Reasons for the failure of the collective security policy. An attempt to create "collective security" in Europe and its failure

Collective security policy (1933-1939).

Significant influence on the domestic policy of the USSR in the 1930s. provided by the international environment. In 1933, the fascist (Nazi) party, headed by A. Hitler, came to power in Germany, who set as his goal the conquest of Germany's "living space" in the east and the "fight against Bolshevism", which involved a war of conquest against the USSR. In 1936, an alliance was concluded between Germany, Italy and Japan - the Anti-Comintern Pact, also called the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. All three powers made no secret of their aggressive intentions.

In this situation, Soviet diplomacy, under the leadership of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. I. Litvinov, pursued a policy of collective security aimed at preventing a new world war. To this end, the activity of the Comintern was redirected from the preparation of revolutions in the capitalist countries to the creation of a broad front of all anti-fascist forces. The USSR concluded agreements on mutual assistance in the event of an attack with France and Czechoslovakia.

However, it was not possible to establish cooperation with the largest European power - Great Britain. The British government still considered the USSR as the main enemy and therefore preferred to pursue a policy of non-intervention towards Germany. England, followed by France, did not react in any way to the unleashing of a civil war in Spain by the fascist countries (1936), the capture of Austria and Czechoslovakia by German troops (1938). The Soviet Union provided military assistance to the Republican government of Spain, but in much smaller amounts than Germany and Italy helped the rebels led by F. Franco. The USSR also offered assistance to the government of Czechoslovakia in defense against German territorial claims, but the government refused to accept this assistance, fearing that it would become a pretext for Soviet intervention. Negotiations on the creation of a military alliance between Britain, France and the USSR, which had been ongoing since the spring of 1939, reached a deadlock by August.

Searched here:

collective security policy
collective security policy is

1.Introduction……………………………………………………………………2

2. Prerequisites for the “collective security” policy……………..2

3. The development of “collective security” in the mid-30s…….4

4. The failure of the “collective security” policy…………………….9

5.Conclusion……………………………………………………………..12

6. Literature………...……………………………………………………… 13

Introduction.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the international situation changed significantly. The deep world economic crisis that began in 1929 caused serious internal political changes in all capitalist countries. In some (England, France, etc.), he brought to power forces that sought to carry out broad internal transformations of a democratic nature. In others (Germany, Italy), the crisis contributed to the formation of anti-democratic (fascist) regimes that used social demagogy in domestic politics at the same time as unleashing political terror, forcing chauvinism and militarism. It was these regimes that became the instigators of new military conflicts (especially after A. Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933).

Hotbeds of international tension began to form at a rapid pace. One developed in Europe because of the aggressiveness of fascist Germany and Italy. The second in the Far East because of the hegemonic claims of the Japanese militarists.

Taking into account these factors, in 1933 the Soviet government defined new tasks for its foreign policy: refusal to participate in international conflicts, especially those of a military nature; recognition of the possibility of cooperation with democratic Western countries to contain the aggressive aspirations of Germany and Japan (the policy of "appeasement"); struggle for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe and the Far East.

Prerequisites for a “collective security” policy

The normalization of relations between the Soviet state and European countries began in the early 1920s. The first agreement was the Soviet-British trade agreement of March 16, 1921. Soon a Soviet-German temporary trade agreement was signed. Similar agreements were soon concluded with Norway, Austria, and Italy. Denmark and Czechoslovakia. In 1922 Genoa hosted the International Economic and Financial Conference, which was attended by 29 countries. Questions about disarmament raised by the Soviet delegation were rejected by other delegations. The position of the Western powers included demands to pay the debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments, return nationalized property to foreigners, and provide foreigners with the opportunity to engage in trade and economic activities in the Soviet country with the rights they had in other countries. They did not come to an agreement. It was decided to refer the disputed issues for consideration to a conference of experts in The Hague. The conference in The Hague ended inconclusively. Participation in the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1922, which discussed issues of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, also demonstrated the incompatibility of the positions of Soviet Russia and Western countries. Bilateral relations developed more effectively for the USSR. During the Genoa Conference in Rapallo, a bilateral Soviet-German treaty was signed (1922). Its signing was regarded as an attempt to disrupt the Versailles international system that began to take shape in post-war Europe. In October 1925, a trade agreement with Germany and a consular convention were signed; in 1926, the USSR and Germany signed a non-aggression and neutrality pact. Soviet-British relations developed more complicated. For a long time the relationship was very tense. A manifestation of this was Curzon's memorandum containing a number of ultimatum demands: an end to subversive activities in Iran and Afghanistan, an end to religious persecution in the USSR, and others. Fearing an escalation of tension, the Soviet government agreed to meet a number of demands. The conflict between Moscow and London was finally settled in 1923. After that, in January 1924, the USSR was officially recognized by Great Britain. In August of the same year, the General Treaty and the Treaty on Trade and Navigation were signed. The aggravation of diplomatic relations took place in 1926 during the strike of the British miners, when the Soviet leadership provided assistance to the strikers through the trade unions. In 1927, diplomatic relations between the countries were severed. Diplomatic relations with other countries were more stable. Established and maintained diplomatic relations with Italy, Norway, Austria, Sweden, Greece, Denmark and France. Only relations with the USA have not been established.

At this time, the USSR was pursuing a more active policy towards Asian countries. After the end of the civil war, it strengthened peaceful relations with the states located on the southern borders of the country - with Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. By the end of the 1920s, the influence of the USSR on the world stage increased. The period of the late 20s - mid-30s was characterized by a relatively stable situation on the western borders of the USSR; the situation on the eastern borders was different. The conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, the Japanese aggression in Manchuria and Shanghai in 1931-32, which escalated into a war between Japan and China. Relations between China and the USSR were restored by 1932, relations with London resumed in 1929. Relations between the USSR and the USA during this period were unstable. Diplomatic relations with the United States were established in 1933, after Roosevelt came to the White House.

Since the mid-1930s, Moscow has actively supported the ideas of creating collective security systems in Europe and the Far East, which were supposed to lead to an alliance with democratic countries and to the isolation of Germany and Japan. In 1934 The USSR was accepted into the League of Nations - an international organization, the predecessor of the UN.

The development of "collective security" in the mid-30s.

The development of international relations in the 1930s took place in a difficult environment. The capitalist world was shaken by the economic crisis of 1929–1932. The crisis led to an aggravation of internal contradictions and intensified the economic and political rivalry between the big imperialist powers. The coming to power of the Nazis had a significance far beyond the national framework and had a strong influence on the change in the entire political climate on the European continent. The aggressive militaristic essence of the fascist regimes, their fierce anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet propaganda began to exert an ever-increasing influence on the development of the foreign policy of the European states. The threat to the victorious countries of the First World War increased, and at the same time, the hopes of London and Paris to use the Nazi regime as a "bastion" against Bolshevism strengthened.

The policy of the Soviet government was aimed at ensuring the security of the USSR and preventing war. The state and party leadership of the USSR believed that the capitalist encirclement, hostile to socialism, would inevitably undertake military actions against the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, it became clear that the most likely opponents in the war would be Germany, Italy, and Japan. In the Soviet Union, a course was taken for the intensive development of military industries and the strengthening of the country's defense capability.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership considered it necessary to strengthen the country's international position by expanding ties with non-aggressive capitalist states, and to create a system of collective resistance to aggression on a contractual basis. The relations of the Soviet Union with the capitalist countries were characterized by deep mutual distrust and suspicion. There was a well-founded fear in the USSR about the possibility of forming a single anti-Soviet bloc of imperialist states. It was no secret to the Soviet leadership that the German slogan "Drang nach Osten" met with a very favorable attitude in Paris and London, that the aggression of the fascist states could be directed against the USSR.

The policy of the Soviet Union, in turn, caused mistrust on the part of the Western powers. The thesis of the CPSU(b) about the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism and the victory of the socialist revolution on a global scale was interpreted in the West as a program of Soviet expansionism. The support of the Soviet Union for the revolutionary movements was regarded by the right-wing leaders of the bourgeoisie as a manifestation of the "revolutionary messianism of the Soviets." The victories of the Popular Fronts in Spain and France in 1936 frightened the bourgeoisie of Western Europe, who hastened to attribute the successes of the left forces to the "intrigues of Moscow." The course of the Soviet leadership to increase the military potential of the USSR was used by anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda to spread the myth of the "Soviet military threat". Many political leaders of the West, considering Nazi Germany as a "bastion against Bolshevism", justified in this way the policy of "appeasement" of the aggressor, which actually encouraged the designs of the most reactionary forces of imperialism directed against the USSR.

In 1935 the Soviet Union already had diplomatic relations with 36 countries of the world, including all the leading capitalist powers. The Soviet government concluded friendship treaties with Turkey and Yemen, an agreement on guarantees and neutrality with Iran, non-aggression treaties with Latvia, Estonia, Poland, France, Italy and Afghanistan. In 1936, a protocol on mutual assistance was signed between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. The expansion of the Soviet Union's ties with other states increased the possibilities for the active influence of Soviet policy on the development of international relations.

The attitude of the Soviet state towards the League of Nations did not remain unchanged. In the first years of the existence of Soviet power, this international organization, created after the end of the First World War, took up anti-Soviet positions, uniting the imperialist powers in the struggle against Soviet Russia. However, the international environment was changing. The Soviet state turned into a power, the existence of which had to be reckoned with by all countries of the world. Japan's aggression in China, the growth of fascist Germany's military preparations, and the withdrawal of these states from the League of Nations created a direct military threat in Europe and Asia. Under these conditions, the participation of the USSR in an international organization whose charter provided for counteracting aggression became desirable for many member countries of the League of Nations. France took the initiative in inviting the USSR to the League of Nations.

The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of December 20, 1933 included a clause on the possibility, under certain conditions, of the USSR joining the League of Nations. The Soviet leadership did not overestimate the effectiveness of the activities of the League of Nations, but considered it possible to participate in the collective actions of this international organization against the military threat from the most aggressive forces of imperialism.

On September 15, 1934, having received an invitation on behalf of 30 member countries of the League of Nations to join this organization, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR sent a letter to the chairman of the XV Assembly of the League of Nations stating that the Soviet government accepted the invitation as an expression of the desire of the majority of the members of the League of Nations to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Union is ready to become a member of the League of Nations and to assume the observance of international obligations arising from the Charter of the League. The Soviet government officially declared that it was not responsible for the decisions taken by the League of Nations prior to the entry of the USSR. In addition, the USSR expressed its disagreement with the system of mandates adopted by the League of Nations, which was in fact a form of colonial domination, and also expressed regret over the absence of obligations of racial equality in Article 22 of the Charter. The head of the Soviet delegation to the XV Assembly of the League of Nations, in his speech on September 18, emphasized that the Soviet Union was entering the international organization as a state of a new socio-political system, preserving its inherent features.

In the opinion of the Soviet government, the effectiveness of collective measures to counter aggression could be ensured only if the international community agreed to determine the real danger, if an international legal basis was created to establish the very fact of aggression. Therefore, even earlier, at the Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Arms in February 1933, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft declaration on the definition of aggression. The Soviet Union proposed to give the most complete definition of aggression, i.e., to fix various actions of the attacking side, which may entail political, economic and military sanctions of the world or regional community within the framework of collective security in the name of maintaining peace.

The declaration proposed by the Soviet Union on the definition of aggression was a new phenomenon in international law and received a wide response in world public opinion and in the ruling circles of many states. In July 1933, the USSR signed a convention on the definition of aggression with 10 states: Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Lithuania. In January 1934, Finland joined the convention. However, the leading capitalist countries - the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan - did not sign the convention, thereby weakening the foundations for creating collective security. Developing the concept of collective security, Soviet diplomacy proposed supplementing the mechanism for ensuring peace, along with the activities of the League of Nations, with a system of regional pacts. In a conversation with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Barthou in Geneva on May 18, 1934, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov spoke about a system of multilateral pacts that were supposed to cover the states of those regions where the threat of war and aggression was brewing. The Soviet People's Commissar considered it expedient to form "three vicious circles" - Eastern European, Pacific and Mediterranean, which could be formed as a result of regional agreements on mutual assistance against aggression with the participation of states interested in maintaining peace in these areas. According to the Soviet government, the regional pacts were to have a close connection with the League of Nations and create a more flexible and more effective mechanism for countering aggression.

The failure of the "collective security" policy

The Western powers pursued a policy of concessions to fascist Germany, hoping to create from it a reliable counterbalance against the USSR and direct its aggression to the east. This policy culminated in the Munich Agreement (September 1938) between Germany, Italy, Britain and France. It legally formalized the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Feeling its strength, Germany in 1930 occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia.

In the Far East, Japan, having captured most of China, approached the Soviet borders. In the summer of 1938, an armed conflict took place on the territory of the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. The Japanese grouping was thrown back. In May 1939 Japanese troops invaded Mongolia. Parts of the Red Army under the command of G.K. Kukov defeated them in the area of the Khalkhin-Gol River.

At the beginning of 1939, the last attempt was made to create a system of collective security between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. However, Western states did not believe in the potential ability of the USSR to resist fascist aggression. Therefore, the negotiations were dragged out by them in every possible way. In addition, Poland categorically refused to guarantee the passage of Soviet troops through its territory to repel the alleged fascist aggression. At the same time, Great Britain established secret contacts with Germany in order to reach an agreement on a wide range of political problems (including the neutralization of the USSR in the international arena).

The Soviet government knew that the German army was already in full readiness to attack Poland. Realizing the inevitability of war and its unpreparedness for it, it sharply changed its foreign policy orientation and went towards rapprochement with Germany. On August 23, 1939, a Soviet-German non-aggression pact was concluded in Moscow, which immediately entered into force and was designed for 10 years (Ribbentrop Molotov Pact). It was accompanied by a secret protocol on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The interests of the Soviet Union were recognized by Germany in the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia, Finland) and Bessarabia.

September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. Poland's allies Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September. However, they did not provide real military assistance to the Polish government, which ensured A. Hitler a quick victory. The second world war began.

In the new international conditions, the leadership of the USSR began to implement the Soviet-German agreements of August 1939 on September 17, after the defeat of the Polish army by the Germans and the fall of the Polish government. The Red Army entered Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. On September 28, the Soviet-German Treaty "On Friendship and Border" was concluded, which secured these lands as part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the USSR insisted on concluding agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, gaining the right to deploy its troops on their territory. In these republics, in the presence of Soviet troops, legislative elections were held, in which the communist forces won. In 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became part of the USSR.

In November 1939, the USSR began a war with Finland in the hope of quickly defeating it and creating a pro-communist government in it. There was also a military-strategic need to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the Soviet-Finnish border away from it in the area of the Karelian Isthmus. Military operations were accompanied by huge losses on the part of the Red Army. They showed her poor preparedness. The stubborn resistance of the Finnish army was provided by the deeply echeloned defensive "Mannerheim Line". Western states provided Finland with political support. The USSR, under the pretext of its aggression, was expelled from the League of Nations. At the cost of enormous efforts, the resistance of the Finnish armed forces was broken. In March 1940, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the USSR received the entire Karelian Isthmus.

In the summer of 1940, as a result of political pressure, Romania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union.

As a result, significant territories with a population of 14 million people were included in the USSR. The border of the country moved in the west in different places to a distance of 300 to 600 km. The foreign policy agreements of 1939 helped to delay the German attack on the Soviet Union by almost two years.

The Soviet leadership made an agreement with fascist Germany, whose ideology and policy it had previously condemned. Such a turn could have been carried out under the conditions of the state system, all the internal means of propaganda of which were aimed at justifying the actions of the government and forming a new attitude of Soviet society towards the Nazi regime.

If the Non-Aggression Pact, signed in August 1939, was to a certain extent a forced step for the USSR, then the secret protocol, the Treaty of Friendship and the Border, and other foreign policy actions of the Stalinist government carried out on the eve of the war did not take into account the interests of different states and peoples of Eastern Europe

Conclusion

A valuable contribution to the practice of international relations was the Soviet proposals on disarmament, on the definition of aggression, and the creation of regional pacts of mutual assistance. Soviet diplomacy gained experience in the League of Nations and became a permanent and active participant in the most important international forums. The undoubted success of Soviet foreign policy was the conclusion of mutual assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia.

The main reason for the failure of the collective security policy was that Soviet diplomacy failed to overcome the hostility of the ruling circles of the West to the Soviet state. The ideological confrontation between socialism and capitalism hindered the development of interstate relations, anti-Sovietism and anti-communism became the basis that led to the Munich agreement. In 1938–1939 crisis phenomena in the relations between the USSR and the leading capitalist countries were growing, and the tendency towards the political isolation of the USSR was intensifying.

The development of international relations was negatively influenced by the inconsistent and contradictory policies of Washington, London and Paris, which failed to overcome mutual rivalry and develop a common position towards aggressive states. It should also be taken into account that the USSR acted in the international arena without loyal and reliable allies. The unfavorable development of international relations was largely influenced by the miscalculations and mistakes of the Soviet political leadership.

References:

1. International Relations: Theories, Conflicts, Organizations: Textbook / Ed. P.A. Tsygankov. M., 2004

2. Political Science: New Directions / Ed. R. Gudina, H.-D. Klingemann. M., 1997.

3. Tsygankov P.A. Theory of international relations. M., 2002.

4. Ilyin Yu.D., History of collective security law. Lecture course

5. Keitel V. Reflections before execution. Smolensk. Rusich. 2000

6. Type of crisis. 1938-1939. Volume 1. Documents and materials. M., 1990

7. World War II in memories ... M., 1990.

8. Taylor A. J. P., Jacobsen G.-A. World War II: Two Views; M 1995

Ilyin Yu.D., History of collective security law. Lecture course

International relations: theories, conflicts, organizations:

Political Science: New Directions / Ed. R. Gudina, H.-D. Klingemann. M., 1997.

After the end of the First World War, the issues of peaceful coexistence worried many countries, primarily the European powers, which suffered incalculable victims and losses as a result of the war. In order to prevent the threat of a new similar war and create a system of international law that regulates relations between states on

on a fundamentally different level than it was before, and the first international organization in the history of Europe, the League of Nations, was created.

In the early 1930s The USSR was not a member of the League and had no reason to trust the objectivity of the Council of the League in the event of this or that conflict between the USSR and any other country. Proceeding from these considerations, already during this period the Soviet Union put forward proposals to a number of European states for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, with the aim of

"strengthening the cause of peace and relations between countries" in the conditions of "the deep world crisis now being experienced."

For the first time, the Soviet delegation raised the issue of the need to conclude a special convention to determine the attacking side at the disarmament conference in December 1932. On February 6, 1933, the Soviet draft convention was formally submitted to the Conference Bureau.

However, at this time there is an increasing destabilization of the situation and the growth of aggressive tendencies in international relations. It takes very little time for totalitarian fascist regimes to be established in Italy and Germany. Under these conditions, the topic of creating a new system of international security, which could prevent the already quite real threat of war, acquires particular relevance.

For the first time, a proposal on the need to fight for collective security was put forward in a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in December 1933. The collective security project was based on the equality of all participants in the proposed regional agreement and on universalism, which consisted in the fact that the system being created included all the states of the covered region without exception. The parties to the pact were to enjoy equal rights and guarantees, while rejecting the idea of any opposition of some countries to others, the exclusion of anyone from the collective security system, or the receipt by any of the participating countries of advantages over other states at their expense.

Thus, the period 1933–1938. passed under the sign of the desire of the Soviet Union to implement a collective security system as a whole or for individual elements in order to prevent the outbreak of war.

The appeasement policy of the fascist government of the aggressor countries, pursued by the governments of England and France, their fears and unwillingness to reach an agreement with a country based on a fundamentally different system of government, an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust led to the failure of plans to create a collective security system in Europe. As a result, fascist Germany, together with its allies, plunged the world into a terrible and devastating World War II.

In general, the proposals for the creation of a collective security system were a significant contribution to the development of theory and to the establishment in practice of the principles of peaceful coexistence, because the very essence of collective security is conditioned and determined by the principles of peaceful coexistence, involves the collective cooperation of states with different social systems in the name of preventing war and the preservation of the world.

The development and adoption of joint collective measures to ensure security turned out to be a much deeper and more complex element of peaceful coexistence than the establishment of diplomatic relations between countries with different social systems and even the development of trade and economic ties between them.

20. The main stages in the formation of a bloc of aggressive states. Axis "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo".

Francoist support was the first instance of Italian partnership with Germany. It helped bring them closer. However, complete reconciliation was not possible apart from a compromise on the question of Austria. The situation was made easier when, in July 1936, Germany and Austria signed a treaty under which Berlin promised to respect Austrian sovereignty and the Austrian government confirmed that Austria recognized itself as a German state. The Italian government expressed satisfaction with the found formula. The German-Austrian agreement removed an important obstacle to the Italo-German rapprochement.

Two days after the USSR refused to comply with the arms embargo against the Madrid government, on October 25, 1936, Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano, who had just been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Berlin. On the same day, a German-Italian protocol of understanding was signed. Germany recognized the existing situation in Ethiopia, the parties agreed on the lines of demarcation of their economic interests in the Danube basin, and, most importantly, Germany and Italy agreed to draw an agreed line in the Spanish question - in fact, it was a agreed military intervention. The Berlin Protocol formalized the partnership between Germany and Italy without establishing a formal union between them. The Berlin-Rome Axis was created.

In November 1936, Italian and German military contingents began to arrive in Spain. These were not regular troops, but the so-called legionnaires. At the same time, international brigades were formed from among the volunteers of different nationalities who sympathized with him to assist the Madrid government, which also took part in the civil war.

In November 1936, Germany and Italy, and in December - Japan recognized the government of Franco (Spanish statesman). With the advent of Italian and German soldiers in Spain, the balance of power began to change in favor of the Francoists. Neither the USSR nor the Euro-Atlantic powers were prepared to take the risk of countering the Italo-German intervention by force. By the end of 1937, Franco had a clear military predominance. Republican forces continued to resist. But they were split. In Madrid, the situation was kept by the communists, who were helped by the USSR. In Barcelona and throughout Catalonia, the Francoists were held back by anarchists and Trotskyists, who themselves called for the overthrow of the government in Madrid. In March 1939, the anti-Franco forces suffered a final defeat in Spain. Dictatorship was restored in the country.

The countries of the Nazi bloc, the countries (powers) of the "axis", the Nazi coalition is an aggressive military alliance of Germany, Italy, Japan and other states, which was opposed during the Second World War by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Axis Union was originally based on the German-Japanese-Italian-Spanish Anti-Comintern Pact and the German-Italian Steel Pact, and fully took shape on September 27, 1940, when Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact on the delimitation of zones of influence while establishing "new order" and mutual military assistance.

This is an alliance before the 2nd World War of fascist Italy with Nazi Germany, which was subsequently joined by militaristic Japan. It was created in opposition to the Soviet Comintern, which sought to destroy the capitalist countries from within through the subversive activities of the communist parties.

21. The development of German aggression in Europe and the policy of "appeasement" of Germany. Anschluss of Austria. Munich agreement and its consequences.

Germany began preparing for war immediately after Hitler came to power. The Hitler regime was created by the German monopoly circles with the full approval of the ruling camp of England, France and the United States.

It is known that the post-Versailles period was marked for Germany by a whole system of measures aimed at restoring German heavy industry, in particular, the German military-industrial potential. An enormous role in this matter was played by the so-called Dawes reparations plan for Germany, with the help of which the USA and Britain hoped to make German industry dependent on American and British monopolies. The Dawes Plan cleared the way for an increased influx and introduction of foreign, predominantly American, capital into German industry.

The first and most important prerequisite for Hitler's aggression was the revival and renewal of heavy industry and the military industry in Germany, which became possible only due to the direct and broad financial support of the ruling circles of the United States of America.

Another decisive circumstance that contributed to the unleashing of Hitler's aggression was the policy of the ruling circles of Britain and France, which is known as the policy of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany, the policy of renouncing collective security. It was precisely this policy of the Anglo-French ruling circles, which was expressed in the rejection of collective security, in the rejection of rebuffing German aggression, in indulging the aggressive demands of Nazi Germany, that led to the Second World War.

Soon after Hitler came to power, as a result of the efforts of the British and French Governments, in 1933, the "Pact of Accord and Cooperation" of the four powers - Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy - was signed in Rome. This pact signified the collusion of the British and French Governments with German and Italian fascism, which even then made no secret of its aggressive intentions. At the same time, this pact with the fascist states meant a rejection of the policy of strengthening the united front of the peace-loving powers against the aggressive states. By conspiring with Germany and Italy, bypassing the other powers - participants in the then ongoing disarmament conference, which discussed the Soviet proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact and a pact on determining the attacking side - Great Britain and France dealt a blow to the cause of ensuring the peace and security of peoples.

Following that, in 1934, England and France helped Hitler to use the hostile position of the allied panorama of Poland against the USSR, as a result of which the German-Polish non-aggression pact was concluded, which was one of the most important stages in the preparation of German aggression. Hitler needed this pact in order to upset the ranks of the supporters of collective security and to show by this example that Europe does not need collective security, but bilateral agreements. This made it possible for German aggression to decide for itself with whom and when to conclude an agreement, against whom and when to attack. There is no doubt that the German-Polish pact was the first serious breach in the building of collective security.

Emboldened, Hitler took a number of measures to openly restore the armed forces of Germany, which did not cause any opposition from the British and French rulers.

The Soviet Union did everything possible to block the path of the fascist aggressors. The Soviet Union acted as the initiator and champion of collective security.

Anschluss (German Anschluss (inf.) - accession, union) - the inclusion of Austria into Germany, which took place on March 12-13, 1938. The independence of Austria was restored in April 1945, after its occupation by the Allied forces during the Second World War, and legalized by the State Treaty of 1955, prohibiting the Anschluss.

Hitler decided to act. He started in Austria. Ethnically and culturally close to Germany, independent Austria seemed to the Fuhrer, who was born and spent his youth there, an integral part of Greater Germany. The Nazi movement flourished in Austria, and this guaranteed the ease of transferring the German order to Austrian soil. Already in the secret annex to the German-Austrian agreement of July 11, 1936, the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg agreed to concessions to the Nazi movement in Austria, although formally Germany pledged not to interfere in the affairs of Austria.

Hitler demanded that Schuschnigg immediately sign a new agreement with Germany. Schuschnigg's two-page document instructed Austria to lift the ban on the activities of the Austrian Nazi Party, grant amnesty to imprisoned Nazis (who were in large part arrested for terrorist activities), appoint Seyss-Inquart, one of the Austrian Nazi leaders, as Minister of the Interior, and another Nazi, Gleiss-Horstenau, Minister of War. It was not an agreement, but an ultimatum, and, in fact, it meant the Nazisification of Austria and its imminent and imminent absorption by the Reich.

Under pressure from Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the German ambassador to Vienna, Franz von Papen, Schuschnigg surrendered. He made only one reservation: according to the Austrian constitution, only the president of the republic could approve such an agreement. Hitler, pretending that his patience had run out, flung open the doors and shouted: "General Keitel!" (Wilhelm Keitel was the chief of the general staff of the German troops). Winking at Keitel and leaving Schuschnigg, who suspected that he was about to be shot, for thirty minutes, Hitler again called on the Austrian chancellor and said that he was ready for the only concession - to delay the execution of the "agreement" for three days. Austria's death warrant was signed.

This was followed by "four weeks of agony" lasting until March 11, during which the Nazis prepared for the Anschluss with little effort from the Austrian Social Democrats to resist it. On March 11, under the threat of a German military invasion, Schuschnigg resigned. Berlin (the operation was led by Hermann Goering) presented an ultimatum to Austrian President Miklas: appoint Seyss-Inquart chancellor or German troops would enter Austria. Seyss-Inquart, the "head of the provisional government" of Austria, under dictation from Berlin, sent a desperate telegram to Berlin with a request to send German troops to Austria to prevent bloodshed. Already on March 12, Hitler was in Austrian Linz (where he spent his school years), and on March 13, 1938, he signed a document on the complete Anschluss of Austria. Austria became a "province of the German Reich".

Munich agreement. From the spring of 1938, the Nazis launched a campaign of unprecedented blackmail and provocation against Czechoslovakia, demanding the transfer of the original Czech lands to Germany. The ruling circles of the West “went open with the Nazis, they decided to betray Czechoslovakia in the interests of unleashing a war between Germany and the USSR. Under these conditions, only aid from the East could save Czechoslovakia. But the Czech bourgeoisie committed an unheard-of national betrayal: on December 16, 1937, President Beneš assured the German envoy in Prague that the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR was “a product of a bygone era, but it cannot be thrown into the wastebasket so easily.”

Meanwhile, the Soviet government during this critical period for Czechoslovakia firmly declared its readiness to come to its aid.

All international reaction did not want a war in defense of Czechoslovakia, in which the Soviet Union would inevitably take part. According to N. Chamberlain's trusted adviser, G. Wilson, “only Bolshevism would profit from this. This should be prevented. It is necessary to recognize the right of the Germans to expand to the South-East.

On September 29 - 30, 1938, a meeting of the heads of governments of England, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich, convened with the active support of the United States. Representatives of Czechoslovakia and the USSR were excluded from participation in the meeting. It decided the fate of Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was transferred to Germany within ten days, in the near future some areas were captured by Poland and Hungary.

On September 30, a declaration of mutual non-aggression was signed between Britain and Germany; a similar declaration by Germany and France was signed a little later.

22. Political crisis in Europe in 1939. Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations and the reasons for their failure. The development of the international situation in Europe at the end of the 1930s led inexorably to a new armed clash between the great powers. By the end of 1938, the Versailles system in Europe practically ceased to exist, and the Munich Agreement significantly strengthened Germany. Under these conditions, the German leadership set itself a new foreign policy goal - to achieve hegemony in Europe, securing the role of a great world power. As a result of the aggressive actions of Germany and Italy in March-April 1939, a pre-war political crisis began in Europe - a period of direct alignment of military-political forces in anticipation of a probable war.

Although the Munich Agreement created a new political environment in Europe, it was seen by all the great powers as the next stage in their relationship. Situation in autumn 1938 - summer 1939 in Europe was a tangled tangle of diplomatic activities of the great powers, each of which sought to achieve its own goals.

Germany did not yet set as its goal a war with the USSR, but, preparing for the capture of Czechoslovakia, was interested in the neutralization of Poland and the non-intervention of England and France. To this end, Germany proposed to Poland to settle the problems of Danzig and the "Polish Corridor" on the basis of cooperation within the framework of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Polish leadership agreed to certain concessions on the issue of Danzig only in exchange for Germany's retaliatory steps. The intransigence of Poland led to the fact that the German leadership began to lean towards the idea of the need for a military solution to the Polish problem under certain conditions.

Anglo-German and Franco-German relations were somewhat overshadowed by the November pogroms in Germany and the rumors that appeared in January 1939 about the preparation of a German attack on Holland. All this forced Britain and France to coordinate their policies, speed up the modernization of their armed forces, maintain contacts with the USSR and at the same time seek a comprehensive agreement with Germany in the spirit of Munich.

Since the autumn of 1938, the German leadership began to gradually seek the normalization of relations with the USSR. On December 19, 1938, without any delay, it was extended for 1939. Soviet-German trade agreement.

In mid-March 1939, the USA, the USSR, England and France had information about Germany's preparations for the occupation of Czecho-Slovakia, but the powers - guarantors of the Munich Agreement did not provide for any countermeasures. In addition, formally, the Munich guarantees of the Czechoslovak borders were not violated by Germany's actions. On March 14, Slovakia, under pressure from Germany, declared independence, and the president of Czechoslovakia left for Berlin, where, in the course of "negotiations," he agreed to the political reorganization of his country. On March 15, German troops entered the Czech Republic, on whose territory the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was created. Initially, the reaction of England and France was rather restrained, but as public opinion aroused, London and Paris toughened their position and on March 18, like the USSR, they protested the actions of Germany, and the British and French ambassadors were recalled from Berlin "for consultations".

On April 17, 1939, the Soviet government proposed to the Western powers that they conclude a tripartite mutual assistance treaty based on equality of obligations and a military convention.

This provided for the provision of assistance to the states located between the Baltic and Black Seas in the event of aggression against them. England, however, had no intention of concluding a mutual assistance pact and tried to enlist unilateral commitments from the USSR to Poland and Rumania. Only after Hitler and Mussolini signed the Steel Pact in May on a military-political alliance did tripartite negotiations begin in Moscow.

Negotiations progressed extremely slowly. England and France, having accepted the principle of mutual assistance in words, in fact did not want to observe the reciprocity of obligations. And although the text of the treaty was basically worked out by the end of July, the British government instructed its diplomats not to allow an agreement to be reached with Moscow. Proceeding from narrowly selfish considerations and distrust of Stalin's policy, it preferred to give Germany the opportunity to develop aggression in the East, and to put pressure on Germany through tripartite negotiations and at the same time hinder Soviet-German rapprochement. At the same time, from May 1939, England was conducting secret negotiations with Germany, probing the ground for a deal on the division of the world into spheres of influence and cooperation in the markets.

At the end of July, the Western powers accepted the Soviet proposal to start negotiations on military issues, but did not show promptness. Delegations were instructed to drag out negotiations. Only towards the end of their stay in Moscow did the English mission receive the authority to conduct them. Both delegations were not authorized to sign the military convention.

In an effort to achieve cooperation with Britain and France, the Soviet side put forward lethal proposals developed by the General Staff of the Red Army on the number of troops and weapons put up by the USSR, and on their participation in repelling aggression in Europe, taking into account three options for the possible development of military events. The British and French missions shied away from discussing specific issues and led the negotiations to an impasse. The Polish government rejected a proposal to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory in the event of German aggression. England and France were unable to exert the necessary influence on Warsaw, devaluing the Moscow negotiations as a result.

C. Optical asymmetry astigmatism, spherical aberration, oblique beam astigmatism, distortion, chromatic aberration

GT; 3. Investigation of violations of the rules for the operation of computers, their systems or networks

I Development of the system of student self-government in the process of integrating the educational, scientific and innovative activities of the university

The negotiations that began with the USSR on concluding a mutual assistance treaty, which took place in the face of growing German threats against Poland, dragged on slowly, drowning in technical details. After Munich, the government of the USSR did not trust the guarantees of England and France, fearing that these countries would again prefer a compromise with the aggressor, including at the expense of the USSR. The position of the USSR was also influenced by the fact that in the spring and summer of 1939, Japan launched military operations against the USSR's ally, Mongolia, on the Khalkhin Gol River, which could at any moment escalate into a full-scale Soviet-Japanese war.

The statement of the Prime Minister of Great Britain N. Chamberlain on July 24, 1939 on the signing of an agreement between Great Britain and Japan, according to which Japan recognized the existence of "special needs" in China, was understood as proof that England and France were preparing a new deal with aggressive countries behind the USSR. Of course, this agreement could also be understood in such a way that England, preparing for a war in Europe, seeks to secure her possessions in Asia from an attack by Japan. However, Moscow seriously feared that the USSR would be drawn into a war with the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact with the neutrality of Great Britain, France and the United States.

Under these conditions, the USSR accepted Germany's proposals to normalize relations and conclude a non-aggression pact. At the same time, both Moscow and Berlin were well aware that the pact signed on August 23, 1939, provided Germany with a free hand for aggression.

At the same time, the leadership of the USSR considered this pact beneficial for itself from all points of view.

Firstly, the USSR ensured its security in the Far East, since Japan without the support of Germany would not have decided on a large-scale war with it. The agreement between Germany and the USSR split the Anti-Cominter Pact and led to a cooling of German-Japanese relations.

Secondly, the possibility of a new "Munich", attempts by England and France to pacify Germany at the expense of the USSR, was excluded.

Thirdly, the USSR was rewarded with a secret protocol in which Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, captured by Poland in 1920-1921, the Baltic countries, Finland, Bessarabia (Moldova), which was part of Romania (that is, for the most part, territories, formerly belonging to the Russian Empire) were recognized as spheres of interests of the USSR. Thus, those territorial resolutions of the Treaty of Versailles, which were adopted without taking into account the interests of Russia, were eliminated.

Another question is that the non-aggression pact, and especially the secret protocol to it, actually turned the USSR into a non-belligerent ally of Germany. The image of a country that consistently opposed fascism and its aggressive policies was destroyed. The temporary advantages that were provided by the pact, the USSR could not use in full. I.V. Stalin and his entourage made the same mistake as the leaders of the Western countries when they considered that it was possible to agree with the fascist regime that it would abide by the agreements reached.

Documents and materials

From the text of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, August 27, 1928:

“Article 1. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare on behalf of their peoples that they condemn the method of resorting to war to settle international conflicts and renounce war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations.

Article 2. The High Contracting Parties recognize that the settlement or resolution of all disagreements or conflicts, regardless of the nature of their origin, that may arise between them, must be carried out only by peaceful means ”(Anthology of World Political Thought. M., 1997. P. 275-276.)

From A. Hitler's speech, November 5, 1937:

“German policy should keep in mind two sworn enemies - England and France, for whom the powerful German colossus in the very center of Europe is a thorn in the eye, and both states have taken a negative position on the issue of the further strengthening of Germany both in Europe and in other parts Sveta<...>If the Fuhrer is still alive, then no later than 1943-1945. he intends to solve the problem of space for Germany without fail.

Questions and tasks

1. Why the 1920s called the "decade of pacifism"? How do you explain the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact by countries that could not resolve their differences beforefirst world war? Analyze the text of the pact. Did he have a chance to determine the relations between the countries of the world for a long time?
2. How can you explain the emergence of hotbeds of aggression in the 1930s? Show them on the map.
3. What was the policy of appeasement of the aggressor in Europe? What results did she bring?
4. Was World War II inevitable? What could stop the preparation for it?
5. Why failed to create a system of collective security in Europe? What were the reasons for the impotence of the League of Nations?
6. How did the Spanish Civil War affect the general situation in Europe?
7. Describe the aggressive actions of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Analyze an excerpt from Hitler's 1937 speech and compare it with earlier statements you know. What are the differences between them?
8. What forced the leadership of the USSR to drastically change its foreign policy and come to an agreement with Germany? Do you think this step was inevitable? What impact did Japan's aggression in Asia have on Soviet policy?