Stolypin was not expected. There was no place in the cars in which the tsar and his retinue followed. He was not given a state-owned car, the chairman of the Council of Ministers had to look for a cab. The tragedy of Stolypin as a reformer was that they did not want to have "a clerk who surpassed them in personal qualities" - it is hard not to agree with these words.
From the pinnacle of today's historical experience, the main root cause of Stolypin's bankruptcy is now especially clearly visible.
The organic defect of his course was that he wanted to carry out his reforms outside of democracy and in spite of it. First, he believed, it is necessary to ensure economic conditions, and then to exercise "freedoms". History repeats itself. It is not surprising that such a mistake was made much later and in completely different historical conditions. Economic reform Kosygin 65g. failed in our country, it seems to me, for exactly the same reason: although the reform was well thought out, they wanted to implement it without destroying the old regime, long rotten from the inside, which opposed all innovations and condoned everything old and unnecessary. They wanted to implement it outside of democracy and without democracy. But after all, history seems to learn from the mistakes of 65g. forgot about them.
After Stolypin, the activities of the government in 1912-1914. showed that all large-scale reforms would be curtailed. Nicholas II refused to cooperate with political figures; he surrounded himself with mediocre people, but who shared his views on the historical path of Russia.
According to G. Popov, there is a constant paradox, consisting in the following: on the one hand, the reform of Russia involves the creation and development of representative power, and on the other hand, in the endless debates of all branches of this power, starting with the Duma, the most necessary measures “sink” for many months. This process is natural, it is due to the very nature of representative power: it is designed to ensure a peaceful settlement of the interests of various groups of society, and therefore, this process cannot but be full of compromises and lengthy. In a country where the social situation is quite prosperous, these democratic parliamentary procedures play a generally progressive and positive role. But in an era of decisive, fundamental reforms (especially in the basics!), When delay is “tantamount to death,” these processes threaten to slow down everything in general.
Both Stolypin and the government realized that the land reform would not pass through the Duma in some acceptable timeframe, or even “sink” altogether.
From the very beginning, she was at the center of Stolypin's main concerns. The First Duma, by its majority, put forward demands that were unacceptable to the autocracy, and on July 8, 1906, it was dissolved. The Second State Duma was chosen by Stolypin as a testing ground for the future Bonapartist course, although the elections were held according to the old electoral law. But the sharp weakening of the Cadet center and the equally obvious strengthening of the left wing already indicated that the possibility of an agreement between the government and the Duma had become even more elusive. The prime minister was clearly provoking the Duma into open conflicts with the government, bringing the hour of dispersal closer.
The Third State Duma, elected according to the "shameless" electoral law, turned out exactly the way he needed, was the instrument on which, as he believed, he would be able to perform his solo part. The main feature of the electoral law of June 3, in addition to its extreme anti-democratism, was Bonapartism, creating the possibility of maneuvering between the right and left wings of the Duma. Statistical analysis shows that only the Octobrist "center" could create a majority by voting with its right or left neighbors. Thus, Stolypin's agrarian Bonapartism was completed and supplemented by political Bonapartism, embodied in the June 3rd Duma. He began to replace the failed Caesarism (based on the peasantry). This at least somehow smoothed out the contradiction between the government and the Duma.
It should be noted that Stolypin violated the law several times in order to implement his policy (perhaps this is one of the underlying reasons for the failure of his reformist course ...). So, for example, it became possible to quickly approve the Decree on land reform with the tsar only thanks to Article 87 of the Basic Laws of the Russian Empire. This article gave the government the right to issue emergency decrees between Dumas on urgent issues. Stolypin took advantage of Article 87 and approved agrarian legislation immediately after the dissolution of the first and before the convocation of the second Duma. At the same time, he twice violated Article 87 (firstly, agrarian legislation was not an emergency issue, on the contrary, it was the main issue of Russia; secondly, the two-month period was not observed). Thus, the fundamental issue of agrarian reform was resolved almost without the participation of the Russian parliament and bypassing it. As in 1861, the bureaucracy dispensed with democratic mechanisms.
Nicholas II approved the reform, but was not its driving force. The engine was Stolypin himself (this, by the way, differs from the situation of the 18-19th century, when the emperors were the initiators of the reforms). ". There is a struggle on two fronts, which diverts resources and exhausts forces. And even the gigantic energy of Stolypin could not withstand such an order of reforms.
In an absolutist monarchy, as in any other totalitarian system, it is very difficult to carry out reforms: the old regime, protecting itself, does not allow forces interested in reforms to form. He suppresses everything. That is why only the regime itself, or rather that part of it that has decided on reforms, can be the driving force. So, the reform from the very beginning was weakened by the fact that it was not led by the first person in the pyramid of power. But this reform weakened even more, because it did not have enough support in society. Stolypin largely overestimated the activity of that part of the peasants who wanted to get rich. Wealthy peasants have not yet become an independent force in the village. Accordingly, they could not become a pillar of the Stolypin reform. In the future, of course, a layer of independent peasant farmers would become a powerful factor in the political life of Russia. But this is in perspective. And in the beginning everything depends on the activity of its initiators. However, what is started from above cannot be long-lasting; the success of the reforms depends on the rapid formation of their social base. Stolypin was never able to find a way that would allow the agrarian reform initiated from above by the forces of the bureaucracy to rely on the activity of the peasantry. It, unfortunately, remained only a material that was reformed. Deprived of social support, the Stolypin reform remained a set of administrative measures. And in the political life of the country there were still forces that opposed the reform both on the right and on the left. Incidentally, this social and political isolation is the main difference between the 1906 reform and the 1861 reform.
The collapse of the Stolypin reform, the impossibility of merging totalitarianism and authoritarianism with independence, the collapse of the course towards the peasant farmer became a lesson for the Bolsheviks, who preferred to rely on the collective farms.
The path of Stolypin, the path of reforms, the path of preventing October 17, was rejected by those who did not want the revolution, and those who aspired to it. Stolypin understood and believed in his reforms. He was their ideologue. This is Stolypin's forte. On the other hand, Stolypin, like any other person, was prone to make mistakes. When correlating various aspects of Stolypin's reforms with modern Russian reality, one should remember both the benefits that can be derived from this historical experience and the mistakes that prevented the successful implementation of Stolypin's reforms.
Putin against the liberal swamp. How to save Russia Kirpichev Vadim Vladimirovich
Features of Russian Bonapartism
They beat on Gaddafi, and destroyed Libya.
Hussein was beaten, and Iraq was dismembered.
They hit Assad, and throw Syria into chaos.
They aim at Putin, but they will end up in Russia. This is the meaning of the game. Our tsar is a figure that interferes with the defeat of Russia, so the ISS is targeting him.
There are fundamental differences between French and Russian Bonapartism. In France, under the hand of the Bonapartes, the national bourgeoisie matured, which later led the country to prosperity. On the banks of the Seine, Bonapartism was a political caterpillar, from which the beautiful bourgeois democratic France, la Belle France, eventually flew out. But here you are not there, in Russia the meanings are opposite. Our neo-Bonapartism is Stagnation-2, which prepares the destruction of the country, the historically inevitable liberal perestroika, with its general degradation. Our Neo-Bonaparte only prolongs the beautiful moment of the system before the collapse of the criminal bureaucratic-oligarchic capitalism.
Today in Russia the bourgeoisie is gaining strength for the political liquidation of the authoritarian leader and the collapse of our natural state. She is preparing February-3 (August 1991, I remind you, there is February-2). In a mono-ethnic state, where there is a unity of the elite, b-democrats (bourgeois democrats) work for the flourishing of the country, and for multi-ethnic, clan and multi-confessional states, they play the role of gravediggers.
The plan for the self-liquidation of the liberal empire through the development of capitalism works with the methodicality of a mole; Bonapartism saws the branch on which it sits, digs its own grave. After all, he is developing capitalism, the class that has gained strength as an owner begins to rush to power, and the ISS is just what it takes to eliminate another powerful authoritarian power hated by the owners.
The Bonapartisms of the nineteenth century existed in a fairly favorable international environment. The ISS was not yet formed at that time, and the national bourgeoisie had to deal with the authoritarian system itself. Today, authoritarian leaders have to withstand external pressure as well. The ISS does not like modern Bonapartes and does not spare money for their liquidation, especially if they show independence.
The white swamp bourgeoisie, encouraged in every possible way by the masters of the global world, has already dug the hatchet, and, of course, the Russian b-democrats are historically doomed to victory. Putin does not have a single chance to resist the onslaught of the bourgeoisie from within and the roll of the ISS from the outside. How many authoritarian leaders over the past hundred years have hoped to outsmart the bourgeoisie and the ISS. Where are they? Some are gone, others have been judged.
By the way, it is not so difficult to calculate the timing of the end of the Bonapartist stagnation.
This text is an introductory piece. From the book History of Public Administration in Russia author Shchepetev Vasily IvanovichThe population of the Russian state The population of Russia was large even by the standards of its time. In the most populated regions (Novgorod, Pskov and the Volga-Oka region), the population density in the 16th century was averaged 3 people per sq. km (in some places 1 person per sq.
From the book History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the 17th century author Milov Leonid Vasilievich§ 1. XVII century in the history of Western Europe and Russia. Features of the Russian historical process and its factors The 15th century ended the medieval period in the history of Russia. And although at that time the old socio-economic relations and
From the book Great Russian Plowman and Features of the Russian Historical Process author Milov Leonid VasilievichMilov L.V. The Great Russian Plowman and Features of the Russian Historical Process M., ROSSPEN,
From the book Russia without Peter: 1725-1740 author Anisimov Evgeny ViktorovichThe collapse of the Russian Goliath NEW, 1727 Petersburg met as usual - solemnly and magnificently: parades, liturgies, fireworks, music, "richly decorated tables with snacks", receptions and awards. Empress Catherine appeared in public on January 6, the day of the Blessing of the Water -
From the book The Cuban Crisis. Chronicle of submarine warfare author Huchthausen PeterForeword to the Russian reader The Cold War period, which lasted for almost half a century (from 1945 to 1991), was marked by many dramatic events, when the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States teetered on the brink of a real war. Cuban
From the book Economic History of Russia author Dusenbaev A A From the book History [Cheat Sheet] author Fortunatov Vladimir Valentinovich23. Formation of Russian absolutism For the needs of the army and the court under Peter, not only state, but also private manufactories were created. Their number grew from a few dozen to 200. But the development of Russian capitalism took place under strict state control,
From the book Empire of Napoleon III author Smirnov Andrey YurievichAPPENDIX No. 2. CLASSICS ON THE ESSENCE OF BONAPARTISM K. MARX The eighteenth brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (382) Bonaparte, as an executive power that has become an independent force, considers himself called upon to ensure “bourgeois order”. The strength of this bourgeois order lies in
From the book History author Plavinsky Nikolai Alexandrovich From the book Between Fear and Admiration: "The Russian Complex" in the Mind of the Germans, 1900-1945 by Kenen GerdThe destruction of the "Russian complex" While from the 1970s on the West German side the youth energy for change often poured into the "new Ostpolitik" and the social-liberal policies of the Brandt-Scheel government, the SED again
From the book Putin. In the mirror of the Izborsk Club author Vinnikov Vladimir YurievichThe foundation of Russian conservatism Russian conservatism at the current stage also has its own foundation. Finding it is a little more difficult, but possible. To do this, there are several fundamental, unshakable parameters that come from the “reverse”. Modern Russian
From the book Putin against the liberal swamp. How to save Russia author Kirpichev Vadim VladimirovichThe meaning of Russian communism This ghost ... wanders somewhere in Europe, but for some reason stops here. Viktor Chernomyrdin Russia is a natural empire. The Russian Empire, the USSR, the Russian Federation are the relay empires of the Russian civilization. Here it is, the secret key that reveals the secret
The deputies can be divided into 4 groups: the extreme left, which is only slightly more than 7 percent, the left (Cadet) center - 23 percent, the right (Octobrist) center - 25.1 percent. and right - 40 percent; non-Party people make up slightly less than 4 percent.
None of the groups, taken separately, represents an absolute majority.
In our country, as in any country with an autocratic or semi-autocratic regime, there are actually two governments: one official - the cabinet of ministers, the other behind the scenes - the court camarilla. ... The huge mass of the “Rights” in the Third Duma will ... defend the interests of precisely this social mould ... Preservation of the feudal economy, the privileges of the nobility and the autocratic-noble regime is a matter of life and death for these mastodons ...
This is how the Black Hundred-Octobrist majority in the Third State Duma is formed: it reaches the impressive figure of 284 people out of 432, i.e. up to 65.7 percent...
It is a stronghold of protectionism and militarism...
The objective course of affairs compels the Octobrists to look for allies in this respect. ...
And here is a new, again counter-revolutionary majority - the Octobrist-Cadet majority. ...
Both Duma majority - the Black-Hundred-Octobrist and the Octobrist-Cadet - relying alternately on which the government of Stolypin intends to balance, both of these majority, each in its own way - in different questions - will be counter-revolutionary. ...
Bonapartism is the maneuvering of a monarchy that has lost its old, patriarchal or feudal, simple and solid support, a monarchy that is forced to equilibrate in order not to fall, to flirt in order to govern, to bribe in order to please, to fraternize with the scum of society, with direct thieves and swindlers, to hold on not only to the bayonet. Bonapartism is the objectively inevitable evolution of the monarchy in every bourgeois country traced by Marx and Engels on a whole series of facts in the recent history of Europe. And the agrarian Bonapartism of Stolypin, quite consciously and unshakably firmly supported on this point by both the Black-Hundred landlords and the Octobrist bourgeoisie, could not even have been born ... if elements within the community had not constantly formed elements with which the autocracy could begin to flirt, with whom it could say : "get rich!", "rob the community, but support me!".
The Stolypin period of the Russian counter-revolution is characterized by the fact that the liberal bourgeoisie turned away from democracy, that Stolypin could That's why address for assistance, for sympathy, for advice, now to one, then to another representative of this bourgeoisie. Without this state of affairs, Stolypin could not have exercised the hegemony of the Council of the United Nobility over the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie ....
The landlord monarchy of Nicholas II after the revolution tried to rely on the counter-revolutionary mood of the bourgeoisie and on the bourgeois agrarian policy pursued by the same landowners; the failure of these attempts, which is now indisputable even for the Cadets, even for the Octobrists, is a failure last possible for tsarism politics.
The main historical sign of Bonapartism: the maneuvering of state power based on the military (on the worst elements of the army) between two hostile classes and forces that more or less balance each other. ...
Bonapartism in Russia is not an accident, but a natural product of the development of the class struggle in a petty-bourgeois country with significantly developed capitalism and a revolutionary proletariat. ... It would be the greatest mistake to think that Bonapartism is ruled out by a democratic situation. On the contrary, it is precisely in this situation (the history of France has twice confirmed this) that it grows up under a certain interrelation of classes and their struggle.
The history of France shows us that by the end of the 18th century (and then a second time by 1848-1852) the Bonapartist counter-revolution grew up on the soil of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, paving the way for the restoration of a legitimate monarchy. Bonapartism is a form of government that grows out of the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie in the context of democratic transformations and democratic revolution.
Lenin V.I. Full coll. op. T. 16. S. 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145. T. 17 S. 273, 274. T. 20. S. 328, 329. T. 34. S.; 49-51, 82- 83.
>>History: Reforms
18. Reforms
The general direction of the reform activity of P. A. Stolypin.
The main task set by the reformer Stolypin was to strengthen the social base of the existing system. Stormy events at the beginning of the 20th century. convinced him that the local nobility, sincerely devoted to the royal power, could no longer serve as a sufficiently reliable support for it alone.
On the other hand, the attempts of the authorities to rely on the communal peasantry did not justify themselves, bearing in mind their traditional political apathy and faith in<доброго царя>.
Powerful agrarian movement 1905-1906 clearly showed that the majority peasants will unconditionally support the government only if it receives state, appanage and, most importantly, landlord lands from it. P. A. Stolypin could not and did not want to go for such a radical socio-economic reorganization of Russia. He planned, leaving the landownership intact, to please the most prosperous part of the peasantry at the expense of the bulk of the communal peasants. Thus, the government, as it were, killed two birds with one stone - it retained the old social support in the person of the noble landlords and created a new one at the expense of<крепких хозяев>.
Not the last role in Stolypin's plans was played by the hope that the destruction of the community, the appearance of the owner-owner would have a grateful effect on the economic development of the village, help it raise the level of production, break out of the routine characteristic of communal farming. Stolypin also counted on the fact that his reforms would lead to changes in people's psychology, instill respect for private property, thereby instilling immunity to revolutionary agitation.
Stolypin was going to carry out all the transformations outlined in the government program, published on August 25, 1906. Moreover, the most important of these reforms were closely interconnected - the agrarian reform was supposed to help formalize<крепких хозяев>into a strong social group; reform of local self-government - to provide them with greater opportunities to participate in the work of zemstvos; reform of secondary and higher education - to democratize the education system in Russia, to make it more accessible to peasant children.
However, due to constant opposition right in the State Council and the royal environment, Stolypin managed to more or less consistently implement only agrarian reform - and even then only because the memories of the pogroms of landowners' estates and the division of estates between rebellious peasants were still fresh. In addition, the transformations proposed by Stolypin in this area practically did not affect the interests of the landlords. Further attempts to develop reformist activity met with hostility.
agrarian reform.
The main direction of the reform, begun back in the days revolution, was the destruction of the community.
Decree of November 9, 1906 on the transfer of communal allotments to the private ownership of individual peasants in full force<заработал>already in post-revolutionary Russia. A number of additional decrees of 1907-1911. the government has clearly defined its
Goals: not only to assign communal lands to individual owners, but also to put an end to the common tiling of the community.<Крепких хозяев>aimed at turning their farms into farms isolated from each other. In the same places, where this was impossible under the conditions of the patchwork of peasant farming, they still recommended to bring their allotments together, into cuts, even if they were located far from the peasant estates.
The local administration by all means forced the process of destruction of the community. For 1907-1914 2 million peasants stood out from the community (22% of all peasant farms). At the same time, not only the nascent rural bourgeoisie, which has long been burdensome and mutual responsibility, and permanent redistribution of land. The ruined poor also began to leave the community, striving to strengthen the land for themselves in order to sell it and go to the city or move to other, happier places.
These<бедняцкие>the land was bought up by the same strong owners, who, in this way, improved their position even more.
Other direction reforms, also aimed at strengthening the layer of wealthy peasants, was associated with the Peasants' Bank. He served as an intermediary between landlords who wanted to sell their land and peasants who wanted to buy it.
The bank facilitated the transfer of part of the landowners' lands into the hands of the rural bourgeoisie, but in a non-violent way, in the form of purchase and sale, moreover, on favorable terms for the landowners. For individual peasants, the bank provided loans on preferential terms necessary for such a purchase. If the first two directions of Stolypin's agrarian policy - the destruction of the community and the activities of the Peasant Bank - were supposed to strengthen the rural bourgeoisie, then Stolypin hoped to solve the problems associated with the rural poor with the help of mass resettlement. Due to this, he hoped, on the one hand, to ease the land hunger in the central provinces, on the other hand, to move the hardened part of the population to the outskirts of Russia, away from the landowners' estates.
The bulk of the settlers went to Siberia. The process of resettlement and land management was poorly organized. Quite often the peasants were left to the mercy of fate, a significant part of them, instead of establishing themselves as independent owners, fell into bondage to the local kulaks. It is no coincidence that more than 500 thousand (about 16%) out of more than three million migrants chose to return<на пепелище>- to native land. disregard for power<слабым и голодным>manifested in this important work, embittered the poor even more.
The results of Stolypin's policy.
P. A. Stolypin failed to fulfill his main task: to expand the social support of power at the expense of wealthy peasants. His reform undoubtedly greatly strengthened this part of the peasantry. However, as the rural bourgeoisie grew and grew stronger, their appetites grew and strengthened: it was impossible to satisfy them with poor communal land, as Stolypin expected. The kulaks dreamed of taking over the land of their main competitors, the landowners, and were ready to use any means for this purpose. Stolypin failed to find a compromise solution to this problem, which, while retaining the support of the landlords for the state power, would attract the sympathy of the rural bourgeoisie to it. Obviously, this was generally an insoluble task.
In 1911 P. A. Stolypin was killed in Kyiv by an agent of the Okhrana activist D. Bogrov. But even during the lifetime of the head of government, it became increasingly clear that his policy, which temporarily calmed Russia, could not prevent a new revolutionary explosion.
Already in 1910, after a long decline, a noticeable revival of the strike movement began, which intensified even more in 1911. The same processes took place in the student movement, among the democratic intelligentsia. A powerful impetus that greatly increased the revolutionary mood in Russia was the events at the Lena gold mines: here in 1912 a strike broke out, culminating in a peaceful procession of workers<к начальству>with your requirements. The procession was mercilessly shot by a military team. The Lena execution caused a whole wave of protest strikes, in which more than 300 thousand people took part. In the same 1912, unrest began in the army and navy, the most serious of which was the uprising in the Trinity camps near Tashkent.
In subsequent years, the revolutionary movement continued to grow uncontrollably. During 1913 - the first half of 1914, the number of strikers in the factory industry amounted to about 2 million people. The national movement intensified in the outskirts - in Transcaucasia, the Baltic states, the Kingdom of Poland. The country was covered by a nationwide crisis fraught with a new revolution. In such a hopelessly sick state, in August 1914, Russia entered the First World War.
1. Think about why the activities of P. A. Stolypin were characterized as<бонапартизм>. Remember where and when this concept appeared and what it means.
2. Compare the agrarian projects of S. Yu. Witte (see item 4) and P. A. Stolypin. Why did they not receive support from either the government, or opposition parties, or the broad circles of the Russian public, or the peasantry?
3. ESSAY: How do you explain the interest of the Russian public in P. A. Stolypin and his activities at the end of the 20th century?
Levandovsky A.A., Shchetinov Yu.A. Russia in the XX century. 10-11 classes. - M.: Enlightenment, 2002
Help a student online, History for grade 11 download, calendar-thematic planning
Lesson content lesson summary support frame lesson presentation accelerative methods interactive technologies Practice tasks and exercises self-examination workshops, trainings, cases, quests homework discussion questions rhetorical questions from students Illustrations audio, video clips and multimedia photographs, pictures graphics, tables, schemes humor, anecdotes, jokes, comics parables, sayings, crossword puzzles, quotes Add-ons abstracts articles chips for inquisitive cheat sheets textbooks basic and additional glossary of terms other Improving textbooks and lessonscorrecting errors in the textbook updating a fragment in the textbook elements of innovation in the lesson replacing obsolete knowledge with new ones Only for teachers perfect lessons calendar plan for the year methodological recommendations of the discussion program Integrated LessonsThird June Monarchy. Stolypin Bonapartism.
(lesson in 11th grade)
The lesson is for 2 hours.
Lesson objectives:
-- contribute to the formation of students' ideas about the features of the socio-political development of Russia in 1907-1913; about the goals, main directions, major events and results of the Stolypin reforms;
- to teach to search for historical information in sources, to carry out external and internal criticism of the source (to characterize the authorship, time, circumstances, purpose of its creation, degree of reliability); distinguish between facts and opinions in historical information; participate in group work, formulate their own position on the issues under discussion, use historical information to argue it, take into account different opinions; present the results of group historical and educational activities;
-- the formation of historical thinking - the ability to consider events and phenomena from the point of view of their historical conditionality, the ability to identify the historical conditionality of various assessments of past events, to determine and reasonably present one's own attitude to the debatable problems of history;
-- formation of value orientations and beliefs of students.
During the classes
1 phase. Call.
Issues for discussion:
Do you think that: a) in Russia from October 17, 1905 to June 3, 1907, there was a constitutional monarchy; b) Were the First and Second State Dumas real parliaments?
Why can the tsar's manifesto of June 3, 1907 be classified as a coup d'état?
Teacher: The completion of the revolution of 1905 - 1907, the change in electoral laws and the implementation of subsequent reforms were largely associated with the activities of P.A. Stolypin. In the policy pursued by Stolypin, the characteristic features of Bonapartism appeared. Bonapartism, a term originally used to refer to the military dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte and the dictatorship of Louis Bonaparte, later came to be used to refer to a special form of military dictatorship based on the policy of maneuvering between classes.
Question: What do you know about the topic of the lesson? What questions do you think we will find answers to during the lesson?
(As a result of the discussion, the goal of the lesson is formulated)
Purpose - To characterize the political situation in Russia after the dissolution of the Second Duma;
- Find out why the activities of P.A. Stolypin were characterized as "Bonapartism";
-- Assess the results of the Stolypin reforms.
phase. Making sense.
Teacher: The revolution ended without resolving most of the issues facing the country. Trying to pursue a new political course, Stolypin defined it in two words: "order and reform." He was convinced that punitive measures alone were not enough to stabilize the situation in Russia. “Revolution,” he wrote, “is not an external disease, but an internal one, and you cannot cure it with external medicines alone.” Stolypin hoped that by implementing the reform program he proposed in 1906, he would be able to "cure" Russia.
I. Program of P.A. Stolypin
Working with a document.
From the government message made by P.A. Stolypin when he assumed the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers
August 24, 1906
Thus, the path of the government is clear: to protect order and by decisive measures to protect the population from revolutionary manifestations and, at the same time, by exerting all the strength of the state, follow the path of construction in order to create a new stable order based on legality and reasonably understood true freedom.
Turning to the means of achieving the latter goal, the government is aware that it faces questions of a different order. Some are subject to the approval of the State Duma and the State Council, and on these questions the higher administration is obliged to prepare fully developed bills that would serve as the basis for judgment in legislative institutions. The entire period of time before the convocation of the State Duma should be used for this. Others, due to their extreme urgency, must be put into practice immediately ... In the first place among these tasks is the question of land, or land management ...
The government is currently working on a number of issues of paramount national importance; the most important of them are the following:
on freedom of religion;
about the inviolability of the person and about civil equality, in the sense of eliminating restrictions and constraints on certain groups of the population;
on the improvement of peasant land tenure;
on improving the living conditions of workers, and in particular on their state insurance;
about the reform of local government, which is supposed to be organized in such a way that provincial and district administrative institutions are put in direct contact with the transformed self-government bodies, including the small zemstvo unit;
on the introduction of zemstvo self-government in the Baltic, as well as in the Northern and South-Western Territories;
on the introduction of zemstvo and city self-government in the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland;
on the transformation of local courts;
on the reform of secondary and higher education;
on income tax;
about the police reform aimed, among other things, at the merger of the general and gendarmerie police;
on measures for the exclusive protection of state order and public peace, with the combination of the current various types of exclusive protection in one law.
The government has the right to count on the sympathy of the prudent part of society, thirsting for peace, and not the destruction and disintegration of the state. For its part, the government considers it obligatory for itself not to hamper the freely expressed public opinion, whether in print or through public meetings. But if these methods of manifestation of social consciousness are used to promote revolutionary ideas, then the government will not hesitate to continue to present to its agents an unconditional demand by all legal measures to protect the population from turning the instrument of enlightenment and progress into a method of propagating destruction and violence.
Questions for the document:
Who is the author of the document? What type of source is it?
When and in connection with what events was this speech delivered?
Describe the political program of Stolypin. What issue did he consider to be the top priority in carrying out reforms?
How did Stolypin feel about the Duma?
What provisions in Stolypin's speech seem reasonable to you, with which you cannot agree?
Do you think there is a connection between the personal qualities of a person and his political position?
What new things did this document help you learn about the political situation in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century?
II. III State Duma.
Teacher: As you remember, on June 3, 1907, a new electoral law was published, on the basis of which the elections were held. A group of officials prepared three schemes for the electoral law. One of them was called "shameless" for providing frank advantages to the landowners. The Council of Ministers chose this scheme.
Task: Based on the diagram (see the Presentation) and the material of the textbook, explain the concepts: "Stolypin's party", "October pendulum".
Group work.
Task: In the III Duma, an unstable balance was established between the right-wing - the Black Hundreds (144 deputies), the center - the Octobrists (148 deputies), and the left factions. Of the leftists, the Cadets (54 deputies) were the most significant faction, who, as a rule, were supported by representatives of the new Progressive Party, created in 1907 (28 deputies). The radical factions - 14 Trudoviks and 19 Social Democrats - kept aloof, but they could not seriously influence the course of the Duma's activities.
Write a speech on behalf of representatives:
1 group - Black Hundreds;
group 2 - Octobrists;
3 group - cadets;
group 4 - Trudoviks;
Group 5 - Social Democrats.
Conclusion: Stolypin skillfully manipulated the mood of the Duma members, providing support for most of his undertakings. The outcome of any vote was decided by the Octobrists. Thus, two majorities alternately arose in the Duma: the Right-Octobrist and the Octobrist-Cadet. The struggle between them made it possible to carry out a policy of maneuvering between the landowners and the big bourgeoisie. This was necessary to keep not only on bayonets.
III. agrarian reform.
Group work.
Task: Based on the generalization of the given documents (see Appendix), create a cluster:
Group 1 - reform objectives
Group 2 - components of the reform
Group 3 - positive results of the reform
Group 4 - negative results of the reform
Group 5 - reasons for the incompleteness of the reform
After the groups present the results of their work, discuss the question: How did agrarian Bonapartism manifest itself?
(Mass resettlement was organized in order to enrich some peasants at the expense of others, dissolving the community and facilitating the transfer of what belonged to the poor into the property of wealthy peasants, without giving the peasants landowners' land (radicalism), to enrich some peasants , to take the city, and secondly, the outskirts where resettlement is organized.From this point of view, Stolypin tried to reach a compromise of social forces, so that, on the one hand, not to infringe on the legal rights of the landowners to land, and on the other hand, to provide land to the most conscious part of the peasantry , as expected,-
the backbone of autocracy.)
Task: Familiarize yourself with the views of P.B. Struve and V.I. Lenin and try to formulate your point of view:
“... There can be no doubt that the agrarian reform, which eliminated the community, in terms of importance in the economic development of Russia, can only be put on a par with the liberation of the peasants and the construction of railways”
P.B. Struve
The “respite” given by Stolypin to the old order and the old feudal agriculture consists in the fact that one more, and, moreover, the last, valve has been opened, which could be opened without expropriating the entire landed estates.
V.I.Lenin
3 phase. Reflection.
Work in groups "Historical hats".
The teacher gives the groups a picture of a hat of a certain color: white, yellow, black, red and blue and explains the meaning of each color and the group's work with it.
White is the hat of an objective observer.
The white hat group must find and list only specific facts on the topic without ratings.
Yellow is an optimist's hat.
The group that received the yellow hat must find all the positive points in the topic covered.
Black is a pessimist's hat.
The group that received the black hat must find all the issues that have not been resolved at this historical stage.
Red is the hat of the emotional participant.
The group that received the red hat must explain what emotions and feelings were experienced by representatives of those social groups that were affected by the ongoing transformations.
The blue hat is the philosopher's hat.
The group that received the blue hat must prepare discussions on the following questions: What explains the “happy fate” of the Third State Duma? Why didn't Stolypin's undertakings find broad social support?
Homework:
Choice:
Create a presentation on the topic: "P.A. Stolypin's reforms"
Write an essay: "Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin - a dictator or a reformer?"
Application
Document 1
From the decree of Nicholas II to the Governing Senate (November 9, 1906):
Every householder who owns land on a communal right may at any time demand that the portion of the said land due to him be secured as personal property.<...>
In societies in which there were no general redistributions for 24 years<...>for each such householder, all plots of land that are in his permanent (not leased) use are strengthened into personal property, in addition to the plot of land<...>Claims for the strengthening of a part of the communal land into personal property<...>are presented through the village headman to the society, which, according to the verdict, decided by a simple majority of votes, is obliged, within a month from the date of filing the application, to indicate the plots received<...>into the property<...>householder. If within the specified period the society does not deliver such a verdict, then at the request of the householder who submitted the application, all the indicated actions are performed on the spot by the zemstvo chief<...>
Every householder<...>has the right to<...>demand that the society allocate to him instead of these plots his own plot, if possible to one place.
Document 2
From the speech of P.A. Stolypin in the State Duma on May 10, 1907
“I believe that land that would be distributed among citizens and alienated from some and transferred to other local Social-Democratic government offices - that this land would soon receive the same properties as water and air. They would begin to use it, yes, but to improve it, to apply their labor to it so that the results of this labor pass to another person - no one would do this. In general, the incentive to work, the spring that makes people work, would be broken. Every citizen - and among them there have always been and will be parasites - will know that he has the right to declare his desire to get land, to apply his labor to the land, then, when he gets tired of this occupation, to leave it and go again to roam the wide world. Everything will be compared, - you can equate everyone only to the lowest level. It is impossible to equate a lazy person with a hardworking person, it is impossible to equate a stupid person with an able-bodied person. As a result, the cultural level will decrease. A good master, a master-inventor, by the very force of things will be deprived of the opportunity to apply his knowledge to the earth.
... The nationalization of the land seems to the government disastrous for the country, and the project of the party of people's freedom, that is, semi-expropriation, semi-nationalization, in the final conclusion, in our opinion, will lead to the same results as the proposals of the left parties. Where is the exit? ... But before talking about methods, one must clearly imagine the goal, and the goal of the government is quite definite: the government wants to raise peasant land ownership, it wants to see the peasant rich, sufficient, because where there is prosperity, there, of course, is enlightenment, there and real freedom.
But for this it is necessary to give an opportunity to a capable, industrious peasant, i.e. salt of the Russian land, to free himself from those vices, from those current conditions of life in which he is currently located. It is necessary to give him the opportunity to strengthen the fruits of his labors and give them inalienable property. Let this property be common where the community has not yet become obsolete, let it be household property where the community is no longer viable, but let it be strong, let it be hereditary. The government is obliged to help such an owner-owner with advice, help with a loan, that is, with money.
...Having spent about 10 years in the field of land management, I came to a deep conviction that hard work is needed in this matter, long-term menial work is needed. This issue cannot be resolved, it must be resolved. In Western states, this took decades. We offer you a modest but sure way. Opponents of statehood would like to choose the path of radicalism, the path of liberation from Russia's historical past, liberation from cultural traditions.
You need great upheavals, we need a GREAT RUSSIA!”
Document 3
The land reform of 1906 through the eyes of the French economic observer Edmond Thery
1914
Emperor Nicholas II, by decree of May 30, 1905, created a special council to strengthen peasant land ownership. At the end of the council's first report, it was said that it was necessary to make it easier for the peasants to acquire personal possession of those plots that make up their allotments, and that the council sees this as the goal of its work. And the king wrote with his own hand on the report that this was the main task to be solved.
Fulfilling the will of the sovereign, the government took action, highlighting 2 main tasks:
1) to provide each peasant with private ownership of the plots assigned to him by the world, while at the same time combining these plots into a single economy, and assist him in acquiring land that is not related to the allotment;
2) to set up institutions in the localities, provided with the necessary technical means, specially responsible for demarcation, for the development and improvement of agricultural implements, and for the practical instruction of the rural population affected by the projected reform.
Among the measures of paramount importance, the most significant was the abolition by the manifesto on November 3, 1905, of redemption payments for those allotments that the peasants received in 1861.
This reduced state revenue by about 80 million rubles.
By a decree of March 4, 1906, provincial and district land management commissions were created, responsible for preparing the details of the reform and for solving all the particular difficulties that could be encountered during its implementation in various regions of the empire.
The choice of the city or village where land management commissions were created fell on the Land Management Commission, created by decree on April 23 of the same year. Since 1906, the Commission has organized 188 county land management commissions in 33 provinces.
Subsequently, the commissions operated in all counties where land management work was required, so that by January 1, 1912, they existed in 452 counties included in 47 of the 50 provinces of the European part of Russia.
3 Baltic provinces, where agrarian reform was carried out on other grounds, did not need the assistance of land management commissions.
Simultaneously with the organization of land management commissions, other measures were introduced that allowed the peasants to improve the cultivation of the land and buy land in excess of allotments. For many years, the Peasants' Bank, established in 1882, worked for this purpose, providing peasants with soft loans to buy land from private individuals. In 1895, the bank received the right to acquire private properties for resale to peasants in the form of small plots; finally, by decrees of November 3, 1905 and October 14, 1906, its functions were simultaneously expanded and the general conditions of loans and loans were improved in favor of the peasants.
But it should not be imagined that thanks to these regulations, enshrined in the decree of November 9, 1906, and the law of June 14, 1910, the peasant, who became a private owner, could dispose of the land thus acquired as he pleased. He could sell the land only to another peasant, mortgage it only to the Peasants' Bank, and in this case he was obliged to fully use the previously received loan to purchase new or improve land already owned by him.
Finally, in order to avoid the risk of land being bought by other speculators, the same law of June 14, 1910, established that no one can acquire too much land and that one family has the right to acquire a maximum of thirty peasant plots.
However, the Russian government was not content with just facilitating the transformation of communal property into sole property, it also provided the peasants with material support and contributed to the improvement of agricultural culture, forming a cadre of agronomists who instructed the peasants and helped them to improve the cultivation of the land.
State initiative also manifested itself in the creation of model farms, which have now spread throughout all provinces, machine depots and warehouses for improved agricultural implements, in improving the quality of livestock, and so on.
The consequences of these measures, supplementing the Great Reform of 1861, are already very significant.
As for, for example, agricultural education, from the explanatory note to the list of the budget for 1913, presented by the Minister of Finance and Chairman of the State Council, Count Kokovtsev, it follows that the number of students in agricultural schools in 1911 amounted to 15 thousand against 9,300 in 1907 and that the number of graduates of these schools exceeds 2,000 a year. Moreover, more than 300,000 peasants are taking practical courses in agriculture.
Progress in agricultural production is manifested at all levels, from the largest farm to the smallest. For example, imports of agricultural machinery and tools, which did not exceed 20,700 thousand rubles in 1906, reached 57,000 thousand rubles in 1911, and at the same time, domestic production of the same machines and tools more than tripled between 1906 and 1911. years, amounting to this last amount of 61,500 thousand rubles.
The number of agricultural societies also more than tripled between 1906 and 1911, rising in the latter to 3,700 from 1,000 in 1906.
In 1909, there were about a hundred agricultural cooperatives that are engaged in the sale of products, the supply of necessary industrial goods, and the distribution of agricultural machinery; over the past three years, 703 of them have been created.
Ter and E. Russia in 1914. Economic review. - Paris, 1986. - S. 28-31.
Document 4
“The effectiveness of P. Stolypin's agrarian reform is ambiguously assessed by historians. The positive aspects, of course, include an attempt to destroy such an archaic institution as the community; the policy of resettlement of peasants, the elimination of many restrictions on their movement, the choice of place of residence, type of occupation; demarcation of the intricate land tenure of neighboring villages. The forced planting of farms and cuts can be called negative aspects ... without taking into account local conditions ...
Despite different points of view, most historians agree that, despite many positive aspects, the reform still failed: it did not destroy the communities, did not create an impressive layer of "strong" owners, which amounted to only 4-5% of the rural population. The reasons for the failure are called many factors of an economic and political nature, although in addition to them there were also purely psychological ones. The main vice of landlord landownership ... does not even lie in the peasant lack of land and landlessness, but in the fact that it put an exorbitant burden on the psychology of the peasant, accustomed him to the consciousness of his secondary importance, fettered his entrepreneurial spirit, reconciled him with a powerless position, in a word, cultivated the psychology of a farm laborer , not the owner (farmer) ...
In addition, the reform was prepared by people who did not know the Russian village enough. Stolypin himself was carried away by the idea of restructuring Russia according to the Western model. The chief theorist on land management A. A. Kofod (a Dane by origin) lived for a long time in the Pskov province, however, even after studying the Russian village, he could not comprehend the psychology of the Russian peasantry ...
The main idea of the reform, consisting in the individualization of land tenure in Russia, is progressive. It is clear that the implementation of this idea was not at all an easy task... If we talk about the Stolypin agrarian reform as an agrarian revolution, then it failed... If we consider it as the first step in the evolutionary restructuring of the Russian countryside, then we cannot deny the progressive reform and courage of the man who took this decisive step.
(Lobanova E.V. Petr Stolypin: evolution of economic views // Economic history.
reformers and reformers. M., 1995. S. 28-31.)
Document 5
“An integral part of the agrarian reform of P. A. Stolypin was the resettlement policy. The government established numerous benefits for those who wished to move to new places: the forgiveness of all arrears, low prices for railway tickets, tax exemption for five years, interest-free loans ranging from 100 rubles to 400 rubles for a peasant household. On the way, the settlers were supposed to be provided with food and medical assistance... In 10 years, 3.1 million people moved to Siberia. The sown area beyond the Ural Range has doubled. Siberia supplied 800 thousand tons of grain to the domestic and foreign markets.
Impressive successes could not obscure the difficulties. Rail travel was poorly organized. Hundreds of people died during the hard journey. The harsh conditions of Siberia demanded the exertion of all forces. Siberian newspapers wrote: “Each piece of arable land is watered with the blood and sweat of a settler, every bare and drained swamp is marked with new crosses in the village cemeteries. Mortality and morbidity among migrants is very high. The taiga demands sacrifices for every inch of land...”
Settlers were not always able to master new methods of agriculture. A Kaluga peasant described the disappointment of his countrymen on the Irtysh when the fields sown according to all the Central Russian rules did not yield a harvest: Why did they endure so much torment and terrible danger? And the women wept bitterly here and promised a lot of bad things to all those by whose mercy they got to this side.
(Our Fatherland. Experience of political history.
M., 1991. Part 1. S. 242-243.)