Kerch operation 1942. The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation began

The Kerch-Feodosia operation of December 1941 became one of the first naval landings of World War II and for a long time remained the largest in terms of the number of troops involved. This operation is not deprived of attention in the literature, but most of the works devoted to it have two drawbacks: firstly, they almost do not use German documents, and secondly, they are based mainly on the documents of the Soviet fleet and almost do not describe the landing operations on the coast. A new cycle of publications dedicated to the events on the Kerch Peninsula on December 26–30, 1941 is intended to correct both of these gaps.

Operation plan

The landing on the Kerch Peninsula was planned by the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet and the Transcaucasian Front since the end of November 1941. It was supposed to be carried out in three different places: the landing on the northern coast of the peninsula was landed by the Azov flotilla, on the south - by the Black Sea Fleet, directly in the Kerch Strait - the Kerch Naval Base (KVMB) evacuated to Taman. The operation involved parts of two armies - the 51st and 44th. Moreover, the latter was supposed to act immediately in large formations - landing on the Black Sea coast made it possible to use warships and seagoing ships to transport troops. In the Kerch Strait and the Sea of ​​Azov, landings were carried out by small ships and boats.

Directly on the western coast of the Kerch Strait, the 302nd mountain rifle division of the 51st army of Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov (823rd, 825th, 827th and 831st regiments), as well as units of the Kerch base (Head - Rear Admiral A. S. Frolov) - first of all, her engineering company. They were supported by the coastal artillery of the base, which had at its disposal the 140th separate coastal defense artillery division of six batteries: three 203-mm, four 152-mm, nine 130-mm and four 75-mm guns (although not all of them could fire on the opposite side). In addition, the 25th Corps Artillery Regiment was located on Taman - three 152-mm and nine 122-mm guns. The air defense of the base was carried out by the 65th anti-aircraft artillery regiment.

Head of the Kerch Naval Base, Rear Admiral A. S. Frolov. Photo from the exposition of the Central Naval Museum

The base was subordinated to small naval forces: three divisions of water area protection boats (“small hunters” and minesweepers), two raid protection groups and a floating battery No. 4, rebuilt from a non-self-propelled barge (displacement - 365 tons; armament - three 100-mm guns , one 37-mm machine gun and anti-aircraft machine guns). In addition, to participate in the operation, the Black Sea Fleet transferred to the base the 2nd brigade of torpedo boats and a group of "small hunters" from the 4th and 8th divisions of sea hunters.

Kerch Peninsula, topographic map of 1938

It was decided to land south of Kerch in a twenty-kilometer strip from Cape Ak-Burun to the collective farm Commune Initiative near Lake Tobechik. Troops were supposed to land at five points. The main forces of the 302nd division unloaded in the harbor of the village of Kamysh-Burun and on the Kamysh-Burun Spit; part of the forces landed north of the bay near the village of Stary Karantin, as well as south of Kamysh-Burun - in Eltigen and the Commune Initiative. In the area of ​​the plant. Voikov and Cape Ak-Burun were supposed to make demonstrative landings. The starting point for the landing movement is Taman, 25 km (2nd and 3rd detachments) from the landing site and the village of Komsomolskoye to the west of Taman (1st detachment).

Kamysh-Burun Bay, view from the north, modern photo. On the left you can see the spit and the fish factory on it, on the right - the Zaliv plant (a former shipyard)

landing force

To participate in the operation, 37 fishing seiners were allocated (of which 6 were armed with 45-mm cannons) and three tugs, dragging two barges and a bolinder, a landing barge from the First World War without an engine. In addition, the landing was provided by 6 patrol boats of the MO-4 type and 29 torpedo boats (the torpedoes were removed from them, and the gutters at the stern were adapted for landing fighters). Subsequently, the minesweeper "Chkalov", the floating battery No. 4 and the armored boat No. 302 were added to these forces. Torpedo boats took on board 15-20 people, seiners - 50-60 people each. All ships could carry 5,500 people and up to 20 field guns in one flight.

Azov fishing seiner with a displacement of 80 tons. Such boats were the main means of transporting troops
Source - A. V. Nemenko. The story of one landing

To deliver the first amphibious assault to each of the four landing points, two torpedo boats and 4–6 seiners were intended. Assault groups with walkie-talkies were the first to land from torpedo boats, then the main train was landed by seiners. The staff of the headquarters of the Kerch base were appointed heads of the landing points, they were also the commanders of the assault groups. After landing, two seiners were to remain at each point: one for observation, the second for evacuating the wounded. The following points were chosen for the landing:

• No. 1 - Old Quarantine(technician-quartermaster of the 1st rank A. D. Grigoriev, head of the command and control unit of the headquarters of the KVMB);
• No. 2 - Kamysh-Burun Spit(senior lieutenant N. F. Gasilin, flagship gunner of the KVMB);
• No. 3 - Eltigen(Major I. K. Lopata, head of the mobilization unit of the headquarters of the KVMB);
• No. 4 - berth of the sinter plant in Kamysh-Burun port(captain of the 3rd rank A.F. Studenichnikov, chief of staff of the KVMB). Here, from four "small hunters" (MO-091, MO-099, MO-100 and MO-148), a reinforced company of the 302nd rifle division landed. At the same time, Studenichnikov led the entire detachment of the first throw, and then had to carry out general coordination of the landing from the board of the MO-100 boat. With him was the head of the political department of the base, battalion commissar K. V. Lesnikov.

General plan of the Kerch-Feodosiya operation
Source - Kerch operation. M.: Military publishing house, 1943

The first throw was labeled as 1st Landing Squad, it also included mooring teams, signalmen and scouts - a total of 225 people at each point (rifle company and sapper squad) from the 823rd and 825th regiments of the 302nd mountain rifle division, the 831st regiment of the 390th rifle division. According to the final report of the base, a total of 1154 people were taken on the ships of the 1st detachment.

It is worth noting that the base command took direct control of the landing, acting in the forefront. Rear Admiral Frolov himself was going to place his command post on the "small hunter" and be directly in the strait - only a direct order from the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F. F. Oktyabrsky, made him stay in Taman.

2nd squad landings under the command of senior lieutenant Petrovsky, in fact, it was a reinforcement of the 1st detachment - it consisted of three companies of the same regiments (200 people each), unloaded from ten seiners and two motorized boats. Each company was reinforced with two 76mm field guns. According to the final plan, one company landed in Stary Karantin, one in Kamysh-Burun itself, and another in Eltigen. In total, 744 people were accepted on the ships. The detachment was accompanied by 2 "small hunters" and 6 torpedo boats.

3rd squad Captain-Lieutenant N. Z. Evstigneev made up the main part of the landing force and landed at the same three points as the 2nd detachment. It consisted of the 823rd, 825th and 831st rifle regiments - 1200 people each with four 76-mm guns each. A barge with a tugboat and three seiners were assigned to each regiment. A serious danger was that the main part of the personnel was transported on a non-self-propelled barge.

Alas, units of the 302nd division had no combat experience, they were not preparing either for landings or for night operations. Only since December 15 in the Taman Bay, with parts of the division, it was possible to conduct ten exercises with the involvement of the minesweeper "Chkalov" and eight seiners. The landing was to be carried out suddenly - in the dark, without artillery preparation, only under the cover of a smoke screen from torpedo boats. The suppression of enemy firing points was assigned to the 45-mm guns of the MO-type boats. At dawn, the artillery of the Kerch base was supposed to support the landing force - for this, spotters with walkie-talkies landed on the shore together with the paratroopers.

Enemy forces

On the German side, the Kerch Peninsula was defended by the 42nd Army Corps, but in fact only its 46th Infantry Division was in the Kerch area. The 72nd Infantry Regiment was intended to defend the northern coast of the peninsula, the 97th Regiment was in reserve west of Kerch. The 27-kilometer strip on the coast of the Kerch Strait was defended by the 42nd Infantry Regiment, which had 1,529 people in combat strength (without rear and support services), including 38 officers, 237 non-commissioned officers and 1,254 privates. The German documents do not report the total strength of the regiment.

The eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula and the location of enemy forces according to Soviet intelligence
Source - Kerch-Feodosiya operation. M.: Military publishing house, 1943

In addition, a fairly strong artillery group was located in the Kerch area: the 114th and 115th artillery regiments, parts of the 766th coastal defense artillery regiment (four batteries of the 148th division, two batteries of the 147th division and one battery of the 774th division), as well as the 4th battery of the 54th coastal defense artillery regiment - a total of 35 serviceable 105-mm field howitzers and 15 heavy 150-mm howitzers, as well as 7 long-range 100-mm guns. Of the last four (captured Dutch) were permanently installed at Cape Takil, all other artillery had mechanical traction and could change positions. The main part of the artillery was located on the coast of the Kerch Gulf, the 1st division of the 64th anti-aircraft regiment of the Luftwaffe was also located here (at least sixteen 88-mm guns and several 20-mm machine guns).

The area from Cape Ak-Burun to Kamysh-Burun was defended by the 3rd Infantry Battalion with the support of the 3rd Battery of the 114th Artillery Regiment. Further south, in the area of ​​Eltigen and the Commune Initiative, was the 3rd Infantry Battalion with the 1st Battery of the 114th Artillery Regiment. Judging by the German descriptions, the coastline itself was guarded only in the villages of Eltigen and Stary Karantin, and only on the Kamysh-Burun Spit was there a reinforced patrol of the 1st battalion with two anti-tank guns and several machine guns. The main forces of the 1st and 3rd battalions were located where it was more convenient to live - in the villages of Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen, Commune Initiative and Tobechik, as well as on the territory of the iron ore plant.

The ruins of the iron ore plant, modern view

On the morning of December 26, it was raining in the Kerch region, the temperature was 3-5 degrees Celsius, the excitement in the strait was 3-4 points. By evening, the temperature had dropped to zero, sleet began to fall.

Landing of the 1st detachment

The command of the Kerch base received an order for landing on December 24, the landing was required to be carried out on the night of the 26th. By dawn on December 25, the ships were concentrated at pre-planned landing points - Taman and Komsomolsk. Despite drills and pre-designed planning tables, the boarding was slow and disorganized. At the appointed time (by one in the morning), only the 1st detachment (the detachment of the first throw) completed it. The 2nd detachment was late with the exit for an hour, the 3rd - for two hours.

For the transition to Kamysh-Burun, a route was chosen through the shallow Tuzla ravine and south of the Tuzla spit, since to the north of it the strait was visible and shot through by the enemy. Part of the fences and signals installed here was torn off by a storm - as a result, the barges of the 3rd detachment ran aground, their removal was delayed until 11 am. The rest of the ships approached the designated landing points at different times, as a result, landing troops not where the plan was supposed - sometimes by order, sometimes without prior notice.

A fragment of a modern topographic map of the area of ​​the settlements of Kamysh-Burun (Arshintsevo) and Eltigen (Geroevskoye)

At about 5 o'clock in the morning, Senior Lieutenant Gasilin from the Kamysh-Burun Spit reported on the radio that the assault group had landed from torpedo boats covertly and without losses, and that landing point No. 2 was ready to receive paratroopers. A little later, quartermaster technician Grigoriev from Stary Karantin (point No. 1) reported that he had landed on the shore and was fighting with superior enemy forces (after that, the connection was interrupted). From Eltigen (point No. 3) there were no messages from Major Lopata.

But the main events took place in the harbor of Kamysh-Burun, where a group of four torpedo boats and six seiners moved. Having already entered the harbor, the flagship MO-100 ran aground literally fifty meters from the pier. It turned out that the harbor was covered with silt, and the depth here does not exceed one and a half meters (with a draft of a boat of the MO-4 type of 1.25 m). As a result, the helmsman Konstantin Kozlov wade reached the pier and fixed the mooring line on it, for which the boat was pulled to the pier. Following him, MO-148 approached the pier, also disembarking paratroopers without enemy opposition. Only after that did the Germans discover the landing: the next two Soviet boats were already moored under fire. Nevertheless, the landing took place practically without losses, the fighters of the assault group successfully entrenched themselves in the shops of the sinter plant.

Until the situation was cleared up, Captain 3rd Rank Studenchikov did not dare to land the rest of the landing force in Kamysh-Burun itself and sent the seiners that came up to land on the spit. The MO-148 boat went to Taman, the other three remained off the coast for fire support. Alas, the Kamysh-Burun Spit was under constant fire from enemy artillery (three 105-mm guns of the 3rd battery of the 114th artillery regiment). According to a German report, "good results were achieved against the enemy who landed on the Rybachy Peninsula". Apparently, as a result of this shelling, the head of landing point No. 2, Senior Lieutenant Gasilin, was killed.

The German patrol withdrew from the spit without a fight to the south and by noon took up positions near the road from Eltigen to Kerch. The Germans took with them a heavy machine gun and two anti-tank guns, but the limber with ammunition for one of them had to be thrown on a spit.

Fight on the beach

What happened at the other landing sites? At Old Quarantine, only an assault group from torpedo boat No. 15 was able to land - 25 people, led by the head of landing point No. 1, technician-quartermaster of the 1st rank Grigoriev (according to the report of the base headquarters, 55 people were landed here - that is, both boats were unloaded ). A heavy battle immediately ensued, about which Grigoriev reported by radio to the headquarters of the base. Soon the radio went out of order, and the connection was interrupted.

The Eltigen group of ships, for unclear reasons, was divided into two detachments in the Tuzla ravine, moving along different routes. The first to go were two torpedo boats with an assault group and two seiners, one of which was the group commander. Behind and somewhat to the north are two other boats and four other seiners.

At Eltigen, torpedo boat No. 92 was the first to approach the shore. While the paratroopers were disembarking, it was turned around with a lag, and then thrown into the shallows. On the shore were 25 paratroopers and 4 sailors, including the commander of the boat, Senior Lieutenant Kolomiets; four more sailors supported them with heavy machine gun fire from the boat. During the battle that began, the radio operator was one of the first to be killed - as a result, Major Lopata was never able to contact the base headquarters. The paratroopers managed to occupy a large stone shed fifty meters from the boat, turning it into a stronghold.

Seeing the battle, the team of one of the seiners turned their ship to the north and, without opposition from the enemy, unloaded it at the base of the Kamysh-Burun Spit. Another seiner did not unload and, accompanied by a torpedo boat, returned to Komsomolskoye. But the second group of ships, apparently, turned to the south and, without opposition from the enemy, landed troops at the Commune Initiative - where this was envisaged by the original plan of the operation.

Shore in the area of ​​the Commune Initiative, modern photo

Having received no information from Eltigen and Stary Karantin, the head of the KVMB, Rear Admiral Frolov, ordered the commander of the first throw detachment, Senior Lieutenant I. G. Litoshenko, with the rest of the ships, to unload on the Kamysh-Burun Spit. However, the large seiners of the 1st detachment were able to approach the shore only one and a half hundred meters, ran into a shallow and were forced to unload the paratroopers (about 250 people) at a depth of 1.2-1.5 m. As it turned out, there was only a sand bar, beyond which the depth again exceeded two meters. As a result, many paratroopers drowned. Only after that, the landing site was transferred to the berth of the sinter plant - the Kuban seiner was sent there, and, possibly, other vessels.

Landing area on a topographic map in 1941

For the Germans, the landing was a complete surprise. The first report about it was received by the headquarters of the 42nd regiment from the headquarters of the 1st battalion in Kamysh-Burun at 4:45 (Moscow time - at 5:45). It reported that "many large and small ships" they are trying to land on the spit and in the area of ​​​​the shipyard south of the village (ship repair plant No. 532, now "Zaliv"), as well as in Stary Karantin. Five minutes later, a report was also received from the 3rd battalion stationed in Eltigen - it was reported that 70 people landed in the southern part of the village (the number of paratroopers was more than doubled).

At 06:10, the command of the 42nd Regiment reported to the headquarters of the 46th Infantry Division that the Russians had managed to establish bridgeheads in two places - in Kamysh-Burun and near the Commune of Initiative. The landing at Stary Karantin was quickly defeated: the 3rd company of the 1st battalion reported on the destruction of the enemy and the capture of 1 officer and 30 privates, one commissar was shot. Possibly, it was a 1st-rank quartermaster technician Grigoriev, whose body, according to Soviet army newspapers, was later found with signs of torture. The fact is that the insignia of the quartermaster of the 1st rank coincided with the insignia of the political instructor of the company - three "heads over heels". As for the landing commissar, he was the senior political instructor Grabarov - on the morning of December 27, he and several paratroopers on a randomly found boat reached the Tuzla spit. There were no other commanders among the landing group. It should be noted that after the war, speaking in court, the former commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, assured that the “order on commissars” (Kommissarbefehl) in his army was not brought to the attention of the troops and was not executed.

The command of the 42nd regiment began to transfer its reserves to the landing site: at 6 o'clock in the morning (7 o'clock Moscow time), an infantry platoon from the 13th company, stationed in Churubash, was sent to Kamysh-Burun, as well as an anti-tank platoon from the 14th company , located in Kerch - both of these units were transferred to the disposal of the 1st battalion.

Sources and literature:

1. Chronicle of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union at the Black Sea theater. Issue 1. From June 21 to December 31, 1941 M.-L: Office of the Naval Publishing House of the NKVMF, 1945
2. Kerch operation. December 1941-January 1942 General Staff of the Army, Military History Department. M.: Military publishing house, 1943
3. A. I. Zubkov. Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. M.: Military Publishing, 1974
4. V. A. Martynov, S. F. Spakhov. Strait on fire. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1984
5. S. S. Berezhnoy. Ships and vessels of the Navy of the USSR. 1928–1945 M.: Military Publishing, 1988
6. A. V. Nemenko. The history of one landing http://www.litsovet.ru/index.php/material.read?material_id=490298
7. Report on the landing operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula and the cities of Kerch and Feodosia 26–31.12.41. Operational department of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol, 1942 (TsAMO RF, fund 209, inventory, 1089, file 14)
8. Report on the operation to force the Kerch Strait and the landing on the Kerch Peninsula of the Kerch naval base of the Black Sea Fleet on December 26–29, 1941. Operational department of the KVMB Black Sea Fleet, 1942 (TsAMO RF, fund 209, inventory, 1089, file 1)
9. Operational reports of the headquarters of the Transcaucasian and Caucasian fronts 11/22/41–01/15/42 (TsAMO RF, fund 216, inventory, 1142 case 14)
10. Combat Log of the 42nd Army Corps (NARA, T-314, R-1668)

This article does not claim to be 100% accurate. It is rather an attempt to rethink, and somewhere to criticize the official data.

The alignment of forces and the course of events.

(who is familiar with the situation on the Crimean peninsula in May 1942, this paragraph can be skipped)

On October 18, 1941, the assault on the Crimean peninsula began. The fighting lasted almost a month and ended on November 16 with the almost complete capture of the Crimean peninsula, with the exception of Sevastopol. Both the Soviet command and the German command considered Crimea the most important strategic foothold. Because the struggle for the Crimea did not subside throughout the war. Already a month and a half after the capture of the Crimea by the Germans, the Soviet troops carried out the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, during which the entire Kerch Peninsula up to Feodosia was occupied. During the winter-spring of 1942, both sides launched repeated attacks and offensives, but neither side was able to achieve strategic success. The war in the Crimea took on a protracted character. This continued until May 1942.

Preparing the next offensive, the Soviet command thought that Manstein's 11th Army, sandwiched between two fronts (the Sevastopol line and the Crimean Front), would be easily defeated, that the Germans were not thinking of advancing, but would simply hold their positions. This apparently explains the almost complete absence of reconnaissance activities on the part of the Soviet troops. However, the German command thought differently. By the end of April, the German General Staff developed a plan to clear the Crimea from Soviet troops, which was called "Hunting Bustard". The Germans actively conducted reconnaissance, at the same time erected all sorts of false fortifications and firing points, to divert eyes. They performed all sorts of maneuvering actions, the movement of equipment in their rear. In a word, they stubbornly misled the Soviet command.

As early as the end of January 1942, L. Z. Mekhlis was sent as a representative of the headquarters to the Crimean Front. He immediately began to do his usual business: cleaning and shuffling personnel. For example, Mekhlis removed Tolbukhin, the chief of staff of the front, putting Major General Vechny in his place.

The Soviet units on the Crimean Peninsula in May 1942 were represented by the Crimean Front, under the command of Lieutenant General Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich, it included the 44th Army (63rd Mountain Rifle, 157th, 276th, 396th, 404th rifle divisions, 124th and 126th tank battalions), 47th army (77th mountain rifle, 224th, 236th, 271st, 320th rifle divisions), 51st army (138 -I, 302nd, 390th, 398th, 400th rifle divisions) and units of front subordination (156th rifle division, 12th, 139th rifle brigades, 83rd marine rifle brigade, 72 1st cavalry division, 151st fortified area, 54th motorized rifle regiment, 39th, 40th, 55th, 56th tank brigades, 79th, 229th separate tank battalions).

Most of these units were badly battered either during the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, or in the recent (January-April 1942) offensives of the Red Army on the Crimean Peninsula itself. Some barely gained 50% of the payroll. For example, back in January 1942, the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division suffered huge losses in the Feodosia region, and experienced constant hunger from a lack of replenishment. Most felt a shortage of 20-40% of the personnel. Only the 396th, 271st, 320th rifle and 72nd cavalry divisions, which had recently crossed over from the Taman Peninsula, were fresh.

Absolutely the same picture was observed with tank formations. In the recent frontal attacks of the winter-spring offensives, the armored units of the Crimean Front also suffered huge losses. So only the 39th tank brigade from March 13 to March 19, 1942 lost 23 tanks.

The German units, on the Crimean Peninsula in May 1942, were represented by the 11th Army (Colonel-General Erich von Manstein) it included: 30th Army Corps (28th Chasseurs, 50th, 132nd, 170 -I infantry, 22nd tank divisions), 42nd army corps (46th infantry division), 7th Romanian corps (10th, 19th Romanian infantry, 8th Romanian cavalry divisions), 8- th air corps (about 400 aircraft) and units of army subordination (18th Romanian infantry division, Groddek motorized brigade, Radu Korne mechanized brigade, tank reconnaissance battalion).

German troops were also not full-blooded. So some infantry divisions experienced a shortage of up to 30% in personnel. For example, by the end of March 1942, the 46th Infantry Division had lost up to a third of its personnel and almost half of its heavy weapons. However, the German and Romanian units stationed near Kerch received significant reinforcements by mid-April 1942. This can be seen at least from the fact that the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade was deployed into a cavalry division, and this is an increase in personnel by 2.5-3 times. The mechanized parts of Manstein were mostly full-blooded. For example, in April, the 22nd Panzer Division received 15-20 Pz.IIIs and Pz.IVs with long-barreled guns, especially to combat the Soviet T-34s and KVs.

Among other things, the troops of both opposing sides were actively supported by the local population: Russian-speaking partisan formations on the side of the Red Army, and Crimean Tatar companies and self-defense battalions on the side of the Wehrmacht. Also on the side of the Wehrmacht were a number of Russian, Ukrainian collaborationist units and a Cossack cavalry squadron.

If you sum up all the units, then the number of troops on both sides will not differ much. But the presence of von Richthofen's 8th Air Corps, and fresh mechanized units, tipped the scales in favor of the Germans in the upcoming battle.

The Kerch defensive operation began on May 7 and ended on May 20, 1942, with the complete defeat of the Crimean Front. During it, the commander of the 11th German Army, Erich von Manstein, carried out the Blitzkrieg plan, only on a reduced scale. Having managed to correctly assess the situation and make the first move. Using the effect of surprise, Manstein struck where he was not expected: he launched a tank and mechanized attack in the only place where the Soviet positions had an anti-tank ditch. Having broken the defenses of the Red Army, the main part of the units of the 11th Army turned north (the main forces of the 22nd Panzer Division, most of the infantry divisions), to encircle and destroy the 47th and 51st Soviet armies. And mobile units (Groddek's motorized brigade, Radu Korne's mechanized group, the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd Panzer Division, the Romanians' 8th Cavalry Division and a number of infantry divisions) rushed into the gap to the east.

During the Kerch defensive operation, the Germans did not wait for the actions of the Soviet troops, but imposed their tactics. The coherence of the actions of aviation, tank troops and infantry gave excellent results. The presence of an effective 8th Air Corps and fresh mobile mechanized units gave the German command a huge advantage.

The Supreme High Command saw the following as the reason for the complete defeat of the Crimean Front. The grouping of troops was offensive, not defensive. Too much congestion of troops in the first echelon. Lack of interaction between the military branches. The disregard of the command towards its troops. Poorly trained, in engineering terms, defensive and lack of rear lines. Bureaucratic and sometimes repressive method of work of the front command and personally L.3. Mehlis. Lack of understanding and sober assessment by the command of the rapidly changing situation. The direct culprits of the Kerch catastrophe were named: L.3. Mehlis, D.T. Kozlov, F.A. Shamanin, P.P. Eternal, K.S. Kolganov, S.I. Chernyak and E.M. Nikolaenko. All of them were removed from their posts and demoted in ranks.

Side losses.

In the works of the Soviet period, the Kerch defensive operation (among the Germans, the operation was called “Hunting for bustards”) was not considered in detail. Accordingly, the losses in this operation were mentioned, somehow in passing. In various modern scientific and near-scientific works, figures from 160,000 to 200,000 people are mentioned. irretrievable losses . (In the late 1980s, these figures could be as high as 300,000). The average figure is 170,000 people.

How were such huge numbers calculated? Virtually no part of the Crimean Front was able to provide lists of casualties. The command of the North Caucasian Front calculated the losses of the Crimean Front as follows: data were taken on payroll composition at the beginning of May 1942, the number of those who crossed to Taman before May 20, 1942 was subtracted and the figure was 176,566 people.

However, let's look at everything in more detail.

Immediately make a reservation that everything that is described below is nothing but a hypothesis. It is not possible to accurately calculate the true losses of the parties in this operation due to the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the sources, or even their absence. I am sure of one thing: the order of the numbers is exactly that.

A very important point in this topic is the determination of the size of the Crimean Front at the beginning of May 1942.

When it is written about 300,000 (or more) people at the beginning of May in the Crimean Front, then the entire payroll is counted. And indeed, if you sum it up, it turns out that in May 1942 there were more than 300,000 people in the Crimean Front. However, as shown above, there simply could not be such a number of troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Krivosheev G. F. estimates the number of troops of the Crimean Front (plus part of the forces of the Black Sea Front and the Azov Flotilla) at 249,800 people. However, these figures are also highly overestimated. In addition, Krivosheev takes into account both the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. However, the authoritative researcher Nemenko A.V. believes that at the beginning of May 1942 there were “just over 200,000 people” in the Crimean Front. Taking the arithmetic mean of these two figures (249800 and 200000), we will be close to the real figure of the composition land(excluding the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) the forces of the Crimean Front: 224,900 people.

The second important point will be the calculation of the number of evacuees to Taman. On May 21, Kozlov gave the following information in a telegram to Stalin: 138,926 people were taken out, of which 30,000 were wounded. But there, he adds that the calculation of the total number is indicative, since there is no data on two marinas and those who crossed on their own (and there were such, although not very many). In addition, those who crossed on airplanes did not succumb to accounting. In the report of military communications of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, figures are given of 119,395 people, of which 42,324 were wounded (by the way, this figure, rounded up to 120,000, was included in many official publications). However, this figure shows the number of crossings only for the period from 14 to 20 May. But in fact, the redeployment of the Crimean Front to Taman began on May 8: Vsevolod Abramov, referring to the archival documents of the 6th separate motor-pontoon bridge battalion, writes that from May 8 to 13, the wounded were transported to Taman. In the report of the military operations of the KVMB units, the figure is "about 150,000 people, excluding those who crossed on their own." As you can see, the numbers vary.

All data on those who crossed are taken from documentary sources, and not calculated. Therefore, in my purely personal opinion, it would be correct to take the average of the above data as the number of evacuees: 136,107 people.

On April 30, Commander-in-Chief Budyonny presented to the headquarters and personally to Stalin another plan for the liberation of the Crimea, in connection with which he asked to strengthen the troops stationed on the peninsula. To which Stalin ordered to go over to the defense of the positions occupied, however, replenishments were nevertheless sent to the Crimean Front. In May, about 10,000 people were transported to the Kerch Peninsula from Taman.

Now about losses.

Let's start with German sources: Manstein writes in his memoirs about 170,000 captured soldiers and officers of the Red Army. Franz Halder indicates 150,000 prisoners. Fedor von Bock first writes about 149,000 prisoners, but then points out that "another 3,000 prisoners were taken, thus about 170,000 prisoners were captured" . Great math, right? Maximilian Fretter-Pico is more cautious in his assessment of the prisoners: he gives the figure of 66,000 prisoners. Moreover, the Germans, as a rule, name only the number of prisoners. Only Robert Furzhik writes about the killed Russians: he writes about 28,000 killed and 147,000 prisoners. Now let's turn to our sources.

According to G. F. Krivosheev, on the Kerch Peninsula from January to May 19, 1942, irretrievable losses amounted to 194,807 people. According to the same Krivosheev G.F., only in another study, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army only for May 8-19, 1942 amounted to 162,282 people. Let's say. Although the well-known researcher of the Crimean defensive operation, Abramov V.V., considers this figure to be overestimated by at least 30,000.

Now let's try to calculate in a different way. To the received number of troops on the Kerch Peninsula at the beginning of May, we add the replenishment arrived for May and subtract the received number of evacuees. We get 224900+10000-136107=98793 people. But this number also includes people who remained in the Adzhimushkay quarries.

The number of Adzhimushkay garrisons should be discussed in more detail.

Trofimenko in his diary estimated the number of Adzhimushkais at 15,000 people. The head of the food supply of the garrison Pirogov A.I., after the war, gave an estimate of “more than 10,000 people”. But it seems that Pirogov and Trofimenko estimated the number of defenders only in the Central Quarries. German estimates for the number of defenders were as high as 30,000. But apparently “the eyes of fear are big” - the Adzhimushkais really caused a rustle, as if there were 30,000 of them. Vsevolod Abramov himself is inclined to the figure of 20,000 defenders of the quarries, meaning those who remained in all the quarries.

This means that the number of irretrievable losses is 78,793 people. It is clear that neither 150,000 nor 170,000 prisoners can "fit" into this number. Therefore, we will take the data of Maximilian Fretter-Pico as the only real figures for the number of prisoners, 66,000 people (although this figure seems to me too high). After not tricky calculations, we get the number of 12793 people killed.

The number of wounded was indicated above, and according to various estimates ranges from 30,000 to 42,324 people (average - 36,162 people).

Thus, in our opinion, the total irretrievable losses of the Crimean Front during the Kerch defensive operation amount to 78,793 people, of which 66,000 were captured, 12,793 were killed. It also mentions a number of missing people. But the “missing” are, as a rule, captured or (to a lesser extent) unfound dead and unidentified seriously wounded. So, in this case (taking into account the specifics of the operation) they are already taken into account in the previous figures. The total losses, together with 36,162 wounded who were safely evacuated to Taman, amounted to 114,955 people.

Perhaps the averaging of some figures catches the eye. Well, let's try to substitute for comparison first all the maximum (a) data, and then all the minimum (b):

a) 249800+10000-150000-66000-30000=13800 people.

b) 200000+10000-119395-66000-10000=14605 people.

As you can see, the numbers are about the same. Taking into account all the "about" and "about" up, this number could rise to 20,000 people.

This is exactly the order of losses of the Crimean Front killed in the Kerch defensive operation. This thousands, Maybe tens of thousands. But by no means hundreds of thousands as it is officially considered.

Further. I consider it simply necessary to say a few words about the losses of the Germans in the operation “Hunting for bustards”. Here it is even more difficult with sources. The number of fascist troops involved in the operation “Hunting for bustards” is given by the well-known researcher A.V. Nemenko at 147,000 people, but this does not take into account units of army subordination: the 18th Romanian Infantry Division, the Groddek motorized brigade, the Radu Korne mechanized brigade, etc. d. The real number was at least 165,000 people.

The Germans evaluate their losses differently. Robert Furzhik writes that the total losses of the troops amounted to 3397 people, of which 600 were killed. Fedor von Bock writes in his memoirs about 7,000 irretrievable losses. Our historians call approximately the same numbers of German losses: Nevzorov names 7588 dead soldiers and officers and Nemenko points out 7790 dead. I note right away that many of our and German publications take a rounded figure of 7,500 people killed as the official losses of the Germans in Operation Bustard Hunting.

Of course, we will not take the data of Robert Furzhik as a basis, because the number of 600 Germans killed seems to us to be completely underestimated. Let's take the average figure of 7500 as officially accepted (besides, as we can see, most sources indicate approximately the same number: 7000, 7588, 7790). But these losses are exclusively German. It is known that the German command considered only its own losses, the Romanian - its own, the Italian - its own, etc. Moreover, among the Germans, even by combat arms, losses were recorded by different departments. Luftwaffe separately, Wehrmacht separately, SS separately, etc. Therefore, among the 7500 killed Germans, 2752 killed Romanians were not taken into account, that is, the losses of the Nazis on May 7-20, 1942 amount to approximately 10252 people killed. However, this figure is not entirely accurate: it does not take into account the prisoners (and although their number was not large, they were), the missing, the wounded, as well as the losses of the 8th air corps of von Richthofen (which, no doubt, also suffered significant losses: the 72nd Cavalry Division alone destroyed at least 36 enemy aircraft).

So what are the total losses of the 11th Army in the May battles on the Kerch Peninsula?

In my purely personal opinion, the total losses of the 11th Army on the Kerch Peninsula in May 1942 are characterized by an entry in the diary of the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Franz Halder, I will quote it verbatim: “Requests for replenishment of the 11th Army cannot be fully satisfied. 60,000 people have been requested; a maximum of 30,000 people can be allocated. This means a shortage of 2-3 thousand people for each division. The situation is especially bad in the artillery units of the RGK. These words perfectly characterize the general losses of the Germans. These losses were indeed great. They are so large that a number of units of the 11th Army lost their combat effectiveness and were withdrawn to the rear.

Opponents during the May battles of 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula suffered fairly comparable losses in the dead. Despite the fact that Manstein brilliantly fulfilled his strategic tasks (in fact, he implemented the Blitzkrieg plan on a reduced scale), this was a Pyrrhic victory for him. Serious losses of the 11th Army forced the German leadership to abandon the implementation of the Blucher I operational plan, according to which the 11th Army was to force the Kerch Strait and advance into the Caucasus through the Taman Peninsula after the capture of Crimea. From all this it is very clear that the courage and ability to fight the Soviet soldiers were not much inferior to the Germans. After all, losses killed in open battle amounted to 10,252 people from the 11th German Army and 12,793 people from the Crimean Front. The blame for the defeat of the Crimean Front lies entirely on the shoulders of the command of the front itself.

This operation had grave consequences for the Red Army: the Sevastopol defensive region was placed in a difficult situation. Oil fields, oil pipelines and oil depots of the USSR were located in the Caucasus, the Germans had the opportunity to carry out a landing from Kerch to Taman. Crimea was an excellent springboard from which it was possible to carry out constant air raids on Soviet troops and facilities located in the Caucasus. The Germans were able to free part of the forces and transfer them from the Crimea to other parts of the theater of operations.

Nevertheless, the Kerch defensive operation showed the high morale of individual units of the Crimean Front. The units that did not panic and did not flinch in the face of a superior enemy showed a fine example of valor and resilience. The personal courage of individual units and the fighters themselves is what made it possible to delay the advance of the Germans for so many days and evacuate a large number of people of the deceased Crimean Front to Taman.

Gerasimenko Roman.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945: A Brief History. The team of authors under the leadership of Telpukhovsky B. S. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1984. p. 86.

Shtemenko S.M. The General Staff during the War: From Stalingrad to Berlin. - M.: AST: Transitbook, 2005. p. 68.

Nemenko A. V. Crimea 1941-1942. Riddles and myths of the peninsula. Electronic version, posted at http://www.litsovet.ru, (accessed 11/12/2013).

On April 6, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees conferring the honorary title of the Russian Federation "City of Military Glory" to Feodosia, Gatchina, Grozny, Petrozavodsk and Staraya Russa. This honorary title was established by federal law on May 9, 2006. It is awarded to Russian cities, on the territory of which or in the immediate vicinity of them, during fierce battles, the defenders of the Fatherland showed courage, steadfastness and mass heroism.

For what merits was the honorary title awarded to Theodosius? In its military history, there were two brightest episodes that are directly related to the military chronicle of Russia. The first in 1771, the 27,000-strong Russian army under the command of General-in-Chief Dolgorukov-Krymsky, in the battle of Kef, defeated the 95,000-strong Turkish army and occupied the city. Even more famous is the heroic Feodosia landing at the end of December 1941. It was the largest landing operation of the Great Patriotic War: in the most difficult conditions, the Black Sea Fleet managed to land an entire combined arms army in the city occupied by the enemy. Due to various objective and subjective reasons, it was not possible to win a big victory at that time, so the unique landing was not appreciated. Today we will talk about it in detail.

In December 1941, the troops of the Army Group "Center" were not only stopped near Moscow, but also rolled west under the blows of fresh Soviet reserves. Also, the Germans were defeated in the south of the country, near Rostov-on-Don, and in the north, near Tikhvin. These failures on the Eastern Front infuriated Hitler and the entire Nazi establishment. The Germans urgently needed a bright, demonstrative success, which could symbolically crown the outgoing 1941. And it was success at any cost that the Fuhrer demanded from the commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein.

On December 17, the Nazis began a decisive assault on Sevastopol, conducting business with skill and assertiveness characteristic of the Wehrmacht of the 1941 model. The defenders of the city fought desperately, but their strength was dwindling. The supply of reinforcements and ammunition by sea by transports and warships did not have time to compensate for the loss. Everything went to the fact that in the first week of January 1942 the city would fall.

In order to pull the enemy forces away from Sevastopol, the Soviet command decided to carry out an amphibious landing on the Kerch Peninsula, thereby opening a new front in the Crimea. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the plan of operation developed by the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, supplementing it with a proposal from the command of the Black Sea Fleet, in addition to the planned landing sites in the Kerch region, to land troops also in the port of Feodosia.

This operation went down in history as the Kerch-Feodosiya. This is one of the largest landing operations carried out by the warring parties during the Second World War, and by a number of parameters the largest landing operation of the Soviet fleet. The lion's share of all combat-ready forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla, an impressive tonnage of transports, a number of marine infantry units, two combined arms armies (51st and 44th) and even tanks were involved in its implementation. T-26 tanks and T-38 amphibious wedges.

On December 26-27, landing units were landed on several bridgeheads north and south of Kerch. Not everything went smoothly. Our troops suffered significant losses, and most importantly, they were sealed in the bridgeheads by a desperately resisting enemy. The position of the landed troops worsened over the next 2 days, when a strong storm and the freezing of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov disrupted the delivery of reinforcements and supplies to the bridgeheads. As a result, the goal of the landings, the capture of Kerch, was not achieved in the first three days.

When the situation in the Kerch region became critical, Soviet naval formations with landing troops on board were just approaching Feodosia.

The ships of the squadron were given the following missions: to land a forward assault detachment consisting of two regiments in the port of Feodosia, to suppress enemy opposition in the landing areas with artillery fire, and to support the landing operations with artillery. To solve these problems, two detachments of ships were formed under the general command of Captain 1st Rank N.E. Bassist. In the landing and artillery support detachment, commanded by Captain 1st Rank B.A. Andreev, the cruisers Krasny Kavkaz and Krasny Krym, the destroyers Nezamozhnik, Zheleznyakov and Shaumyan, as well as the transport Kuban entered.

A detachment of landing craft under the command of Lieutenant Commander A.I. Ivanov was formed from the minesweepers "Shield", "Explosion" and 12 boat hunters of the MO-4 type. On board the ships of these detachments, the first echelon of the landing of the 251st mountain rifle and 633rd rifle regiments, numbering more than 5 thousand soldiers and commanders, was delivered.

In total, the first (assault) landing echelon consisted of 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 minesweepers and 12 MO4 boats.

After the landing of the first echelon, two detachments of transports with security forces were to deliver to Feodosia the main forces of the 44th Army of the 263rd Rifle and 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions. Armored vehicles were also delivered on transports: 20 T-38 light amphibious tanks and 14 T-26 tanks. T-38s went on the Jean Zhores transport, T-26 on the Kalinin transport.

In general, the operation plan provided for the landing of 23,000 soldiers of the 44th Army in three echelons in Feodosia.

In the first echelon of the landing for assault operations, a detachment of marines numbering 600 people was formed. It was headed by Senior Lieutenant A.F. Aidinov. The assault detachment was supposed to land the MO-4 boats. Together with the assault detachment of Aidinov, in the first throw, the reconnaissance detachments of the fleet headquarters and the hydrographic department of the fleet, as well as corrective groups of ships of the landing detachment and artillery support, landed.

At 3 h. 48 min. NOT. Basisty ordered to begin artillery preparation. The ships opened fire on the port and artillery batteries. The destroyers fired their first volley of illuminating shells, followed by the cruisers.

At 4:03 a.m. the order was given to the landing craft detachment: "Boats go to port!" The landing has begun.

The first boat to break into the waters of the Feodosia port was MO-0131 (commander Lieutenant I.G. Chernyak), the second MO-013 (commander Lieutenant N.N. Vlasov) with the commander of the landing craft detachment, Captain Lieutenant A.I. Ivanov on board. They landed marines and spotters on the Protective (Long) pier. This group was headed by the commander of the detachment of small hunters, senior lieutenant V.I. Chupov. The Marines quickly captured the lighthouse building on the pier, and then began to advance along the pier to the shore. The hydrographers who were part of this group measured the depths at the pier to determine the mooring places for ships. After the capture of the lighthouse, the signal “Entrance is free” was transmitted from it to the ships.

Having received a signal, N.E. Basisty gave the order to break into the port of minesweepers and destroyers.

After the boats, the destroyer Shaumyan and the minesweeper Shield entered the port. At 4:26 a.m. "Shaumyan" moored at the Shirokoye Mole and began the landing of paratroopers. The enemy immediately concentrated fire on the stationary ship. The landing of paratroopers took only a few minutes, but the debarcation of cargo, mainly ammunition, required much more time. Several shells hit the ship. Shrapnel killed and wounded about 20 people from the crew. Only 20 minutes later, having completed the unloading of cargo, "Shaumyan" left the port.

In no less difficult conditions, the destroyers Nezamozhnik and Zheleznyakov landed troops in the port.

In accordance with the plan, the Krasny Kavkaz was supposed to moor with the port side to the outer side of the Wide Mole, however, due to a strong squeezing wind, this maneuver could not be performed immediately. At 5:08 a.m. two mines hit the cruiser. Their explosion killed several people. A fire started in the first pipe. An enemy shell hit the foremast and caused a fire in the area of ​​the chart house. Emergency parties began extinguishing fires. At 5:23 a.m. an artillery shell pierced the armor and exploded inside the fighting compartment of the second turret.

Only at eight o'clock the cruiser was moored and began the landing of paratroopers.

All this time, the "Red Caucasus" was firing. The artillery of the cruiser, which is the 180-mm main caliber, 100-mm and 76-mm universal guns, suppressed enemy batteries located on the heights around the city, destroyed several tanks, dispersed a convoy of vehicles with infantry approaching the city.

At 8:15 a.m. "Red Caucasus" completed the landing, unloading equipment and moved away from the pier to the outer roadstead, from where it continued to fire according to the corrective posts.

The cruiser "Red Crimea" anchored in the outer roadstead 3 cabs from the entrance to the port and from 4 hours 50 minutes. began the landing, using first ship's watercraft, and then the MO-4 boats and the minesweeper "Shield". The cruiser completed the landing at 0930 hours.

At 7.20 am, the Kuban transport moored in the captured port. 627 fighters were landed from it, 9 guns, 6 mortars, 15 vehicles and about 112 tons of ammunition, food, etc. cargo were unloaded.

Street fighting, starting at about 5.00, continued all day on December 29 until about 18.00 (darkness) and ended with the capture of the city. Separate enemy groups continued to resist on December 30.

The successful landing of troops of the 44th Army in Feodosia dramatically changed the situation on the Kerch Peninsula. For the entire enemy grouping, located in the eastern part of the peninsula, there was a threat of encirclement. The command of the 11th German Army was forced to make a decision to withdraw its troops from the peninsula. On December 30, the enemy left Kerch without a fight. The German fascist command was forced to urgently strengthen its troops in the Feodosia direction. In early January, northwest and west of Feodosia, in addition to the 46th Infantry Division, units of the 73rd Infantry Division and the Romanian Mountain Rifle Corps were already operating. In addition, the 132nd and 170th Infantry Divisions, deployed from near Sevastopol, were on the way to this area, where the second offensive of the Nazi troops was thwarted by the heroic efforts of the soldiers of the Sevastopol defensive area. By the end of January 2, Soviet troops reached the Kiet-Koktebel line, where they met organized enemy resistance. This ended the operation to seize the Kerch Peninsula. The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation ended with the capture of an important operational foothold in the Crimea, the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of important enemy strongholds in the Crimea, the cities and seaports of Kerch and Feodosia, the troops advanced 100-110 km west.

As a result of the operation, the position of the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region was strengthened. On January 1, 1942, the German command was forced to stop its second offensive against Sevastopol and transfer part of its forces from there to the Feodosia region. The Kerch grouping of the enemy suffered heavy losses. These results were achieved thanks to the heroic actions of the ground forces and the navy. The operation, which was carried out as part of the counter-offensive of the Red Army, which unfolded in December 1941, was the largest amphibious assault operation during the Great Patriotic War. Its main significance was that the enemy lost the opportunity to use the Kerch Peninsula as a springboard for penetrating the Caucasus. At the same time, it diverted part of the enemy forces from near Sevastopol, making it easier for its defenders to repulse the second enemy assault.

When the Nazis came to the Crimean land, many Feodosians went to the partisans. For the courage shown during the Great Patriotic War and the significant labor contribution of the Crimeans in the restoration of their native city, Feodosia was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

The events of the modern period have shown that the current generation of city residents adequately preserves the memory of their fellow countrymen. On March 19, 2014, the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as new subjects, became part of Russia. The recognition of the heroic merits of the defenders of Feodosia was the assignment of the honorary title of the Russian Federation "City of Military Glory" to it.

Original taken from tatamo in Several photographs "The writer Konstantin Simonov, being a war correspondent for the Red Star in 1942, visited the Crimean Front two months before the tragedy that happened - the failure of the Kerch operation in May 1942:" When I returned from the army, first to Kerch, and then to Moscow, after the spectacle of mediocre and senseless troops crammed close to the front line, and after the stupidity associated with all this, which I saw during our unsuccessful offensive, I had a heavy premonition that something very bad might happen here.

No one fortified, no one dug trenches. Not only at the forefront, on the front line, but also in the rear, nothing was done in case of possible active actions by the enemy. Here, on the Crimean front, then, in February, the slogan "Forward, forward and forward!" was in use. It might seem that valor lies only in everyone crowding as close as possible to the front, to the front line, so that some units do not end up in the rear, so that someone does not end up outside the enemy’s artillery shelling. Some kind of incomprehensible and terrible mania, which I have not had to deal with either before or after ...

Almost thirty years have passed since the end of the war and our victory, but I still cannot reread these pages of the diary without pain and grief. The unsuccessful offensive, which I then witnessed, was a direct precursor to everything that was to come. And during the February failure, and during the May defeat, Mekhlis, who acted on the Crimean Front as a representative of the Headquarters and kept himself there as Stalin's personal representative, crushed the weak-willed commander of the front under him and led everything himself ... ".

Marshal Vasilevsky wrote: "The main reason for the failure of the Kerch operation was that the command, the front- Kozlov, Shamanin, representative of the Headquarters Mekhlis, commanders of the armies of the front and especially the 44th Army - Lieutenant General Chernyak and the 47th Army - Major General Kolganov discovered a complete misunderstanding of the nature of modern warfare..."

General Manstein, as it became known later, could not believe in reality of what was happening on the other side of the front, he sent reconnaissance aircraft until he was convinced that the Soviet troops, instead of carefully strengthening the lines, began to be located like targets at the training ground. In addition to moving all the artillery into the infantry battle formations, pulling up the rear units in close proximity to the front line, our troops were ordered to abandon the trenches, as they reduce the offensive impulse and negatively affect the morale of the Red Army. Mekhlis stubbornly put pressure on the military command, demanding prompt active action on the entire front. And he succeeded. On February 27, 1942, the Crimean Front launched an offensive, which immediately failed, despite the advantage in manpower. The very next day, the enemy returned everything that the Red Army troops managed to capture the day before, first of all, the main defense center - Koi-Asan ...

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The head of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Red Army, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, was born in 1889 in Odessa into a poor family. For some time he worked as a clerk, in 1911, after being drafted into the army, Mekhlis served in the reserve artillery units. IN

In 1918 he joined the Communist Party and until 1920 was in political work, in 1921-1922. - Manager of the administrative inspection in the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (People's Commissar - Stalin), and in 1926 became an assistant to the growing strength of Stalin. Mekhlis zealously set to work. He fanatically demanded increased repression against "enemies of the people" and, heading the Political Directorate of the Red Army, launched an unprecedented campaign to discredit the highest command and political staff. As a result of his actions, the highest and middle levels of the Red Army were practically destroyed, and he not only assisted the state security agencies, but also took the initiative himself, contributing to a wave of arrests. He personally went to the military districts, where he organized political cleansing among the command staff. So, having arrived in the Far East in 1938, he immediately ordered the arrest of most of the commanders of the Far Eastern Army.
. In 1942, when there was a real possibility of ousting the 11th Army, Colonel-General Manstein from the Crimea and deblocking Sevastopol, The Supreme Commander sent Mekhlis to the Crimean Front, and the front was overwhelmed with repressions. Obvious signs of a coming catastrophe went unnoticed, but, in accordance with the trends of the times, Mekhlis created an atmosphere of spy mania. In early April, he sent Stalin and Beria a code of particular importance, insisting on "cleansing" Novorossiysk from suspicious persons and giving it the status of a closed city, withdrawing from there, as well as from Kerch, the NKVD camps in which those released from German captivity were kept: the latter had de the opportunity to communicate with the soldiers going to the front, which was regarded as an unacceptable thing. Having created such an environment in which each of the commanders thought more about how to protect himself from Stalin's favorite than about the situation at the front, the Stavka representative actually provided all the conditions for the failure of the offensive, and the offensive operation smoothly turned into a defensive one.

In June 1942, Mehlis was removed from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, and also demoted to the rank of corps commissar, but from the same 1942 to 1945 he again became a member of the Military Councils of the 6th th army and many fronts. In all positions in the army, Mekhlis continued to constantly interfere in the decisions of the commanders, demanding "to be guided by the decisions of the party", regardless of the strategic and tactical tasks of the troops. He constantly wrote denunciations to the Central Committee against the commanders, demanding that they be held accountable ... "With the outbreak of World War II, Mekhlis became Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, while continuing to head the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army
In 1950, Mekhlis was retired for health reasons and died in 1953. The ashes were buried in the Kremlin wall in Moscow. Stalin died a few days later...
Kozlov (1896-1967). Commander of the Crimean Front.

The defeat in the Crimea and the defeat near Kharkov extremely complicated the situation at the front
The Crimean disaster of 1942 led to the loss of the entire peninsula. Nazi troops rushed to the North Caucasus ...

The Kerch landing operation is a major landing operation of the Soviet troops in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. It took place from December 26, 1941 to May 20, 1942. Despite the initial success, the operation ended in a major failure: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated. The total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as a significant amount of heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing had a serious impact on the fate of the besieged Sevastopol and facilitated the Wehrmacht's summer attack on the Caucasus.

At the end of December 1941, units of the Transcaucasian Front, with the support of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov-Black Sea Flotilla, carried out an amphibious assault: on December 26 in the Kerch region and on December 30 in the Feodosia region. The initial number of troops was more than 40 thousand people.
In Feodosia, the landing forces were unloaded at the port. The resistance of the small German garrison was quickly broken, after which reinforcements began to arrive in Feodosia.

In the Kerch area, the landing was much more difficult: the infantry landed directly into the icy sea and went chest-deep in water to the shore. Hypothermia caused great losses. A few days after the start of the landing, frost hit and most of the 51st Army crossed the ice of the frozen Kerch Strait.

At that moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian Regiment of Mountain Riflemen, guarding the area of ​​the Parpach Range. The landing forces in Kerch were many times superior to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this area, in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, Manstein ordered to hold the defense, but it was no longer possible to fulfill it. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving behind all heavy weapons. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.

The 51st Army advancing from Kerch did not move forward fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia moved with its main forces not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yaila spurs - the Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th division of the Wehrmacht, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and the Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat capability of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the rear units of the German army, including those from the army headquarters, were included in their composition.

During the operation, the total losses amounted to 40 thousand people, of which more than 30 thousand were irretrievably: killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.

By January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. Given the weakness of the German defense, the Headquarters pointed out to General Kozlov the need for an early exit to Perekop and strikes at the rear of the Sevastopol enemy grouping.

The Headquarters approved the start date for the offensive on February 26-27, 1942. By the beginning of the offensive, the Crimean Front had twelve rifle divisions, one cavalry division, several separate tank battalions with heavy KV and medium T-34s and artillery units of the RGK. Of the total number of troops, 9 divisions were part of the first echelon of the front.
The offensive began on 27 February. At the same time, the Seaside Army attacked from Sevastopol, but failed to break through the encirclement. The offensive on the Kerch bridgehead developed very slowly: the actions of the tanks were hindered by heavy rains and the enemy repelled all attacks of the attackers. Only the 18th Romanian division could not resist, in the northern section of the isthmus. Manstein had to throw his last reserve into battle - the 213th Infantry Regiment and headquarters units. Stubborn fighting continued until March 3. The troops of the Crimean Front failed to break through the enemy defenses to the full depth.

Despite all efforts, decisive success was not achieved this time either.

In early April, reinforcements began to arrive in Manstein's army: a tank division (22nd etc.) appeared in its composition - 180 tanks.

At the insistence of L. Z. Mekhlis, Soviet troops were concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the front line, not having sufficient depth. In addition, most of the forces of the Crimean Front were concentrated in the north of the Parpach Isthmus. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command planned a detour maneuver from the south (“Operation Trappenjagd”). An important role in the operation was assigned to aviation, for which, by special order of Hitler, the 8th Luftwaffe Air Fleet (commander Wolfram von Richthofen) was transferred to the Crimea.

The offensive began on 8 May. As a result of an aimed air strike, the command post of the 51st Army, commanded by General Lieutenant. V.N. Lvov was killed, deputy commander, general. K.I. Baranov was seriously wounded. A feint was carried out in the north, while the main attack came from the south. As a result, within two weeks the main forces of the Crimean Front were pressed against the Kerch Strait. On May 18, the resistance of the encircled grouping of the Red Army ceased.

According to German data, the number of prisoners was about 170,000 people. The plans of the Soviet command to liberate the Crimea did not come true. After the liquidation of the Crimean Front, Manstein was able to concentrate his forces against the besieged Sevastopol.

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