Humane treatment of prisoners of war. The problem of humanity, the manifestation of humanity to the prisoner

24.05.2008 06:45

Many events and outcomes of World War II are subjected to permanent falsification. No sooner had the debate about who made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism subsided than a new topic for political speculation appeared - about the cruel treatment of Soviet soldiers and officers, as well as the authorities with prisoners of war. And what do archival documents and witnesses say about this?

It is well known that many events and results of the Second World War are subjected to permanent falsification. This unseemly deed is being done not only by Western politicians and scientists, but, unfortunately, by individual domestic Russophobes. No sooner had the debate about who made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism subsided than a new topic for political speculation appeared - about the cruel treatment of enemy prisoners of war by Soviet soldiers and officers, as well as by the authorities.

And what do archival documents and witnesses say about this?

After the end of the war, the Military Tribunal of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Voronezh convicted five German generals and a large group of senior officers captured as a result of the defeat of the German troops and their satellites on the local sector of the front.

Among them was, for example, Hochbaum Frederick Wilhelm, lieutenant general from infantry, commander of an infantry division, whose subordinate units and the gendarmerie committed atrocities in the Oryol and Voronezh regions.

Another high rank is Shvatlo-Gesterding, Chief of Staff of the 7th Army Corps. On his instructions, 20 people were shot on the territory of the Stalin state farm, 12 people in the village of Devitsa, including several teenagers aged 13-14 for allegedly stealing a pack of cigarettes from a German soldier.

Hielscher Rudolph's hands, who had been chief of staff of the 7th Army Corps before Schwatlo-Gesterding, were bloody up to the very elbows. They were given an order by the gendarmerie on July 14, 1942 to “clear” the premises of the Orlovka mental hospital from mentally ill Soviet citizens. In pursuance of this order, 721 people were shot by the gendarmerie, including 700 mentally ill people, 13 wounded soldiers of the Soviet army, 6 civilians and doctors from the psychiatric hospital Gruzd and Reznikova with an infant. In addition, in July-September 1942, under his leadership, 28 civilians were shot on the territory of the Stalin state farm, 450 people in Sandy Log, 50 people in the village of Devitsa, 66 people in Podkletnoye, and 50 people in the village of Medvezhye. . Hinscher was the author of instructions for the destruction of Voronezh.

After reading and shuddering at these atrocities, the reader probably decided that the executioners deserved the most severe punishment - the death penalty. Nothing like this! All of them were spared their lives and given 25 years in labor camps. I think that many will be surprised by such a conditionally mild sentence: if they had been at the Nuremberg trials or in any other country of the anti-Hitler coalition, they would certainly have been hanged.

I repeat: the prisoners were sent not to a concentration camp, but to a forced labor camp. But on the second day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American authorities interned more than 100,000 Japanese in a concentration camp in Nevada, where they were kept until the end of the war.

Of course, one can relate differently to the conditions of detention of officers in prison camps, but from archival materials and communication with eyewitnesses, I know for certain that senior officers, as a rule, were not used for physical work. Starting with colonels and higher in rank, they had the right to keep orderlies-orderlies.

And what did the captured generals and colonels do? One painted, the second was engaged in burning and wood carving, the third was fond of sewing (he even made costumes for employees of the NKVD Directorate).

In the camps for Japanese prisoners of war, at first, officers, starting with a major, were even allowed to wear broadswords - samurai swords, but after several cases of hara-kiri being committed on themselves by the most fanatical officers, this privilege was canceled.

But the most striking fact was that the captured officers were fed according to the norms, which included, in addition to bread and cereals, fish and, twice a week, meat. Each camp had a medical unit. The commandant of the Japanese prisoner of war camp that was near Kustanai told the author of these notes that at first many Japanese began to suffer from gastrointestinal diseases from our food. Without thinking twice, the camp authorities beat off a telegram addressed to I.V. Stalin (then it was accepted). A month later, a wagon with rice and a wagon with sea fish arrive at the camp. I don’t know how other people of my generation ate in those years, but in Siberia in the spring I picked spikelets and frozen potatoes on collective farm fields.

Here is what a former Japanese intelligence officer told me, who after the war was sentenced to 25 years in labor camps and served his sentence in the Ivanovo region (he was released after 12 years). “We were fed in the camp as yours did not eat in the wild. For 12 years no one has laid a finger on me. He returned home completely healthy. I punished both my children and grandchildren so that they would not do anything bad against Russia.

It is probably not necessary to convince anyone that a Russian person is genetically characterized by mercy. This can explain such a humane and liberal attitude towards captured enemies. As for the Germans, during their time in captivity they had to feel from their own experience that the Russians were not barbarians, as they were convinced for decades, but a humane, civilized nation, very sensitive to the grief of others. I believe that our authorities here also pursued far-reaching goals - we had to live in the territory that later became the GDR and work with the citizens of this country. And for sure: after serving 8-10-12 years, many prisoners of war returned to Germany and settled in the Soviet sector of occupation.

Moreover, a significant percentage of the leadership of the MGB of the GDR was staffed by former prisoners of war officers who had taken courses in anti-fascist schools here. The time of their stay in the USSR, communication with the Soviet people, their benevolent attitude towards yesterday's enemies did not pass without a trace. They knew that in order to save the wounded and sick German officers, our doctors transfused them with the blood of Voronezh peasant women, whose husband, son or brother they might have killed.

A person close to me, the poet V. Pankratov, unfortunately now deceased, told how many Voronezh women stood on the side of the road ahead of time, along which the prisoners were taken to work, mainly to construction sites, in order to give someone a potato or a piece of bread.

Working for several years in the GDR, I constantly communicated with former prisoners of war in official and non-official situations, but I don’t remember a single case when one of them even after drinking a solid dose of alcohol (and the Germans loved freebies) complained about the difficult conditions of their stay in captivity. On the contrary, they thanked the Soviet people for their humanity, mercy and altruism.

I am far from thinking of representing the life of prisoners of war in a rosy light, and I state only the facts that became known to me from archival documents and eyewitness accounts.

At an international conference held on April 14-15 at the Agrarian University, an Italian professor M. Giusti spoke in the section led by me, who painted a horrific picture of the detention of Italian prisoners of war in the camps of the Tambov region (we did not have them).

She said that 17,000 prisoners of war died of starvation and disease. When the professor said that her fellow countrymen were poorly fed, I could not resist and asked: does she imagine how our victorious people were fed in 1946-1947? I doubted her information because the country's leadership knew that the Italian occupiers committed atrocities less than the Germans and Magyars, and in some cases even showed loyalty to the local population, and therefore such cruel treatment of their prisoners of war was, as it were, illogical.

I also want to get to the bottom of this issue: I turned to the leadership of our FSB Department with a request to request an official certificate from Tambov on this problem.

How to make up for the lack of truth about the war? First of all, do not rewrite your history, but perceive it as it was.

Archival materials should not be dissected from the standpoint of current political expediency. This is being done both nationally and locally. .

It is also not necessary to ignore the reaction of the falsification of Western politicians and scientists who continue to belittle our people.

This concept refers to a number of agreements, including four conventions and three additional protocols, signed over a long period of time up to 2005. All of them, to one degree or another, relate to various aspects of international humanitarian law. We are interested in documents adopted before the outbreak of World War II. In August 1864, 12 states present at the diplomatic conference in Geneva introduced the symbols of the Red Cross known to us and signed the "Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Soldiers on the Battlefield." Russia did not take part in the work of this conference, but signed the convention in 1867. Germany in its modern concept was represented at the conference by individual states: Baden, Hesse, Prussia and Württemberg. The German Empire, as a new state formation founded in 1871, signed the agreement only in 1907, which was associated with delays in ratification by individual subjects, mainly due to friction between Austria and Prussia. In a short time after the signing of the convention, publications appeared in the scientific world of Europe criticizing the provisions of the agreement in terms of its dogmatism and inconsistency with modern conditions. In 1906, the first Geneva Convention was revised and adopted in an amended version. An extremely important change was the abolition of the previous amendment, which prescribed compliance with the terms of the convention only by signatory countries. These changes were also approved by Germany and Russia. The First Geneva Convention, as amended in 1906, was used to develop the text of the Hague Convention of 1907, which makes it possible to speak of a common humanitarian legal basis for two international agreements.

ADN-ZB/Archive
II. Weltkrieg 1939-1945
An der Front im Süden der Sowjetunion; Julie 1942
Gefangene Rotarmisten müssen ihren Durst an einem Tümpel stillen.
Aufnahme: Gehrmann

In July 1929, three new humanitarian law agreements were signed in Geneva: “On the improvement of the condition of the wounded and sick in active armies” (a modernized version of the corresponding agreement of 1864/1906), “On the improvement of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in the Military -Navy" and, finally, "On the treatment of prisoners of war."
The new international act regarding the humane treatment of captured enemy soldiers consisted of 97 articles and was noticeably larger than the Hague Document of 1907. Directly in Art. 1 stated that the provisions of this agreement apply to the persons listed in Art. 1, 2 and 3 of the 1907 Hague Agreement. Art. 89 there was a direct reference to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The main provisions and innovations of this document:

Art. 2 emphasized that prisoners of war were in the hands of an enemy power, but by no means of a separate military unit that had taken them prisoner. They must be constantly treated humanely, protected from violence, insults and the curiosity of the crowd. The article forbade reprisals against them.

Art. 3 spoke for the first time about the special treatment of captive women (“according to their sex”).

Art. 4 strictly regulated the cases in which a different content of prisoners of war was possible, which was a significant refinement in comparison with 1907.

Art. 5 forbade insults, bullying and threats if the prisoner refuses to provide information of a military nature.

Art. 10 provided guarantees for hygiene, health, heating and lighting in buildings for prisoners of war.

The area of ​​​​the premises and individual space at the disposal of the prisoner of war should have been no less than that of a soldier of the state in whose hands the prisoner was.

The authors of the convention recorded in it an important innovation in comparison with the Hague Agreement of 1907. Art. 82 read: "If, in case of war, one of the belligerents is not participating in the convention, nevertheless, the provisions of such remain binding on all the belligerents who signed the convention."

The Agreement on the Treatment of Prisoners of War has been signed and ratified by 47 states. Germany signed this agreement directly at the conference. In 1934, the document was ratified and received the highest legal status of "imperial law" in Germany. The Soviet Union did not take part in the work of the conference and, accordingly, did not sign this agreement.

Reasons for not signing the Geneva Convention of the USSR

The reasons for the non-signing of the Geneva Convention "On the Treatment of Prisoners of War" by the USSR are considered proven in historiography. A. Schneer points out: “One of the reasons why the Soviet Union did not sign the Geneva Convention as a whole was disagreement with the division of prisoners on a national basis. According to the leaders of the USSR, this provision was contrary to the principles of internationalism. An unequivocal answer to the question is given by the Conclusion of the consultant Malitsky on the draft resolution of the CEC and SNK of the USSR “Regulations on prisoners of war” dated March 27, 1931. This document arose after the adoption of the Central Executive Committee and SNK of the USSR Decree No. 46 on the approval of the draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee and SNK of the USSR “Regulations on prisoners of war "dated March 19, 1931, i.e. national legislation of 45 articles on the humane treatment of prisoners of war. Malitsky lists the differences between the Soviet “Regulations” and the Geneva Convention of 1929.

All the differences between the national Soviet and international legal acts in this area were in the ideological plane. The unequal position of soldiers and officers, the orderly and the limited functions of the collective representations of prisoners of war (camp committees) contradicted the fundamental prevailing attitudes in the USSR. Consequently, the Geneva Agreement "On the Treatment of Prisoners of War" could not be signed on behalf of the Soviet Government.

A further comparison of the two documents shows that Moscow gave prisoners of war the opportunity not to work at all if they wished (Article 34 of the Regulations of 1931), intended to emphasize the supremacy of Soviet laws on the territory of the camp (Article 8.), but at the same time did not prevent the departure of religious cults in the absence of interference with the routine of the camp (Art. 13), although in the early 1930s. the ideology of militant atheism continued to operate in the USSR. Also noteworthy is the conciseness of the wording. In general, a comparative analysis of the two documents allows us to conclude that the basic rights of prisoners of war were spelled out in the same vein and with identical content both in the Geneva Convention "On the Treatment of Prisoners of War" of 1929 and in the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "Regulations on Prisoners of War » 1931. However, a significant drawback of the Soviet legislative act was its national status, which prevented the norm of mandatory implementation of these instructions by the armies of other states of the world in relation to the captured soldiers of the Red Army.

In August 1931, in the declaration of the head of the NKID M. Litvinov, Moscow announced its accession to one of the three conventions approved in 1929 in Geneva, “On improving the lot of the wounded and sick in active armies”, and the decision of the CEC dates back to May 1930 The fact that the USSR acceded to this convention is confirmed by foreign sources, for example, this is stated in the ratification document of Austria and in the comments on international humanitarian law, posted in the database of legislative acts of the Office of the Federal Chancellor of Austria. The agreement consisted of 39 articles. It prescribed that the wounded and sick should be treated humanely, regardless of their citizenship and belonging to a particular belligerent army (Art. 1), and in Art. 2 emphasized the nature of the treatment of wounded prisoners of war: with the application of general international law.

Nazi approach

Even before the first shot was fired on the German-Soviet border, Nazi Germany proclaimed the racial and "civilizational" nature of the future war against the USSR. Adopted by the Wehrmacht in 1938, the “Instruction regarding prisoners of war” GDv 38/2, which, by and large, corresponded to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, was irrelevant for a new military campaign. The position of official Berlin regarding the future treatment of captured soldiers and officers of the Red Army was announced by Hitler as early as 03/30/1941 in a speech to the German generals: "The Bolshevik enemy, both before and after (capture - D.S.) is not a comrade." The order of the head of the OKV / ABA, General G. Reinecke, to whom the prisoner of war department was also subordinated, dated 06/16/1941 and his order No. 3058/41 with the attached "Memo on the protection of Soviet prisoners of war" dated 09/08/1941 In these documents, the command of the Wehrmacht openly ordered the treatment of captured soldiers of the Red Army in clear contradiction with the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Finally, in the order of the OKW and OKH of October 21, 1941, signed by Quartermaster General E. Wagner, it was directly stated that the Geneva Agreement of 1929 was not observed in relation to Soviet prisoners of war: “...7. The Soviet Union did not accede to the agreement on the treatment of prisoners of war of June 27, 1929. For this reason, there is no obligation on our part to provide Soviet prisoners of war with the amount of food established by this agreement and the quota provided (...) Non-working Soviet prisoners of war can die of starvation.

K. Streit, the most prominent specialist in the study of the stay of Soviet soldiers and officers in German captivity, summarizes: “It (the German leadership - D.S.) did not want to subject itself to any restrictions either in the methods of warfare or in relation to Soviet prisoners of war, nor in occupation policy. An equally significant factor that determined the fate of Soviet prisoners of war was the desire of the German leadership to spend the minimum amount of resources to maintain the lives of prisoners. The dominant was the supply of the Wehrmacht at the expense of the food reserves of the occupied territories, which was envisaged by the Barbarossa plan, as well as the use of Soviet prisoners of war as free labor, replacing the Germans called to the front.

In practice, in 1941-1945. Soviet prisoners of war were starving, were in conditions unsuitable for life, up to earthen holes, faced with a massive violation of sanitary and hygienic standards. After being captured, the soldiers of the Red Army and Soviet partisans were forced to disclose military information, including with the use of threats and torture. According to a number of orders, certain categories of Soviet prisoners of war (Jews, party workers, commissars, and often officers) were subject to "selection" and execution. In the front line of the German armies, during foot marches and in "dulags", wounded and weakened prisoners of war were executed by guards on the spot. Medical care in the camps was minimal. Wounded and sick prisoners were not released from transportation to other camps, including in Germany, without military necessity. Soviet prisoners were involved in forced labor in the military industry of the "Reich", they worked seven days a week. In almost all industrial sectors (metalworking, chemical and mining industries, the railway sector, loading operations), Soviet prisoners had to work in conditions that were harmful to health; technical safety standards were not observed. Sentences against "guilty" Soviet prisoners of war were carried out "in haste", the investigation and trial were the exception rather than the rule. In each camp there was a punishment cell or another isolated place of strict detention. Corporal punishment was widely used against captured Soviet military personnel, for example, for absenteeism from work (even in case of illness or physical impossibility of actions) or for refusing to join the ROA and other collaborationist formations. Soviet prisoners of war were often sent to stationary places of detention that were not intended for their detention in the sense of international law, for example, to Gestapo prisons and concentration camps under the jurisdiction of the SS. With a few exceptions, Soviet prisoners were not able to send correspondence to their homeland. Neither the state structures of the USSR, nor the families knew about their whereabouts. Satisfaction of cultural and religious needs was out of the question, with the exception of the ascetic activities of individual representatives of the church, which, however, was allowed by the Nazis only for propaganda purposes, in the occupied territory and for a short period. Female prisoners of war were subjected to violence and abuse. Thus, the Wehrmacht and the leadership of Germany deliberately and purposefully violated most of the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Attempts by the USSR to improve the situation of prisoners of war

For the Soviet leadership, not only the attack of the Wehrmacht on the USSR was sudden, but also the tragic failures of the first days and weeks of the war, and, as a result of the situation at the front, a large number of prisoners. The hostilities meant a break in diplomatic relations, and, consequently, direct contacts between Moscow and Berlin. The first reaction to the situation was the adoption of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of the new "Decree on Prisoners of War" No. 1798-800s of 07/01/1941. It came into force along with the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 0342 of 07/21/1941. The resolution consisted of seven chapters: general provisions , evacuation of prisoners of war, accommodation of prisoners of war and their legal status, criminal and disciplinary liability of prisoners of war, reference information and assistance to prisoners of war. The new rules provided for close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The content of the resolution was in line with the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The form of the resolution largely repeated the structure of these documents.

On July 17, 1941, the Kremlin addressed the Swedish government with a note in which it expressed its readiness to comply with the Hague Convention of 1907 on the terms of reciprocity from Germany. According to Streit, "The Soviet Union, having declared for itself a binding agreement signed by the tsarist government, has completed the process of its accession to the Hague Convention." Germany rejected this note on August 25, 1941. Proof of Moscow's serious intentions is the following document, rarely quoted in Russian literature: “Telegram from Moscow on August 8, 1941 to Herr Huber, President of the Committee of the International Red Cross, Geneva. In response to your (note) No. 7162, the NKID of the USSR, on instructions from the Soviet government, has the honor to announce that the Soviet government, by its note of July 17, has already declared to the government of Sweden, representing the interests of Germany in the USSR: the Soviet Union considers it obligatory for itself to comply with those listed in IV. The Hague Convention of October 18, 1907 rules of warfare regarding the laws and customs of war on land, subject to the obligatory observance of these rules by Germany and its allies. The Soviet government agrees with the exchange of information on wounded and sick prisoners of war, as provided for in Art. 14 in the annex to the said convention and art. 4 of the Geneva Convention of July 26, 1929 "On the improvement of the condition of the wounded and sick in active armies." Vyshinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The following notes of protest, signed by V. Molotov, followed on 11/25/1941 and 04/27/1942. The NKID of the USSR in a note dated 11/25/1941, which appeared at the Nuremberg trials as a document "USSR-51", cited specific examples of inhumane and cruel Nazi treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. Chapter 6 of this document was called "The extermination of Soviet prisoners of war." This note testifies to the lack of hushing up of the problem on the part of the Kremlin and contradicts the thesis about the alleged “indifference of Stalin” to the fate of Soviet prisoners of war. At this point, attempts at indirect appeals to the German government, in essence, were stopped.

conclusions

Based on the facts presented in the article, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. By the time the Great Patriotic War began, international humanitarian law clearly spelled out the conditions for the humane treatment of prisoners of war.

2. The Soviet side recognized the Hague Convention of 1907. Even if we do not consider the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of 1918 as recognition of this document, the notes of 07/17/1941, 11/25/1941 and 04/27/1942 leave no doubt about the unambiguity of obligations Moscow.

3. The Geneva Convention of 1929 contained the obligations of the warring party to comply with the terms of the agreement in relation to the military personnel of the army of the enemy who did not sign the convention.

4. National Soviet humanitarian law in relation to enemy prisoners of war in 1931 and 1941. comply with the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

5. Nazi Germany after 06/22/1941 continued to be bound by the obligations of international humanitarian law. She deliberately refused to comply with them in relation to Soviet prisoners of war, which was documented and implemented in practice. The reasons for the refusal were ideological, military and economic. Berlin also systematically violated the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, which was recognized by both sides even before the war.

6. It is problematic to determine whether Moscow's attempts to alleviate the fate of its citizens in Nazi captivity were "sufficient". Germany's unwillingness to finally and irrevocably recognize the norms of international humanitarian law in relation to Soviet prisoners of war played a significant role. The lengthy and unsuccessful negotiation process caused Moscow to be skeptical about the ICRC's ability to seriously influence the situation. It is necessary to negatively assess the excessive suspicion of the Soviet leadership, its readiness to protect itself at any cost "from interference in internal affairs" by the "capitalists", as well as the unwillingness, for orthodox-ideological reasons, to fully recognize the Geneva Convention. However, it is doubtful that further efforts to establish contact with the German leadership through intermediary states and structures would have been successful.

7. In the context of a series of military defeats in 1941-1942. and the total nature of the war, the Soviet leadership had extremely limited opportunities to influence the situation of its citizens in captivity. These opportunities included notes of protest and statements to the International Red Cross and the governments of neutral states. This has been put into practice. Moscow had no other levers of influence on the fate of the captured Soviet soldier from the moment of captivity until the moment of liberation.

This electronic publication is an abbreviated version of the article: Stratievsky D. Soviet prisoners of war of World War II and humanitarian law. Could Moscow have saved its citizens? // Journal of Russian and East European Studies. 2014. No. 1(5). pp. 79-90. You can read the full text of the article.

Dmitry Stratievsky

Doctor of History, Master of Political Science, Deputy Director of the Berlin Center for the Study of Eastern Europe (Germany)

At the end of the 18th century, Admiral Ushakov, together with the Turkish squadron, took the Ionian Islands from the French. The Russian-Turkish landing force fought together, but after the end of the operation, a misunderstanding arose. Ushakov forbade the Turks to slaughter French prisoners. From such an order, the Turks' eyes popped out of their sockets: then why did they fight? The killing of prisoners is a holiday, a delicacy, the best reward for military hardships. Such torment usually lasted for several days, with barbecue and drums. The prisoners were skinned alive, their veins were pulled, their eyes were torn out, they were roasted over low heat, their ears and noses were cut off, their fingers were cut off, their genitals were nailed to boards, limbs were sawn off, their throats were poured with boiling oil, they were put on a stake, their necks were crushed with silk cords. If for three or four Turks it was possible to get a bipedal bag with gifts, many hours of taking out toys from it - the liver, kidneys, heart - brought inquisitive and naive Asians a lot of joy. And now Ushak Pasha broke the buzz. It was hard to imagine a greater injustice.

At first glance, the tactics of the Turks had their own reason. Raise a caste of flayers, demoralize the enemy. So that the very name of the Ottomans would cause horror among other peoples. Again, greater mobility of the units was ensured - besides, the Turks killed or left their own wounded to the mercy of fate. However, in general, the success of Turkish weapons in the European theater was modest. In the 19th century, Turkey retained its independence only because of the inability of the Europeans to properly share the "legacy of a sick man."

The behavior of Europeans in the war differed fundamentally. For a number of reasons, the Europeans fought constantly and extremely fiercely (there was nothing like it in the East). If we take, for example, the most cultural and densely populated part of Europe - the Netherlands, then mochilovo went on there for centuries. Permanently. This is a LIFESTYLE. People live in the city, have fun at the carnival. Two kilometers away - three thousand people are killing each other with concentration. Not Asian: they whistled, swooped in, killed three, made sure that the matter was serious and in the bushes, but “your excellency, I bring to your attention that four people and a banner remained from the battalion.” Six kilometers further - the surrounding peasants are burying the corpses of soldiers from the skirmish - 800 pieces. And beyond the river, the siege of the city goes on for six months - there is famine in the city.

At first, the Europeans fought in much the same way as the Turks. The courage and cruelty of the French, Germans or Spaniards was not to be occupied. But gradually, by the bloody method of trial and error, EXPERIENCE was accumulated. Experience in the most effective conduct of military operations. Cruelty in war is not an end but a means. Sometimes it happens that generosity and mercy is the most effective way to achieve military goals. Since the time of Hugo Grotius, international law and a system of international agreements have arisen that regulate even such an irrational and inhumane thing as military operations.

The Europeans began to help their wounded. This somewhat reduced mobility, but dramatically increased the cohesion and stamina of the troops. The soldiers began to feel like members of a military fraternity, to see team members as friends, combatants. The prisoners received the right to life, medical care and even honor. This made it possible to avoid unnecessary losses when finishing off the losers, and indirectly increased the morale of the soldiers even more. The dead soldiers of the enemy began to be given military honors (the Turks had a strong point in defiling the corpses of enemies). Emphasized respect for the captured officers strengthened the military hierarchy. The technology of capitulation of enemy commune cities made it possible to avoid economic destruction and facilitated the annexation of conquered territories. The fight against looting increased the degree of controllability of the troops AT TIMES. Etc. and so on.

Of course, under such conditions, the non-military component became increasingly important in military operations. Europeans began to crush uncultured enemies with humanism. Europe has captured half the world by force of arms, and this capture was carried out under the slogans of civilization and humanism. Which was REAL.

The Russian-Japanese war was very indicative - English instructors strictly warned the Japanese allies: do not touch Russian prisoners. So that not a single hair ... WHAT WILL YOU SERVE IN BED! And they explained why. England is a democratic country with a parliamentary opposition, transparent to propaganda. Asian torment is a serious trump card of Russian propaganda in Europe, perfectly used during the last Russian-Turkish war. The Japanese understood, and, by the way, carried out the installation with Asian cruelty. Several violations in this area ended with the order of the emperor to kill the samurai against the wall. Japan won the information war brilliantly.

The problem of attitude towards prisoners. I. P. Tsybulko 2020. Option No. 8 (“Lieutenant Boris Kostyaev had one wish ...”)

How did Russian soldiers treat captured Germans? It is this question that arises when reading the text of the Russian Soviet writer V.P. Astafiev.

Revealing the problem of the attitude of Russian soldiers to captured Germans, the author tells about the military events on a small farm. Here, Lieutenant Boris Kostyaev covers the captured Germans, who are trying to shoot a soldier distraught with grief, who lost loved ones in the war. A military doctor provides first aid to all the wounded, regardless of who is in front of him: a Russian or a German. The senior sergeant sympathizes with the German with frostbitten hands, saying to him with pity: “How will you work now, head?”
All these examples, complementing each other, clearly demonstrate the humanity and humanism of Russian soldiers, who understand that the prisoners are unarmed and now they are not afraid, but cause pity.
The author's position is as follows: Russian soldiers humanely treated the captured Germans, gave them the opportunity to warm up, satisfy their hunger and receive medical care.

The position of the author is close to me. Undoubtedly, during the war, Russian soldiers showed a humane attitude towards prisoners, showed humanity and mercy. The kindness of Russian soldiers, the breadth of the soul and the ability for forgiveness and mercy are shown in the novel by L. N. Tolstoy "War and Peace" during the Patriotic War of 1812. Two frozen Frenchmen come out of the forest to the fire, and the Russian soldiers sitting by the fire do not spare porridge for them, feed the unfortunate warriors and allow them to warm themselves around the fire.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the Russian people are generous and kind, they know how to forgive, they show mercy to the defeated enemy.

Text by V.P. Astafiev

(Shaykin V.I.)

(“Military Legal Journal”, 2010, N 2)

LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR IN RUSSIAN MILITARY HISTORY

V. I. SHAIKIN

Shaykin V. I., Associate Professor of the Department of Tactics of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications, member of the Military Academy of Sciences, Colonel in the Reserve, Candidate of Military Sciences.

The system of laws and customs of war took shape over a long historical period; its purpose is to "humanize" war as far as possible, to somewhat mitigate its grave consequences. It is important to note that Russia made a significant contribution to the humanization of the laws and customs of war. The rules of warfare in Rus' were traditionally less cruel than in other states. The standard for the Old Russian state about the advance declaration of war is well known, for example, the saying of one of the most militant Russian princes, Prince Svyatoslav, "I want to go to you." His father, Prince Igor, having undertaken a campaign against Constantinople in 941, ordered the squad to spare the enemy and take the Greeks alive. Prince Vladimir Monomakh reconciled the warring, setting an example of piety and justice, urging his heirs to live in peace and harmony. With the adoption of Christianity in Rus', they tried to follow the postulates of the Sermon on the Mount: “Blessed are the merciful, for they will have mercy,” “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called sons of God.”

Special, uncharacteristic for most other states and armies of that time was the attitude towards prisoners. For the first time in Rus', the mutual extradition of prisoners without ransom was carried out under Ivan III after the battle with the Crimean Tatars. The charter of military, cannon and other matters relating to military science ... 1621 forbade "without obedience to capture anyone and set fires."

It is well-known respect of Peter the Great for his enemy, his desire to learn from experienced and intelligent enemies. After the crushing defeat of the Russian army near Narva in 1700, he declared: "Thanks to brother Karl - there will be time, and we will repay him for the lessons." Nine years after the brilliant victory at Poltava, Peter arranged a feast on the battlefield and, returning the swords to the Swedish generals, raised the cup for his teachers in military affairs.

After the Baltic lands were again part of Russia, Peter granted great benefits to new subjects, including the inviolability of the language, confession, courts, etc. War for Peter was not a goal, but a means, a temporary disaster with which he had to put up for the sake of national development and the well-being of the people. Before the Battle of Poltava, he addressed the soldiers with the words: "... and know about Peter that life is not dear to him, if only Russia would live, her glory, honor and prosperity." Teaching his people "military and civil sciences", the first emperor of Russia consoled himself with the thought that in the person of the Russians he was creating new zealots of education, culture and civilization for mankind.

Peter I demanded from his troops strict observance of the customs and laws of warfare. Russian troops strictly adhered to the norms of the institution of military captivity, showed due humanity in relation to the sick and wounded of the enemy, as well as to the civilian population on foreign territory. In this sense, of considerable interest is the instruction on the prosecution of the army of Charles XII, given by Peter to Prince Volkonsky on June 1, 1709. It was strictly forbidden to rob local residents: firmly."

Peter I was ready to conclude a general agreement with Sweden on prisoners of war based on certain principles, in particular, equal treatment of prisoners of war, regardless of their nationality, with the possibility of release from captivity on parole. As Field Marshal Sheremetev noted, “a great number of officers and soldiers taken near Poltava admit that the tsar treated them with extreme mercy, although, judging by the disasters that our prisoners of war undergo in Sweden, they do not deserve such favors and good deeds. . They confess that the king of the soldiers left by the king and taken in the field and in the forests ordered the soldiers to be treated in every possible way.

The government of Peter I paid great attention to the life of prisoners of war. Captivity was allowed only in conditions of hostilities, and all the formalities of surrendering the enemy were observed. In the XVIII century. the rule was abolished, according to which the fate of prisoners of war was decided by those who captured them. Responsibility for their fate was assigned to the command or administrative authorities. Already in this century in Russia, unlike other countries, arbitrariness against prisoners of war was punishable by death by hanging. According to the Danish envoy, any ranks of the Russian army were punished for unauthorized withdrawal of prisoners (failure to surrender them to command). The military charter of 1716 categorically forbade the killing of prisoners after the surrender of a garrison or military unit, it also established the death penalty for plundering enemy cities and villages occupied without resistance. For the first time, there is a demand to preserve schools, hospitals, churches, private buildings in settlements occupied by Russian troops. During the same period, Russia established the rules for the humane treatment of the wounded, the sick, the elderly, women and children, as well as severe penalties for deviating from these rules.

In addition, unlike, for example, the Swedes, the Russians did not take civilians prisoner. Legal acts were adopted regulating the attempted escape of prisoners of war, as well as the possibility of their repatriation to their homeland on parole. Captured officers received a salary. Prisoners of war were provided with the opportunity to correspond regularly with their relatives - a unique phenomenon at that time. In addition, they could enter the service in the Russian army only with their consent.

The noble traditions of the Petrine era were preserved and multiplied throughout all the wars of the 18th century.

For example, during the Seven Years' War of 1756 - 1763, where the military genius of Pyotr Alekseevich Rumyantsev, the first great Russian commander of the post-Petrine era, was revealed, all divisional commanders and brigadier generals were ordered to "... examination of the seriously wounded and seriously ill on infirmary carts and other regimental carts with one staff officer, staff doctor and a fair number of doctors with a sufficient escort to send, and to accommodate the wounded prisoners of war on the same trucks and keep them in good care, which is for the sake of the general-proviantmeister Maslov was ordered to supply all prisoners of war, wounded, healthy and deserters with baked bread for the time in which they will be on the road.

A. V. Suvorov also spoke about the principle of humanity, who wrote: “My tactics: courage, courage, insight, insight, order, measure, rule, eye, speed, onslaught, humanity.” In 1778, in an order to the troops of the Kuban corps, A. V. Suvorov demanded from his subordinates "... to act philanthropicly with prisoners, to be ashamed of barbarism ... to strike the enemy with philanthropy no less than weapons." The aphorism from the "Science of Victory" "A warrior must crush the enemy's power, and not hit the unarmed" was and remains an indispensable guide to action for every soldier in Russia.

During the assault on Warsaw on October 24, 1794, after the capture of its suburbs, a delegation arrived at Suvorov with a letter from Stanislav Poniatowski, King of Poland. The delegation was delighted by the extraordinary modesty of the conditions proposed by the winner: “Weapons, artillery and shells should be laid down outside the city in a designated place. A solemn promise is given in the name of the Russian Empress that everything will be consigned to oblivion and that the Polish troops, after laying down their arms, will be disbanded to their homes, with the provision of personal freedom and property of each. The same is guaranteed to civilians.” The deputies were surprised by the generosity and goodwill with which Suvorov received them, treated them and talked.

When the Russian troops entered Warsaw on October 29, 1794, Suvorov received the keys from the senior member of her magistrate and, kissing them, thanked God loudly, after which he began to hug the members of the city administration in a brotherly manner. Suvorov's sincere, fair and benevolent attitude towards the Poles to a large extent contributed to the fact that the voluntary peaceful disarmament of Poland was soon completed. The field marshal always adhered to the rule that "the more the winner shows his generosity, the more complete the result of appeasement will be." “Poland was conquered not by revenge, but by generosity,” said A. V. Suvorov, who was a model of administrative wisdom when he peacefully ruled this country for a year.

In the disposition drawn up in December 1790 for the assault on Ishmael, Suvorov does not forget to write: “Christians and the disarmed should not be deprived of their lives at all, meaning the same about all women and children.” In Poland, instructions for the storming of Prague also paid attention to the treatment of civilians: “Do not run into houses; do not kill the unarmed; do not fight with the women; don't touch the kids."

Suvorov demanded humane treatment of prisoners of war. He obligated those who surrendered to save their lives: “Get down on the spot, drive, if, give mercy to the rest. It is a sin to kill in vain: they are the same people. Suvorov pointed out that the destruction of surrendering prisoners can only increase the resistance of the enemy.

The commander sought a fair treatment of the civilian population. “Do not offend the layman, he gives us water and food,” this requirement was constantly repeated in Suvorov’s orders. So, in an order to the troops of the Kuban and Crimean corps, Suvorov wrote: “In standing and on campaigns, marauders should not be tolerated and severely punished, that hour is on the spot ... Where it happens to forage, repair it with the troops, according to the rules, with extreme order. Is there any prudence here, where to deprive yourself of future consequences; Satisfied subsidies and roofing. Watch it even in the most hostile land. To make and in this complaint of every inhabitant immediately due pleasure. It is no less than a weapon to strike the enemy with philanthropy.

The great commander confirmed the correctness of his views by practical actions, which was especially clearly manifested in the campaign of 1799 in the Alps, where, thanks to his ability to comply with the measure and show humanity, he was able not only to achieve the support of the local population, which often provided him with information about the enemy and assisted in logistics, but also to strengthen the trust and respect of their own troops.

Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was also distinguished by exceptional tact and endurance. Participating in the Polish campaign of 1792, M. I. Kutuzov demanded from his subordinates not to offend the inhabitants of this country, to preserve the people's wealth. He is also characterized by the fact that, for example, he forbade the cutting of trees planted along the road to Warsaw, and, respecting the national dignity of the Poles, did not allow Russian armed detachments to enter the Polish capital.

During the Russo-Austrian-French War of 1805, Kutuzov addressed his subordinates with an appeal "not to cause any offense to the townsfolk." He showed sincere concern for the captured officers and soldiers of the enemy, took measures to strengthen discipline in the army, provide it with modern food, equipment and ammunition. The commander demanded the strict implementation of all his orders and instructions, which concerned, in particular, such an issue as the behavior of Russian military personnel in foreign countries. For example, in the Order on the attitude towards the Austrian population and Austrian officers dated October 3, 1805, it was said: “... to confirm to all lower ranks that there should be no offense or displeasure to the townsfolk, but they would try to run away from everyone that could be a reason for any quarrel and complaints, and try to bind the inhabitants of the earth to yourself by the most affectionate and good treatment with the owners. The order to strengthen discipline dated November 20, 1805 obliged “... residents, both in the villages and on the roads, not to offend others with a bad word. For every crime to exact, on which the livelihood of the troops depends.

During the foreign campaign of the Russian army in 1813-1814. She was greatly helped and supported by the Polish and German peoples, which was largely the result of the humane attitude towards them on the part of the Russian soldiers. Preparing the army for campaigns, Kutuzov ordered to observe the strictest discipline during the passage of troops through the territory of foreign states. He sought to exclude everything that could lead to complications in allied relations and cause unfavorable rumors in Europe about the Russian army.

The Russian military leaders of the second half of the 19th century also played an important role in the progressive development of the laws and customs of war. So, General Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev became famous not only for his feats of arms, but also for his humane attitude towards prisoners and civilians. “Beat the enemy without mercy, while he holds a weapon in his hands,” Skobelev inspired his subordinates. - But as soon as he surrendered, he asked for amina, he became a prisoner - he is your friend and brother. Don't eat it yourself - give it to him. He needs more ... And take care of him as of yourself!

Skobelev's soldiers respected the civilian population both in Central Asia and in Bulgaria and took them under their protection. Looting was not allowed and severely punished. All the wounded - both their own and the enemy - were provided with equal care.

During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. after the battle, Skobelev enters the surrendered Turkish redoubt. “Return the sabers to the prisoners, sacredly preserve their property so that not a single crumb is lost from them ... Warn me, I will shoot for robbery! You fought gloriously, bravo... Tell them that such opponents are an honor... They are brave soldiers."

In one place, Skobelev was sent a bouquet of unknown flowers. Their time had not yet come, and there were no such in the vicinity.

- Where does it come from?

- Gratitude ... From Turkish women ... For the fact that their honor was not violated, for the fact that the inviolability of the harems was sacredly observed by your troops.

- Absolutely in vain, - was the answer, - Russians do not fight with women!

In the report of the head of the Imitli detachment, Lieutenant General Skobelev, dated January 3, 1878, to the commander of the 8th Army Corps, it was said: “In the grove in front of the village, I saw orderlies of the Red Crescent Society, mostly Swiss, who, despite the danger of their position, were engaged in dressing the wounded; I immediately gave the order to put a guard on them.

As soon as Plevna fell, the Romanians, allies of Russia, rushed to rob the city. Immediately after his appointment as the military governor of the city, Skobelev called the Romanian officers and told them: “... Go and warn your people that I will shoot such winners ... Anyone caught looting will be killed like a dog. So remember ... Yours offend women - I present to you to judge how vile it is ... Know that not a single complaint will remain without consequences, not a single crime will be unpunished.

The Turks called Skobelev "fair." When he took the city, there were many wounded and sick in it. “When you need to fight, there is no time to heal,” said Osman Pasha. - The wounded and sick are an extra burden. The Sultan and Turkey do not need them.” Skobelev looked at it differently. He immediately opened hospitals, and a large detachment of doctors and orderlies was sent to treat the Turks. After the general visited the mosque, where the wounded prisoners were also lying, the Turks said: “Your place is better than ours, now we see it ... Your Ak-Pasha and the Turk visits his enemies, but our Osman never saw us.”

In a conversation with Skobelev after the capture of Plevna, Osman Pasha said: “I know that you are helping a wounded enemy, but the asker knows one thing: they will treat him the way he does. And so that he does not run away to your infirmaries, I have to turn a blind eye to his cruelty. It's the law of war, general." In response, he heard: "This is a violation of the laws of war, pasha."

An excellent example of the use of the norms of the law of war in order to strengthen discipline can be the following statement by General M. D. Skobelev: ". This statement is further support for the idea that ignoring actions such as acts of personal revenge or looting, which lack a deterrent ethical component, undermines the effectiveness of military operations. Of course, such behavior leads to the loss of control on the part of the military leader over the actions of his subordinates. Moreover, unrestricted brutality distracts military personnel from the task at hand and often leads to a violation of the basic principles of military art, such as economy of forces and resources, unity and simplicity of action.

Summing up the above, it should be noted that the laws and customs of war are not a new and alien concept for Russia and its Armed Forces. Their observance was a natural element of the activity of all great military leaders without exception. The military successes of Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Skobelev prove the importance of waging war in compliance with the principles of humanity. One of the main features of the military activity of Russian commanders was their strict observance of the laws and customs of warfare, which later became one of the sources of international humanitarian law, which is applied today in wars and armed conflicts.

And during the Great Patriotic War, as Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov emphasized, "our army showed great humanism of nobility." Isolated cases of atrocities against civilians in the country of the defeated enemy were harshly suppressed, and soon enough the civilian population of Germany was convinced that the Soviet soldier could not be feared. Later, Marshal Zhukov, when asked how he managed to restrain anger and revenge after the entry of Soviet troops into Berlin, the capital of the enemy, who committed unprecedented atrocities on Soviet territory, answered: “Honestly, when the war was going on, all of us, including me, were determined to repay the fascists in full for their outrages. But we held back our anger. Our ideological convictions, internationalist feelings did not allow us to surrender to blind hatred. A huge role here was played by educational work in the troops and the generosity inherent in our people.

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