George Kennan - World War II diplomacy through the eyes of George Kennan, US Ambassador to the USSR. George Kennan and Russia Ambassador to the USSR

George Frost Kennan

The political essence of Soviet power in its current incarnation is a derivative of ideology and the prevailing conditions: the ideology inherited by the current Soviet leaders from the political movement in the depths of which their political birth took place, and the conditions in which they rule in Russia for almost 30 years. To trace the interaction of these two factors and to analyze the role of each of them in shaping the official line of conduct of the Soviet Union is not an easy task for psychological analysis. Nevertheless, it is worth trying to solve it if we want to understand Soviet behavior for ourselves and successfully counteract it.
It is not easy to summarize the set of ideological positions with which the Soviet leaders came to power. The Marxist ideology in its variant, which has spread among Russian communists, is subtly changing all the time. It is based on extensive and complex material. However, the main provisions of the communist doctrine, as it had taken shape by 1916, can be summarized as follows:
a) the main factor in a person's life, which determines the nature of social life and the "face of society", is the system of production and distribution of material goods;
b) the capitalist system of production is disgusting, because it inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class and cannot fully ensure the development of the economic potential of society or the fair distribution of material goods created by human labor;
c) capitalism bears within itself the germ of its own destruction, and as a result of the inability of the capital-owning class to adapt itself to economic changes, sooner or later power will inevitably pass into the hands of the working class with the help of revolution;
d) imperialism as the last stage of capitalism inevitably leads to war and revolution.
The rest can be summarized in the words of Lenin: “The uneven economic and political development is an unconditional law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of socialism is possible initially in a few or even in one country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of this country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed classes of other countries to itself ... ")" It should be noted that capitalism was not supposed to perish without a proletarian revolution. To overthrow the rotten system, a final push from the revolutionary proletarian movement is needed. But it was believed that sooner or later such a push is inevitable.
During the fifty years prior to the beginning of the revolution, this way of thinking was extremely attractive to the participants in the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, dissatisfied, having lost hope of finding expression in the narrow confines of the political system of Tsarist Russia (or perhaps too impatient), having no broad popular support for their theory that a bloody revolution was necessary to improve social conditions, these revolutionaries in Marxist theory saw an eminently convenient substantiation of their instinctive aspirations. She gave a pseudoscientific explanation for their impatience, their categorical denial of anything of value in the royal system, their thirst for power and revenge, and their desire to achieve their goals at all costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that they believed without hesitation in the truth and depth of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, which was so consonant with their own feelings and aspirations. Do not question their sincerity. This phenomenon is as old as the world. Edward Gibson said it best in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: “From enthusiasm to imposture, there is one step, dangerous and inconspicuous; the demon of Socrates is a vivid example of how a wise person sometimes deceives himself, a good person deceives others, and the mind sinks into a vague dream, not distinguishing its own delusions from deliberate deception. It was with this set of theoretical propositions that the Bolshevik Party came to power.
It should be noted here that during the many years of preparation for the revolution, these people, and Marx himself, paid attention not so much to the form that socialism would take in the future, but to the inevitability of the overthrow of the hostile government, which, in their opinion, should have necessarily preceded the building of socialism. !. Their ideas about a positive program of action that would have to be implemented after coming to power were for the most part vague, speculative and far from reality. There was no agreed program of action other than the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private fortunes. With regard to the peasantry, which, according to Marxist theory, is not a proletariat, there has never been complete clarity in communist views; and during the first decade of the Communists in power, the issue remained a subject of controversy and doubt.
The conditions that prevailed in Russia immediately after the revolution - the Civil War and foreign intervention, and the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a small minority of the Russian people - led to the need for a dictatorship. The experiment with "war communism" and the attempt to immediately destroy private production and trade led to dire economic consequences and further disappointment in the new revolutionary government. Although the temporary easing of efforts to impose communism in the form of the New Economic Policy somewhat eased the economic plight and thus justified its purpose, it clearly showed that the "capitalist sector of society" was still ready to immediately take advantage of the slightest easing of pressure from the government and, .if given the right to exist, it will always represent a powerful opposition to the Soviet regime and a serious competitor in the struggle for influence in the country. Approximately the same attitude developed towards the individual peasant, who, in essence, was also a private, albeit a small producer.
Lenin, if he were alive, might have been able to prove his greatness and reconcile these opposing forces for the benefit of the entire Russian society, although this is doubtful. But be that as it may, Stalin and those whom he led in the struggle to inherit the Leninist leadership role were unwilling to put up with competing political forces in the sphere of power they coveted. Too acutely they felt the fragility of their position. In their special fanaticism, which is alien to the Anglo-Saxon traditions of political compromise, there was so much zeal and intransigence that they did not even intend to constantly share power with someone. Disbelief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence on a permanent basis with political rivals passed to them from their Russo-Asiatic ancestors. Easily believing in their own doctrinaire infallibility, they insisted on the subjugation or destruction of all political opponents. Outside the framework of the Communist Party, no coherent organization was allowed in Russian society. Only those forms of collective human activity and communication were permitted in which the Party played the leading role. No other force in Russian society had the right to exist as a viable integral organism. Only the party was allowed to be structurally organized. The rest was destined for the role of an amorphous mass.
The same principle prevailed within the party itself. The rank and file members of the party, of course, participated in the elections, discussions, adoption and implementation of decisions, but they did this not on their own initiative, but at the direction of the party leadership that instilled awe and certainly in accordance with the ubiquitous "teaching".
I want to emphasize once again that, perhaps, these figures did not aspire subjectively to absolute power as such. They undoubtedly believed - it was easy for them - that only they know what is good for society, and will act for its good, if they manage to reliably protect their power from encroachment. However, in an effort to secure their power, they did not recognize any restrictions in their actions - neither God's nor human. And until such security is achieved, the well-being and happiness of the peoples entrusted to them were relegated to the last place in their list of priorities.
Today, the main feature of the Soviet regime is that this process of political consolidation has not yet been completed, and the Kremlin rulers are still mainly engaged in the struggle for protection against encroachments on the power that they seized in November 1917 and are striving to turn into absolute power. First of all, they tried to protect it from internal enemies in Soviet society itself. They are trying to protect her from encroachments from the outside world. After all, their ideology, as we have already seen, teaches that the world around them is hostile to them and that it is their duty to someday overthrow the political forces in power outside their country. The mighty forces of Russian history and tradition contributed to the strengthening of this conviction in them. And finally, their own aggressive intransigence towards the outside world eventually caused a backlash, and they were soon forced, in the words of the same Gibson, to "stigmatize the arrogance" that they themselves had caused. Every person has an inalienable right to prove to himself that the world is hostile to him, if you repeat this often enough and proceed from this in your actions, you will inevitably turn out to be right in the end.
The way of thinking of the Soviet leaders and the nature of their ideology predetermine that no opposition can be officially recognized as useful and justified. Theoretically, such an opposition is a product of the hostile, irreconcilable forces of dying capitalism. As long as the existence of the remnants of capitalism in Russia was officially recognized, it was possible to shift part of the blame for the preservation of the dictatorial regime in the country on them as an internal force. But as these remnants were eliminated, such an excuse fell away. It completely disappeared when it was officially announced that they were finally destroyed. This circumstance gave rise to one of the main problems of the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia, and the Kremlin was not ready to openly admit that serious broad opposition could arise in the country on its own from the liberated masses subject to it, it became necessary to justify the preservation of the dictatorship by the thesis of capitalist outside threat.
It started a long time ago. In 1924, Stalin, in particular, justified the preservation of the organs of suppression, by which, among others, he meant the army and the secret police, by the fact that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement, the danger of intervention remains, with all the consequences that follow from it." According to this theory, from that time on, any forces of internal opposition in Russia were consistently presented as agents of reactionary foreign powers hostile to Soviet power. For the same reason, the original communist thesis of antagonism between the capitalist and socialist worlds was strongly emphasized.
Many examples convince us that this thesis has no basis in reality. The facts relating to it are largely explained by the sincere indignation that Soviet ideology and tactics aroused abroad, and also, in particular, by the existence of large centers of military power - the Nazi regime in Germany and the government of Japan, which in the late 30s really hatched aggressive plans against the Soviet Union. However, there is every reason to believe that the emphasis that Moscow is placing on the threat to Soviet society from the outside world is explained not by the real existence of antagonism, but by the need to justify the preservation of the dictatorial regime inside the country.
The preservation of this character of Soviet power, namely the desire for unlimited dominance within the country at the same time as the planting of a half-myth about the irreconcilable hostility of the external environment, greatly contributed to the formation of the mechanism of Soviet power with which we are dealing today. The internal organs of the state apparatus, which did not meet the set goal, withered away. Those that met the target swelled beyond measure. The security of Soviet power began to rely on iron discipline in the party, on the cruelty and omnipresence of the secret police, and on the unlimited monopoly of the state in the field of the economy. The organs of suppression, which Soviet leaders saw as defenders against hostile forces, largely subjugated those they were supposed to serve. Today, the main organs of Soviet power are absorbed in perfecting the dictatorial system and propagating the thesis that Russia is a besieged fortress with enemies lurking around its walls. And millions of employees of the apparatus of power must defend this view of the situation in Russia to the last, because without it they will be out of work.
At present, the rulers can no longer even think of doing without organs of suppression. The struggle for absolute power, which has been going on for almost three decades with unprecedented (at least in scope) cruelty in our time, is again causing a backlash both at home and abroad. The excesses of the police apparatus made the covert opposition to the regime much stronger and more dangerous than it could have been before the outbreak of these excesses.
And least of all, the rulers are ready to give up the fabrications with which they justify the existence of a dictatorial regime. For these inventions have already been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses that were committed in their name. They are now firmly entrenched in the Soviet way of thinking by means far beyond ideology.

Such is the story. How is it reflected in the political essence of Soviet power today?
Nothing has officially changed in the original ideological concept. As before, the thesis is preached about the primordial viciousness of capitalism, about the inevitability of its death and about the mission of the proletariat, which must contribute to this death and take power into its own hands. But now the emphasis is mainly on those concepts that have a specific bearing on the Soviet regime as such: on its exceptional position as the only truly socialist order in a dark and misguided world, and on the relationships of power within it.
The first concept concerns the immanent antagonism between capitalism and socialism. We have already seen what a firm place it occupies in the foundations of Soviet power. It has a profound effect on Russia's behavior as a member of the international community. It means that Moscow will never sincerely recognize the common goals of the Soviet Union and the countries that it considers capitalist. In all likelihood, Moscow believes that the goals of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime and, consequently, to the interests of the peoples controlled by it. If from time to time the Soviet government puts its signature on documents that say otherwise, then this must be understood as a tactical maneuver, permitted in relations with the enemy (always dishonorable), and perceived in the spirit of caveat emptor. The underlying antagonism remains. It is postulated. It becomes the source of many manifestations of the Kremlin's foreign policy that cause us concern: secretiveness, insincerity, duplicity, wary suspicion and general unfriendliness. In the foreseeable future, all these manifestations, apparently, will continue, only their degree and scale will vary. When the Russians want something from us, one feature or another of their foreign policy is temporarily relegated to the background; in such cases, there are always Americans who hasten to joyfully announce that “the Russians have already changed,” and some of them even try to take credit for the “changes” that have taken place. But we must not succumb to such tactical ploys. These characteristic features of Soviet policy, as well as the postulates from which they follow, constitute the inner essence of Soviet power and will always be present in the foreground or background until this inner essence changes.
This means that we will have to experience difficulties in relations with the Russians for a long time to come. This does not mean that they should be perceived in the context of their program, by all means to carry out a revolution in our society by a certain date. The theoretical proposition about the inevitability of the death of capitalism, fortunately, contains a hint that this can not be rushed. Progressive forces can slowly prepare for the final coir de grace. For the time being, it is vital that the “socialist fatherland”, this oasis of power already won for socialism in the face of the Soviet Union, be loved and defended by all true communists at home and abroad; that they may promote his prosperity and stigmatize his enemies. Helping immature "adventurist" revolutions abroad, which could somehow put the Soviet government in a difficult position, must be regarded as an unforgivable and even counter-revolutionary step. As decided in Moscow, the business of socialism is to support and strengthen Soviet power.
Here we come to the second concept that defines Soviet behavior today. This is the thesis about the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which does not allow for any organizational centers outside the party itself, requires that, in theory, the party leadership remain the only source of truth. For if the truth were to be found somewhere else, then this could serve as an excuse for its manifestation in organized activity. But this is precisely what the Kremlin cannot and will not allow.
Consequently, the leadership of the Communist Party is always right, and has always been right since 1929, when Stalin legitimized his personal power by declaring that Politburo decisions were taken unanimously.
Iron discipline within the Communist Party is based on the principle of infallibility. In fact, these two positions are interrelated. Strict discipline requires the recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires discipline. Together, they largely determine the model of behavior of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their significance can only be understood if a third factor is taken into account, namely, that the leadership can, for tactical purposes, put forward any thesis that it considers useful for the cause at a given moment, and demand the devoted and unconditional consent to it of all members of the movement as a whole. This means that the truth is not immutable, but is actually created by the Soviet leaders themselves for any purpose and intention. It can change every week or every month. It ceases to be absolute and immutable and does not follow from objective reality. It is just the latest concrete manifestation of the wisdom of those who should be considered the source of truth in the final instance, because they express the logic of the historical process. Together, all three factors give the subordinate apparatus of Soviet power unshakable stubbornness and monolithic views. These views are changed only at the direction of the Kremlin. If a certain party line is developed on this issue of current policy, then the entire Soviet state machine, including diplomacy, begins to move steadily along the prescribed path, like a wound up toy car that is launched in a given direction and will stop only when it collides with a superior force. People who are the details of this mechanism are deaf to the arguments of the mind that reach them from outside. All their training teaches them not to trust and not to recognize the apparent persuasiveness of the outside world. Like a white dog in front of a gramophone, they hear only the "voice of the owner." And in order for them to deviate from the line dictated from above, the order must come only from the owner. Thus, the representative of a foreign power cannot expect that his words will make any impression on them. The most he can hope for is that his words will be conveyed to the top, where people who have the power to change the line of the party are sitting. But even these people can hardly be affected by normal logic if it comes from a representative of the bourgeois world. Since it is useless to refer to common goals, it is just as pointless to count on the same approach. Therefore, facts mean more to Kremlin leaders than words, and words carry the most weight when they are supported by facts or reflect facts of undeniable value.
However, we have already seen that the ideology does not require the Kremlin to quickly achieve its goals. Like the church, it deals with long-term ideological concepts and therefore can afford to take its time. He has no right to risk the gains of the revolution already achieved for the sake of the illusory chimeras of the future. Lenin's teaching itself calls for great caution and flexibility in achieving communist goals. Again, these theses are reinforced by the lessons of Russian history, where little-known battles between nomadic tribes were fought over the vast expanses of unfortified plains for centuries. Here caution and prudence, resourcefulness and deceit were important qualities; Naturally, for a person with a Russian or Eastern mindset, these qualities are of great value. Therefore, the Kremlin, without regret, can retreat under the pressure of superior forces. And since time has no value, he does not panic if he has to retreat. His politics is a smooth stream, which, if nothing interferes with it, constantly moves towards the intended goal. His main concern is to fill in all the nooks and crannies in the pool of world power by all means. But if on his way he encounters insurmountable barriers, he takes it philosophically and adapts to them. The main thing is not to run out of pressure, a stubborn desire for the desired goal. There is not even a hint in Soviet psychology that this goal must be achieved within a certain period of time.
Such reflections lead to the conclusion that dealing with Soviet diplomacy is both easier and more difficult than dealing with the diplomacy of such aggressive leaders as Napoleon or Hitler. On the one hand, it is more sensitive to resistance, ready to retreat in certain sectors of the diplomatic front, if the opposing force is assessed as superior and, therefore, more rational in terms of the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand, it is not easy to defeat or stop her by defeating her with a single victory. And the persistent tenacity that drives it suggests that it can be successfully resisted not through sporadic actions dependent on the fleeting whims of democratic public opinion, but only through a well-thought-out long-term policy of Russia's opponents, which would be no less consistent in its goals. and no less varied and inventive in means than the policy of the Soviet Union itself.
Under the circumstances, the cornerstone of United States policy towards the Soviet Union must undoubtedly be a long, patient, but firm and vigilant check on Russia's expansionist tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with external harshness, with empty or boastful statements of firmness. While the Kremlin is most flexible in the face of political realities, it has certainly become inflexible when it comes to its prestige. By tactless statements and threats, the Soviet government, like almost any other, can be placed in a position where it will not be able to yield, even contrary to the demands of reality. Russian leaders are well versed in human psychology and are well aware that the loss of self-control does not contribute to the strengthening of positions in politics. They skillfully and quickly take advantage of such manifestations of weakness. Therefore, in order to successfully build relations with Russia, a foreign state must necessarily remain cool and collected and make demands on its policies in such a way that it remains open to concessions without sacrificing prestige.

In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that Soviet pressure on the free institutions of the Western world can only be contained by skillful and vigilant counteraction at various geographical and political points, constantly changing depending on the shifts and changes in Soviet policy, but it cannot be eliminated with the help of spells and conversations. The Russians expect an endless duel and believe that they have already achieved great success. We must remember that at one time the Communist Party played a much smaller role in Russian society than the current role of the Soviet country in the world community. Let ideological convictions allow the rulers of Russia to think that the truth is on their side and that they can take their time. But those of us who do not profess this ideology can objectively assess the correctness of these postulates. The Soviet doctrine not only implies that Western countries cannot control the development of their own economy, but also assumes the boundless unity, discipline and patience of Russians. Let's take a sober look at this apocalyptic postulate and assume that the West manages to find the strength and means to contain Soviet power for 10-15 years. What will it mean for Russia?
Soviet leaders, using modern techniques in the art of despotism, solved the problem of obedience within their state. Rarely does anyone challenge them; but even these few cannot fight against the repressive state organs.
The Kremlin has also proved its ability to achieve its goals by creating, regardless of the interests of the peoples of Russia, the foundations of heavy industry. This process, however, has not yet been completed and continues to develop, bringing Russia closer in this respect to the main industrialized states. However, all this - both the maintenance of internal political security and the creation of heavy industry - was achieved at the expense of colossal losses in human lives, destinies and hopes. Forced labor is being used on a scale never seen before in our time. Other sectors of the Soviet economy, especially agriculture, the production of consumer goods, housing and transport, are ignored or mercilessly exploited.
In addition to everything, the war brought terrible destruction, enormous human losses and poverty of the people. This explains the fatigue, physical and moral, of the entire population of Russia. The people in the mass are disappointed and skeptical, the Soviet government is no longer as attractive to them as before, although it continues to attract its supporters abroad. The enthusiasm with which the Russians took advantage of some of the concessions for the church, introduced during the war for tactical reasons, eloquently shows that their ability to believe and serve ideals did not find expression in the politics of the regime.
In such circumstances, the physical and mental strength of people is not unlimited. They are objective and operate in the conditions of even the most brutal dictatorships, since people are simply not able to overcome them. Forced labor camps and other institutions of repression are only temporary means to force people to work more than their desire or economic necessity requires. If people do survive, they age prematurely and should be considered victims of a dictatorial regime. In any case, their best abilities have already been lost to society and cannot be put at the service of the state.
Now there is only hope for the next generation. The new generation, despite hardship and suffering, is numerous and energetic; besides, the Russians are a talented people. It is still, however, not clear how this generation, when it enters the age of maturity, will be reflected in the extreme emotional overload of childhood, generated by the Soviet dictatorship and greatly aggravated by the war. Concepts such as ordinary security and peace of mind in one's own home now exist in the Soviet Union only in the most remote villages. And there is no certainty that all this will not affect the general abilities of the generation that is now coming of age.
In addition, there is the fact that the Soviet economy, although it boasts significant achievements, develops alarmingly unevenly and unevenly. Russian communists who talk about the "unequal development of capitalism" should be ashamed to look at their economy. The scale of development of some of its branches, such as metallurgical or machine-building, went beyond reasonable proportions in comparison with the development of other branches of the economy. We have before us a state which aspires within a short time to become one of the great industrial powers, and at the same time does not have decent highways, and its railway network is very imperfect. Much has already been done to raise labor productivity and to teach semi-literate peasants how to use machines. However, logistics is still the most terrible hole in the Soviet economy. Construction is carried out hastily and poorly. Depreciation costs are probably huge. In many sectors of the economy, it has not been possible to instill in the workers at least some of the elements of the general culture of production and the technical self-respect inherent in the skilled workers of the West.
It is difficult to imagine how tired and depressed people who work under conditions of fear and coercion will be able to quickly eliminate these shortcomings. And until they are overcome, Russia will remain an economically vulnerable and somewhat infirm country that can export its enthusiasm or spread the inexplicable charms of its primitive political vitality, but is unable to back up these exports with real evidence of material strength and prosperity.
At the same time, a great uncertainty hung over the political life of the Soviet Union, the same uncertainty that is associated with the transfer of power from one person to another or from one group of persons to another.
This problem, of course, is connected mainly with the special position of Stalin. It must not be forgotten that his inheritance of Lenin's exclusive position in the communist movement is so far the only case of a transfer of power in the Soviet Union. It took twelve years to consolidate this transition. It cost the people millions of lives and shook the foundations of the state. Side shocks were felt throughout the international communist movement and hurt the Kremlin leaders themselves.
It is quite possible that the next transfer of unlimited power will take place quietly and imperceptibly, without any perturbations. But at the same time, it is possible that the problems associated with this will lead, in the words of Lenin, to one of those "extraordinarily rapid transitions" from "subtle deceit" to "unbridled violence" that are characteristic of the history of Russia, and will shake the Soviet power. to the base.
But it's not just about Stalin himself. Since 1938, a disturbing rigidity of political life has been observed in the highest echelons of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, which is theoretically considered the highest organ of the Party,1 must meet at least once every three years. The last congress was almost eight years ago. During this time, the number of party members doubled. During the war, a huge number of communists died, and now more than half of all members of the party are people who joined its ranks after the last congress. Nevertheless, at the top of power, despite all the misfortunes of the country, the same small group of leaders remains. To be sure, there are reasons why the ordeal of the war years brought about fundamental political changes in the governments of all major Western states. The reasons for this phenomenon are quite general, and therefore should be present in the hidden Soviet political life. But there are no signs of such processes in Russia.
The conclusion is that even within an organization as highly disciplined as the Communist Party, differences in age, attitudes and interests must inevitably become more and more apparent between the huge masses of ordinary members who have joined it relatively recently, and a very small group of permanent top leaders, with whom most of these party members have never met, never spoken to, and with whom they cannot have any political affinity.
It is difficult to predict whether under these conditions the inevitable rejuvenation of the upper echelons of power will proceed (and this is only a matter of time) peacefully and smoothly, or whether rivals in the struggle for power will turn to the politically immature and inexperienced masses to enlist their support. If the latter is true, then the Communist Party must expect unpredictable consequences: after all, the rank-and-file members of the Party have learned to work only under conditions of iron discipline and subordination and are completely helpless in the art of reaching compromises and agreement. If a split occurs in the Communist Party that paralyzes its actions, then the chaos and helplessness of society in Russia will be revealed in extreme forms. For, as already mentioned, Soviet power is only a shell that hides an amorphous mass that is denied the creation of an independent organizational structure. Russia does not even have local self-government. The current generation of Russians has no idea about independent collective action. Therefore, if something happens that destroys the unity and effectiveness of the party as a political instrument, then Soviet Russia can instantly turn from one of the strongest into one of the weakest and most miserable countries in the world.
Thus, the future of Soviet power is by no means as cloudless as the Russian habit of self-deception may seem to the Kremlin rulers. They have already demonstrated that they can hold on to power. But they have yet to prove that they can easily and calmly pass it on to others. However, the heavy burden of their dominance and the vicissitudes of international life have noticeably undermined the strength and hopes of the great people on which their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological influence of Soviet power is currently stronger outside of Russia, where the long arms of the Soviet police cannot reach. In this regard, the comparison comes to mind, which is in the novel by Thomas Mann "Buddenbrooks". Arguing that human institutions acquire a special outward brilliance just at the moment when their internal decay reaches its highest point, he likens the Buddenbrook family at the time of its heyday to one of those stars whose light illuminates our world most brightly when on in fact, they have long ceased to exist. Who can vouch for the fact that the rays that the Kremlin is still sending out to the discontented peoples of the Western world are not the very last light of a fading star? You can't prove it. And refute too. But there remains a hope (and, in the opinion of the author of this article, quite a big one) that the Soviet power, like the capitalist system in its understanding, bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction, and these seeds have already begun to grow.
It is clear that a political rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet regime can hardly be expected in the foreseeable future. The United States must continue to see the Soviet Union not as a partner, but as a rival in the political arena. They must be prepared for the fact that Soviet policy will reflect not an abstract love of peace and stability and not a sincere belief in the constant happy coexistence of the socialist and capitalist world, but a cautious and persistent desire to undermine and weaken the influence of all opposing forces and countries.
But we must not forget that Russia is still a weak country compared to the Western world as a whole, that Soviet politics are highly unbalanced, and that there may be flaws in Soviet society that will ultimately lead to a weakening of its overall potential. This in itself entitles the United States to confidently pursue a policy of determined containment to oppose the Russians with unyielding strength anywhere in the world where they attempt to encroach on the interests of peace and stability.
But in reality, the possibilities of American policy should by no means be limited to pursuing a firm line of containment and hopes for a better future. By its actions, the United States may well influence the development of events both in Russia itself and in the entire communist movement, which has a significant impact on Russian foreign policy. And this is not only about the modest efforts of the United States to disseminate information in the Soviet Union and other countries, although this is also important. Rather, it is about how successful our efforts will be in creating among the peoples of the world the image of the United States as a country that knows what it wants, that successfully manages its domestic problems and responsibilities as a great power, and that has sufficient fortitude, to firmly defend their positions in modern ideological currents. To the extent that we succeed in creating and maintaining this image of our country, the aims of Russian communism will appear fruitless and meaningless, enthusiasm and hope will be waned among Moscow's supporters, and the problems of the Kremlin's foreign policy will increase. After all, the senility and dilapidation of the capitalist world constitute the cornerstone of communist philosophy. Therefore, the very fact that the predictions of the prophets from Red Square, who self-confidently predicted since the end of the war that an economic crisis would inevitably break out in the United States, would not come true, would have profound and important consequences for the entire communist world.
On the other hand, manifestations of uncertainty, split and internal disunity in our country inspire the communist movement as a whole. Each such manifestation causes a storm of delight and new hopes in the communist world; complacency appears in Moscow's behavior; new supporters from different countries are trying to join the communist movement, taking it as the leading line of international politics; and then the pressure of the Russians increases in all areas of international relations.
It would be an exaggeration to believe that the United States alone, without the support of other states, could decide the issue of life and death of the communist movement and cause the imminent fall of Soviet power in Russia. Nevertheless, the United States has a real opportunity to significantly tighten the conditions in which Soviet policy is carried out, to force the Kremlin to act more restrained and prudently than in recent years, and thus contribute to the development of processes that will inevitably lead either to the collapse of the Soviet order, or to its gradual liberalization. For not a single mystical, messianic movement, and especially the Kremlin one, can constantly fail without starting sooner or later to adapt in one way or another to the logic of the real state of affairs.
Thus, the solution of the issue largely depends on our country. Soviet-American relations are essentially the touchstone of the international role of the United States as a state. To avoid defeat, it is enough for the United States to stand up to its best traditions and prove that it deserves to be called a great power.
We can say with confidence that this is the most honest and worthy test of national qualities. Therefore, anyone who closely follows the development of Soviet-American relations will not complain that the Kremlin has challenged American society. On the contrary, he will be somewhat grateful to the fate that, by sending the Americans this ordeal, made their very security as a nation dependent on their ability to unite and assume the responsibility of the moral and political leadership that history has prepared for them.

In the United States, George Kennan died - a man who can rightly be called one of the main architects of the Cold War. It was he who invented and developed the doctrine according to which the spread of communism must be contained - using any measures for this. And American diplomacy in relation to the USSR owed a lot to him. At the same time, Kennan was not enthusiastic about the way the United States pursued its foreign policy, and sincerely loved Russia.

American Kennan was connected with Russia even before his birth. And he was born, by the way, on February 16, 1904 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in a wealthy family. His birthday was celebrated along with the birthday of his grandfather's brother - George Kennan, a journalist, traveler and ethnographer, who gained considerable fame for his works about Russia and, in particular, about the Siberian penal servitude.

As a sign of respect for the eminent relative, Kennan Jr.'s parents decided to name him George Frost Kennan - the child received the name Frost in honor of Kennan Sr.'s comrade in his travels in Russia.

After graduating from military school in Wisconsin, George Frost Kennan continued his studies at Princeton University. It was there that he became interested in the problems of international politics, and in the first place - relations between the United States and Russia. In 1925, immediately after graduating from Princeton University, Kennan entered the diplomatic service. After a short stay in Geneva, he had the opportunity to complete a three-year postgraduate study at one of the European universities, on the condition that he take up the study of some rare language. Kennan chose the University of Berlin and the Russian language in the hope of getting an appointment to work in the Soviet Union. Later, he actually worked at the American diplomatic mission in Riga, and finally, in 1933, Kennan was sent to the US embassy in Moscow.

Initially, Kennan was a classic anti-Soviet. He believed that a compromise with the Soviet regime was impossible. The USSR for him was the focus of evil, a country that destroyed the aristocratic culture of pre-revolutionary Russia, and had an extremely harmful effect on world politics. It is difficult to blame him for this, since only 10 years have passed since the October Revolution and the Civil War, and for that part of the world's population that considered itself civilized, the Bolsheviks differed little from the barbarians.

But being a smart man, Kennan did not focus on his dislike for the USSR, but preferred to study this mysterious country, about which most Americans had the most vague idea. He got acquainted with Russian culture and became very fond of Russian literature, in particular Chekhov and Tolstoy - Kennan visited Yasnaya Polyana several times. At that time, surprisingly, American diplomats traveled relatively freely around the USSR - Ostap Bender's meeting with the Americans, described in The Golden Calf, is not an invention of Ilf and Petrov.

Mr. Kennan, our people believe that it is possible to be a friend of another country and at the same time be a loyal and committed citizen of one's own country. You are exactly that kind of person.

Mikhail Gorbachev

Cannon was impressed by Orthodox culture - he visited New Jerusalem, the Church of the Intercession on the Nerl and a number of other shrines. In Orthodoxy, the Presbyterian Cannon found traditionalism and patriarchy - values ​​that were unconditional for him. He tried to understand the mentality of the Russian people, who seemed to him a representative of the pre-industrial world, nostalgia for which in America at that time was very common.

The beginning of the 20th century was marked for the United States by wholesale industrialization and urbanization. It was hardly a coincidence that Owen Whistler's novel The Virginian, published back in 1903, met with a very warm welcome from readers: over 300,000 copies were sold in two years, not to mention constant reprints. "Virginian" became an expression of protest against the advent of the age of machines, against the loss of the values ​​of rural life. It was not by chance that Whistler chose as the main characters a native of Virginia - the "heart" of pre-war agrarian America with its valor, honor and principles, with its loyalty to traditions.

No nation has been so deeply wounded and humiliated as the Russian people, who survived several waves of violence that our cruel century sent upon them. That is why it is difficult to expect the huge state, social and economic system of Russia to change in one decade. Given the enormous losses that have befallen the country and the abuses that have prevailed here, one cannot hope to put everything in order in one decade. It may not be enough for a whole generation.

George Kennan

Inwardly, Kennan did not accept the "machinization" of the United States, which destroyed the world of respectable, respectable and religious people dear to him. Therefore, the industrialization of the USSR, which he witnessed, also did not arouse any enthusiasm in Kennan. The construction of a new world on the land of Tolstoy seemed to him absolutely inorganic for Russian society. Kennan believed that Russia preferred spirituality to rationalism and was prone to self-contemplation rather than stepping up efforts to improve material life. The modernization of life in the USSR, he feared, would lead to the disappearance of the country's natural way of life, its patriarchal identity.

At the same time, Kennan watched with equal distaste the changes taking place both in the USSR and in the USA. He did not like the mass movements of social protest that arose after the crisis of 1929, and Roosevelt's New Deal. In a growing and expanding democracy, Kennan saw a threat to meritocracy, which, in his opinion, was a much more just type of social order - after all, Kennan believed that the right to participate in political life must be earned, and not received ready-made by birthright in a certain territory.

Love for Russian culture did not prevent him from remaining a critic not only of the USSR, but also of the actions of the West in relation to the country of the Bolsheviks. Kennan denounced Roosevelt for his concessions to the Kremlin, particularly on the issue of Soviet debt. He also criticized the West for its indifferent attitude towards the Russian emigration, which found itself in the United States in the position of literally poor relatives.

Nevertheless, Kennan was one of the first to see that the Soviet system was a developing organism capable of producing unexpected, if undesirable, results in the distant future. But in this development, Kennan also saw the death of the Soviet system.

In February 1946, George Kennan replaced Averell Harriman as US Ambassador to Moscow. Among other documents that arrived from Washington, Kennan came across a request from the State Department and the Treasury Department to analyze Soviet statements about various international financial institutions that emerged after the war in order to clarify the true goals and motives of the Soviet leaders in their post-war policies. The task was not God knows what, an ordinary routine note; but Kennan saw it as a chance.

At the heart of the Kremlin's neurotic view of international affairs lies the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of the presence of danger, the fear of Western societies more competent, more powerful, more highly organized in the economic sphere. However, this last type of uncertainty affected the rulers of Russia more than the Russian people, since the Russian rulers always felt that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological basis, unable to withstand comparison or contact with political systems. in Western countries.

George Kennan. Origins of Soviet behavior

The result was one of the longest (and certainly the most famous) official telegrams in history. Telegram #511 contained 8,000 words. A year and a half later, her text entitled "The Origins of Soviet Behavior" was published in the journal "Foreign Affairs" under the pseudonym "X". (Kennan G.F. The Sources of Soviet Conduct // Foreign Affairs. 1947. July. No. 25. P.566-582.)

Kennan's opinion sharply diverged from generally accepted ideas in the United States about the main directions of national foreign policy. In the early post-war years, Americans wanted to live in peace. They felt sympathy for the USSR, their recent ally. Accordingly, Washington was inclined to be sympathetic to Stalin's demands. Kennan, on the other hand, argued that any concessions to Stalin would only whet his appetites, since the Soviet dictator respects only strength, and considers “good will” a manifestation of weakness.

The popular idea that Stalin could be "negotiated," wrote Kennan, is false and dangerous. Illusions must be parted, he believed, and he proposed a "containment strategy" for the USSR. Kennan wrote that the Kremlin is paranoid about the free world and this makes it impossible for the two systems to coexist normally. But a new war (according to many sober-minded Americans, inevitable), Kennan did not consider a way out. The war against the USSR, he believed, should be "cold", that is, reduced to a policy of containment. As a result, Kennan wrote, the Soviet system would collapse on its own, since the internal processes taking place in it would make it completely unviable.

This "long cable" influenced US public opinion and the policies of the Truman administration during the period of uncertainty that followed the end of World War II. By adopting a course of opposition to Stalinist expansion and refusing to return to traditional isolationism (the Monroe Doctrine), the United States assumed the role of a superpower.

At the same time, Kennan's speech was sharply criticized, and he had to explain what he actually meant. For all his dislike for the USSR (and sincere love for Russia), Kennan offered the Americans non-violent coercion of Russians to peace, that is, the political containment of the USSR by political methods.

In 1950, Kennan retired from diplomatic service due to disagreements with the State Department on a number of issues, and accepted an invitation from Robert Oppenheimer to visit his Institute for Advanced Study. But in the spring of 1952, Kennan was recalled from this vacation and appointed US Ambassador to the USSR. At the same time, both the United States and the USSR understood that the appearance of such a person in this post would most likely lead to a conflict, which soon happened.

In September of the same year, Kennan, while in West Berlin, made a sharp criticism of the Soviet system. The punishment was not long in coming. On October 3, 1952, the Soviet Foreign Ministry declared him persona non grata. This episode put an end to the career of professional diplomat George Kennan.

But the historical mission of this man had already been completed by that time - Kennan became one of the main architects of the Cold War. His ideas served as the basis for the most important international initiatives, in particular, the Marshall Plan.

On June 5, 1947, US Secretary of State General George Marshall, in his speech at Harvard University, introduced the "Program for the Reconstruction of Europe" to the world. Marshall believed that the speedy elimination of the destruction caused to the Western European countries by the Second World War was in the interests of the United States and other countries of the world whose economies suffered from the lack of stable and large-scale ties with Europe. The Secretary of State offered to provide assistance to a number of European and Asian countries, including former enemies, which was ultimately supposed to strengthen peace and promote the development of democracy. The US Congress included the Marshall Plan in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.

The European economic recovery program was supported by Great Britain and France. In the summer of 1947, at an international conference in Paris, 16 countries gave their consent to participate in it. They concluded a convention on the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was supposed to develop a joint "program for the reconstruction of Europe." The plan began to be implemented in April 1948.

Assistance was provided from the US federal budget in the form of gratuitous supplies of goods, subsidies and loans. From April 1948 to December 1951, the United States spent about 17 billion dollars under the Marshall Plan, with Great Britain, France, Italy and West Germany receiving the bulk of the aid, to which the Marshall Plan was extended in December 1949.

On December 30, 1951, the Marshall Plan officially ceased to exist and was replaced by the Mutual Security Act, which provided for the simultaneous provision of economic as well as military assistance. Later, a united Europe was born on this basis.

The Kennan Institute is a subdivision of the Wilson Center. The main task of the institute is to promote the expansion of knowledge about Russia and other states of the former USSR in the United States; preparation of scientific research and reports on this issue; development of a dialogue between American scientists and experts from government structures on issues of US relations with Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics; expansion of contacts between scientists from the USA and CIS countries.

In 1991, forty-five years ago, Kennan's prophecy came true - the Soviet Union collapsed from within, unable to bear the burden of internal contradictions. The US approach to relations with an ideological adversary proposed by Kennan was partly used in the "Marshall Plan" and in other American diplomatic developments. This approach worked throughout the post-war decades and ultimately led to the collapse of the communist system.

During his lifetime, Kennan wrote 21 books and published many articles, projects, critical works, letters, and speeches. He has won the prestigious Pulitzer Prize twice. In 1974-1975, Kennan, along with James Billington, director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, and historian Frederick Starr, founded the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. It should be noted that the institute got its name in honor of George Kennan Sr. In 1989, President George W. Bush presented Kennan with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian award in the United States.

But in the end, Kennan will be remembered as the man who predicted the imminent collapse of the USSR long before the Belovezhskaya Accords. At the same time, Kennan was not a prophet - he was "only" an ambitious aristocrat of the spirit, possessing a remarkable analytical mind. He was lucky to be in the right place at the right time and lucky to be heard. But sometimes that kind of luck can change the course of history.

This diplomat became the architect of American politics during the Cold War. In 1946, his telegram marked the beginning of a policy of "containment" of the USSR. He later advocated arms control

George F. Kennan, the most authoritative specialist on the Soviet Union, who at the height of the Cold War turned into a passionate advocate of the limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons, has died. He is 101 years old.

Kennan, the historian and diplomat best known for his concept of "deterrence", which became the cornerstone of US policy towards the USSR for 40 years, died at his home in Princeton, New Jersey.

He had an extraordinary literary gift, wrote 26 books and many articles. In 1956, he received the Pulitzer Prize for History and the National Book Award for Russia Leaves the War, and in 1967 a second Pulitzer Prize for " Memoirs: 1925-1950" ("Memoirs: 1925-1950").

In addition, Kennan was an emeritus professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton University. He has collaborated with the Institute since 1950, most of that time as a professor at the School of Historical Research. Even in the last years of his life, Kennan looked like a typical diplomat: tall, slender, straight, balding, with a small mustache. His appearance was slightly ascetic, which, combined with some shyness, often gave the impression of arrogance and even authority.

Many considered Kennan's main merit his concept of "containment", but for him the fact that he would go down in history precisely because of this caused considerable annoyance and sadness.

Kennan first came to attention as a specialist on the USSR in connection with an 8,000-word cable he sent to the State Department while working at the American embassy in Moscow. This document, prepared in February 1946, entered the history of diplomacy under the name "long telegram".

The message was divided into five sections - "everything was neatly arranged on the shelves, as in the Protestant sermon of the 18th century," Kennan later noted in his memoirs. Each of them was devoted to one of the main features of the worldview of the Soviet leadership in the early post-war years, their origin and influence on the foreign policy of the USSR, both at the official and unofficial levels. The concluding part contained suggestions on what conclusions American diplomacy should draw from this.

Kennan argued that the Soviets rejected the idea of ​​respect and inviolability of international treaties. Joseph Stalin and his diplomats will certainly try to turn all negotiations and agreements to their advantage, and are unlikely to respect previously concluded agreements if they consider them unprofitable for themselves. Such a foreign policy approach, in his opinion, was due not so much to communist ideology as to the historical traditions of Russian policy towards Europe.

The author of the "long telegram" warned of the expansionist ambitions of the Stalinist Kremlin and noted: "The Soviet government is deaf to the arguments of reason, but very susceptible to the logic of force." No less important was another conclusion - that the Kremlin is likely to back down "if it encounters strong resistance at some stage."

To counter Soviet expansionism, Kennan noted, American diplomacy must take an active stance in international politics, assuming a "great power" role.

Later, explaining the reasons for the appearance of the telegram, Kennan wrote that ever since the war years he had been disturbed by the "groundless dreams" of some Americans "about cloudless and friendly cooperation with Moscow." Its purpose - and not only then, but also in earlier and later reports - was to dispel the "naive optimism" of some circles in Washington, who believed that the American-Soviet alliance that took shape during the Second World War would become a guarantee of peace in the post-war era. .

Kennan's report came at just the right moment: Washington and Western Europe were already ready to embrace the idea of ​​a Soviet threat. Around the same time that the Kennan telegram was being deciphered in Washington, Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech [in Fulton - approx. transl.], declaring that the Soviet Union was lowering an "iron curtain" over Eastern Europe.

The contents of the "long telegram" were leaked to the press, as a result of which it received close attention from the general public. Kennan's innovative foreign policy ideas had an immediate impact. He was recalled from Moscow to the United States and appointed to a highly significant position as an expert on the Cold War at the National War College. After that, he became the head of the foreign policy planning department of the US State Department.

While in this position, he further strengthened his reputation as a recognized specialist on the USSR, publishing in July 1947 in the journal "Foreign Affairs" an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" ("The Sources of Soviet Conduct"). In it, Kennan outlined his idea of ​​a "policy of containment." However, as head of the State Department's planning office, he was unwilling to sign under his own name, and preferred to speak under the pseudonym "X."

In terms of influence on post-war US foreign policy, the article had an effect that he could not even dream of. "Containment" soon became one of the fundamental directions of American foreign policy. The name of the article's author soon became known, and Kennan's reputation as a diplomatic strategist skyrocketed. Thirty years later, Henry Kissinger will remark: "Kennan is one of the few diplomats in our history who deserves to be called the author of the diplomatic doctrine of his era."

However, the practical implementation of the concept of "deterrence" very soon began to cause alarm in Kennan. He believed that it was being implemented unrealistically: too much emphasis is placed on deterrence by military means, to the detriment of political mechanisms, and, moreover, the scope of deterrence is not limited by anything, covering all regions of the world. Rather than "absolute containment," Kennan favored a more selective approach of identifying the areas most important to US interests, such as Britain, Japan, and the Rhineland in what was then West Germany.

In addition, Kennan believed - and expressed this opinion in some provisions of the "long telegram", as well as later articles, books and lectures - that Soviet leaders were as eager to avoid war as their Western counterparts. Kennan pointed out that Marxist "theology" does not provide for the indispensable unleashing of wars against capitalist countries, and that the power of the West serves as a sufficient deterrent to avoid military conflicts.

"Western alarmists, who are trying to convince us of the serious possibility of a surprise attack [USSR - approx. transl.] on Western Europe if we do not multiply our deterrence capacity, live in a world of their own illusions, and the Soviet leadership in their statements appears quite different from what most of us know him to be," he wrote.

Such words could not but provoke a hostile reaction. Critics - and there were many of them - reproached Kennan with a naive idea of ​​the intentions of the USSR.

"Kennan is an 'impressionist', a poet, a man out of this world," said Eugene V. Rostow, deputy secretary of state in the Johnson administration.

Another critic, Edward N. Littwak, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, says that the late Secretary of State Dean Acheson "admired Kennan's intelligence but distrusted his estimates."

Acheson himself - during the Truman administration, Kennan was his chief adviser - in 1958 remarked: "In my opinion, Kennan could never understand the realities of power relations, perceiving them rather in a mystical spirit."

On the other hand, Kennan had a legion of admirers and even "adepts" who fully shared his foreign policy views, especially in the field of nuclear arms control. Kennan argued that a military policy based on the use of nuclear weapons is, by definition, wrong. He recommended that the United States adhere to the principle of no first use of nuclear weapons, and opposed NATO decisions to deploy nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

Among his supporters was the late California Democratic Senator Alan Cranston. “Kennan was a trailblazer who opened the eyes of the Americans to the benefits and dangers of negotiating with the Soviets,” he argued. “His firm commitment to facts over fear, realism over reaction, gave hope to those who believed that with wisdom and political will, we we can prevent the US-Soviet rivalry from escalating into a nuclear holocaust."

However, no matter how correct Kennan's opinion about the intentions of the Soviet leadership was, among his contemporaries in the West one can hardly find a person who knew more about the USSR than he did.

George Frost Kennan was born in Milwaukee on February 16, 1904. His father, Kossuth Kent Kennan, was a lawyer specializing in tax matters. Mother, Florence James Kennan, died shortly after the birth of her son. He graduated from the military academy [in the USA - a high school for boys of a paramilitary type - approx. transl.], and later described himself as a child as "a strange guy, but not an eccentric, who did not serve as an object of ridicule or hostility of his peers, just not completely accessible to a superficial glance."

Literature and history, especially Russian history, became a joy for him. Interest in this country was aroused in him by a distant relative, also named George Kennan, a specialist in tsarist Russia. This "senior" George Kennan published the sensational book "Siberia and the Exile" (Siberia and the Exile System) as early as 1891. Its second, abridged edition appeared in 1957, with a preface by George Kennan "the younger".

In 1925 he graduated from Princeton University, a year later he got a job in the State Department and entered the newly created Diplomatic School (Foreign Service School). Kennan was one of the first young diplomats to receive special training as an expert on Russia even before the recognition of the Soviet government by the United States.

He held various positions in the American consulates in the independent Baltic republics - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia: then diplomatic missions in these countries were used as "observation posts" for the USSR. In addition, at the University of Berlin, he took an intensive course in Russian.

In 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union, Kennan, by then fluent in Russian, was sent to Moscow to help Ambassador William C. Bullit set up a US diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union. capital.

However, after the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Kennan was sent to Berlin, where a year later he took the post of first secretary of the embassy. In December 1941, after the US entered the war, the German authorities interned Kennan along with 125 other Americans.

Kennan's memoirs describe this period as a difficult time - the internees were completely cut off from contact with Washington. However, after seven months, most of the detained Americans were put on a train and sent to Lisbon, where they were exchanged for a similar number of Germans.

Kennan writes that the State Department did not help its released employees much and even refused to pay them their salaries for the period of internment, saying that they were not working at that time.

After the first trip, Kennan visited Moscow three more times - as second secretary in 1935-36, then, starting in 1944, as an adviser - envoy to W. Averell Harriman, and, finally , in 1952 already as an ambassador.

However, less than a year later he was declared "persona non grata": Kennan, by his own admission, showed frivolity, comparing life in the anti-American atmosphere of Stalin's Moscow with the period of German captivity during the war.

Humiliated at being forced to leave the country, Kennan returned to the US, but just a few months later, John Foster Dulles, appointed by President Eisenhower to the post of Secretary of State, forced him to resign from the Foreign Service. Later, in the early 1960s, Kennan returned to the Foreign Office: President Kennedy appointed him ambassador to Yugoslavia. But even in this position, he did not stay long, and experienced many complications, and not from the Belgrade government, but again from American politicians who rejected his idea to grant Yugoslavia the most favored nation status, despite its disagreements with Moscow.

Kennan later spoke out loudly against the Vietnam War and, at the age of 98, criticized the George W. Bush administration's plans to invade Iraq. War “has its own momentum, and once it starts, it takes you away from any prudent intentions,” he remarked in a September 2002 interview, six months before the invasion. “If we send troops into Iraq today, as the president suggests , we will know how it all began. But no one can say how it all ends."

For many years, Kennan's works have received the highest marks for their brightness and erudition. "For more than half a century, the diplomatic dispatches, political and scientific writings of George F. Kennan have enriched and enlivened public debate in the United States and our intellectual and scientific life," wrote the late Los Angeles Times correspondent Don Cook in 1989 in the book reviews of our newspaper. "It is difficult to name another American writer who has had such a stimulating effect on the intellectual process for such a long time, whose ideas on the greatest problems of the nuclear age would have attracted such close attention."

In the works of Kennan, his skeptical attitude towards modern American society is also manifested. In the epilogue to one of his last works, Sketches of a Life, he wrote: “I am surprised to find how gloomy my homeland is. The United States, in fact, looks tragic - the country has gigantic natural resources that it is rapidly squandering and depleting, and an extremely talented and original scientific and artistic intelligentsia, which are poorly understood and respected by the prevailing political forces in the country. They are usually silenced or shouted down by the commercial media. Perhaps it is forever doomed, like the Russian intelligentsia of the 19th century, to helplessly watch the unsettling direction that the country is taking."

In an article published in the New York Book Review on the occasion of Kennan's centenary, Ronald Steel, professor of international relations history at Southern California University, compared Kennan to the 18th-century English historian Edward Gibbon, author of the famous Decline and the fall of the Roman Empire." "Perhaps Kennan's greatest accomplishment and greatest merit is his sympathetically acrimonious interpretation of the meaning of American history, and of our dramatic, sometimes tragic conflict with ourselves," Steele noted.

Among the awards received by Kennan - the Presidential Medal of Freedom (Presidential Medal of Freedom) [the highest civilian award in the United States - approx. transl.], the Albert Einstein Peace Prize and the Gold Medal of the American Academy and the Institute of Arts and Letters for services to the study of history.

George Kennan's closest relatives are his widow Annelise Sorenson Kennan, whom he married in 1931, and four children - Grace Kennan Warnecke, Joan Kennan, Christopher James Kennan (Christopher James Kennan) and Wendy Kennan (Wendy Kennan), eight grandchildren and two great-grandchildren.

Contributed by Los Angeles Times correspondent John Averill

George Kennan's remarks about the Soviet Union:

"The main element of any US policy towards the Soviet Union must be a long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant check on Russia's expansionist tendencies."

"The pressure of the USSR on the democratic institutions of the Western world can be contained through skillful and vigilant opposition, but it cannot be eliminated by charm and persuasion."

“We have before us a country that aspires to become one of the great industrial powers of the world in a short time, and this despite the fact that it still does not have a road network that deserves this name, and the railway network is rather primitive. In addition, in many areas of the economy it has failed to bring into life anything comparable to the general culture of production and professional self-respect that characterizes the skilled worker in the West.

It is hard to imagine that a tired and discouraged population, working mainly out of fear and coercion, is able to eliminate these shortcomings in a short time.

“Thus, if something happens that can undermine the unity of the party and its effectiveness as a political instrument, Soviet Russia can in an instant turn from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most miserable national communities.

Thus, the future of Soviet power may not look as certain as it seems to the Kremlin leaders due to their purely Russian penchant for self-deception."

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

Historian, internationalist and diplomat George Frost Kennan - one of the founders of Sovietology in the United States, in 1934-1938. he was the first secretary, and in 1945-1946. Counselor at the US Embassy in Moscow. During the years of work in the USSR, Kennan became an ardent opponent of the Stalinist system, convinced of the impossibility of cooperation with it. In 1947-1949. he headed the US State Department's foreign policy planning division and played a prominent role in developing the Marshall Plan, a "psychological warfare" strategy against the USSR. Kennan is the author of the foreign policy doctrine of "containment", first set forth in Kennan's so-called long telegram to the US Secretary of State (February 1946) and later developed in the well-known article "The Origins of Soviet Behavior", published under the signature "X" in the July issue of the magazine Foreign Affairs, 1947.

George Frost Kennan

The political essence of Soviet power in its current incarnation is a derivative of ideology and the prevailing conditions: the ideology inherited by the current Soviet leaders from the political movement in the depths of which their political birth took place, and the conditions in which they rule in Russia for almost 30 years. To trace the interaction of these two factors and to analyze the role of each of them in shaping the official line of conduct of the Soviet Union is not an easy task for psychological analysis. Nevertheless, it is worth trying to solve it if we want to understand Soviet behavior for ourselves and successfully counteract it.
It is not easy to summarize the set of ideological positions with which the Soviet leaders came to power. The Marxist ideology in its variant, which has spread among Russian communists, is subtly changing all the time. It is based on extensive and complex material. However, the main provisions of the communist doctrine, as it had taken shape by 1916, can be summarized as follows:
a) the main factor in a person's life, which determines the nature of social life and the "face of society", is the system of production and distribution of material goods;
b) the capitalist system of production is disgusting, because it inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class and cannot fully ensure the development of the economic potential of society or the fair distribution of material goods created by human labor;
c) capitalism bears within itself the germ of its own destruction, and as a result of the inability of the capital-owning class to adapt itself to economic changes, sooner or later power will inevitably pass into the hands of the working class with the help of revolution;
d) imperialism as the last stage of capitalism inevitably leads to war and revolution.
The rest can be summarized in Lenin's words: Uneven economic and political development is an unconditional law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of socialism is possible initially in a few or even in one country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of this country, having expropriated the capitalists and organized socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed classes of other countries to itself ... It should be noted that capitalism was not supposed to perish without a proletarian revolution. To overthrow the rotten system, a final push from the revolutionary proletarian movement is needed. But it was believed that sooner or later such a push is inevitable.
During the fifty years prior to the beginning of the revolution, this way of thinking was extremely attractive to the participants in the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, dissatisfied, having lost hope of finding expression in the narrow confines of the political system of Tsarist Russia (or perhaps too impatient), having no broad popular support for their theory that a bloody revolution was necessary to improve social conditions, these revolutionaries saw in Marxist theory an eminently convenient substantiation of their instinctive aspirations. She gave a pseudo-scientific explanation for their impatience, their categorical denial of anything of value in the royal system, their thirst for power and revenge and the desire to achieve their goals at all costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that they believed without hesitation in the truth and depth of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, which was so consonant with their own feelings and aspirations. Do not question their sincerity. This phenomenon is as old as the world. Edward Gibson said it best in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: “From enthusiasm to imposture, there is one step, dangerous and inconspicuous; the demon of Socrates is a vivid example of how a wise person sometimes deceives himself, a good person deceives others, and the mind sinks into a vague dream, not distinguishing its own delusions from deliberate deception. It was with this set of theoretical propositions that the Bolshevik Party came to power.
It should be noted here that during the many years of preparation for the revolution, these people, and Marx himself, paid attention not so much to the form that socialism would take in the future, but to the inevitability of the overthrow of the hostile government, which, in their opinion, should have necessarily preceded the building of socialism. . Their ideas about a positive program of action that would have to be implemented after coming to power were for the most part vague, speculative and far from reality. There was no agreed program of action other than the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private fortunes. With regard to the peasantry, which, according to Marxist theory, is not a proletariat, there has never been complete clarity in communist views; and during the first decade of the Communists in power, the issue remained a subject of controversy and doubt.
The conditions in Russia immediately after the revolution, the civil war and foreign intervention, and the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a small minority of the Russian people, led to the need for a dictatorship. The experiment with "war communism" and the attempt to immediately destroy private production and trade led to dire economic consequences and further disappointment in the new revolutionary government. Although the temporary easing of efforts to impose communism in the form of the New Economic Policy somewhat eased the economic plight and thus justified its purpose, it clearly showed that the "capitalist sector of society" was still ready to immediately take advantage of the slightest easing of pressure from the government and, if given the right to exist, it will always represent a powerful opposition to the Soviet regime and a serious competitor in the struggle for influence in the country. Approximately the same attitude developed towards the individual peasant, who, in essence, was also a private, albeit a small producer.
Lenin, if he were alive, might have been able to prove his greatness and reconcile these opposing forces for the benefit of the entire Russian society, although this is doubtful. But be that as it may, Stalin and those whom he led in the struggle to inherit the Leninist leadership role were unwilling to put up with competing political forces in the sphere of power they coveted. Too acutely they felt the fragility of their position. In their special fanaticism, which is alien to the Anglo-Saxon traditions of political compromise, there was so much zeal and intransigence that they did not even intend to constantly share power with someone. Disbelief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence on a permanent basis with political rivals passed from their Russo-Asian ancestors to them. Easily believing in their own doctrinaire infallibility, they insisted on the subjugation or destruction of all political opponents. Outside the framework of the Communist Party, no coherent organization was allowed in Russian society. Only those forms of collective human activity and communication were permitted in which the Party played the leading role. No other force in Russian society had the right to exist as a viable integral organism. Only the party was allowed to be structurally organized. The rest was destined for the role of an amorphous mass.
The same principle prevailed within the party itself. The rank and file members of the party, of course, participated in the elections, discussions, adoption and implementation of decisions, but they did this not on their own initiative, but at the direction of the party leadership that instilled awe and certainly in accordance with the ubiquitous "teaching".
I want to emphasize once again that, perhaps, these figures did not aspire subjectively to absolute power as such. They undoubtedly believed it was easy for them, that only they know what is good for society, and will act for its good if they manage to reliably protect their power from encroachment. However, in an effort to secure their power, they did not recognize in their actions any restrictions, either God's or human. And until such security is achieved, the well-being and happiness of the peoples entrusted to them were relegated to the last place in their list of priorities.
Today, the main feature of the Soviet regime is that this process of political consolidation has not yet been completed, and the Kremlin rulers are still mainly engaged in the struggle for protection against encroachments on the power that they seized in November 1917 and are striving to turn into absolute power. First of all, they tried to protect it from internal enemies in Soviet society itself. They are trying to protect her from encroachments from the outside world. After all, their ideology, as we have already seen, teaches that the world around them is hostile to them and that it is their duty someday to overthrow the political forces in power outside their country. The mighty forces of Russian history and tradition contributed to the strengthening of this conviction in them. And finally, their own aggressive intransigence towards the outside world eventually caused a backlash, and they were soon forced, in the words of the same Gibson, to "stigmatize the arrogance" that they themselves had caused. Every person has an inalienable right to prove to himself that the world is hostile to him, if you repeat this often enough and proceed from this in your actions, you will inevitably turn out to be right in the end.
The way of thinking of the Soviet leaders and the nature of their ideology predetermine that no opposition can be officially recognized as useful and justified. Theoretically, such an opposition is a product of hostile, irreconcilable forces of dying capitalism. As long as the existence of the remnants of capitalism in Russia was officially recognized, it was possible to shift part of the blame for the preservation of the dictatorial regime in the country on them as an internal force. But as these remnants were eliminated, such an excuse fell away. It completely disappeared when it was officially announced that they were finally destroyed. This circumstance gave rise to one of the main problems of the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia, and the Kremlin was not ready to openly admit that serious broad opposition could arise in the country on its own from the liberated masses subject to it, it became necessary to justify the preservation of the dictatorship by the thesis of capitalist outside threat.
It started a long time ago. In 1924, Stalin, in particular, justified the preservation of the organs of suppression, by which, among others, he meant the army and the secret police, by the fact that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement, the danger of intervention remains, with all the consequences that follow from it." According to this theory, from that time on, any forces of internal opposition in Russia were consistently presented as agents of reactionary foreign powers hostile to Soviet power. For the same reason, the original communist thesis of antagonism between the capitalist and socialist worlds was strongly emphasized.
Many examples convince us that this thesis has no basis in reality. The facts relating to it are largely explained by the sincere indignation that Soviet ideology and tactics aroused abroad, and also, in particular, by the existence of large centers of military power of the Nazi regime in Germany and the government of Japan, which in the late 30s actually hatched aggressive plans against the Soviet Union. However, there is every reason to believe that the emphasis that Moscow is placing on the threat to Soviet society from the outside world is explained not by the real existence of antagonism, but by the need to justify the preservation of the dictatorial regime inside the country.
The preservation of this character of Soviet power, namely the desire for unlimited dominance within the country at the same time as the planting of a half-myth about the irreconcilable hostility of the external environment, greatly contributed to the formation of the mechanism of Soviet power with which we are dealing today. The internal organs of the state apparatus, which did not meet the set goal, withered away. Those that met the target swelled beyond measure. The security of Soviet power began to rely on iron discipline in the party, on the cruelty and omnipresence of the secret police, and on the unlimited monopoly of the state in the field of the economy. The organs of suppression, which Soviet leaders saw as defenders against hostile forces, largely subjugated those they were supposed to serve. Today, the main organs of Soviet power are absorbed in perfecting the dictatorial system and propagating the thesis that Russia is a besieged fortress, with enemies hiding around its walls. And millions of employees of the apparatus of power must defend this view of the situation in Russia to the last, because without it they will be out of work.
At present, the rulers can no longer even think of doing without organs of suppression. The struggle for absolute power, which has been going on for almost three decades with unprecedented (at least in scope) cruelty in our time, is again causing a backlash both at home and abroad. The excesses of the police apparatus made the covert opposition to the regime much stronger and more dangerous than it could have been before the outbreak of these excesses.
And least of all, the rulers are ready to give up the fabrications with which they justify the existence of a dictatorial regime. For these inventions have already been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses that were committed in their name. They are now firmly entrenched in the Soviet way of thinking by means far beyond ideology.

Such is the story. How is it reflected in the political essence of Soviet power today?
Nothing has officially changed in the original ideological concept. As before, the thesis is preached about the primordial viciousness of capitalism, about the inevitability of its death and about the mission of the proletariat, which must contribute to this death and take power into its own hands. But now the emphasis is mainly on those concepts that have a specific bearing on the Soviet regime as such: on its exceptional position as the only truly socialist order in a dark and misguided world, and on the relationships of power within it.
The first concept concerns the immanent antagonism between capitalism and socialism. We have already seen what a firm place it occupies in the foundations of Soviet power. It has a profound effect on Russia's behavior as a member of the international community. It means that Moscow will never sincerely recognize the common goals of the Soviet Union and the countries that it considers capitalist. In all likelihood, Moscow believes that the goals of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime and, consequently, to the interests of the peoples controlled by it. If from time to time the Soviet government puts its signature on documents that say otherwise, then this must be understood as a tactical maneuver, permitted in relations with the enemy (always dishonorable), and perceived in the spirit of caveat emptor. The underlying antagonism remains. It is postulated. It becomes the source of many manifestations of the Kremlin's foreign policy that cause us concern: secretiveness, insincerity, duplicity, wary suspicion and general unfriendliness. In the foreseeable future, all these manifestations, apparently, will continue, only their degree and scale will vary. When the Russians want something from us, one feature or another of their foreign policy is temporarily relegated to the background; in such cases, there are always Americans who hasten to joyfully announce that “the Russians have already changed,” and some of them even try to take credit for the “changes” that have taken place. But we must not succumb to such tactical ploys. These characteristic features of Soviet policy, as well as the postulates from which they flow, constitute the inner essence of Soviet power and will always be present in the foreground or background until this inner essence changes.
This means that we will have to experience difficulties in relations with the Russians for a long time to come. This does not mean that they should be perceived in the context of their program, by all means to carry out a revolution in our society by a certain date. The theoretical proposition about the inevitability of the death of capitalism, fortunately, contains a hint that this can not be rushed. For the time being, it is vitally important that the "socialist fatherland", this oasis of power, already conquered for socialism in the face of the Soviet Union, be loved and defended by all true communists in the country and abroad; that they may promote his prosperity and stigmatize his enemies. Helping immature "adventurist" revolutions abroad, which could somehow put the Soviet government in a difficult position, must be regarded as an unforgivable and even counter-revolutionary step. As decided in Moscow, the business of socialism is to support and strengthen Soviet power.

Here we come to the second concept that defines Soviet behavior today. This is the thesis about the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which does not allow for any organizational centers outside the party itself, requires that, in theory, the party leadership remain the only source of truth. For if the truth were to be found somewhere else, then this could serve as an excuse for its manifestation in organized activity. But this is precisely what the Kremlin cannot and will not allow.
Consequently, the leadership of the Communist Party is always right, and has always been right since 1929, when Stalin legitimized his personal power by declaring that Politburo decisions were taken unanimously.
Iron discipline within the Communist Party is based on the principle of infallibility. In fact, these two positions are interrelated. Strict discipline requires the recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires discipline. Together, they largely determine the model of behavior of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their significance can only be understood if a third factor is taken into account, namely, that the leadership can, for tactical purposes, put forward any thesis that it considers useful for the cause at a given moment, and demand the devoted and unconditional consent to it of all members of the movement as a whole. This means that the truth is not immutable, but is actually created by the Soviet leaders themselves for any purpose and intention. It can change every week or every month. It ceases to be absolute and immutable and does not follow from objective reality. It is just the latest concrete manifestation of the wisdom of those who should be considered the source of truth in the final instance, because they express the logic of the historical process. Together, all three factors give the subordinate apparatus of Soviet power unshakable stubbornness and monolithic views. These views are changed only at the direction of the Kremlin. If a certain party line is developed on this issue of current policy, then the entire Soviet state machine, including diplomacy, begins to move steadily along the prescribed path, like a wound up toy car that is launched in a given direction and will stop only when it collides with a superior force. People who are the details of this mechanism are deaf to the arguments of the mind that reach them from outside. All their training teaches them not to trust and not to recognize the apparent persuasiveness of the outside world. Like a white dog in front of a gramophone, they hear only the "voice of the owner." And in order for them to deviate from the line dictated from above, the order must come only from the owner. Thus, the representative of a foreign power cannot expect that his words will make any impression on them. The most he can hope for is that his words will be conveyed to the top, where the people who have the power to change the line of the party are sitting. But even these people can hardly be affected by normal logic if it comes from a representative of the bourgeois world. Since it is useless to refer to common goals, it is just as pointless to count on the same approach. Therefore, facts mean more to Kremlin leaders than words, and words carry the most weight when they are supported by facts or reflect facts of undeniable value.
However, we have already seen that the ideology does not require the Kremlin to quickly achieve its goals. Like the church, it deals with long-term ideological concepts and therefore can afford to take its time. He has no right to risk the gains of the revolution already achieved for the sake of the illusory chimeras of the future. Lenin's teaching itself calls for great caution and flexibility in achieving communist goals. Again, these theses are reinforced by the lessons of Russian history, where little-known battles between nomadic tribes were fought over the vast expanses of unfortified plains for centuries. Here caution and prudence, resourcefulness and deceit were important qualities; Naturally, for a person with a Russian or Eastern mindset, these qualities are of great value. Therefore, the Kremlin, without regret, can retreat under the pressure of superior forces. And since time has no value, he does not panic if he has to retreat. His policy is a smooth flow, which, if nothing interferes with it, constantly moves towards the intended goal. His main concern at all costs is to fill all the nooks and crannies in the pool of world power. But if on his way he encounters insurmountable barriers, he takes it philosophically and adapts to them. The main thing is not to run out of pressure, a stubborn desire for the desired goal. There is not even a hint in Soviet psychology that this goal must be achieved within a certain period of time.
Such reflections lead to the conclusion that dealing with Soviet diplomacy is both easier and more difficult than dealing with the diplomacy of such aggressive leaders as Napoleon or Hitler. On the one hand, it is more sensitive to resistance, ready to retreat in certain sectors of the diplomatic front, if the opposing force is assessed as superior and, therefore, more rational in terms of the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand, it is not easy to defeat or stop her with one single victory over her. And the tenacity that drives it suggests that it can be successfully countered not through sporadic actions dependent on the fleeting whims of democratic public opinion, but only through a well-thought-out long-term policy of Russia's opponents, which would be no less consistent in its goals. and no less varied and inventive in means than the policy of the Soviet Union itself.
Under the circumstances, the cornerstone of United States policy towards the Soviet Union must undoubtedly be a long, patient, but firm and vigilant check on Russia's expansionist tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with external harshness, with empty or boastful statements of firmness. While the Kremlin is most flexible in the face of political realities, it has certainly become inflexible when it comes to its prestige. By tactless statements and threats, the Soviet government, like almost any other, can be placed in a position where it will not be able to yield, even contrary to the demands of reality. Russian leaders are well versed in human psychology and are well aware that the loss of self-control does not contribute to the strengthening of positions in politics. They skillfully and quickly take advantage of such manifestations of weakness. Therefore, in order to successfully build relations with Russia, a foreign state must necessarily remain cool and collected and make demands on its policies in such a way that it remains open to concessions without sacrificing prestige.

In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that Soviet pressure on the free institutions of the Western world can only be contained by skillful and vigilant counteraction at various geographical and political points, constantly changing depending on the shifts and changes in Soviet policy, but it cannot be eliminated with the help of spells and conversations. The Russians expect an endless duel and believe that they have already achieved great success. We must remember that at one time the Communist Party played a much smaller role in Russian society than the current role of the Soviet country in the world community. Let ideological convictions allow the rulers of Russia to think that the truth is on their side and that they can take their time. But those of us who do not profess this ideology can objectively assess the correctness of these postulates. The Soviet doctrine not only implies that Western countries cannot control the development of their own economy, but also assumes the boundless unity, discipline and patience of Russians. Let's take a sober look at this apocalyptic postulate and assume that the West manages to find the strength and means to contain Soviet power for 10-15 years. What will it mean for Russia?
Soviet leaders, using modern techniques in the art of despotism, solved the problem of obedience within their state. Rarely does anyone challenge them; but even these few cannot fight against the repressive state organs.
The Kremlin has also proved its ability to achieve its goals by creating, regardless of the interests of the peoples of Russia, the foundations of heavy industry. This process, however, has not yet been completed and continues to develop, bringing Russia closer in this respect to the main industrialized states. However, all this, both the maintenance of internal political security and the creation of heavy industry, was achieved at the cost of colossal losses in human lives, destinies and hopes. Forced labor is being used on a scale never seen before in our time. Other sectors of the Soviet economy, especially agriculture, the production of consumer goods, housing and transport, are ignored or mercilessly exploited.
In addition to everything, the war brought terrible destruction, enormous human losses and poverty of the people. This explains the fatigue, physical and moral, of the entire population of Russia. The people in the mass are disappointed and skeptical, the Soviet government is no longer as attractive to them as before, although it continues to attract its supporters abroad. The enthusiasm with which the Russians took advantage of some of the concessions for the church, introduced during the war for tactical reasons, eloquently shows that their ability to believe and serve ideals did not find expression in the politics of the regime.
In such circumstances, the physical and mental strength of people is not unlimited. They are objective and operate in the conditions of even the most brutal dictatorships, since people are simply not able to overcome them. Forced labor camps and other institutions of repression are only a temporary means of getting people to work more than their desire or economic necessity requires. If people do survive, they age prematurely and should be considered victims of a dictatorial regime. In any case, their best abilities have already been lost to society and cannot be put at the service of the state.
Now there is only hope for the next generation. The new generation, despite hardship and suffering, is numerous and energetic; besides, the Russians are talented people. It is still, however, not clear how this generation, when it enters the age of maturity, will be reflected in the extreme emotional overload of childhood, generated by the Soviet dictatorship and greatly aggravated by the war. Concepts such as ordinary security and peace of mind in one's own home now exist in the Soviet Union only in the most remote villages. And there is no certainty that all this will not affect the general abilities of the generation that is now coming of age.
In addition, there is the fact that the Soviet economy, although it boasts significant achievements, develops alarmingly unevenly and unevenly. Russian communists who talk about the "unequal development of capitalism" should be ashamed to look at their economy. The scale of development of some of its branches, such as metallurgical or machine-building, went beyond reasonable proportions in comparison with the development of other branches of the economy. We have before us a state which aspires within a short time to become one of the great industrial powers, and at the same time does not have decent highways, and its railway network is very imperfect. Much has already been done to raise labor productivity and to teach semi-literate peasants how to use machines. However, logistics is still the most terrible hole in the Soviet economy. Construction is carried out hastily and poorly.
Depreciation costs are probably huge. In many sectors of the economy, it has not been possible to instill in the workers at least some elements of the general culture of production and the technical self-respect inherent in the skilled workers of the West.
It is difficult to imagine how tired and depressed people who work under conditions of fear and coercion will be able to quickly eliminate these shortcomings. And until they are overcome, Russia will remain an economically vulnerable and somewhat infirm country that can export its enthusiasm or spread the inexplicable charms of its primitive political vitality, but is unable to back up these exports with real evidence of material strength and prosperity.
At the same time, a great uncertainty hung over the political life of the Soviet Union, the same uncertainty that is associated with the transfer of power from one person to another or from one group of persons to another.
This problem, of course, is connected mainly with the special position of Stalin. It must not be forgotten that his inheritance of Lenin's exclusive position in the communist movement is so far the only case of a transfer of power in the Soviet Union. It took twelve years to consolidate this transition. It cost the people millions of lives and shook the foundations of the state. Side shocks were felt throughout the international communist movement and hurt the Kremlin leaders themselves.
It is quite possible that the next transfer of unlimited power will take place quietly and imperceptibly, without any perturbations. But at the same time, it is possible that the problems associated with this will lead, in the words of Lenin, to one of those "extraordinarily quick transitions" from "subtle deceit" to "unbridled violence" that are characteristic of the history of Russia, and will shake Soviet power to grounds.
But it's not just about Stalin himself. Since 1938, a disturbing rigidity of political life has been observed in the highest echelons of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, which is theoretically considered the highest organ of the party, must meet at least once every three years. The last congress was almost eight years ago. During this time, the number of party members doubled. During the war, a huge number of communists died, and now more than half of all members of the party are people who joined its ranks after the last congress. Nevertheless, at the top of power, despite all the misfortunes of the country, the same small group of leaders remains. To be sure, there are reasons why the ordeal of the war years brought about fundamental political changes in the governments of all major Western states. The reasons for this phenomenon are quite general, and therefore should be present in the hidden Soviet political life. But there are no signs of such processes in Russia.
The conclusion is that even within an organization as highly disciplined as the Communist Party, differences in age, attitudes and interests must inevitably become more and more apparent between the huge masses of ordinary members who have joined it relatively recently, and a very small group of permanent top leaders, with whom most of these party members have never met, never spoken to, and with whom they cannot have any political affinity.
It is difficult to predict whether under these conditions the inevitable rejuvenation of the upper echelons of power will proceed (and this is only a matter of time) peacefully and smoothly, or whether rivals in the struggle for power will turn to the politically immature and inexperienced masses to enlist their support. If the latter is true, then the Communist Party must expect unpredictable consequences: after all, the rank-and-file members of the Party have learned to work only under conditions of iron discipline and subordination and are completely helpless in the art of reaching compromises and agreement. If a split occurs in the Communist Party that paralyzes its actions, then the chaos and helplessness of society in Russia will be revealed in extreme forms. For, as already mentioned, Soviet power is only a shell that hides an amorphous mass, which is denied the creation of an independent organizational structure. Russia does not even have local self-government. The current generation of Russians has no idea about independent collective action. Therefore, if something happens that destroys the unity and effectiveness of the party as a political instrument, then Soviet Russia can instantly turn from one of the strongest into one of the weakest and most miserable countries in the world.
Thus, the future of Soviet power is by no means as cloudless as the Russian habit of self-deception may seem to the Kremlin rulers. They have already demonstrated that they can hold on to power. But they have yet to prove that they can easily and calmly pass it on to others. However, the heavy burden of their domination and the vicissitudes of international life have noticeably undermined the strength and hopes of the great people on which their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological influence of Soviet power is currently stronger outside of Russia, where the long arms of the Soviet police cannot reach. In this regard, the comparison comes to mind, which is in the novel by Thomas Mann "Buddenbrooks". Arguing that human institutions acquire a special outward brilliance just at the moment when their internal decay reaches its highest point, he likens the Buddenbrook family at the time of its heyday to one of those stars whose light illuminates our world most brightly when on in fact, they have long ceased to exist. Who can vouch for the fact that the rays that the Kremlin is still sending out to the discontented peoples of the Western world are not the very last light of a fading star? You can't prove it. And refute too. But there remains hope (and, in the opinion of the author of this article, a rather large one) that the Soviet government, like the capitalist system in its understanding, bears the seeds of its own destruction, and these seeds have already begun to grow.
It is clear that a political rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet regime can hardly be expected in the foreseeable future. The United States must continue to see the Soviet Union not as a partner, but as a rival in the political arena. They must be prepared for the fact that Soviet policy will reflect not an abstract love of peace and stability and not a sincere belief in the constant happy coexistence of the socialist and capitalist world, but a cautious and persistent desire to undermine and weaken the influence of all opposing forces and countries.
But we must not forget that Russia is still a weak country compared to the Western world as a whole, that Soviet politics are highly unbalanced, and that there may be flaws in Soviet society that will ultimately lead to a weakening of its overall potential. This in itself entitles the United States to confidently pursue a policy of determined containment to oppose the Russians with unyielding strength anywhere in the world where they attempt to encroach on the interests of peace and stability.
But in reality, the possibilities of American policy should by no means be limited to pursuing a firm line of containment and hopes for a better future. By its actions, the United States may well influence the development of events both in Russia itself and in the entire communist movement, which has a significant impact on Russian foreign policy. And this is not only about the modest efforts of the United States to disseminate information in the Soviet Union and other countries, although this is also important. Rather, it is about how successful our efforts will be in creating among the peoples of the world the image of the United States as a country that knows what it wants, that successfully manages its domestic problems and responsibilities as a great power, and that has sufficient fortitude, to firmly defend their positions in modern ideological currents. To the extent that we succeed in creating and maintaining this image of our country, the aims of Russian communism will appear fruitless and meaningless, enthusiasm and hope will be waned among Moscow's supporters, and the problems of the Kremlin's foreign policy will increase. After all, the senility and dilapidation of the capitalist world constitute the cornerstone of communist philosophy. Therefore, the very fact that the predictions of the prophets from Red Square, who self-confidently predicted since the end of the war that an economic crisis would inevitably break out in the United States, would not come true, would have profound and important consequences for the entire communist world.
On the other hand, manifestations of uncertainty, split and internal disunity in our country inspire the communist movement as a whole. Each such manifestation causes a storm of delight and new hopes in the communist world; complacency appears in Moscow's behavior; new supporters from different countries are trying to join the communist movement, taking it as the leading line of international politics; and then the pressure of the Russians increases in all areas of international relations.
It would be an exaggeration to believe that the United States alone, without the support of other states, could decide the issue of life and death of the communist movement and cause the imminent fall of Soviet power in Russia. Nevertheless, the United States has a real opportunity to significantly tighten the conditions in which Soviet policy is carried out, to force the Kremlin to act more restrained and prudently than in recent years, and thus contribute to the development of processes that will inevitably lead either to the collapse of the Soviet order, or to its gradual liberalization. For not a single mystical, messianic movement, and especially the Kremlin one, can constantly fail without starting sooner or later to adapt in one way or another to the logic of the real state of affairs.
Thus, the solution of the issue largely depends on our country. Soviet-American relations are essentially the touchstone of the international role of the United States as a state. To avoid defeat, it is enough for the United States to stand up to its best traditions and prove that it deserves to be called a great power.
We can say with confidence that this is the most honest and worthy test of national qualities. Therefore, anyone who closely follows the development of Soviet-American relations will not complain that the Kremlin has challenged American society. On the contrary, he will be somewhat grateful to the fate that, by giving the Americans this ordeal, made their very security as a nation dependent on their ability to rally and assume the responsibility of the moral and political leadership that history has prepared for them.

George Kennan was interested in traveling since childhood, however, at first he had to work as a telegraph operator. On the instructions of the Russian-American Telegraph Company, he came to Russia as part of an expedition that investigated the possibility of laying telegraphy from America to Russia through Alaska. Bering Strait, Chukotka and Siberia.

This is how Kennan's love for Russia began - in the area of ​​​​the mouth of the Anadyr, Kennan and his partner, advancing on dog sleds, explored the area, several times they were on the verge of death from cold and hunger. Failures accompanied the project - no money was sent, local Koryaks did not want to work, in the end the project was closed and 22-year-old Kennan went home from Okhotsk on a Russian troika through Siberia home. And at home, in his native state of Ohio, he published a book “Tent Life in Siberia” , after which he declared himself as a writer, and popularity made it possible to earn a living by lecturing about Russia.

In 1870, he made a trip to the Caucasus and became the first American to visit there. The Caucasus was extremely popular at that time in connection with the Caucasian War. In St. Petersburg, daggers inlaid with silver and gold were sold, hoods came into fashion. All this made an indelible impression on Kennan, and in 1870 he appeared in St. Petersburg, not paying attention to the warnings of his friends about the dangers of travel, he soon found himself in Dagestan.

Preparation of trench road near Bodo (Photos courtesy of Kennan)

For two months, Kennan traveled through the foothills, where he met with representatives of 30 ethnic groups who spoke different languages, he seemed to be transported back to the time of Julius Caesar - these people did not want to part with their traditions, the custom of blood feud was preserved here and much more - Kennan I wrote down these customs, so that later I could tell the world about it.
Shocked by the fact that these people did not manage to advance in their social development for many centuries, he reflected on the role of Russia in the Caucasus.
Returning home through Istanbul, he was already sure that it was Russia that had the honorable role to bring the achievements of Western civilization to this lost world.

At that time in America in relation to Russia there were two opposite. Some saw in it the only strong ally and sought to establish trade relations, others pointed to tyranny and called for its isolation.

One of the accusers of royal despotism was William Jackson Armstrong, who worked for some time in Russia at the American consulate. Despite the assassination of Alexander II, and the sympathy of American society for the Russian Tsar, he continued to criticize Russian monarchism.

Armstrong convinced his fellow citizens that despite the abolition of serfdom, the Russian Empire continued to be a barbarian country, because the authorities still hindered democratic development and severely punished those who did not agree with this.

Kennan, considering himself a connoisseur of Siberia, openly opposed attacks on Russia. A verbal battle unfolded between the two experts on the pages of the press. Everyone defended their point of view.

Seriously carried away by the discussion, Kennan began to get acquainted with books about Russia, tried to get Russian newspapers and magazines, among the books he looked for books by Russian authors. So he met Maksimov And Yadrintsev, their work about Siberia made him think about what, in fact, he knows about Russia.

Sergei Vasilievich Maksimov

The question of attitude towards Russia worried Kennan so seriously that in order to form his own opinion about the situation of convicts in Siberia, Kennan decided to make a new trip.

To do this, he convinced the magazine "The Century" send him as a journalist to Siberia, he also undertook to write 12 articles for the magazine about his journey. Soon an agreement was reached not only with the editor of the magazine, but also with the American government. Kennan was to receive $6,000 for his work and an advance of $100 monthly to his wife while he was away for 15 months. The purpose of the trip was to check conflicting information about the situation of prisoners in Siberia, to obtain additional information in support of the correctness of this or that information, and on the basis of the data received, to develop their own attitude to the events in Russia.

American readers found it difficult to understand "the hardened intensity of the feeling of hatred of the young people of Russia for their government" This is what an American journalist had to understand and explain to his readers.

A year before the trip, Kennan decided to prepare well and, despite having a basic knowledge of Russian, he learned Russian well. This gave him, unlike other travelers, the opportunity to receive information directly, without an interpreter. He also got acquainted with all possible critical articles about Siberia.

To this end, he went to St. Petersburg to buy as much literature as possible. In addition, he took care of all possible official permissions to move around Russia and visit prisons. And since he had a reputation as a supporter of Russia, he easily received the recommendations of high officials.

Yadrintsev not only introduced Kennan to his views on the problem, he provided him with directions to places not usually shown to “tourists”, the names and addresses of those who could give him informal information about the state of affairs in Siberia, as well as letters of recommendation that opened before Kennan the doors behind which the "opposition" was hiding.

In June 1885, Kennan, accompanied by the artist and photographer George Frost, was already in the Urals, where he spent the summer, in September the travelers arrived in Irkutsk and in the autumn reached the Karsky mines.
The trip was not easy, the travelers themselves had to look for places to spend the night, negotiate a change of horses, get food, prudently bypass those settlements in which typhus and plague raged. They learned what it was like to spend the night on the cold floor of postal stations, to get rid of insects that swarmed with huts at the billet. It was a test of physical strength. The need to hide contacts with the exiles, to behave in such a way with the local authorities so as not to lose their trust, to collect and encrypt information, to be ready for a search and even arrest, required great nervous tension.
By the end of the journey, George Frost had a clouding of his mind against the background of physical exhaustion; Kennan also had to be treated for a long time after the trip.

Windmills near Omsk

A Siberian stage or exile station house

Street in Irkutsk

Tarantas - a large four wheel carriage without seats used for travel in Siberia during the summer

Siberian convicts working in a placer mine

Dr. Martinoff's little boy & son of Yakimova born in fortress
Children born during the imprisonment of the convicted Yakimova in the fortress

Contacts with Yadrintsev continued until Yadrintsev's death in 1894. Yadrintsev not only met with Kennan when he came to Russia, but also continued to supply him with information, introduce him to people who could provide interesting information.
For example, shortly before Yadrintsev's death, Kennan asked him to send information on the Caucasus. Kennan, in turn, spoke about what Yadrintsev was interested in, for example, the system of organizing schools for the indigenous population.