Ontology- the doctrine of being. The problem of being is one of the oldest in philosophy. In all developed philosophical systems known to us there is a doctrine of being. But the understanding of being is fundamentally different in idealism and materialism. In general, there are two main variants of ontology.

IN objective idealism the existence of a special world of spiritual entities outside of man is affirmed. This world underlies the sensually perceived world of things, phenomena, etc. Here we can recall the concept of Plato.

Does ontology exist in subjective idealism? Since it is argued that things, objects, etc. are the product of human consciousness, his activity, it may seem that there is no ontology in subjective idealism. But it's not. Recall the Berkeley concept. A thing is a complex of sensations, perceptions. A thing exists, has being, insofar as it is perceived. A person has perception, sensations, they have being, and the being of things depends on the being of perceptions. Thus, in subjective idealism there is also an ontology, but a specific ontology that bases the existence of human consciousness.

IN materialism an ontology of a different type is asserted. It is based on the assertion of material, objective being as primary in relation to subjective being (being of consciousness, ideal).

Dialectical-materialistic ontology refuses scholastic arguments about "pure being", "being in general". There is a material existence and a spiritual existence; the second depends on the first. From this it follows that the concept of being ultimately means the being of matter. Dialectical-materialistic ontology is a philosophical theory of material existence, matter.

In the course of the development of philosophical thought, various conceptions of matter were proposed. In the philosophy of the Ancient World, the idea is being formed that in the diversity of things, phenomena of the surrounding world there is a certain element that unites them.

Specific substances were proposed as matter, the original: water, air, fire, etc. - either individually or in groups (five initials in the natural philosophy of Ancient China, four - in the philosophy of Ancient India and Ancient Greece). In the future, an important role in materialism played atomistic Concept, in which matter was understood as a multitude of atoms (immutable, indivisible, uncreatable and indestructible smallest particles) that move in the void, collide with each other and, when combined, form various bodies.

Atomists explained the difference in things by the fact that atoms differ in shape, weight and size and form different configurations when combined.

The idea that all things, phenomena of the world have a universal, single material basis is one of the initial ideas of materialistic philosophy. This single basis was called either the term “substance” or the term “substrate” (substrate is what something consists of). This substratum-substantial understanding of matter.

Subsequently, other variants of the substratum-substantial concept of matter were proposed. In the 17th century Descartes and his followers proposed "ethereal" concept of matter .

Descartes' concept was later developed by Maxwell. He postulated the existence of an "ether" that fills all space. Electromagnetic waves propagate through the air.

In the XVIII-XIX centuries. becomes the leader real concept of matter. Matter is understood as matter, a set of physico-chemical bodies and ether. Due to this duality, the explanation of some phenomena is based on atomic ideas (for example, in chemistry), and the explanation of others (for example, in optics) is based on ideas about the ether. Advances in natural science in the 19th century based on this concept, led many scientists to believe that it gives an absolutely correct idea of ​​matter.

Substratum-substantial the understanding of matter as a whole is based on two ideas: a) matter (substance) is usually characterized by a small number of unchanged properties, these properties are borrowed from experimental data, and they are given a universal meaning; b) matter (substance) is considered as a certain carrier of properties different from them. The properties of material objects are, as it were, "hung" on an absolutely unchanging basis. The relationship of substance to properties is in a certain sense similar to the relationship of man to clothing: a person, being a wearer of clothing, exists without it.

The substratum-substantial understanding of matter is metaphysical in its essence. And it is no accident that it was also discredited in the course of the revolution in natural science in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It was found that such characteristics of atoms as immutability, indivisibility, impenetrability, etc., have lost their universal significance, and the alleged properties of the ether are so contradictory that its very existence is doubtful. In this situation, a number of physicists and philosophers came to the conclusion: "Matter has disappeared." It is impossible to reduce matter to some particular, concrete type or state of it, to consider it as some kind of absolute, unchanging substance.

2.2. Matter is an objective reality

Dialectical materialism refuses to understand matter as an absolute substratum, substance. Even before the revolution in natural science, Engels spoke of the ineffectiveness of the search for "matter as such." There is no matter as a special substrate, beginning, which serves as material for the construction of all concrete things, objects. Matter as such, Engels pointed out, unlike concrete things, no one saw phenomena, did not experience them in any sensual way.

IN dialectical materialism the definition of matter, firstly, is given on the basis of the solution of the fundamental question of philosophy. The materialistic solution of the first side of the main question of philosophy indicates the primacy of matter in relation to consciousness, the solution of the second side of the main question of philosophy indicates the cognizability of matter. With this in mind, V. I. Lenin determined matter as an objective reality, existing outside and independently of consciousness and reflected by it.

Secondly, dialectical materialism points to the futility of any improvement in the substratum-substantial understanding of matter. The fact is that this understanding, in principle, implies the assumption of the existence of absolutely elementary, unchanging "atoms". But this assumption leads to insoluble difficulties, in particular, to the conclusion that such “atoms” are structureless, that they have no internal activity, etc. But then it remains completely incomprehensible how material objects consisting of such “atoms” can form and develop. ". Willingly or involuntarily, then one will have to appeal to forces external to matter with all the ensuing consequences.

There is no absolute substance; matter is a diverse and changeable objective reality. In dialectical materialism, instead of substratum-substantial understanding, attributive understanding of matter.

The material world is an infinite set of structurally organized, different-quality individual material objects that are in diverse relationships and changes.

In his practical interaction with the material world, a person deals precisely with individual material objects. These objects are perceived as something specifically individual. As a result of comparing various individual material objects, their similarity, commonality in certain respects is captured. There are different classes of similar objects, smaller and larger in terms of the number of their members. To denote what is inherent in all material objects, the term "universal" or "attribute" is used.

The attributes of matter are reflected in philosophical categories. In common usage, the term "category" is used as a synonym for a set of objects. In philosophy, under categories are concepts that reflect the universal. Categories denoting and reflecting the attributes of matter are called ontological categories.

One should not identify the attributes of matter and ontological categories. After all, the attributes of matter exist objectively, and the categories exist in cognition and consciousness. The confusion of attributes and categories often occurs because both can be denoted by one word. Take, for example, the word "time". It can denote real time itself (an attribute of matter) and the concept of time (category). In such cases, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the use of such a word in various contexts.

Since the universal (attributes) in individual objects exists in connection with the individual, then the concepts of the content of the attributes of matter have the same source as the concepts of the individual - from experience, social, historical practice. The content of the attributes of matter is revealed not through scholastic, speculative operations, but on the basis of the study of specific types of matter (various inorganic, organic and social objects).

The attributes of matter are interconnected with each other. The dialectical concept of matter not only points to individual attributes, but also reveals their meaningful relationships. To build a system of attributes, it is necessary and expedient to apply the dialectical method (primarily dialectical analysis and dialectical synthesis).

2.3. Phenomenon and essence

The dialectical analysis of a material object presupposes the bifurcation of the one into opposites. Dialectical analysis as a successive transition from the “concrete to the abstract” (K. Marx) must begin with the most “concrete” (that is, the most complex, richest in content) attributes. At the same time, in order to avoid subjectivity in the study of the attributes of a material object, it is necessary to constantly take into account the principle of unity of theory and practice. The dialectical analysis of an object must be based on the history of practical activity (in particular, the history of technology), the history of all sciences (in particular, natural science), and the history of philosophy. Let's start with the last one.

Already the thinkers of the ancient world "divided" the world into something external, sensually given, and something that is behind it and determines it. In Plato, in the spirit of idealism, such a bifurcation underlies his doctrine of the "world of things" and the "world of ideas." Through the entire history of philosophy there is a fundamental division of the world into the external, which is and the internal, its essence.

Scientific knowledge aimed at studying the material world is guided by an important methodological setting: move from the description of the object under study to its explanation. Description deals with phenomena, and explanation involves referring to the essence of the objects under study.

Finally, the history of technology provides rich material showing the deep meaning of the distinction between phenomena and their essence. A vivid example of this is the discovery of the essence of secret technological processes (Chinese porcelain, Damascus steel, etc.).

All of the above gives sufficient grounds for the conclusion that the material object in the course of dialectical analysis, first of all, must be “divided” into a phenomenon and an essence.

The concept of a phenomenon presents no particular difficulties. Matter "appears" to us in a wide variety of forms: in the form of a thing, property, relationship, set, state, process, etc. Phenomenon always something individual: a specific thing, a specific property, etc. As for the concept of essence, there have historically been many disputes and various interpretations around this concept; idealists have built around this concept many scholastic and even speculative mystical schemes.

To characterize the content of the essence, one should proceed from the practice of studying various phenomena. From the generalization of the results of such studies, it first of all follows that the essence acts as the internal side of the object, and the phenomenon - as the external. But "internal" must be understood here not in a geometrical sense. For example, the details of the mechanical device of a watch in the geometric sense are "inside" their case, but the essence of the watch is not in these details. Essence is the basis of phenomena. In a watch, the internal base is not mechanical parts, but what makes them a watch, a natural oscillatory process. Essence is the internal, deep connections and relationships that determine phenomena. Let's take a few more illustrations. The essence of water is the combination of hydrogen and oxygen; the essence of the movement of celestial bodies is the law of universal gravitation; the essence of profit is the production of surplus value, etc.

The essence in comparison with the phenomena acts as the general; the same essence is the basis of many phenomena. (Thus, the essence of water is the same in the river, and in the lake, and in the rain, etc.) The essence, in comparison with its manifestations, is relatively more stable. The peculiarity of the essence in the epistemological plan lies in the fact that, unlike observable, visual phenomena, the essence is unobservable and invisible; it is known by thought.

So, essence is an internal, general, relatively stable, cognizable by thinking basis of phenomena.

After the “dismemberment” of a material object into a phenomenon and essence, the task of further analysis of the phenomenon and essence arises. A generalization of the practice of scientific research and data from the history of philosophy shows that to describe a phenomenon, it is necessary to use the categories of quality and quantity, space and time, etc., and to reveal the content of the essence, it is necessary to use the categories of law, possibility and reality, etc. These ontological categories do not have an independent meanings, along with the categories "phenomenon" and "essence", but reflect certain aspects of the content of the phenomenon and essence as the most complex attributes of a material object. The next task is to analyze the phenomenon, and then the essence of the object.

2.4. Quality and Quantity

Every phenomenon contains two interconnected attributes - quality And quantity.

Studying quality starts with reflecting and fixing certainty material object, its difference from others, specificity. The study of the object shows that it has border. Each object is different from other objects and at the same time interconnected with them. Any difference, any relationship presupposes a boundary: if objects have no boundary, then they are indistinguishable from each other and even more so cannot be interconnected (if there is no common boundary). Further, since the object has a border, it finite.

The finiteness of the object reveals the contradictory nature of its existence. The boundary simultaneously separates objects from each other and connects them to each other; the boundary characterizes the being of the object, its existence and, on the other hand, its non-existence, its negation. The fact is that the final object cannot be understood as something absolutely immutable. Every finite has an internal and external basis for passing into another, for going beyond the boundary.

An object as a definite, limited, finite, on the one hand, exists as something independent, and on the other hand, it exists in interconnection with other objects. When an object interacts with other objects, its internal content is manifested. The next aspect of the qualitative certainty of an object is a property.

Property- this is the ability of an object, when interacting with other objects, to generate some changes in them and change itself under their influence. The property has a dual conditionality: the internal content of the object and the nature of those objects with which it interacts. An object exhibits many properties in its various interactions with other objects.

If at first the quality of an object looks like a set of its properties, then a deeper approach reveals that the object is a system that has a certain content and form, i.e., it consists of a certain set of elements and has a certain structure.

The concept of an element designates some limiting in a certain respect parts of which an object consists. One can speak of an element only in a certain respect, since in another respect the element itself will be a system consisting of elements of another level. The concept of structure reflects and means the way the elements of a material object are connected, their relationship within the framework of a given whole.

Just as the category of quality reflects a number of aspects of a material object, the category of quantity also reflects “its own” moments that should be identified and characterized. The experience of the history of philosophy and mathematics gives sufficient reason to single out number (set)And value How moments of quantity.

Number as a moment of the category of quantity was, apparently, singled out earlier than magnitude. The concept of number is based on practical activities: counting, operations on numbers (addition, subtraction, etc.). In the course of counting, the objects being counted are identified and abstracted from a number of their qualitative aspects. However, this abstraction is relative, since the result of the count is usually expressed by a named number (for example, seven trees, nine thousand rubles, etc.). On the basis of the counting operation, ordinal numbers first arose (first, second, etc.), and then quantitative ones (one, two, etc.). The concept of a natural series of numbers was formed. Natural numbers were the original kind of numbers. Then, as a result of using the operations of subtraction, division, and others, new types of numbers arise: the ring of integers, then the field of rational numbers, then the field of real numbers, and finally the field of complex numbers.

The second moment of quantity is magnitude. Every property, every element of an object has a value. The value is characterized by additivity (the value of some whole is equal to the sum of the values ​​of its components). If the number is characterized by discreteness, then the value is characterized by continuity. Both numbers and magnitudes are in relations of equality and inequality.

Number and magnitude are related. On the one hand, there are no “pure” values ​​in material objects that could not be represented as some kind of numerical characteristic, and on the other hand, there is no “pure” number that would not be associated with some value or with some some ratio of magnitudes.

So, a material object is characterized by certainty and consistency from a qualitative point of view, and from a quantitative point of view it is characterized by quantities and numbers.

2.5. Space and time

The object from the side of the phenomenon, in addition to qualitative and quantitative, is characterized by spatio-temporal moments.

In the history of philosophy and science, for a long time, the metaphysical concept of space and time was leading, in which space was considered as a kind of receptacle for material bodies, and time as a certain duration that exists independently of matter and space. The metaphysical concept of space and time is overcome in the dialectical-materialist philosophy and science of the 19th-20th centuries.

The dialectical-materialistic understanding of space and time affirms their attributive, universal character. There are no material objects without space-time characteristics.

The main points of the space attribute are place and position. The place is a certain volume of the object (the totality of its lengths), covered by the spatial boundary (the place of the apartment is its "cubic capacity" - not the area!). Position is the coordination of the place of one object relative to the place of another (other) object (the position of the apartment is the city in which it is located, the house, the location relative to other apartments).

Each object and each element of the object has its specific place and position. Thanks to this, a certain system of spatial relations of coexistence and compatibility arises in phenomena, i.e., a spatial structure. The relationship of coexistence is such a spatial relationship when different elements (or objects) occupy different places, and compatibility is understood as such a relationship when they completely or partially occupy the same place.

The main moments of time are duration and moment. Duration is the interval of existence of any phenomenon, an instant is some “atom” of duration that cannot be further divided. Duration - the duration of the existence of an object or its elements, the preservation of their existence.

The duration of each material object (or element) has a certain coordination with respect to the durations of other objects (elements). This coordination lies in a relationship of simultaneity or succession. By virtue of existence between objects (elements) of relations of simultaneity and sequence in material objects there is a chronological structure.

In a material object, space and time are in unity. A single space-time is internally connected with movement.

2.6. Movement

In metaphysical materialism, movement is understood, as a rule, in a narrow sense, as spatial movement of an object, while the object does not change qualitatively; in dialectical materialism, movement is understood in a broad sense, like any change to an object. mechanical movement is one of the forms of movement, and besides it, there are physical(optical, electrical, etc.), chemical, biological, social changes. In metaphysical materialism, some special scientific concepts, mainly mechanics, were absolutized. The predominant development of mechanics in the XVII-XVIII centuries. gave rise to exaggerated hopes for the possibility of explaining all natural phenomena from the standpoint of mechanics. These hopes turned out to be unjustified, and thus the incorrect understanding of motion only in the sense of mechanical processes was revealed.

In contrast to the mechanical concept, in which movement was opposed to rest (an object can move or be at rest), and thus movement was understood as a particular property of matter, dialectical materialism considers movement (change) as a way of existence of matter, an attribute. Matter neither loses nor acquires the ability to change.

If in metaphysical materialism the movement was understood mainly as “forced”, as a result of external influence, then in dialectical materialism the dual conditionality of movement is affirmed: both by external influences and by the internal activity of material objects.

Understanding movement as change in general warns against reducing the variety of types of movement to any one, as was the case in metaphysical, mechanical materialism. The statement that motion is an attribute of matter does not mean that there is some kind of motion “in its pure form”; motion as an attribute of matter is something universal that is inherent in all specific types of motion.

Movement is contradictory, first of all, as a unity of the relative and the absolute. Motion is relative in the sense that a change in the location or state of an object is always relative to another object. Movement is absolute in the sense that movement is universal, uncreated and indestructible; there is no absolute rest.

The inconsistency of motion also lies in the unity of the moments of stability and variability. In metaphysical materialism, movement and rest (stability) were opposed to each other. In fact, stability and variability are aspects of the movement itself.

2.7. Regularity and law

The interconnection of phenomena is one of the main forms of the existence of matter. The emergence, changes, transition to a new state of any material object are possible not in an isolated and isolated state, but in interconnection with other objects. Beginning with Galileo, the laws of science have become the most important feature of scientific knowledge.

The concept of law as a philosophical category was adopted later than a number of other philosophical categories. This is explained by the fact that law, as an attribute of essence, began to manifest itself in human activity later than the categories that reflect phenomena.

Historically, it turned out that in the beginning, human activity was based on the idea of ​​certain repetitions. Seasonal weather changes repeat, objects without support fall, etc. Stable, repeating relationships (connections) between phenomena are usually called regularities.

There are two types of patterns: dynamic and statistical. Dynamic pattern- such a form of connection between phenomena, when the previous state of the object uniquely determines the next one. Statistical the regularity is a certain recurrence in the behavior of not each individual object, but their collective, an ensemble of phenomena of the same type. Regularity as a recurring relationship between phenomena refers to an attribute of the phenomenon, not the essence. The transition to the essence, to the concept of law occurs when the question is raised about the basis, the reason for regularity.

The law is an objective, essential, necessary, repetitive connection (relation) that determines the regularity (recurrence, regularity) in the sphere of phenomena. The essential here is understood as such a relation that internally determines what is repeated in the sphere of phenomena. The necessity of the law lies in the fact that, under certain conditions, it determines the order, structure, connection of phenomena, the constancy of processes, the regularity of their course, their repetition under relatively identical conditions.

The history of science reveals that if a certain set of phenomena is based on a law (a law of the first order), then behind this law lies a deeper law (of a second order), and so on. A material object actually obeys not one, but many laws. Each individual law does not manifest itself "in its pure form". The cumulative action of several laws gives rise to the impression of some uncertainty. This is especially evident in such a complex system as society, where laws are implemented only as a general direction of various processes.

2.8. Possibility and reality

The ongoing analysis of the essence of a material object consists in highlighting the aspects of potential and actual being, possibility and reality in it.

concept "reality" is used in two senses. In a broad sense, in its content it is close to the concepts of "matter", "material world" (when one speaks, for example, about "the reality around us"). But the concept of reality in this sense cannot be compared with the concept of possibility, since matter, the material world, exists as such not in possibility, but in actuality. Another meaning of the concept of "reality" is the concrete existence of a separate object at a certain time, spatially localized, with certain qualitative and quantitative characteristics, under certain conditions. Reality in this sense has as its dialectical partner a possibility (as the possibility of a given object). We will use the term "reality" in this sense.

The main signs of reality are reality (relevance) and historicity. The reality of an object is all the richness of its content, its internal and external relations at a certain time. But the reality of an individual object is not something fixed and unchanging. Each specific phenomenon once arose. The reality that existed before has passed into the present reality, the present reality will sooner or later turn into another. The historicity of reality lies in the fact that it is the result of a change in previous reality and the foundation of future reality.

This content of the object (reality) contains the prerequisites for the emergence of a new reality. The category "possibility" reflects the dialectic of the relationship between present and future reality. Opportunity- this is the future of the object in its present, certain trends, directions of change of the object. Possibility does not exist somehow apart from reality, but in reality itself. This reality in the general case contains a certain set of possibilities, the nature of its change is characterized by some uncertainty. The present, in the general case, cannot unequivocally determine which of the possibilities will be realized, since the conditions for their implementation have not yet matured. Each particular possibility is quite certain, but the fate of each individual possibility, whether it will be realized or not, is relatively uncertain.

In a particular material object, not everything is possible. Its set of possibilities is limited by the laws of the object; law is that objective criterion that limits the spectrum of the possible, separating it from the impossible. Not all possibilities are objectively equal; this circumstance is reflected in the classification of possibilities.

Distinguish real and abstract possibilities. By real is meant such a possibility that can turn into reality on the basis of existing conditions, and by abstract - not realized on the basis of existing conditions, although in principle it is allowed by the laws of the object. Abstract possibility is different from impossibility. The impossible is contrary to the laws, and therefore is not allowed by them. Precisely because there is an objective law of transformation and conservation of energy, attempts to create a "perpetual motion machine" are useless.

Each possibility has its own objective basis - the unity of the content of the object and the conditions of its existence. With a change in the content of the object and the conditions of its existence, the basis of the possibility also does not remain unchanged. Opportunity has a quantitative characteristic, which is called a measure of possibility - probability. Probability is a measure of the feasibility of some possibility. The definition of a measure of possibility, i.e., probability, is of great importance in practice.

Possibility and reality are intertwined. In their unity, reality plays a decisive role; possibility exists on the basis of a certain reality.

For the transition of the possible into reality, two factors are necessary: ​​the operation of objective laws and the existence of certain conditions. When conditions change, the probabilities of certain possibilities change. There is a kind of competition of opportunity in the object. Laws only limit the range of permissible possibilities, but not the implementation of a strictly defined one; the latter depends on a set of conditions.

The process of realizing opportunities in nature proceeds spontaneously. In nature, transformed by people, the realization of possibilities is mediated by a subjective factor. A person can create such conditions under which some possibilities are realized and others are not realized. The conscious activity of people plays an even greater role in the realization of opportunities in society. There are many different and often opposite possibilities in society, and here the subjective factor plays a big role.

An analysis of the ways in which possibility can be turned into reality leads to the concepts of necessity and chance.

2.9. Necessity and chance

In the history of philosophy there have been various concepts of necessity and contingency. Two of them were the most common.

In the first, the objective content of the category of necessity was recognized, and chance was interpreted only as a subjective opinion, the result of ignorance of the causal dependencies of phenomena (Democritus, Spinoza, Holbach, and others). Since everything is causally determined, everything is necessary. From this it followed that everything in the world is predetermined; applied to society and man, such a position led to fatalism.

The second, opposite concept denied the need for objective existence. The world is a chaos of chance elemental forces, there is nothing necessary, natural in it. If the world seems logical to us, it is only because we ourselves attribute logic to it (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, etc.).

Dialectical philosophy emphasized the causality of both necessity and chance; it was said about the illegality of the identification of necessity and causality, about the different determination of necessity and chance. The following definitions of necessity and chance were given. Necessity- this is what follows from the internal, essential connections of the object, which must inevitably happen in this way, and not otherwise. Accident was understood as something that has a cause in another, that follows from external relations, and therefore it may or may not be, it can occur in different forms. Thus, randomness and necessity are considered from the point of view of their conditionality by insignificant and essential connections, and external connections were considered insignificant, and internal connections were considered essential.

Such an interpretation of necessity and chance raises reasonable objections. There is a sharp contrast between the inside and the outside here. But in fact, their difference is relative. In addition, if we consider a finite closed system, then all changes in it are caused by internal factors and, therefore, there is nothing random in it. But this contradicts experience, since systems (inorganic, biological and social) are known in which, even in the condition of isolation from external influences, there are random phenomena. It turns out that chance can have an internal basis. So, for a number of reasons, there is a need for a definition of the categories of necessity and chance that is different than the above.

When studying the transformation of possibility into reality, two options are found.

1. In an object under given conditions, in a certain respect, there is only one possibility that can turn into reality (for example, an object without support falls; for any living being there is always a limit to the duration of existence, etc.). In this version, we are dealing with necessity. Necessity is the realization of the only possibility that an object has under certain conditions in a certain relation. This single possibility sooner or later turns into reality.

2. In an object under given conditions, in a certain respect, there are several different possibilities, any of which, in principle, can turn into reality, but as a result of an objective choice, only one turns into reality. For example, when tossing a coin, there are two possibilities for one or the other side to fall out, but only one is realized. In this version, we are dealing with randomness. Randomness is the realization of one of several possibilities that an object has under certain conditions in a certain relation.

Necessity and contingency are defined as the difference in the ways in which a possibility turns into reality.

Metaphysical thinking opposes necessity and chance, not seeing the relationship between them. However, in material objects, necessity and chance are in unity. Between different possibilities in one object, something similar is found. Whatever possibility is realized, this similarity is unambiguously realized. For example, when throwing a dice, each individual fall on one side or another is an accident. But in all these fallouts there is a similar and, moreover, unequivocally manifested - a fallout precisely by a face (in the conditions of the game, a dice cannot fall on an edge or on a corner). Therefore, necessity is manifested in chance.

There is neither "pure" necessity nor "pure" chance in material objects. There is not a single phenomenon in which moments of chance would not be present to one degree or another. Also, there are no such phenomena that are considered random, but in which there would be no moment of necessity. Let's look at statistical patterns. In the mass of homogeneous random phenomena, stability and repeatability are found. Peculiarities of individual random phenomena seem to level out mutually, the average result of a mass of random phenomena is no longer random.

2.10. Causality. Interaction

For clarity, we introduce an elementary causal link: (X - Y). Here X- the reason Y- consequence, - a way of generating the cause of the effect. Signs of causation:

1) the most important sign of causality - productivity, genetics.

Cause X produces, generates an effect Y;

2) time sequence. Cause X precedes corollary Y. One can “cause”, “generate” only that which did not exist at first, and then arose. The time interval between cause and effect may be small, but it always exists. From the fact that the cause precedes the effect, it does not follow at all that something that precedes is always the cause of the next. For example, day precedes night, which is not its cause at all;

3) one-to-one relationship(the principle of the uniformity of nature): the same cause in the same conditions causes the same effect (for example, the same forces acting on bodies of the same mass cause the same accelerations);

4) asymmetry, irreversibility. The effect of a particular cause cannot be the cause of its own cause (if X is cause Y, then Y can't be the reason X);

5) irreducibility of the content of consequences to the content of their causes. As a result of causal action, something new arises.

An elementary causal link is part of the causal chain, since this cause is the effect of another cause, and the effect is the cause of another effect: ... - X-Y-Z- ... It is not easy to find causal chains of considerable length, but it is very important in many cases, for example, in the analysis of environmental situations.

In the material world, there is not one kind of causal chain, but many of them. The change of an object is only partly determined by another object, but also depends on the content of itself. There is not only "external", but also "internal" causality.

Real causality acts as an interaction of "external" and "internal" causal factors. In the material world, objects interact. The category of interaction reflects the process of generating reactive causal chains. With the causal impact of one object on another, a change in the second has a reverse effect (reaction), generating a change in the first object (shown schematically on p. 58).

It should also be kept in mind that there are both external and internal interactions in an object. Disclosing the details of the interaction is the last step in revealing the content of the essence of the object.

2.11. Development

The metaphysical absolutization of the moment of stability in motion led to the denial of development. In the XVIII century. dominated by the idea of ​​the immutability of nature. But since the end of this century, the idea of ​​development has been formed in natural science (the Kantian cosmogonic hypothesis, evolutionary paleontology, Darwin's theory, etc.).

At the present time, you can hardly meet a person who denies development in general. But his understanding is different. In particular, the question of the relationship between the categories of movement and development remains debatable: which of them is broader, or maybe they are identical?

An analysis of the factual material shows that development is not identical with movement. Thus, not every qualitative change is a development; it is hardly possible to consider such a qualitative change as development as the melting or freezing of water, the destruction of a forest by fire, etc. Development is some special movement, a special change.

We use the model of a developing object (system) proposed in our philosophical literature. In the course of its development, four stages: emergence (becoming), ascending branch (achieving a mature state), descending branch and disappearance.

At the first stage - the formation of a system of elements. Naturally, a material object does not appear “out of nothing”. The process of emergence usually proceeds as a “self-construction”, a spontaneous connection of elements into a system. The connection method is determined by the properties of the elements. With the emergence of the system, something new appears, something that is not in its elements and which can be represented as a non-additive sum of the properties of the elements.

After the formation of the system, it enters the ascending stage. This stage is characterized by the complication of the organization, the increase in the set of opportunities.

The material system passes through some highest point of development and enters a descending branch. At this stage, there is a relative simplification of the structure, a reduction in the set of possibilities, and an increase in the degree of disorder.

A specific separate material system cannot exist and develop forever. Sooner or later, it exhausts its possibilities, the process of disorganization of internal connections takes place, the system becomes unstable and under the influence of internal and external factors it ceases to exist, turning into something else.

For the subsequent concretization of the concept of development, the concepts progress And regression. Sometimes the ascending branch is characterized as a progressive change, and the descending branch as a regressive change. From our point of view, such an understanding is incorrect. The facts show that at both these stages there is both progress and regression, but the matter is in their different ratio: progress dominates on the ascending branch, regression dominates on the descending one. Understanding the ascending and descending branches as a unity of progressive and regressive changes is an important methodological idea, since it removes the possibility of metaphysical coarsening in the understanding of development.

To define the concept of progress (regression), you can use the concept of the level of organization. In general terms, progress can be defined as a form of system change associated with an increase in the level of organization, and regression as a form of system change associated with a decrease in the level of organization.

The proposed understanding implies an indication of organization level criteria. There are three groups of criteria: system, energy And informational. Systemic characterize the level of organization in terms of the complexity of the system, the diversity of elements and structural relationships, the degree of stability, etc. Energy criteria show the degree of efficiency of the system (the cost of matter and energy to achieve a specific goal). Informational the criteria characterize the systems by the number of communication channels and the volume of information received from the environment, the state of control systems.

For an adequate assessment of the level of development of individual material systems, all these criteria must be taken into account. But it seems that special attention should be paid to systemic criteria, since others in one way or another depend on them.

Nowadays, the problem of development is often considered from the point of view of synergetic ideas. The central problem here is the relationship between order and chaos. These concepts can be used to interpret the level of organization of material systems. In material systems, there are two tendencies: the desire for a disordered state (lowering the level of organization) - in closed systems; the desire for orderliness (increasing the level of organization) - in open systems. Synergetics translates the fundamental issues of development into its own language.

Among the problems of the theory of development, in the foreground are the questions: why does it occur, how does it occur, where is it directed? Dialectical philosophy offers answers to these questions in the laws of dialectics.

2.12. Laws of dialectics

Even within the framework of the mythological worldview, and then in the philosophy of the Ancient World, the idea was carried out that changes in the world are associated with the struggle of opposing forces. As philosophy develops, the recognition or denial of objective contradictions becomes one of the most important features that separate dialectics and metaphysics. Metaphysics does not see objective contradictions, and if they exist in thinking, then this is a signal of error, delusion.

Of course, if objects are considered outside of their relationship, in statics, then we will not see any contradictions. But as soon as we begin to consider objects in their interconnections, movement, development, we discover an objective inconsistency. Hegel, to whom the merit of the theoretical substantiation of the laws of dialectics belongs, wrote that contradiction “is the root of all movement and vitality; only insofar as something has a contradiction in itself, it moves, has a motive and is active.

We use concepts "opposite" And "contradiction". But what do they mean? Marx wrote that dialectical opposites are "correlative, mutually conditioning each other, inseparable moments, but at the same time excluding each other ... extremes, that is, poles of the same thing." To clarify, consider the following example. Objects move from point 0 in opposite directions (+x and -x). When we talk about opposite directions, we mean that:

1) these two directions mutually presuppose each other (if there is a movement in the direction +x, from the obligatory there is a movement in the direction -x);

2) these directions mutually exclude each other (the movement of an object in the +x direction excludes its simultaneous movement in the -x direction, and vice versa);

3) +x and -x are identical as directions (it is clear that, for example, +5 km and -5 km are opposites, and +5 kg and -5 km are not opposites, since they are different in nature).

Dialectical contradiction presupposes opposites. Opposites in a dialectical contradiction do not simply coexist at the same time, they are not simply somehow interconnected, but they influence each other. Dialectical contradiction is the interaction of opposites.

The interaction of opposites forms an internal "tension", "confrontation", internal "restlessness" in objects. The interaction of opposites determines the specifics of the object, predetermines the tendency towards the development of the object.

Dialectical contradiction is sooner or later resolved either by the "victory" of one of the opposites in the conflict situation, or by smoothing out the sharpness of the contradiction, the disappearance of this contradiction. As a result, the object passes into a new qualitative state with new opposites and contradictions.

The law of unity and struggle of opposites: all objects contain opposite sides; the interaction of opposites (dialectical contradiction) determines the specifics of the content and is the cause of the development of objects.

In material objects, quantitative And quality changes. The measure category reflects the unity of quality and quantity, which consists in the existence of a certain limited interval of quantitative changes within which a certain quality is preserved. So, for example, a measure of liquid water is the unity of a certain qualitative state of it (in the form of di- and trihydrols) with a temperature range from 0 to 100 ° C (at normal pressure). A measure is not just a certain quantitative interval, but the relationship of a certain interval of quantitative changes with a certain quality.

Measure is the basis the law of interrelation of quantitative and qualitative changes. This law answers the question of How is development going? quantitative changes at a certain stage, at the border of the measure, lead to qualitative changes in the object; the transition to a new quality has a spasmodic character. The new quality will be associated with a new interval of quantitative changes, in other words, there will be a measure as the unity of the new quality with new quantitative characteristics.

A jump is a break in continuity in the change of an object. Leaps, as qualitative changes, can occur both in the form of one-time "explosive" processes, and in the form of multi-stage processes.

Development occurs as a negation of the old by the new. The concept of negation has two meanings. The first is logical negation, the operation whereby one proposition negates another (if P is true, then its non-P negation will be false, and vice versa, if P is false, then non-P will be true). Another meaning is dialectical negation as the transition of an object into something else (another state, another object, the disappearance of this object).

Dialectical negation should not be understood only as destruction, annihilation of the object. Dialectical negation includes three sides: disappearance, preservation and emergence (appearance of the new).

Every material object, due to its inconsistency, is sooner or later denied, transforming into something different, new. But this new, in turn, is also denied, passes into something else. The process of development can be characterized as "negation of denial". The meaning of "the negation of the negation" is not reduced to a simple sequence of negations. Let's take Hegel's example: grain - stalk - ear. Here the denials proceed as a natural process (unlike, say, the case: grain - stalk - mechanical damage to the stalk).

What is revealed in the negation of negation when a natural process is going on? First, the preservation of the elements of the old along with the emergence of the new determines the progression of the process of negation of negation. But it would be a simplification to consider the development of an object as a linear progressive change. Along with progression in the process of development, there is repetition, cyclicity, a tendency to return to the old state. This situation is reflected in the law of negation of negation. Let's give a formulation of this law: in the process of development (negation of negation) objectively there are two tendencies - progressive change and return to the old; the unity of these trends determines the "spiral" trajectory of development. (If progression is depicted as a vector, and return to the old as a circle, then their unity takes the form of a spiral.)

The result of the negation of negation, completing a certain "coil of the spiral", is at the same time the starting point for further development, for a new "coil of the spiral". The development process is unlimited; there can be no final negation after which development stops.

Answering the question of where development is going, the law of negation of negation at the same time expresses a complex integral process that may not be detected in short time intervals. This circumstance is the basis for doubts about the universality of this law. But doubts are removed if we trace sufficiently large intervals in the development of material systems.

Let's sum up some results. A material object is a unity of phenomenon and essence. The phenomenon includes attributes: quality and quantity, space and time, movement; essence - attributes: law, reality and possibility, necessity and chance, causality and interaction. Attributive understanding of matter continues in the dialectical concept of development.

Crisis of classical ontological models

Lecture 11

"Non-classical ontologies of the second half of the 19th - 20th centuries: hierarchical models of being"

In the framework of one of the previous lectures on classical philosophy, we drew attention to the fact that Hegelian idealism, as the brightest expression of the classical tradition, in a sense, exhausted the possibilities of traditional ontologies and gave a direct impetus to the formation of non-classical ontological models.

The strength of the classical philosophical concepts, focused on the construction of integral and closed ontologies, is their installation on the fundamental cognizability of the world and the total transparency of being (natural, social and human) for rational reflection. Moreover, a truly cognized being is a guarantee of truth in assessing all manifestations of human essence and any human actions, ranging from the problems of distinguishing between good and evil, beautiful and ugly, and ending with a value orientation in purely practical situations. Accordingly, philosophy, based on a developed ontology, is an extensive system of interrelated knowledge that allows a person to explain and evaluate any phenomena.

However, this strength (systematicity, rational coverage of various phenomena from a unified standpoint) acted as a serious weakness during its absolutization, because such philosophical systems, as a rule, are closed, closed in nature and claim to achieve the ultimate truth (absolute truth), which contradicts the meaning of philosophy itself.

By the middle of the XIX century. in philosophy there is a certain crisis of ontology as a key section of metaphysics. The reaction to the isolation of ontological systems, to their claim to master the absolute truth is an attempt to go beyond this isolation and beyond the limits of rationality as such. This is realized in the desire to “find some kind of reality lying outside the mind”, which in turn, as A.L. Dobrokhotov, “turned into a reduction of the mind to one or another irrational element.” There is a kind of irrationalistic turn in philosophy, as a result of which the search for some "realities" that have nothing in common with the real world and are also known in an irrationalistic way is brought to the fore. True, it should be noted that a philosophical explanation is essentially a rational-theoretical explanation, even when it takes an irrationalistic form. As we said above, the most irrationalistic form of philosophy is still realized as a rational attitude.

Thus, Schopenhauer speaks of the “unconscious cosmic will”, which is “not only the beginning, but also the only force that has a substantial character.” Kierkegaard tries to oppose abstract thinking and the existence of the individual, "radically separating thinking and existence." As a result, his God is not a philosophical absolute, but a living God. The basis of his comprehension is faith, not reason. Feuerbach, on the contrary, puts at the center of the whole person who acts as a real being, where even God is a creation of the human mind, on which the properties of the human personality are transferred. However, the irrationalist reaction to hypertrophied rationalism (and especially Hegelian speculative idealism and panlogism) is not the only form of rejection of traditional ontologies.

In many cases, the rejection of ontology acted simply as absolutization of the epistemological essence of philosophy(neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school) or the translation of all philosophical problems into the field of methodology and epistemology (primarily the positivism of the first and second waves). The source of this was the rapid growth of natural science and humanities knowledge in the 19th century, which we wrote about in the previous lecture, as well as the radical changes in the general cultural role and influence of scientific knowledge. The scientific revolution at the turn of the late 19th and early 20th centuries only reinforced this undoubted “epistemological tilt” of philosophy.

In the same period, it rises sharply problem of values and axiology is formed as the third most important section of metaphysics, if it is understood in the classical sense as the theoretical core of philosophical knowledge. neo-Kantianism), puts forward new philosophical idols, such as Nietzsche, and academic authorities, such as W. Windelband. At the same time, the obvious underestimation of value issues in previous metaphysical constructions casts a shadow on ontology as a whole, as an independent philosophical discipline.

In parallel, in the light of new evolutionary concepts in science, metaphysics is increasingly being understood as such a picture of nature, where the latter looks frozen and unchanged in time, i.e. metaphysics is identified not only with speculative-idealistic ontologies, but also with philosophy of nature based on classical Newtonian mechanics, in particular, with the constructions of French materialism of the 18th century.

As a result of all these processes, the terms "metaphysics" and "ontology" are considered as synonyms and are identified with closed and static substantialist ontologies of the classical type (both materialistic and idealistic), acquiring a distinctly negative connotation.

If the negative meaning in the concept of “metaphysics” is still being invested by representatives of some philosophical schools, then the indicated crisis of ontologism turned out to be not so long and already at the end of the 19th – early 19th century. 20th century “Psychological and epistemological interpretations of ontology are being replaced by directions that are oriented towards revising the achievements of previous Western European philosophy and returning to ontologism.”

The return to ontological problems and to the presentation of philosophy as a special kind of connected system was not accidental, but represented, on the one hand, overcoming the absolutization of the epistemological interpretation of philosophy, and on the other hand, a transition to a more complex philosophical understanding of the structure of being and the place of man in it. As a result, literally all currents of modern philosophy “return to ontology”. However, the accents in these new - non-classical - ontologies will be different: somewhere a completely new form will be taken by the philosophy of nature (primarily in Engels and in dialectical materialism), somewhere a fundamentally new sound will be received by the speculative-metaphysical dimension of ontology and the interpretation of ideal objects ( for example, in the work of Nikolai Hartmann), and in a number of philosophical schools the emphasis will be placed on the anthropological dimension of ontology and various interpretations of the existential and cultural being of a person (phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, etc.) will come to the fore. In some works, with varying degrees of elaboration and thoroughness, attempts will be made to carry out an organic synthesis of these three vectors of ontological analysis with a new understanding of the classical ontological problems associated with the status of divine being.

We now turn to the consideration of these key moves of non-classical ontological thought, which continue to be developed in the works of modern philosophers. In the concepts of ontology presented, the problem of a multi-level and in a certain way subordinated structure of being, as well as the possibility of its genetic explanation, comes to the fore.

The hierarchy of being, as an idea, was realized in a variety of ways, the most famous of which were dialectical materialism and N. Hartmann's "new ontology". However, F. Engels sketched out a hierarchical model of nature even earlier in his manuscripts with the demonstrative title “Dialectics of Nature”.

In the history of philosophy and science, as we noted above, the idea of ​​substantiality has always been important as an explanatory factor of both natural and social processes and phenomena. With the development of the sciences, it began to increasingly acquire concrete scientific features.

Thus, Newton's physics was based on the belief in the "simplicity" of the structure of the world and its initial elements. Therefore, matter began to act as a substance, understood as a substance or mechanical mass (that is, the amount of matter), which consists of physically indivisible smallest particles - atoms. “Being material” meant “consisting of indivisible particles” with rest mass.

It was a mechanical picture of the world, in which matter was a hierarchy of systems. First, the atoms bind into some bodies, which in turn form larger bodies, and so on up to cosmic systems. Matter is evenly distributed in the Universe and is permeated by the forces of universal gravitation. Moreover, the propagation velocity of interactions was considered to be infinite (the principle of long-range interaction).

Accordingly, in this physics, space and time were considered as absolute entities, independent of each other and of other properties of material reality, although by this time there were other concepts (for example, Augustine or Leibniz). Newton, as A. Einstein later noted, actually gave a model of the world, which, due to its harmony, remained unsurpassed for a long time. “The thinking of modern physicists is largely conditioned by the fundamental concepts of Newton. So far, it has not been possible to replace Newton's unified concept of the world with another, equally all-encompassing unified concept.

At the same time, notes A. Einstein, Newton's concept was essentially a theoretical (constructed) model, which did not always follow from experience. In philosophical terms, Newton gave a kind of natural-philosophical picture of the world, which was based on the fact that the physical laws inherent in part of the universe extended to all its formations, including man and society. An absolutely homogeneous picture of the world, devoid of dynamics and hierarchy, was proposed.

Thus, the substantiation of the material unity of the world here was associated with very strong theoretical assumptions, characteristic of the philosophy of metaphysical materialism of this period. “Although Newton's desire to present his system as necessarily arising from experience is noticeable everywhere and to introduce as few concepts as possible that are not directly related to experience, he nevertheless introduces the concepts of absolute space and absolute time ... A clear understanding of this circumstance reveals both Newton's wisdom and weak side of his theory. The logical construction of his theory would certainly be more satisfactory without this ghostly concept.

The dominance of physics in the system of sciences largely determined the philosophical ideas about the structure of the world, which literally identified a specific physical picture of the world with the philosophy of nature and even ontology as such. This could not but be reflected in the theory of knowledge, in which they proceeded from the immutable essence of the cognized object and the absoluteness of truth.

However, the very development of physics called into question the views of the world established by Newton's physics. At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. in physics there are cardinal discoveries. And from 1895 to 1905, these discoveries, due to their number and significance, become explosive, destroying the old ideas about physics and the picture of the world that was based on it. We list some of them:

1895 - discovery of X-rays;

1896 - discovery of the phenomenon of spontaneous radiation of uranium;

1897 - discovery of the electron;

1898 - discovery of radium and the process of radioactivity;

1899 - measurement of light pressure and proof of electromagnetic mass;

1900 - creation of the quantum theory by M. Planck;

1903 - creation of the theory of radioactive decay by Rutherford and Soddy;

Even without a special analysis, it is clear that each of these discoveries destroyed the physical concepts based on Newton's theory and dealt a blow to metaphysical materialism, which was the dominant philosophy of nature in this period and acted, on the one hand, as the philosophical foundation of physics, and on the other hand, was based in the construction philosophical ontology based on the principles of classical physics. The crisis of Newtonian physics showed the fundamental relativity of concrete scientific ideas about the world, based on very strong assumptions in the interpretation of the world. It turned out that the very principle of extrapolation (spreading) of our knowledge about a part of the Universe to the whole world is illegal and limited, that the laws of the micro-, macro- and mega world can differ significantly from each other.

The paradox of the philosophical situation of this period was that metaphysical materialism was no longer able to explain new phenomena in physics, and the most powerful philosophical system that could potentially act as the basis of the philosophical foundations of sciences, that is, Hegel's idealistic dialectics, was not without the efforts of Hegel himself. its author, divorced from the development of specific sciences.

To solve new worldview and methodological problems in science, a synthetic concept was needed that combines the materialistic and dialectical components of the approach to the world, and dialectical materialism (or materialistic dialectics, which is the same thing) began to claim this role.

Within the framework of this concept, an attempt was made to develop a new type of ontology, based on the combination of the latest knowledge from the field of natural sciences, primarily physics, and the dialectical-materialistic variety of philosophy. Works on the philosophy of nature played a huge role here. F. Engels. And although “Dialectics of Nature” - his main work in this area - was published much later, nevertheless, it is from the height of subsequent ontological constructions (the same Soviet diamat and N. Hartmann’s ontology) that we can appreciate and in a “pure” form depth and genuine non-classical nature of Engels' ideas.

The philosophy of dialectical materialism, dating back to the works of the founders of Marxism, in matters of ontology was based on the synthesis of materialistic teachings and Hegel's materialistically interpreted dialectics, which allows it to be attributed to the classical model of ontology in many respects. However, the quality of the whole is irreducible, as we remember, to the quality of its constituent parts. Itself is the unification of materialism and dialectics revealed a radical novelty and non-classical. Firstly, it became possible to build a holistic, but open and open philosophy of nature, taking into account the ever-renewing array of scientific data, and, secondly, the possibility of extending materialistic ideas to the sphere of social phenomena. The first of these possibilities was just realized by Engels in Dialectics of Nature.

The development of this problematic by F. Engels was connected with the problem of the classification of sciences and the search for the fundamental basis for such a classification. The positivism that arose at that time, claiming that the time of metaphysical constructions was over, tried to systematize the sciences on the basis of their mechanical summation, which simplified the real picture of being.

For example, Auguste Comte proposed a purely formal system of classification of sciences. Philosophically, it was based on the metaphysical idea of ​​the immutable essence of things and their reflection in our concepts. That is, once received the truth in the sciences, remained unshakable. As a result, the sciences that investigated the various parts of nature were considered in isolation from each other, and their arrangement in Comte's classification was purely methodical, created for convenience. It was a linear classification based on the principle of external coordination of scientific disciplines from which the interconnection of areas of ontology, which are reflected in each of the sciences, was not clear. It was understood that each of the sciences explores some part of reality, and therefore the totality of sciences should have given us a complete picture of this reality, which could be realized in some unified system of sciences. Schematically, this can be represented as follows:

MATHEMATICS¦ PHYSICS¦ CHEMISTRY¦ SOCIAL PHYSICS

The very idea of ​​such a systemic understanding was progressive, but in fact it greatly simplified the real picture of being, since, firstly, new sciences are constantly emerging, the process of their differentiation is underway, and, secondly, the system should be based on principles that are outside her, that is, metaphysical. Therefore, if in the philosophical classics attempts to link science and metaphysics suffered from speculativeness, then in positivism, by simplifying the situation. It was convenient, as F. Engels noted for teaching, but no more.

In contrast to this position, F. Engels lays down the principle of the relationship between the sciences. In other words, the relationship between the sciences and their subordination are not accidental, but are determined by the unity of the material being itself. Accordingly, the most important methodological prerequisites that can be used as the basis for the classification of sciences, and hence a unified picture of natural being, are - the principle of monism and the principle of development.

The sciences, Engels argues, can be subordinated according to their subjects, reflecting the objective ascent of human thought from the simpler to the more complex. Moreover, such a cognitive ascent reflects the dialectical development of nature itself, which generates more complex forms from simple ones. The unity of matter and monism in science are here inseparable from the development of specific natural forms and a complex system of hierarchical and genetic relationships between them, and the principle of development, in turn, is realized only through the qualitative specifics and unity of the subject of each of the sciences. In other words, F. Engels makes a dialectical conclusion, brilliant for his time, which has not completely lost its significance today: true integrity cannot but develop and differentiate, and development is always integral. This applies to both being and knowledge.

Since the basis of the world and its scientific knowledge is the material substrate principle, Engels begins with the search for this principle as the basis for the classification of sciences. Initially, he singles out energy and, accordingly, the classification takes the following form, in which the complication of the type of energy leads to the complication of the field of research in science:

MECHANICAL - PHYSICAL - CHEMICAL - BIOLOGICAL - SOCIAL

However, energy as a substrate principle was not enough. This allowed only mechanics, physics and chemistry to be subordinated. Engels is looking for another substratum principle, which should determine forms of motion of matter. Accordingly, the material carrier of the mechanical form of motion is the mass; physical - a molecule; chemical - atom; biological - protein. The scheme takes the following form.

Further, the development of philosophy went in such a way that natural sciences began to exert an ever greater influence on it, and the idea of ​​substantiality as an explanatory factor of being began to acquire specific scientific features. Of course, other lines in the interpretation of being developed in philosophy, but it is certain that the orientation towards scientific criteria has become the main line in the development of philosophy on this issue. In connection with the development of the sciences of modern times, the idea of ​​the substantiality of the world passes into a new quality and is built on the basis of physical concepts.
Newton's physics is based on the belief in the "simplicity" of the structure of the world and its initial elements. Matter is the substance. This is a substance, or a mechanical mass (quantity), which consists of physically indivisible smallest particles - atoms. "To be material" means "to consist of indivisible particles" that have a rest mass. Newton was a deeply religious person and makes his purely materialistic concept of physics a kind of means of substantiating the existence of God. From the standpoint of mechanics, the mass is inert, it cannot move without efforts applied to it, the first push is necessary for passive matter. In the Newtonian system, matter receives it from God.
It was a mechanical picture of the world. First, the atoms bind into some bodies, which in turn form larger bodies, and so on up to cosmic systems. Matter is evenly distributed in the Universe and is permeated by the forces of universal gravitation. Moreover, the speed of propagation of interactions was considered to be unlimited (the principle of long-range interaction). Accordingly, in this physics, space and time were considered as absolute entities, independent of each other and other properties of material reality, although by this time there were also opposite concepts (for example, Augustine or Leibniz). Newton, as A. Einstein later noted, actually gave a model of the world, which, due to its harmony, remained unsurpassed for a long time. "The thinking of modern physicists is largely conditioned by Newton's fundamental concepts. So far, it has not been possible to replace Newton's unified concept of the world with another, equally all-encompassing unified concept."
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At the same time, notes A. Einstein, Newton's concept was essentially a theoretical (constructed) model, which did not always follow from experience. In philosophical terms, Newton gave a kind of general picture of the world, which was based on the fact that the physical laws inherent in a part of the world extended to the entire Universe. Thus, the substantiation of the material unity of the world here was associated with very strong theoretical assumptions, characteristic of the philosophy of metaphysical materialism of this period. “Although Newton’s desire to present his system as necessarily arising from experience is noticeable everywhere and to introduce as few concepts as possible that are not directly related to experience, he nevertheless introduces the concepts of absolute space and absolute time. A clear understanding of this circumstance reveals both Newton’s wisdom and weak side of his theory. The logical construction of his theory would certainly be more satisfactory without this ghostly concept. The dominance of physics in the system of sciences largely determined the philosophical ideas about the structure of the world, which literally adopted this physical picture of the world as an essential part of ontology, which was especially evident in the theory of knowledge, the most important of which was the principle of absolute truth.
However, the very development of physics refuted the views of the world established by Newton. At the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. cardinal discoveries were made in physics that destroyed the old ideas about physics and the picture of the world that was based on it. We list some of them: 1895 - the discovery of X-rays; 1896 - discovery of the phenomenon of spontaneous radiation of uranium; 1897 - discovery of the electron; 1898 - discovery of radium and the process of radioactivity; 1899 - measurement of light pressure and proof of the existence of electromagnetic mass; 1900 - creation of the quantum theory by M. Planck; 1903 - Creation by Rutherford and Soddy of the theory of radioactive decay; 1905 - A. Einstein published the special theory of relativity.
Even without a special analysis, it is clear that each of these discoveries dealt a blow to metaphysical materialism, which was the dominant philosophical concept in this period and was based in the construction of philosophical ontology on the principles of classical physics. It turned out that the very principle of extrapolation (spreading) of our knowledge about a part of the Universe to the whole world is unjustified, that the laws of the micro-, macro- and mega-world are largely different from each other.
A peculiar attempt to overcome this situation in physics and philosophy was the philosophical concept of Marxism, within which an attempt was made to develop a form of ontology based on the combination of knowledge from the field of natural sciences, primarily physics, and dialectical materialist philosophy.
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The philosophy of dialectical materialism in matters of ontology was based on a synthesis of materialistic teachings and Hegel's materialistically interpreted dialectics. The formation of the concept of matter followed the path of rejecting its interpretation as a certain substance or set of substances to a more abstract understanding of it. Thus, for example, Plekhanov wrote in 1900 that "in contrast to 'spirit', 'matter' is that which, acting on our sense organs, evokes certain sensations in us. What, exactly, acts on our sense organs? To this question I, together with Kant, answer: the thing-in-itself. Therefore, matter is nothing but the totality of things in themselves, since these things are the source of our sensations. IN AND. Lenin puts at the center of the dialectical-materialist understanding of ontology the idea of ​​matter as a special philosophical category for denoting objective reality. This meant that it could not be reduced to any specific physical formation, in particular to matter, as Newton's physics and metaphysical materialism allowed.
Dialectical materialism was a form of materialistic monism, since all other entities, including consciousness, were considered as derivatives of matter, i.e. as attributes of the real world. "Dialectical materialism rejects attempts to construct a doctrine of being in a speculative way. "Being in general" is an empty abstraction." Based on this, it was argued that matter is objective, i.e. exists independently and outside of our consciousness. Scientific knowledge is, first of all, knowledge of matter and concrete forms of its manifestation. The philosophers of this period, who took other positions, immediately noted that such an understanding of matter had much in common with similar ideas of objective idealism. With this approach, the epistemological problem of substantiating the principle of the cognizability of the world finds a solution, but the ontological status remains unclear (the call to supplement Lenin's definition of matter with ontological characteristics was very popular in Soviet philosophy as well).
The category of being was interpreted as a synonym for objective reality, and ontology as a theory of material existence. "Beginning the construction of ontology with the advancement of" general principles of being "related to the" world as a whole ", philosophers actually either resorted to arbitrary speculations, or raised to an absolute," universalized ", extended to the whole world in general the provisions of one or another specific scientific system knowledge. This is how natural-philosophical ontological concepts arose" .
The category of substance at the same time also turned out to be superfluous, historically obsolete, and it was proposed to talk about the substantiality of matter. The "removal" of the eternal philosophical problem of opposing being and thinking is carried out with the help of the position
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about the coincidence of the laws of thinking and the laws of being: the dialectics of concepts is a reflection of the dialectics of the real world, therefore the laws of dialectics perform epistemological functions.
The strong side of dialectical materialism was the orientation towards dialectics (with all the criticism of Hegel), which manifested itself in the recognition of the fundamental cognizability of the world. It was based on an understanding of the inexhaustibility of the properties and structure of matter and on a detailed substantiation of the dialectics of absolute and relative truth as a principle of philosophical knowledge.
Thus, we see that all the substantive concepts considered above are characterized by a monistic view of the world, i.e. a positive solution to the question of the unity of the world, although different content was invested in this.

In the works of the founders of Marxism and its philosophical basis - dialectical materialism - the term "ontology" is not used. F. Engels argued that "only the doctrine of thinking and its laws remains from the former philosophy - formal logic and dialectics." 1

Ontology began to experience a certain renaissance in the Soviet philosophical literature of the 1950s and 1960s, primarily in the works of Leningrad philosophers. Pioneer in this regard were the works and speeches at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Leningrad University V.P. Tugarinov, V.P., Rozhin, V.I. Svidersky and others. to it the school of gnoseologists, which was headed by a number of Moscow philosophers (B. M. Kedrov, E. V. Ilyenkov, and others).

ι Marx K., Engels F. Op. 2nd ed. T. 26. S. 54-5B.

In 1956, in his work “The Correlation of the Categories of Dialectical Materialism”, V. P. Tugarinov, raising the question of the need to single out and develop the ontological aspect of the category of matter, thereby laid the foundation for the development of the ontology of dialectical materialism. The basis of the system of categories, in his opinion, should be considered the categories of "thing" - "property" - "relationship". 2 Substantial categories act as a characteristic of various aspects of a material object, among which, according to Tugarinov, nature in the broad sense of the word is the source. “Further on, the concept of nature has two forms: material and spiritual... Consciousness is also being, a form of being.” 3 “Being is the external determination of nature. Another definition is the concept of matter. This is no longer an external, but an internal definition of nature. 4 Matter characterizes nature in three dimensions: as a set of bodies, substances And etc.; as a really common thing that exists in all things, objects; like a substance.

Raising the question of revealing the ontological aspect of the category of matter through the concept of substance, V. P. Tugarinov noted the insufficiency of a purely epistemological definition of it as an objective reality. V. P. Rozhin spoke about the need to develop the ontological aspect of dialectics as a science.

In the future, these same problems were repeatedly raised in speeches at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Leningrad University and in the works of V. I. Svidersky. Svidersky interpreted ontology as the doctrine of an objectively universal dialectic. He noted that philosophers who oppose the ontological aspect of philosophy argue that its recognition would mean a separation of ontology from epistemology, that the ontological approach is the approach of natural science, etc. The ontological approach is the consideration of the surrounding world from the standpoint of ideas about objective and universal dialectics . "The ontological side of dialectical materialism ... constitutes the level of universality of philosophical knowledge." 5 At the same time, I had to argue on these issues with “epistemologists” (B. M. Kedrov, E. V. Ilyenkov, and others, mostly Moscow philosophers), who, for various reasons, denied the “ontological aspect” of dialectical materialism: such an approach, they say, it separates ontology from epistemology, turns philosophy into natural philosophy, etc. B. M. Kedrov

2 Since such a substantial category as a thing with its properties and relations is taken as the basis of the system of categories, this system can be qualified as a system of ontological categories.

3 Tugarinov V.P. Selected philosophical works. L., 1988. S. 102.

4 Ibid. pp. 104-105.

5 Svidersky VI About some principles of philosophical interpretation of reality // Philosophical sciences. 1968, JSfe 2, p. 80.

wrote: “By philosophy itself, F. Engels understands, first of all, logic and dialectics ... and does not consider philosophy to be either natural philosophy or what some authors call “ontology” (i.e., consideration of being as such, outside the relation of the subject to it , in other words, as the world taken by itself)". 6

The point of view of denying ontology as a special section of dialectical materialism was shared by E. V. Ilyenkov. Proceeding from Lenin's thesis about the coincidence in Marxism of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge, he identified the philosophy of Marxism with dialectics, and reduced dialectics to logic and theory of knowledge, i.e., to dialectical epistemology. 7 Thus, "objective dialectics" is eliminated from dialectics - that area, the area of ​​​​universal-dialectical, which "ontologists" considered as the subject of ontology.

The authors of the articles “Ontology” in the “Philosophical Encyclopedia” (Motroshilova N.) and in the “Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary” (Dobrokhotov A. L.) adhere to approximately the same position, speaking about the removal of the opposition of ontology and epistemology in Marxist philosophy, and in fact about the dissolution ontology in epistemology.

For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that there were attempts: to start expounding the system of categories from the category of being, for example, in the book of I.D.Pantskhava and B.Ya.Pakhomov "Dialectical materialism in the light of modern science" (M., 1971). However, without any justification, being by them is identified with existence, the totality of existing something is defined as reality, and the world of objective reality is defined as matter. As for the "ontological definition of matter", without any justification, it is declared an extreme, "based on a misunderstanding." 8

The final generalizing understanding of the subject and content of ontology was reflected in the works of Leningrad philosophers of the 80s: “Materialistic Dialectics” (in 5 volumes. Volume 1. M., 1981), “Objective Dialectics” (M., 1981); Dialectics of the material world. The ontological function of materialistic dialectics” (L., 1985). In contrast to the point of view that identifies "ontological" and "objective", the authors understand by ontology not just the doctrine of objective reality, but the objectively universal, which is reflected in philosophical categories. 9 Emphasis on versatility; categoriality of ontological knowledge had as its goal

6 Kedr o in BM On the subject of philosophy//Questions of Philosophy. 1979 № 10. p. 33.

7 Ilyenkov E. V. Dialectical logic.

8 Pantskhava ID, Pakhomov B. Ya. Dialectical materialism in the light of modern science. M., 1971. S. 80.

9 Materialist dialectics: In 5 vols. T. 1. M., 1981. S. 49.

to distinguish ontology from natural philosophy, in particular from the so-called general scientific picture of the world.

At the same time, the authors disavowed traditional ontological concepts, qualifying them as speculative and. metaphysical.· It was emphasized that in the philosophy of dialectical materialism the traditional concepts of ontology are critically overcome. "The discovery of a fundamentally new approach to the construction of philosophical knowledge led to a revolutionary transformation of the content of ontology and other sections of philosophy, to the creation of a new, only scientific understanding of it." 10

The "revolutionary transformation" came down to the fact that, like other ontological authors, there is no special analysis of the fundamental ontological category - the category of being, and the system of ontological categories begins with a material object, understood "as a system of interrelated attributes". eleven

Further, the expression about the creation of a “only scientific understanding” of ontology is hardly correct. Of course, the system of categories developed by the authors of this - attributive - model of objective reality, as well as other systems, significantly concretized the ontological aspect of dialectical materialism. However, their disadvantage was a purely negative attitude towards non-Marxist concepts - both modern and past concepts, in which important ontological problems and the categories corresponding to them were developed and are being developed, in particular such fundamental categories as "being" and "existing" (in concepts of Hegel, Hartmann, Heidegger, Sartre, Maritain, etc.). Moreover, the authors of the concept of an attributive model of a material object, from the correct position that objectively there really is no “being as such” and that “being in general” is an abstraction, made the wrong conclusion that “being in general” is an empty abstraction. 12 And since she - empty abstraction, then all discussions about it before the analysis of specific forms of being were qualified as purely speculative, which should have been discarded as having no scientific value. The authors attributed the Hegelian ideas about the relationship between pure being and nothing to the category of such empty abstractions. Arguing after Trendelenburg (one of the first critics of Hegelian dialectics) that one must begin not with pure being, but with present being, the authors do not notice that present being is only a specific mode of being, and we will not know anything about it if we first we do not define the concept of being. The rejection of the Hegelian analysis of pure being and non-being as the initial categories of ontology turned for the authors into the phenomenon of throwing out the child-Hegelian dialectics along with muddy waters. 13 But in general, both the very concept of the attributive model of a material object and the discussions around this concept, in particular when writing the first volume of "Materialistic Dialectics", significantly advanced the development of problems of ontology and, above all, the categories "being", "objective reality", "matter ".

Within the framework of the ontological concept of dialectical materialism, the concept of being was essentially identified with the concept of objective reality, matter. Various definitions were given to the so-called ontological aspect of the concept of matter: matter as a substance, as a basis, an object, a carrier, etc. But gradually, two alternative approaches were identified in this set of definitions: substrate and attributive.

From the point of view of the substrate approach, the ontological aspect of the concept of matter expresses the concept of matter as a substance. Moreover, to speak of matter as a substance means to characterize it as a carrier of attributes. This approach and concept were developed by V. P. Tugarinov back in the 1950s. One of the first who posed the important problem of the need to reveal the ontological content of the definition of matter as an objective reality given in sensation, an epistemological definition, V. P. Tugarinov emphasized that this aspect expresses the concept of substance. It characterizes matter as a universal objective "object", as a substratum, "the basis of all things, as the bearer of all properties". 14 This understanding of matter as substance was shared by many Soviet philosophers. For example, A. G. Spirkin, characterizing matter as a substance, understands the substance as the general basis of the entire unified material world. 15

In contrast to the substrate concept of matter, the so-called attributive concept of matter was put forward and developed. Supporters of this concept and the model of matter saw the lack of the substrate concept (both in historical and modern form) in the fact that it differs and even contrasts “carrier” and properties (attributes), and the substrate is understood as a support on which “hung” attributes. Setting the task of overcoming this opposition of carrier and properties, they defined matter as “agreement

13 Our understanding of this dialectic was discussed in the paragraph on Hegelian dialectical ontology.

14 Tuta p inov VP Selected philosophical works. L., 1988. S,

15 Spi p k and n A. G. Fundamentals of Philosophy. M., 1988. S. 147.

coherent system of attributes." 16 With this approach, the indicated opposition is indeed removed, since matter is identified with attributes, however, it is achieved at such a price, What if it is not removed, then in any case the question of matter as a carrier of properties is obscured in general, and it loses its substrativity and is reduced to properties, connections, relations.

We have a typical antinomic situation. For the supporters of these concepts, it existed at the level of an alternative discussion of the problem. Interestingly, this alternative arose already in pre-Marxist philosophy, moreover, in the controversy between materialism and idealism. Thus, according to Locke, "substance is the bearer of those qualities that are capable of evoking in us simple ideas and which are usually called accidents." 17 A carrier is something "supporting", "standing under something". Substance is different from accidents: accidents are knowable, but there is no clear idea about the carrier substance. 18 At the same time, Fichte clearly gravitates toward an attributive view, defining substance as a set of accidents. “The members of a relation, considered separately, are accidents; their fullness is substance. Substance is not something fixed, but only change. Accidents, being synthetically combined, give substance, and in this latter there is nothing but an accident: the substance, being analyzed, breaks up into accidents, and after a complete analysis of the substance, nothing remains but accidents. 19

The fact that the alternative of the substratum and attributive concepts arose not only in modern philosophy; but there was also in the history of philosophy, once again suggests the presence of a deep objective basis for this alternative. In our opinion, such a basis is one of the fundamental contradictions of matter - the contradiction of stability and variability. The substratum concept, raising the question of matter as a carrier of attributes, focuses on the aspect of the stability of matter and its specific forms. Focusing attention on attributes, naturally, leads to emphasizing the aspect of variability, since the content of attributes can be revealed only in the processes of interaction of material systems, i.e., in the processes of their change, movement, development.

16 Bransky V. P., Ilyin V. V., Karmin A. S. Dialectical understanding of matter and its methodological role. / / Methodological aspects of materialistic dialectics. L., 1974. S. 14, 16.

17 Locke D. Fav. philosophical works: In 3 vols. T. 1. M, I960. S. 30!.

19 Fichte I. G. Selected. op. M., 1916. S. 180.

What is the way out of these difficulties? First, the alternative must be given the appearance of a theoretical antinomy in which the truth of none of the alternative concepts is denied.

Secondly, since we now have an antinomy in front of us, in accordance with the methodology of setting and resolving antinomies, it is necessary to comprehensively analyze and evaluate all the “pluses” and “minuses” of alternative concepts so that the positive aspects of both concepts are preserved during the dialectical removal and thereby resolution of the antinomy. .

Thirdly, the procedure of withdrawal itself means an exit to a deeper foundation, in which the one-sidedness of alternative concepts is overcome. In relation to the antithesis of the concepts "substrate" and "attribute", such a dialectical basis is the category of substance, in which both aspects of matter are expressed in a dialectical connection: stability and variability. This raises the question of matter as a substance. But in order to comprehensively disclose the content of the category of substance, it is necessary to determine its place in the system of those categories that are directly related to the disclosure of the dialectical content of the category of matter.

The starting point in this system should be the definition of matter as an objective reality given to us in sensation - definition par excellence epistemological. We emphasize “predominantly”, since it also has a certain ontological content. It is and should be the initial one because, starting from this definition, it can be emphasized with all certainty that we are talking about a system of categories materialism, which cannot be said if one starts this system from another category, for example, a substance.

The next step in the definition is the disclosure of the ontological content of the category of matter. This step is done with the help of the category of substance. It would be wrong to identify the concept of substance and substratum. Such an identification actually occurs when substance is defined as the universal basis of phenomena, i.e., as the universal substratum. But, firstly, there is no universal substrate as a carrier of attributes, but there are specific forms or types of matter (physical, biological and social form of organization of matter) as carriers (substrates) of the corresponding forms of movement and other attributes.

Secondly, the category of substance is richer in content than the concept of substratum. Substance includes a substrate, understood as a stable basis (in the form of specific forms of matter) of phenomena, but is not reduced to it. The most essential content of the substance expresses Spinoza's "Causa Sui" - the self-justification and self-determination of changes, the ability to be the subject of all changes.

An important aspect of the ontological content of matter is also expressed by the concept of attributes. But just as objectively-really there is no universal substrate - the carrier of attributes, and specific forms of matter, as well as universal attributes (movement, space - time, etc.) objectively-really exist in specific forms (modes). So, objectively, in reality, there is no movement as such, but specific forms of movement; there is no space and time as such, but specific spatio-temporal forms (space - time, micro-macro-mega of the world, etc.). 20

Thus, the one-sidedness of the substrate and attributive concepts are overcome in the synthetic substantive-substrate-attributive understanding of matter as an objective reality. The noted considerations were expressed by us as the editor-in-chief of the first volume of "Materialistic Dialectics" during its preparation to the supporters of both alternative concepts. But these remarks "remained behind the scenes." Moreover, in the later work “Dialectics of the material world. The ontological function of materialistic dialectics” noted above, the one-sidedness of the attributive concept was strengthened. We can say that it manifested a certain nominalistic underestimation of the abstract-theoretical substantiation of the initial foundations of the ontological theory.

Assessing in general the results of the development of problems of ontology within the framework of dialectical materialism, we can note the following. This development itself took place under severe pressure from the Moscow "epistemologists", and we must pay tribute to the theoretical courage of the above-mentioned Leningrad philosophers. Sharp and numerous discussions at the Faculty of Philosophy of Leningrad University and their continuation in articles and monographs undoubtedly contributed to the formulation and in-depth study of fundamental ontological problems.

At the same time, it should be noted that the main drawback of these studies is ignorance or ignorance of the positive results achieved in non-Marxist ontological concepts. But this shortcoming is not a unique shortcoming of research in the field of problems of ontology, but in general of all research conducted within the framework of dialectical materialism,

20 The need to introduce the concept of "spatio-temporal forms" is sufficiently substantiated in the works of A. M. Mostepanenko.

Time and thought in Nietzsche

1. In the course of researching the genealogy of “guilt” and “bad conscience”, F. Nietzsche is struck by the shift in the meaning of justice.

1 S t e g m a i e r W. Nietzsches Verzeitlichung des Denkes.

literal punishment and punishment, as it is presented in the history of criminal law, which gives the German philosopher a reason for the conceptual understanding of the differentiation of the origin and the ultimate goal of the "institution of law" in general. Nietzsche pays special attention to the transformation of meaning as a physiological organ, "public mores, political customs, art forms, religious cults" and, finally, any "things, forms and organizations" in general. 2

2. The former genealogies of morality, so Nietzsche begins his digression, proceeded from the search for the goal of introducing punishment and saw it in a certain good, which eventually came to be considered the metaphysical cause of punishment. However, in history it turns out that the cause of the emergence of a thing and its practical usefulness, application and expediency are far from the same thing.

The search for the origin and ultimate goal of all things is the main problem of Aristotle's ontology. Even today it determines the way in which we can think of becoming and change in time, namely, as the change of things that change, but at the same time remain something self-preserving and identical to themselves and, as such, do not belong to becoming and time, but themselves acquire power over them. To justify the possibility of self-preservation in time after Aristotle, essence, substance (ousia) and qualities are distinguished, the change of which does not affect the essence. Through essence, a thing remains identical with itself, and through qualities it acquires the ability to change. However, the essence itself is unchanging, and its meaning is to explain the identity of a thing with all its qualitative changes.

However, not only external qualities, like color and surface, but also the substance itself are subject to change. Aristotle called the unchanging essence form (morphae), which, unlike matter, is comprehended not by feelings, but by thinking. The task of thinking is to reveal the form of changing things. Essence as form constitutes the concept of a thing (eîdos, ti âen ënai); the invariable intelligible form of matter is in Stagirite the concept of the concept.

The Aristotelian concept of a concept is something like a living being. Behind this is the understanding of nature as a growing entity (physis) by itself, cruelly and indifferently playing with the separate and good, beautifully ordered, eternally preserving this order (kosmos) in general. The purpose of knowledge is to reveal and substantiate this order as accurately as possible and above all on earth "under the moon" among the species of living beings. "View" (eîdos) gets from Aristotle

2 Nietzsche F. Sämtliche Werke in 15 Bänden (KSA). Munich; Berlin; New York, 1980.

logical and biological meaning, and the first gets its visible embodiment in the second. The biological species is manifested in the product of the same form (so a person gives birth to a person). This "form", which passes from one individual to another, differs from other forms in features, which, in turn, are included in the content of "genera" that include certain species. “Types” correlate with each other as the lower and higher concepts of a logical pyramid, at the top of which are poor in content, but broad in scope, concepts, the soil of which is narrow in scope, but specific and meaningful concepts.

What constitutes the "form" of a species can only be shown by examples of living beings. Individual beings change very significantly during life precisely in form; (for example, frogs and butterflies). Thus, the problem of time, which Aristotle originally posed on the basis of the assumption of an unchanging essence, returns. This leads him to define "essence" in terms of broader concepts, which must be consistent with the change in form in individual living beings. This is possible on the basis of the concept of "goal". The "form" of a living being, Aristotle believed, manifests itself only at a certain period of its development, when it reaches a state of flowering or maturity. At this time, it is able to multiply, i.e., transfer the form to another substance in order to form new sdivids of the previous form. Thus, "form" becomes a "goal": if the first can not be known at any time of the development of a living being, then the second covers the entire time of the formation of the form. Therefore, the essence, which has its goal in itself, the Stagirite calls "entelechy."

If something has its goal in itself, then it has it at the beginning as the plan of its development; so the goal is the source. Aristotle's assumption of an "essence" that changes and yet remains similar to itself leads to a correspondence between the goal and the beginning. And this remains in force not only for the being as a whole, but also for individual isolated organs. The Aristotelian origin is "arche", borrowed from its predecessors and characteristic of Greek thinking as a whole. Compared with his predecessors, Aristotle sees his merit in the fact that, on the basis of this concept, he clarified the essence of becoming and connected time with it. "Arche" includes in its content "the beginning", "essence" and "power". The stagirite himself distinguishes four meanings of "arche": substance, form, purpose and the effective cause of becoming, which cannot be thought of one without the other. "Arche" - the substance from which a living being is built, the form that controls the course of development, and the goal in which it ends. So the beginning and the end coincide. And today we can think of the development of living beings solely on the basis of the concept of purpose. We think, as Kant would say, that the goal is known to the being from the very beginning and determines its further development.

3. Nietzsche's attack on the interdependence of the beginning and the goal is caused by disagreement with the dissolution of time as becoming. The uncontrollability of becoming should not be subject to the concept that explains it. Nietzsche proceeded from the independence of becoming, and for this he had to rethink the "concept of the concept" in order to find a way to understand becoming. He proceeded from the idea of ​​"organic world". Ch. Darwin's theory of evolution became the strongest reason to comprehend the essence itself as temporary, and not to destroy time, allowing for timeless entities. The Aristotelian premise of immutable entities led to the conclusion that species are immutable. On the contrary, the basic idea of ​​evolution turns out to be not only excluded, but generally unthinkable within the framework of such assumptions. As more and more new biological research, the principles of order in the organic world became more and more controversial and uncertain; the old way of interconnecting living nature was called into question. Darwin was able to offer a bold and original understanding of the interconnectedness of the organic world due to the fact that he took into account not only species, but also individuals, not only identity, but also development. It arises in the course of the "struggle for existence", in which certain qualities are acquired or lost. This is also possible through selection. The selection of different individuals by changing the conditions of their existence ensures both the change of species and their relationship, which is no longer logical-systematic, but temporal or genealogical. Now it is impossible, relying on the hierarchy of higher and lower concepts, to construct a single time for all cases. On the contrary, a consistent reconstruction of the origin of species shows the independence of time, which ensures the relationship in nature. After Darwin and his theory of evolution, the interconnection of the organic world is conceived in time and on its basis. It was this turn in the consciousness of time that prepared Nietzsche's genealogical approach.

Yet evolutionary biology does not abandon the concept of "species". It orders the organic world both by species, which are understood as evolving over time, as constituting a "breeding community," and by individuals, who form a community for as long as they can reproduce. 3 Not only evolutionary thinking, but also our thinking in general cannot do without the concepts of “kind” and “essence”. The genealogical conditions of our thinking are

s M a y e g E. Die Entwicklung der biologische Gedankenwelt. Berlin, 1984. S. 219.

its reliance on Aristotelian essences is based, for without an object, without “essence”, it cannot think, and Nietzsche clearly understood and took this circumstance into account. In a well-known fragment from notes unpublished during his lifetime, he spoke of a "scheme" with which we think and which we cannot discard. Thanks to this, we can see "the border as a border". 4 Nietzsche seeks to comprehend this boundary as temporal, for he denies timeless entities. Thinking essence in the perspective of time, he thinks in time.

4. "Essence" for Aristotle was a concept, thanks to which he could think of identity, but at the same time lost time. He wasted time by making "essence" the power to govern becoming and change. Therefore, Nietzsche, who thought of identity in terms of time, had to move from the concept of essence to the concept of power. The decisive step towards a new concept of the concept is the refusal to think of "power" as an "essence". Power is defined in opposition or in a game with other power. This is an important and new understanding: when using the concept of "essence", "identity" is defined without any comparison with the other, on the contrary, power is fundamentally related to the other. By virtue of its independence from the other, essence has itself as the source of its change. On the contrary, power in the game with other forces does not remain constant, but each time posits itself anew. Power in Nietzsche's sense is the power of definitions - whether it concerns the organic world, where power organizes the other according to its will, or a person who uses concepts that establish order.

Power is a concept posited before the distinction between life and thought, but presupposing their opposite. Nietzsche not only does not seek to consciously separate them, but, on the contrary, considers thinking and life to be one, understands thinking from life, and life from thinking. “The logic of our conscious thinking,” he wrote, “is only an approximate and coarsened repetition of what is necessary for our organism and even for each individual organ of it.” 5 Therefore, if everything that happens in the organic world is a struggle for domination, then it is natural that the dominant and strong act as the basis of a new interpretation, that in the course of such a new interpretation or justification of the new power, the former “meaning” and “purpose” are either obscured or disappear altogether.

Because of this, the functions of organs are constantly changing in the organic world. The ability to change function provides the ability to survive in new conditions. An organ that has arisen by chance at first seems useless and even interfering.

4 Nietzsche. KSA, 12, 5

5 Ibid. And, 35 .

but under changed conditions, it is most often he who ensures the possibility of survival. 6 If life in new conditions requires a change in functions, then, no matter how unusual it may sound, it is wrong to judge new functions in terms of old ones, and vice versa. This is significant not only for the organic, but also for the cultural world: the purpose and usefulness of every thing - be it a "physiological organ", legal institutions, social mores, political customs, art forms or religious cults - become something fluid and mobile, dependent from the one whose will to power turns out to be dominant and thus determines the restructuring of functions and meaning. 7

5. At this point in his reasoning, Nietzsche somewhat unexpectedly takes a step from the concept of power to the concept of a sign. Such a move was very significant for the young Nietzsche. And this again, independently of him, became significant centuries later in modern philosophy. The life process that has reached the stage of thought is interpreted by Nietzsche as a sign process. The call to understand the process of thought as a process of power, i.e., to the unity of source and goal in the unity of “arche”, means understanding power as a sign process in the new concept of unity and source, which takes into account the radical temporality of any meaning.

It may seem that Nietzsche uses the concept of "sign" in a completely non-semiotic sense, namely, in relation to the "will to power." Will κ power cannot be a sign, because it is that which is formed as a result of a change in functions and sets a new origin for signs and thus a new kind of “arche”. Nietzsche's formula "will to power" was understood in this way for a long time. 8 However, Nietzsche does not derive the will to power from the process of signs. It reveals itself both to others and to itself as a sign. 9 Power is a sign, and this, according to Nietzsche, determines its concept. Since power manifests itself only in the game with other forces, it cannot be defined in itself, but only through its relationship with other power. But what is this other power also presupposes a correlation not with itself, but with something else, and thus power has no basis either in itself, or in another, or in a third. What remains is the play of signs, which is not something frozen. The will to power is not derived from anywhere, but, on the contrary, is assumed. The fact that it is impossible to define what the power of pure concepts is does not mean that it cannot be communicated. On the contrary, it communicates in a sign form, which, however, does not have any stable meaning. Established signs that have equal meaning for everyone and everyone are possible if all certain conditions of communication are observed. If conditions change

"Nietzsche-Studien, 22, 1993. P. 371-388.

7 See Derrida J., Simon I.

s Heidegger M. Nietzsche. 2 bd. Pfullingen, 1961.

9 Compare: Wittgenstein L. Schriften. bd. I. Frankfurt am Main, 1960. I. 504.

communication, context, the meaning will also change. But the conditions of communication change if the participants in the communication process themselves are in continuous development. On the other hand, the condition for the possibility of communication is the stability of the signs, recognized by the participants. This contradiction is resolved in our everyday life, where the same signs can be understood in different ways. Thus, the meaning of the signs with which we communicate can be established by analogy with the functions of the organs necessary for survival. The vital need for a change in function in the organic world corresponds to the vital change in meaning in the cultural world. “The positing of meaning,” wrote Nietzsche, “in many cases is the interpretation of old interpretations that have become incomprehensible, which itself is only a sign.” 10

6. All of the above allows you to think of "essence" as temporary. The thing, which in the Aristotelian ontology is assumed to be the “essence” unchanged in all changes, becomes, under the changed conditions of communication, the “history of the thing”, the continuously changing meaning. “A concept,” Nietzsche noted in “Beyond Good and Evil,” “is something living, therefore partly growing, partly dying; and concepts can die in the most miserable way.”11 Thus, for example, the concept of an individual can turn out to be completely false , if it is presented as an "entity" "Such entities are not isolated: the central difficulty is change."

In the genealogy of morality, Nietzsche extends the temporality of "essence" to the concepts of power and sign. The following passage is the key to his interpretation: to understand the life and thought processes as a process of power, and the latter as a sign process, means to represent the “thing” as an uninterrupted chain of ever new interpretations and justifications ... their causes, in turn, are not themselves reducible to others. , but dissolve in relationships and random events. The temporality of "essence" thus understood is not exhausted by the concept of development. "Development" is a modern concept constructed under the assumption of a beginning and a goal to explain becoming. To expose it means to reveal the premises of the Aristotelian ontology and abandon it in favor of a new understanding of becoming, where sequences take place that are more or less connected with the processes of control, the selection of effective reactions and counteractions. 13 Therefore, Nietzsche puts forward a new simple formula for the concept of the concept: "Form is fluid, but meaning is still more."

7. Nietzsche, of course, would not be Nietzsche if he simply limited

10 Nietzsche. KÄS/ 12, 2 .

11 Ibid. 11, 40 .

12 Ibid. 11, 34; compare: 12, 9 .

13 Compare: Luhmann N. Sozial Systeme. Frankfurt am Main, 1984.

nichilsya promotion of the thesis. For now, this is just a sign to be careful. If we were talking about an objection to Aristotle, we could limit ourselves to the statement "form is fluid." Nietzsche speaks not only of the fluidity of "form", but also of the fluidity of "meaning", moreover

In the works of the founders of Marxism and its philosophical basis - dialectical materialism - the term "ontology" is not used. F. Engels argued that "only the doctrine of thinking and its laws remains from the former philosophy - formal logic and dialectics." 1

Ontology began to experience a certain renaissance in the Soviet philosophical literature of the 1950s and 1960s, primarily in the works of Leningrad philosophers. Pioneer in this regard were the works and speeches at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Leningrad University V.P. Tugarinov, V.P., Rozhin, V.I. Svidersky and others. to it the school of gnoseologists, which was headed by a number of Moscow philosophers (B. M. Kedrov, E. V. Ilyenkov, and others).

ι Marx K., Engels F. Op. 2nd ed. T. 26. S. 54-5B.

In 1956, in his work “The Correlation of the Categories of Dialectical Materialism”, V. P. Tugarinov, raising the question of the need to single out and develop the ontological aspect of the category of matter, thereby laid the foundation for the development of the ontology of dialectical materialism. The basis of the system of categories, in his opinion, should be considered the categories of "thing" - "property" - "relationship". 2 Substantial categories act as a characteristic of various aspects of a material object, among which, according to Tugarinov, nature in the broad sense of the word is the source. “Further on, the concept of nature has two forms: material and spiritual... Consciousness is also being, a form of being.” 3 “Being is the external determination of nature. Another definition is the concept of matter. This is no longer an external, but an internal definition of nature. 4 Matter characterizes nature in three dimensions: as a set of bodies, substances And etc.; as a really common thing that exists in all things, objects; like a substance.

Raising the question of revealing the ontological aspect of the category of matter through the concept of substance, V. P. Tugarinov noted the insufficiency of a purely epistemological definition of it as an objective reality. V. P. Rozhin spoke about the need to develop the ontological aspect of dialectics as a science.

In the future, these same problems were repeatedly raised in speeches at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Leningrad University and in the works of V. I. Svidersky. Svidersky interpreted ontology as the doctrine of an objectively universal dialectic. He noted that philosophers who oppose the ontological aspect of philosophy argue that its recognition would mean a separation of ontology from epistemology, that the ontological approach is the approach of natural science, etc. The ontological approach is the consideration of the surrounding world from the standpoint of ideas about objective and universal dialectics . "The ontological side of dialectical materialism ... constitutes the level of universality of philosophical knowledge." 5 At the same time, I had to argue on these issues with “epistemologists” (B. M. Kedrov, E. V. Ilyenkov, and others, mostly Moscow philosophers), who, for various reasons, denied the “ontological aspect” of dialectical materialism: such an approach, they say, it separates ontology from epistemology, turns philosophy into natural philosophy, etc. B. M. Kedrov

2 Since such a substantial category as a thing with its properties and relations is taken as the basis of the system of categories, this system can be qualified as a system of ontological categories.

3 Tugarinov V.P. Selected philosophical works. L., 1988. S. 102.

4 Ibid. pp. 104-105.

5 Svidersky VI About some principles of philosophical interpretation of reality // Philosophical sciences. 1968, JSfe 2, p. 80.

wrote: “By philosophy itself, F. Engels understands, first of all, logic and dialectics ... and does not consider philosophy to be either natural philosophy or what some authors call “ontology” (i.e., consideration of being as such, outside the relation of the subject to it , in other words, as the world taken by itself)". 6

The point of view of denying ontology as a special section of dialectical materialism was shared by E. V. Ilyenkov. Proceeding from Lenin's thesis about the coincidence in Marxism of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge, he identified the philosophy of Marxism with dialectics, and reduced dialectics to logic and theory of knowledge, i.e., to dialectical epistemology. 7 Thus, "objective dialectics" is eliminated from dialectics - that area, the area of ​​​​universal-dialectical, which "ontologists" considered as the subject of ontology.

The authors of the articles “Ontology” in the “Philosophical Encyclopedia” (Motroshilova N.) and in the “Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary” (Dobrokhotov A. L.) adhere to approximately the same position, speaking about the removal of the opposition of ontology and epistemology in Marxist philosophy, and in fact about the dissolution ontology in epistemology.

For the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that there were attempts: to start expounding the system of categories from the category of being, for example, in the book of I.D.Pantskhava and B.Ya.Pakhomov "Dialectical materialism in the light of modern science" (M., 1971). However, without any justification, being by them is identified with existence, the totality of existing something is defined as reality, and the world of objective reality is defined as matter. As for the "ontological definition of matter", without any justification, it is declared an extreme, "based on a misunderstanding." 8

The final generalizing understanding of the subject and content of ontology was reflected in the works of Leningrad philosophers of the 80s: “Materialistic Dialectics” (in 5 volumes. Volume 1. M., 1981), “Objective Dialectics” (M., 1981); Dialectics of the material world. The ontological function of materialistic dialectics” (L., 1985). In contrast to the point of view that identifies "ontological" and "objective", the authors understand by ontology not just the doctrine of objective reality, but the objectively universal, which is reflected in philosophical categories. 9 Emphasis on versatility; categoriality of ontological knowledge had as its goal

6 Kedr o in BM On the subject of philosophy//Questions of Philosophy. 1979 № 10. p. 33.

7 Ilyenkov E. V. Dialectical logic.

8 Pantskhava ID, Pakhomov B. Ya. Dialectical materialism in the light of modern science. M., 1971. S. 80.

9 Materialist dialectics: In 5 vols. T. 1. M., 1981. S. 49.

to distinguish ontology from natural philosophy, in particular from the so-called general scientific picture of the world.

At the same time, the authors disavowed traditional ontological concepts, qualifying them as speculative and. metaphysical.· It was emphasized that in the philosophy of dialectical materialism the traditional concepts of ontology are critically overcome. "The discovery of a fundamentally new approach to the construction of philosophical knowledge led to a revolutionary transformation of the content of ontology and other sections of philosophy, to the creation of a new, only scientific understanding of it." 10

The "revolutionary transformation" came down to the fact that, like other ontological authors, there is no special analysis of the fundamental ontological category - the category of being, and the system of ontological categories begins with a material object, understood "as a system of interrelated attributes". eleven

Further, the expression about the creation of a “only scientific understanding” of ontology is hardly correct. Of course, the system of categories developed by the authors of this - attributive - model of objective reality, as well as other systems, significantly concretized the ontological aspect of dialectical materialism. However, their disadvantage was a purely negative attitude towards non-Marxist concepts - both modern and past concepts, in which important ontological problems and the categories corresponding to them were developed and are being developed, in particular such fundamental categories as "being" and "existing" (in concepts of Hegel, Hartmann, Heidegger, Sartre, Maritain, etc.). Moreover, the authors of the concept of an attributive model of a material object, from the correct position that objectively there really is no “being as such” and that “being in general” is an abstraction, made the wrong conclusion that “being in general” is an empty abstraction. 12 And since she - empty abstraction, then all discussions about it before the analysis of specific forms of being were qualified as purely speculative, which should have been discarded as having no scientific value. The authors attributed the Hegelian ideas about the relationship between pure being and nothing to the category of such empty abstractions. Arguing after Trendelenburg (one of the first critics of Hegelian dialectics) that one must begin not with pure being, but with present being, the authors do not notice that present being is only a specific mode of being, and we will not know anything about it if we first we do not define the concept of being. The rejection of the Hegelian analysis of pure being and non-being as the initial categories of ontology turned for the authors into the phenomenon of throwing out the child-Hegelian dialectics along with muddy waters. 13 But in general, both the very concept of the attributive model of a material object and the discussions around this concept, in particular when writing the first volume of "Materialistic Dialectics", significantly advanced the development of problems of ontology and, above all, the categories "being", "objective reality", "matter ".

Within the framework of the ontological concept of dialectical materialism, the concept of being was essentially identified with the concept of objective reality, matter. Various definitions were given to the so-called ontological aspect of the concept of matter: matter as a substance, as a basis, an object, a carrier, etc. But gradually, two alternative approaches were identified in this set of definitions: substrate and attributive.

From the point of view of the substrate approach, the ontological aspect of the concept of matter expresses the concept of matter as a substance. Moreover, to speak of matter as a substance means to characterize it as a carrier of attributes. This approach and concept were developed by V. P. Tugarinov back in the 1950s. One of the first who posed the important problem of the need to reveal the ontological content of the definition of matter as an objective reality given in sensation, an epistemological definition, V. P. Tugarinov emphasized that this aspect expresses the concept of substance. It characterizes matter as a universal objective "object", as a substratum, "the basis of all things, as the bearer of all properties". 14 This understanding of matter as substance was shared by many Soviet philosophers. For example, A. G. Spirkin, characterizing matter as a substance, understands the substance as the general basis of the entire unified material world. 15

In contrast to the substrate concept of matter, the so-called attributive concept of matter was put forward and developed. Supporters of this concept and the model of matter saw the lack of the substrate concept (both in historical and modern form) in the fact that it differs and even contrasts “carrier” and properties (attributes), and the substrate is understood as a support on which “hung” attributes. Setting the task of overcoming this opposition of carrier and properties, they defined matter as “agreement

13 Our understanding of this dialectic was discussed in the paragraph on Hegelian dialectical ontology.

14 Tuta p inov VP Selected philosophical works. L., 1988. S,

15 Spi p k and n A. G. Fundamentals of Philosophy. M., 1988. S. 147.

coherent system of attributes." 16 With this approach, the indicated opposition is indeed removed, since matter is identified with attributes, however, it is achieved at such a price, What if it is not removed, then in any case the question of matter as a carrier of properties is obscured in general, and it loses its substrativity and is reduced to properties, connections, relations.

We have a typical antinomic situation. For the supporters of these concepts, it existed at the level of an alternative discussion of the problem. Interestingly, this alternative arose already in pre-Marxist philosophy, moreover, in the controversy between materialism and idealism. Thus, according to Locke, "substance is the bearer of those qualities that are capable of evoking in us simple ideas and which are usually called accidents." 17 A carrier is something "supporting", "standing under something". Substance is different from accidents: accidents are knowable, but there is no clear idea about the carrier substance. 18 At the same time, Fichte clearly gravitates toward an attributive view, defining substance as a set of accidents. “The members of a relation, considered separately, are accidents; their fullness is substance. Substance is not something fixed, but only change. Accidents, being synthetically combined, give substance, and in this latter there is nothing but an accident: the substance, being analyzed, breaks up into accidents, and after a complete analysis of the substance, nothing remains but accidents. 19

The fact that the alternative of the substratum and attributive concepts arose not only in modern philosophy; but there was also in the history of philosophy, once again suggests the presence of a deep objective basis for this alternative. In our opinion, such a basis is one of the fundamental contradictions of matter - the contradiction of stability and variability. The substratum concept, raising the question of matter as a carrier of attributes, focuses on the aspect of the stability of matter and its specific forms. Focusing attention on attributes, naturally, leads to emphasizing the aspect of variability, since the content of attributes can be revealed only in the processes of interaction of material systems, i.e., in the processes of their change, movement, development.

16 Bransky V. P., Ilyin V. V., Karmin A. S. Dialectical understanding of matter and its methodological role. / / Methodological aspects of materialistic dialectics. L., 1974. S. 14, 16.

17 Locke D. Fav. philosophical works: In 3 vols. T. 1. M, I960. S. 30!.

19 Fichte I. G. Selected. op. M., 1916. S. 180.

What is the way out of these difficulties? First, the alternative must be given the appearance of a theoretical antinomy in which the truth of none of the alternative concepts is denied.

Secondly, since we now have an antinomy in front of us, in accordance with the methodology of setting and resolving antinomies, it is necessary to comprehensively analyze and evaluate all the “pluses” and “minuses” of alternative concepts so that the positive aspects of both concepts are preserved during the dialectical removal and thereby resolution of the antinomy. .

Thirdly, the procedure of withdrawal itself means an exit to a deeper foundation, in which the one-sidedness of alternative concepts is overcome. In relation to the antithesis of the concepts "substrate" and "attribute", such a dialectical basis is the category of substance, in which both aspects of matter are expressed in a dialectical connection: stability and variability. This raises the question of matter as a substance. But in order to comprehensively disclose the content of the category of substance, it is necessary to determine its place in the system of those categories that are directly related to the disclosure of the dialectical content of the category of matter.

The starting point in this system should be the definition of matter as an objective reality given to us in sensation - definition par excellence epistemological. We emphasize “predominantly”, since it also has a certain ontological content. It is and should be the initial one because, starting from this definition, it can be emphasized with all certainty that we are talking about a system of categories materialism, which cannot be said if one starts this system from another category, for example, a substance.

The next step in the definition is the disclosure of the ontological content of the category of matter. This step is done with the help of the category of substance. It would be wrong to identify the concept of substance and substratum. Such an identification actually occurs when substance is defined as the universal basis of phenomena, i.e., as the universal substratum. But, firstly, there is no universal substrate as a carrier of attributes, but there are specific forms or types of matter (physical, biological and social form of organization of matter) as carriers (substrates) of the corresponding forms of movement and other attributes.

Secondly, the category of substance is richer in content than the concept of substratum. Substance includes a substrate, understood as a stable basis (in the form of specific forms of matter) of phenomena, but is not reduced to it. The most essential content of the substance expresses Spinoza's "Causa Sui" - the self-justification and self-determination of changes, the ability to be the subject of all changes.

An important aspect of the ontological content of matter is also expressed by the concept of attributes. But just as objectively-really there is no universal substrate - the carrier of attributes, and specific forms of matter, as well as universal attributes (movement, space - time, etc.) objectively-really exist in specific forms (modes). So, objectively, in reality, there is no movement as such, but specific forms of movement; there is no space and time as such, but specific spatio-temporal forms (space - time, micro-macro-mega of the world, etc.). 20

Thus, the one-sidedness of the substrate and attributive concepts are overcome in the synthetic substantive-substrate-attributive understanding of matter as an objective reality. The noted considerations were expressed by us as the editor-in-chief of the first volume of "Materialistic Dialectics" during its preparation to the supporters of both alternative concepts. But these remarks "remained behind the scenes." Moreover, in the later work “Dialectics of the material world. The ontological function of materialistic dialectics” noted above, the one-sidedness of the attributive concept was strengthened. We can say that it manifested a certain nominalistic underestimation of the abstract-theoretical substantiation of the initial foundations of the ontological theory.

Assessing in general the results of the development of problems of ontology within the framework of dialectical materialism, we can note the following. This development itself took place under severe pressure from the Moscow "epistemologists", and we must pay tribute to the theoretical courage of the above-mentioned Leningrad philosophers. Sharp and numerous discussions at the Faculty of Philosophy of Leningrad University and their continuation in articles and monographs undoubtedly contributed to the formulation and in-depth study of fundamental ontological problems.

At the same time, it should be noted that the main drawback of these studies is ignorance or ignorance of the positive results achieved in non-Marxist ontological concepts. But this shortcoming is not a unique shortcoming of research in the field of problems of ontology, but in general of all research conducted within the framework of dialectical materialism,

20 The need to introduce the concept of "spatio-temporal forms" is sufficiently substantiated in the works of A. M. Mostepanenko.

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F f Vyakkerev in Givanov b and Lipsky b in Markov et al.

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