Strategic priorities for building national cultural sovereignty. Sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the field of traditional values ​​and cultural policy Russia is a separate civilization

National culture is a relatively recent phenomenon. The main condition for its possibility is the presence of a supra-ethnic and supra-class space of communication. But, as soon as such a space can be created and maintained only by the state, national culture and the national state are inseparable from each other. The heyday of national cultures coincides with the heyday of nation-states. This is the beginning of the XIX - the middle of the XX century.

During the last third of the XX century. there are conditions that significantly complicate the possibility of maintaining a single communication and symbolic space. Therefore, it is likely that history will confirm the correctness of Terry Eagleton, who stated the following: culture was in the past what underlay the creation of nation states; it will become in the future what will destroy them.

The sovereignty of nation-states in the cultural sphere is becoming more and more fictitious. However, its fictitiousness does not prevent states from claiming it. Moreover, the more obvious the fictitiousness of cultural sovereignty, the more actively claims to possess it are put forward.

National culture is relatively a recent phenomenon. The main condition of its possibility is the presence of uber- ethnical and uber- class space of communication. But since such space can be created and maintained only by state, national culture and national state turn out to be inseparable from each other. The time of flourishing of the national cultures coincides with the time of flourishing of the national states. It is the beginning of XIX - mid. XX century.

During the third part of the XX century the conditions have been shaped, that sustainably hampered the nation states" capability of maintaining a unified symbolic space and a unified space of communication. Therefore it"s quite likely, that history confirms the rightness of Terry Eagleton , who stated that it was culture, that was the basis for creating national states in the past; and in the future it will be culture, that will destroy them.

Sovereignty of the nation states in the cultural sphere is becoming more and more fictitious. However, its fictitiousness doesn't prevent states from pretending to it. Moreover, the more obvious the fictitiousness of cultural sovereignty is, the more actively they claim to possess it.

This article is concluded with the author's reflections on the struggle for cultural sovereignty in the post-Soviet context. According to his views, the positions of nationalism are as losing, as the positions of cultural imperialism.

KEY WORDS: nation state, sovereignty, national culture, globalization, cultural sovereignty.

KEY WORDS: nation state, sovereignty, national culture, globalization, sovereign culturalty.

The phenomenon of "national culture" as a symbolic entity, including all the inhabitants of a certain territory, arose relatively recently. It was the result of the "nationalization" that the cultural space of Europe underwent in the era of modernity. The modern state posits itself as a nation state, i.e. as a political unity that has the "nation" as its source of sovereignty. The latter is imagined not only as a collection of individuals under one jurisdiction, but also as a cultural unity. In other words, the nation-state presupposes the coincidence of political and cultural boundaries. In this coincidence - more precisely, in the desire for such a coincidence - is the fundamental difference between the modern state and the pre-modern state (that is, conditionally, that existed before 1800).

Class stratification is characteristic of pre-modern states. Their population is so rigidly hierarchized that the lower and upper layers belong to different cultures. Aristocratic culture, on the one hand, and the culture of the peasant masses, on the other, do not come into contact with each other at all at the level of everyday practices and only sporadically meet at the symbolic level. At the same time, the culture of the nobility largely exists across state borders [Elias 2002], while the culture of the peasants often turns out to be localized within a particular province.

The state of the modern era was, as Zygmund Bauman aptly put it, a gardener state, while the state of the pre-modern era was a huntsman state [Bauman 1987, 51-67]. Just as the huntsman only watches what is happening in the forest, so the pre-modern state interfered minimally in the sphere that we today would call cultural life. The gardener, on the other hand, is engaged not only in cultivating desirable plants, but also in uprooting undesirable ones. From this stem two important features of the modern state: (1) assimilationist pressure on the cultures of "minorities" and (2) the relatively harmonious coexistence of the state and the market - the efforts of the state to maintain a certain cultural standard, on the one hand, and the activity of participants in cultural exchanges, on the other.

In the era of modernity, the development of ethnic and regional cultures is blocked. Local cultures (from Provençal in France to Ukrainian in Russia) are not considered worthy of the name "culture". People from these cultural areas are expected to assimilate into the dominant - "national", i.e. state-sponsored culture.

The lower classes are denied the possession of culture. Proper culture is considered only that cultural sample, which is produced and consumed by the elites. "Folk culture" under these conditions is a contradiction in definition. The normative dichotomy of "high" and "mass" culture (the first as the embodiment of quality, the second - as the embodiment of surrogacy and baseness) did not accidentally survive until the middle of the 20th century.

The state of the era that came about four decades ago, with great difficulty, manages to act as a gardener. Why?

Firstly, because as the global cultural market develops, request for difference. As a result, players enter the scene who previously had no chance of being noticed. Minority voices can no longer be silenced. Moreover, belonging to a minority becomes a value, and therefore a cultural resource.

Former opponents of nation-states - and nation-cultures - have new opportunities at their disposal. What used to be associated with backwardness, lack of modernity, reactionaryness, etc., acquires a veil of progressiveness and respectability. As soon as there is a demand for difference, and the carriers of such a demand are dispersed throughout the world, the supply of difference also becomes global.

Breton culture in France, Basque culture in Spain, Scottish culture in Great Britain, Tatar culture in Russia, Tibetan culture in China, Indian culture in North America, etc. All these cases are specific, but their common feature is the preservation of ethnic identity (at the level of language, religious practices, or at least life style) despite the assimilation pressure from the state. Moreover, ethnic minorities are motivated to preserve such originality not only by internal, but also by external motives (the sympathy of foreigners - potential sponsors or at least tourists).

The cases discussed above illustrate ethnic opposition to the cultural projects of nation-states. But no less (perhaps even more) importance in this regard is the challenge to national projects from the regions. An example of regional opposition to homogenization is "regionalism" in contemporary Spain. The Catalans today insist on their difference from the rest of Spain no less vigorously than they did half a century ago, when the use of the Catalan language was forbidden. Today, Catalan is the second official language in Catalonia, along with Spanish (which is called here only as "Castilian"). In Catalonia, they prefer a different cuisine than in the rest of Spain, they consider the sard rather than flamenco to be the national dance, and the bullfight, without which the identity of the Madrid people is unthinkable, has recently been banned here.

Another illustration of the regional challenge to national culture is the "Northern League" in Italy. For the protagonists of this movement, it is far from obvious that Italy is one country, with one historical and cultural past and one political future. In the ideology of this movement, an important role is played by the myth of the special origin of the northerners. They are supposed to trace their ancestry from the Celts (and, being the heirs of a unique Celtic culture, they carry a special Celtic mentality), which the inhabitants of the Italian south cannot boast of [Shnirelman 2007, 452-485].

The phenomenon dubbed "new regionalism" does not necessarily imply a revision of existing political boundaries. Regionals, as a rule, are far from separatism. But they call into question existing symbolic borders. It is the region, and not the state of which this region is a part, that acts as a brand in global symbolic exchanges. An example is commercials on world TV channels (such as CNN and BBC) inviting investors to invest in Tatarstan. The text tells about the harmony of ancient traditions and the dynamism of today's life, and the visual range unobtrusively invites you to enjoy the minarets of Kazan mosques and Elena Isinbayeva's jump. The brand of Scotland and Bavaria, the Ruhr region and Kalmykia is built in a similar way. Their self-presentations to a potential investor never mention the nation-state under whose jurisdiction they are located. The local is addressed to the global, bypassing the mediation of the national.

Secondly, the ability of states to control the reproduction on their territory of one - taken as a "national" - cultural model, is greatly weakened under the influence of international migrations.

Millions of people from the "Third World", who moved to permanent residence in the countries of Western Europe and North America, make a significant contribution to the change in the cultural landscape of these countries. Under the influence of immigration processes, the structure of demand and the structure of supply in the sphere of material culture are changing.

By the way, these supply and demand are formed not only and not so much due to the presence of immigrants, but due to the new cultural needs of local residents. The middle classes in Western cities actively consume non-Western cultural products. Arabic coffee houses and Turkish tea houses, hookah smoking, butcher shops offering halal meat, Chinese fast food, oriental medicine centers, belly dance studios (and also "Latino"), hairdressers doing Afrostyle hairstyles, eateries and restaurants of Oriental, African and Latin American kitchens are just the most obvious signs of changes in everyday culture.

Under the influence of immigration, the artistic ("spiritual") culture of the host countries is also being transformed. Natives of a migrant environment, becoming directors, screenwriters, producers, writers, composers, create works that, in aesthetic and ideological terms, go beyond the Eurocentric picture of the world.

Third, agents that are not tied to the national territory - transnational corporations - begin to operate in the cultural sphere. Their activities lead to the fact that the mediation of the state between the individual as a consumer of cultural products, on the one hand, and the producers of these products, on the other, ceases to be necessary. .

This entails a shift in the cultural loyalty of citizens. Previously, the loyalty of individuals was almost automatically addressed to the symbolic and communicative space, the framework of which was set by the nation-state. Now this automatism is broken. The objects of cultural loyalty are sign-symbolic integrity and communication spaces, the borders of which cross the borders of national states.

The radical shift in consciousness in question can also be described in other terms, namely: there is a complication of identification mechanisms. For more than a century and a half (from the first third of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century), the imaginary community with which individuals identify themselves has been the nation. The national identity of individuals coexists with professional, gender, religious, regional, etc. With the end of modernity, the period of dominance of the “nationalist” way of mental mapping of the world also ended. This gave rise to communities of identity[Castells 2000], poorly compatible with national identity.

Skeptics will argue that such communities have existed since the rise of nation-states (for example, members of religious minorities have been reluctant to identify with one nation or another). It's right. But with the development of modern information technologies, the consolidation of such communities acquires a new quality. Thanks to the Internet and other forms of electronic communication, communities of identities that are alternative to nations are able to recruit their members regardless of territorial state. In addition, identity communities are multiplying [Castells 1997]. (They are formed both on a religious and on an ideological and / or life-stylistic basis (ecology, feminism, pacifism, anarchism, the international human rights movement, etc.).

In the modern era, the resources of the State are comparable to the resources of the Market. As soon as the market operates on a national scale, it does not challenge the state. Agents of cultural exchanges do not seek to transcend the borders of the nation-state. If such an exit does occur, it does not jeopardize the ability of the state to set the cultural norm.

What we observe with the end of modernity is a clear and sharp contradiction between the official institutions of cultural (re)production, on the one hand, and market institutions, on the other.

A certain asymmetry between the imperatives of the market and the imperatives of the public good has accompanied states since the formation of capitalism. The state, by definition, must follow the principle of social responsibility, which means it must restrict merchants operating in the cultural sphere (adopt and implement legislation prohibiting pornography and propaganda of violence, etc.). At the same time, as soon as the state proclaims its adherence to the values ​​of "market democracy", it has to put up with the commercialization of culture, and therefore with the fact that the agents of cultural production and distribution are guided in their activities by only one motive - the motive of profit. In practice, this is tantamount to mass distribution of products that thematize sex and violence [Raymond 1995, 102-108].

Of course, this asymmetry has existed for more than a decade. However, these days it is becoming much more noticeable. If before the state had more or less effective instruments of control over the cultural sphere within its own borders, then in the era of "informationalism" the possibilities of such control significantly decreased.

However, the collision “(national) state vs. (transnational) market" should not be viewed solely through the prism of cultural degradation. The emergence of a global cultural market also brings with it something positive. TNCs engaged in show business contribute to the fact that niches appear in the commercial space for works that were not originally designed for commercial success. The fact is that works that are non-commercial in their design can also sell well. There is a demand for them, and the distributors involved in discovering (and generating!) such demand on a worldwide scale are doing quite a noble thing. If not for the series "Another Cinema" (the European analogue of this series - "Art house") on video and DVD, the Russian audience would never have watched dozens of film masterpieces. If not for Peter Gabriel's "Real World" label, the world audience would never have heard hundreds of works of "ethnic music" (world music).

Here's what, for example, the strategy of record companies selling "ethnic music" looks like. If an ethnic group or individual performer has a chance to win the love of a global audience, it is given the necessary gloss, followed by a massive advertising campaign and, if successful, huge circulations of discs. If such a group or performer is too specific and is unlikely to be perceived by the world public, then the emphasis is on its originality. Accordingly, its "ethnic" features are enhanced, and the product itself is addressed to one or another national audience.

Of course, the sovereignty of the state in the cultural sphere has always been largely fictitious. Not a single state of modernity was able to completely protect its territory from the penetration of signs and symbols produced outside its borders. And yet, until recently, the state had resources at its disposal to manage the identities of its citizens.

These resources were noticeably depleted during the last third of the 20th century. The spread of modern technologies in the field of transport and the media has made interstate borders porous. Satellite and cable television, and then the Internet, put an end to the monopoly of the state in the distribution of cultural products on its territory.

Thus, if sovereignty means independence in decision-making, then the cultural sovereignty of states at the beginning of the 21st century is only a memory. However the fictitiousness of cultural sovereignty does not prevent real claims to its possession.

In my opinion, what is happening today can be called stylization of sovereignty. What is it due to? Oddly enough, the logic of the process that we, for lack of a better expression, call globalization.

One thoughtful author pointed out that the essence of "globalization" lies precisely in globalization. cultural exchanges[Waters 2002]. After all, what do we mean when we talk about globalization? The fact that the exchanges taking place in different spheres become worldwide. However, strictly speaking, this does not happen either in the economic or in the political sphere. Only exchanges in the sphere of culture acquire a worldwide character. As M. Waters notes, "economic exchanges are localized, political exchanges are internationalized, cultural exchanges are globalized." [Waters 2002, 20].

However, the matter can be approached differently, namely: to get away from the rigid division of the three spheres of public life and focus on their mutual penetration. This is what Ronald Robertson does when he insists that today there is a “culturalization” of society at all levels [Robertson 1992]. In other words, the content of the process called globalization lies in the fact that culture begins to permeate both the economy and politics. As an example, we can take the competition between Japanese and German car manufacturers. The question of whose cars will be more in demand on the world market is a question brand. This means that the answer to it lies in the sign-symbolic - that is, in the cultural - plane, and not in the technical or financial plane. With complete equality in terms of price-quality ratio, the winner is the one whose "image" in the eyes of the buyer will be more attractive.

Claims to cultural sovereignty put forward by the post-Soviet states provoke different reactions. Many (especially those who watch them from Russia) find these claims unfounded. At the same time, they usually note the modest resources at the disposal of new claimants to sovereignty. The cultural heritage and cultural symbols that the elites of the post-Soviet states would like to use as national ones turn out to be part of a wider civilizational area. Say, Turkic in the Uzbek case or Iranian in the Tajik. Tamerlane was not an Uzbek, no matter how much the modern leadership in Tashkent would like, and Firdousi wrote in Farsi, not in Tajik. Chingiz Aitmatov, who is the pride of Kyrgyzstan, is too closely associated with Soviet culture to be considered a Kyrgyz writer without a doubt. In addition, Russian observers are puzzled by a certain redundancy of efforts for cultural sovereignization. Many of the activities carried out by the leadership of the former Soviet republics are clearly counterproductive in terms of raison d'etat. Translating into the state language a huge amount of literature available in Russian (from fiction to economic and legal) is an extremely costly business. And responsible statesmen could use this money for more pressing needs. Pushing the Russian language out of the public sphere is not only troublesome (given the resistance of the Russian-speaking part of the population and the dissatisfaction of official Moscow), but also harmful. The Russian language for most people living here is a window into world culture.

Nevertheless, for all the seeming irrationality of such efforts, they are quite rational. I will give three arguments in favor of this assertion. First, the modern world political system is organized as a system of states. States are considered as sovereign units - as centers of power, or "power receptacles". The possession of cultural power is here implied in the same way as the possession of military-political and economic power. Therefore, positioning itself as a (homogeneous) nation is a fully justified strategy for states. It gives them a chance to improve their position in the global competition. Either you represent an autonomous cultural-political whole and make you be considered as such a whole, or they look at you as a not-quite-state. Secondly, in these efforts one can see the desire for self-affirmation and, if you like, revenge. The elites of today's newly independent states, which were part of the USSR two decades ago, are ready to go to great lengths to prove their worth to their "big brother" - albeit with the twists and turns characteristic of a teenager. Finally, thirdly, let's not forget the extraordinary popularity that the discourse of "post-colonialism" has acquired since the 1970s. It would be surprising if the new sovereigns did not take the opportunity to fit into it and present their presence inside the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as languishing in the "prison of peoples." In other words, by putting forward claims to restore the desecrated authenticity, the post-Soviet states are only playing by the rules that are set by the “global community” . Their nationalism is nothing but submission to transnational political imperatives.

Therefore, it is hardly worth going to the other extreme and trying to disavow their desire for sovereignty (including cultural). In my opinion, cultural imperialism is just as much a losing position as cultural nationalism. Nationalism emphasizes differences. Imperialism does not notice them. Nationalism on behalf of small cultures is too zealous in terms of sovereignty (autonomy, independence, authenticity). Imperialism - and, in fact, nationalism on behalf of the Big Culture - denies recognition to small cultures.

Literature

Bauman 1987 - Bauman Z. Gamekeepers turned gardeners // Bauman Z. Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, Post-Modernity and Intellectuals. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.

Gellner 1991- Gellner E. Nations and nationalism. - M.: Progress, 1991.

Castells 1997 - Castells M. The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.

Castells 2000 - Castells M. Information Age. Economy, society and culture. M.: GU HSE, 2000.

Kozhanovsky 2007- Kozhanovsky A.N. The Spanish Case: Ethnic Waves and Regional Rocks // Nationalism in World History. Ed. V.A. Tishkov and V.A. Shnirelman. - M.: Nauka, 2007

Raymond 1995 - Raymond Williams. The Sociology of Culture. With a new Foreword by Bruce Robbins. The University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Robertson 1992 - Robertson R. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. L.: Sage, 1992.

Waters 2002 - Waters M. globalization. L., NY: Routledge, 2002.

Shnirelman 2007 - Shnirelman V.A. United Europe and the Seduction of the Celtic Myth // Nationalism in World History. Ed. V.A. Tishkov and V.A. Shnirelman. - M.: Nauka, 2007.

Schulze 1994 - Schulze H. Staat und Nation in der Europaeischen Geschichte. Muenchen: Beck, 1994.

Elias 2002 - Elias N. court society. M.: Languages ​​of Slavic culture, 2002.

Notes

The possibility of their meeting is provided only by symbols of confession and dynasty. For pre-modern societies as a set of mutually isolated cultural segments, see: [Gellner, 1991].

On the cultural heterogeneity (including linguistic) of the population of European states in the pre-modern era, see: [Schulze 1994].

With regard to Russia, a caveat is needed here: since the Russian elites positioned the country as an empire, and not as a nation-state, they did not seek cultural homogenization of the ethnically diverse population for a long time. However, the processes of Russification that began under Alexander III proceeded in line with the same assimilation policy pursued by the nation-states of Western Europe.

A theoretical revision of this generally accepted division is undertaken in the 1960s. The pioneers here were the sociologists of the Birmingham School, who instead of the term mass culture began to use the term popular culture and tried to demonstrate that the dividing line between this culture and the culture of the bourgeoisie lies not along the line of quality, but along the line of attitudes towards capitalism and the exploitation of man by man.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the term "postmodern" was used to refer to this era, in the 1990s it was supplanted by the term "globalization".

The insistence on Catalan specificity is a manifestation of regional rather than ethnic self-awareness. The same is true in other areas of Spain. The population of a particular region identifies itself with the region, and not with the ethnic group. Thus, the inhabitants of Aragon, Valencia and the Balearic Islands, despite the fact that they speak the Catalan language, consider themselves, respectively, Aragonese, Valencian and Balearic, and not Catalan at all, as one might assume, based on the ethnocentric scheme familiar to us. See: [Kozhanovsky 2007] .

There is no need to make a special explanation that states like Guatemala, on the one hand, and like the United States, on the other, have different resources for influencing the identity of their citizens.

Sovereignty and globalization

The actualization of the issue of sovereignty in the era of globalization is a clash of two opposite trends. One can, of course, speak of their dialectical interdependence, especially since it is quite real. Paradoxical is the clash in the public arena of the interests of the United States and its European partners on the issue of laying the South Stream gas pipeline. It is obvious that it is beneficial to European countries, but the United States insists that they decide to suspend it to the detriment of their economic interests.

It is strange that the US FATCA law, which requires banks, investment and insurance companies around the world to disclose information about the accounts of US taxpayers and their companies, applies to financial structures outside the US. It is clear that the US is blackmailing banks with the threat of financial loss: they face a 30% tax on any transactions through the US and the closure of accounts in US financial institutions. But the enforcement of North American law outside the United States is a very significant reason to talk about sovereignty.

In the case where Russia forces VISA and MASTERCARD companies to suffer financial losses in order to be able to operate in the Russian market, the legal requirements do not go beyond Russian territory, although some experts admit that the requirements are excessive. Of interest is the event on April 22 in the Ukrainian capital, when the North American official guest Joe Biden “held a meeting with the Ukrainian leadership, in fact, in the format of the head of state at an internal meeting, he sat at the head of the table, and Ukrainian representatives were located on the sides of him”2, as noted the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry S. Lavrov. All this not only gives ground for reflection on the topic of the strategy of building national sovereignty, but also the confidence that this is the right direction of active activity.

Apparently, we can say that the “games with globalization”, in which all countries of the world were invited on the terms of their exclusivity, are ending. Why this happened is another question. It is clear that globalization no longer works as a cover, and the banal dominance of one country over others has come to the surface of real world politics.

International institutions demonstrate impotence, the UN removes itself from the need to develop, grow above individual countries, become a global arbiter, to overcome conflict situations impartially and diplomatically, while maintaining the face of all participants in a conflict of interest.

International global organizations (as another level of pressure from the dominant country) simply hang over countries that are trying to protect their own interests. These processes brought to life the image of sovereignty, as it were, sent to rest, and now we can say with confidence that it is increasingly in demand by society. The society forms a demand for a strong sovereign elite.

Society, as a set of averaging and simplifying, follows the shortest way of thinking: if not the way it is now, then it is better to let it be the way it was. Sovereignization, of course, is not the best way out, but at least some kind of response to the fact that the United States has abandoned the role of a globalizer and switched to simple domination. The concept of sovereignty has become that defensive reaction, the nature of which has not yet been reliably established, but it is no longer possible to ignore it. And the well-known topic of political sovereignty over the past year has expanded to a whole family due to the active discussion of the topics of the sovereignty of culture and the sovereignty of the economy.

Cultural sovereignty of the USSR and its loss by the Russian Federation

An increased interest in discussing the problems of Russia's cultural sovereignty arose after a meeting (in October 2013) of the Presidential Council for Culture and Art with the participation of Russian President V.V. Putin. In his speech at this meeting, film director Karen Shakhnazarov, one of the most talented and authoritative creators of culture of the recent past and present, gave the following assessment of the state of culture in Russia: “The USSR, as you know, had not only full political sovereignty, but it also had what is called "cultural sovereignty". And if we managed to regain political sovereignty today, with cultural sovereignty, in my opinion, the situation is much more complicated - to a large extent, we have lost it today. Some may say that there is no cultural sovereignty, culture is universal. To which I would answer that culture has no boundaries, but it has roots. And the whole question is this: the next generation, any other generation, after a generation brought up already in the absence of cultural sovereignty or in other cultural traditions, will it even want to preserve the political sovereignty of the country? This is a question, which, of course, is very, in my opinion, acute in modern Russia.

How true is such a categorical statement? Is Russia's cultural sovereignty really lost? How relevant is such alarmism? Unfortunately, the current cultural industry provides more than enough cause for concern. For example, in domestic animation, cultural sovereignty has been lost. Experts note that our animation has been delighting viewers around the world for a century, but outstanding cartoons made in recent decades can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Domestic children's cinema, according to K. Shakhnazarov, "died", as there are no longer directors and screenwriters specializing in this segment. Without animation, children's films, games focused on the root (according to Shakhnazarov) images of culture, it will be problematic to fix the sovereignty of culture.

O. Sviblova, using the metaphor of imprinting, showed that the opportunity to lead the younger generations through the virtual space has been missed: “We know from zoology the imprinting of a duck: here it goes either after the mother duck, as soon as the chick crawls out of the egg, or behind the pillow, if he meets her first. Our children today, whether we like it or not, first of all meet with what they find in this very virtual space.”

What, in fact, did K. Shakhnazarov express when he said that the cultural sovereignty of the country has been lost? He said that 20 years after the liquidation of the USSR, that is, after the loss of its sovereignty, its culture lived for another two decades and by now this resource has been used up.

K. Shakhnazarov, as a representative of Soviet culture, as a representative of a certain generational stratum (like many who spoke at the Council on Culture in support of the theses of the director of Mosfilm), expressed the feelings of his generation, concern about the state of cultural images close to this generation. The positions in culture he compares, both explicitly and unconsciously, are the positions of Soviet culture at the time of its heyday and at the present decline.

This point of view is clear and understandable, it can be sympathetically perceived by many. But what about the operative part? As follows from the report, this is the adoption of urgent state measures to force the reproduction of a sample of culture, which is already almost lost.

On the theory and practice of cultural development

How successfully the analysis of the stated problem is consistent with the measures to resolve it, we will try to establish by referring to the theory and practice of the development of culture in modern conditions.

The scientific aspect of the issue of cultural sovereignty and the explanation of the trends in its dynamics was also covered recently, in 2011, on the pages of the journal "Problems of Philosophy". V.S. Malakhov showed that national culture and the national state are inseparable from each other, but the time of the flowering of national cultures has passed, and by the end of the 20th century. conditions have developed under which the sovereignty of nation-states in the cultural sphere is becoming increasingly fictitious. That, however, does not stop the growing claims of the state to the possession of this sovereignty.

Suppose, but in the development of culture, this feature is observed both in traditional society and in the society of modernity and postmodernity: the dominant generational stratum fully recognizes as culture only its own cultural model. Age stratification is one of those that create the basic basis for the reproduction of the human community7. The source of this feature - the existence of "genuine culture" and the rest of lack of culture - is not in class, but in dominance, that is, in power.

Further, according to Malakhov, modern societies as such are faced with the difficulties of cultural sovereignty. Russia is not alone in this. The author believes that the reason for this is the development of the market across national borders. And we can agree with this, since market communication dictates diversity everywhere, rooting consumer relations. The mode of consumption, according to E. Fromm8, requires diversity, hence, for example, the material encouragement of local ethnic diversity by tourists who are eager to satisfy their needs of learning new and unusual lifestyles.

It is important to add that this desire is driven by the need to make up for the lack of nonconformity that is emerging in modern societies. Interest in nonconformism is caused by the penetration and growth of the influence of power in all spheres of life. State power claims the territory of culture in an effort to occupy key positions in the control of public consciousness and thereby creates a conformist environment, on the one hand, and an environment of opposition, on the other.

A developed personality strives for autonomy precisely in culture, since the material spaces of development are reliably controlled by networks of state infrastructure. For the individual, the path to freedom remains only in culture and creativity. It turns out that both the state and the individual expand the space of culture in their own interests, and culture remains the winner.

As a result, it became objectively difficult for developed countries to impose their sovereignty in culture precisely because the claims of the authorities to the possession of this sovereignty began to conflict with similar claims of the individual.

It is worth noting the main thing: the clash of interests of state power and the individual for the possession of sovereignty over culture determines the nature of the contradictions in modern society. And in this clash, the victory of one of the parties is not a foregone conclusion, since globalism, as we remember, advanced on a wave of protest against pressure on the individual from state structures.

On this basis, the conclusions of experts about the imminent end of state sovereignty were perceived with optimism. The end of sovereignty and the emergence of new institutions of global governance were interpreted by experts as a new opportunity and basis for asserting democratic rights and popular sovereignty on a global scale.

In practice, the norms for the formation of a cultural pattern today are set by the progress and wide distribution of digital content. Its range is from entertainment and education to social design and military technology. According to K. Rodkin, digital content today actually creates cultural sovereignty, which is achieved not by bans and firewalls, but by the active production of content and the development of technologies.

World production data shows that many countries of the world are following this path, for example, in Asia, the share of their own content is about 85% and is based on a conscious choice of the audience. This forms a serious barrier, in particular, to Hollywood multimedia products, including films.

Patriotic computer games

In Russia, since 2010, government authorities have begun to pay more attention to the field of digital content, but there have been no breakthrough successes so far. In 2010, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Nikolai Pankov proposed the idea of ​​creating military computer games in which children would play "for Russians, not for Americans." The following year, President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev suggested creating a Russian version of the popular online game World of Warcraft. However, none of the game manufacturers began to participate in the competition for the creation of the technical core of this game, announced by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation.

Similar attempts were made by the Ministry of Communications, the State Drug Control Service (the games "Anti-Drug Addiction" and "Special Forces Fighter of the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia"), the Ministry of Defense (the games "Sea Battle" and "Tetris"). However, the quality of digital products left much to be desired, and the execution of the work resulted in overhead costs that caused heated debate.

At the same time, some computer games with a patriotic theme, released without the participation of the state, showed satisfactory results in terms of quality and market demand. These are such domestic products as “The Truth about the Ninth Company”, “Confrontation. Peace enforcement” (based on the Ossetian Georgian conflict in August 2008).

Popular games are "Cossacks" (Ukrainian manufacturer GSC Game World), "Operation Bagration" (Belarusian manufacturer Gamstream), as well as the client online game "World of tanks" (Belarusian manufacturer Wargaming.net), which has received worldwide recognition as the best game 2010 - 2012 years.

The theme of tank battles gives an example of how the feedback between society and the sphere of cultural production can work, an example of a successful and interesting dialogue between the screen spheres of culture and its addressee. The game "World of tanks" and the film "White Tiger" by K. Shakhnazarov were simultaneously a great success, maintaining mutual interest and at the same time performing important patriotic and educational work with young people from the state point of view - drawing their attention to the theme of the Great Patriotic War, to the theme of war and the world in general.

And all this important and necessary work was done on the basis of interest, the awakening of attention by modern means of culture - the means of gaming, audiovisual propaganda.

Sovereignty of national film culture

As for modern domestic film production, practice and its assessments do not always coincide. Not only domestic entertainment film production is clearly losing today to the world leader in the film industry - the United States (annual box office in Russia is around 85/15% in favor of the North American film industry). On this cut of cultural sovereignty, there are serious problems in all countries (except India).

However, in comparison with other European countries, domestic cinema enjoys the greatest audience sympathy in absolute terms. For the most part, Russian viewers go to films of national production more willingly than citizens of other countries11. Per 1,000 inhabitants, this figure is decreasing, but due to the fact that the Russian industry produces relatively few films (52 films in 2010, 58 films in 2011, 68 films in 2012) .

The leaders in interest in national cinema (excluding the United States, of course) are France and Spain, where such an effect is achieved due to the greater production of films than in Russia, and also to a small extent due to the system of quota distribution of foreign films (in Spain, the minimum share of distribution of national production - 16% of films).

As a similar measure to support domestic cinema, a bill “On Cinematography in the Russian Federation” was submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, according to which a quota minimum of 20% of domestic films in the box office should be set, but this proportion of 20/80% has developed naturally.

A fairly rigid quota system operates in China, where cinemas are allowed to show no more than 34 foreign films a year, while giving foreign studios about 25% of box office receipts.

If we talk about measures to strengthen the sovereignty of Russian film culture in the field of commercial distribution, then they are limited to financial state support for the production of individual films. The popularity of most of these films reflects the thesis of film expert J. Chapron: “Today, films created on a political order are doomed to failure.”

As a rule, the Russian audience did not appreciate the patriotism of high-profile Russian film premieres of recent years, despite the significant financial resources that the state has invested in their production.

The interstate project of Russia and Belarus "Brest Fortress" was a success with the mass audience, while the military epic - S. Mikhalkov's dilogy "Burnt by the Sun-2: Anticipation" and "Burnt by the Sun-3: Citadel" was coolly received at the box office.

In Ukraine, as in Russia, the situation with patriotic cinema is similar: such “high-profile” premieres of Ukrainian cinema as “Bogdan Zinoviy Khmelnitsky”, “Vladyka Andrei”, financed by the state, brought losses to distributors.

Dialogue of culture and state

It is entirely possible that the compulsory measures of cultural revival are not only understandable for the state, but also convenient. However, it does not take into account the fact that, along with Soviet cultural sovereignty, the methods of dialogue between culture and the state have also become the property of history.

At a meeting of the Council for Culture, this idea was voiced. It was expressed by R. Emelyanov: “... it seemed to me that I heard today and often hear about the imposition of culture. I would like to caution against this. Because there is an illusion, in particular, that if suddenly on some popular entertainment television channel that is watched by millions, instead of some show, they start showing good literary readings or Swan Lake, then this will become much more popular, and these millions will see what they have to offer. They won't watch, unfortunately. It's the same subtle structure. It is necessary to propagandize - yes, to educate - yes, in some way to promote - yes, but to impose ... By imposing, you can achieve a completely opposite effect, repulsive.

The claim of the state power to hegemony in culture, the desire to build a national culture according to the models of the heyday of national cultures is not only doomed to failure, it clearly, on the example of a number of CIS countries, demonstrates comical examples of repositioning the national culture that has freed itself from the yoke of the USSR, as the most ancient , the richest in all sorts of key inventions in the history of human civilization and which had a decisive role in its course.

Yes, most national histories were created in a similar way, but right now, in the era of information openness, such imitation looks comical.

Market production of a cultural product

In the post-industrial world, the production of a cultural product and business are inextricably linked. The market-oriented production of a cultural product takes into account needs and demand, since the production costs invested by the business are aimed at returning profits, which means that the entire production-consumption mechanism here also works on the basic principle of efficiency.

This is a production that takes into account the tastes, expectations, preferences of the consumer, maintains fashion trends, explores promising trends, develops more and more new technologies to attract the attention of an increasingly demanding consumer.

This is a super-innovative, intellectually intensive industry. Knowledge about a person in it is of paramount importance. It is safe to say that the film content industry knows a lot more about a person than he does. This industry creates a huge layer of culture and already has its own specific niche in culture, cyclically reproducing its consumer. It provides samples, models, images and methods of self-identification, including mimicking national cultures.

As a world leader, the US film industry creates images of national culture to represent them to the whole world, thereby formatting public consciousness, imposing national images on the global audience from its own point of view, changing them from film project to film project if necessary. Does it make sense for the US government to support such an industry? Certainly yes.

UNESCO protection of cultural producers

Recently, the United States is hardly alone in the face of an upsurge in the struggle for markets for cultural products in a number of countries. Thus, on October 20, 2005, the UNESCO General Conference adopted (148 countries voted in favor, with two “against” - the United States and Israel, and four abstentions) a document on the legality of domestic legal measures aimed at protecting local producers of cultural goods and services and cultural - leisure activities.

Thus, the US today has to bear the blow to its cultural hegemony in the world. K. Bruner argues that the United States will have to defend its position, proving the necessity and desirability of liberalizing trade in cultural products. The global tide washing away state sovereignty has given way to an ebb in the minds of intellectuals who are thinking about somehow regaining a sense of sovereign power, at least in the form of a state.

Work according to time

The methods of motivating the development of a sovereign culture, which have been reproduced for a long time in Russia and do not show obvious success, owe their origin to the bureaucratic habit of manual control in the conditions of catch-up development.

Therefore, in order for a patriotic domestic picture of the class "Saving Private Ryan" to be able to repeat and surpass the success and power of the artistic impact of this Hollywood film, it is not enough to release one picture of the "Stalingrad" class by F. Bondarchuk. This requires a competitive environment - the work of different creative teams, the competition of doctrines, approaches, readings, styles of a dozen different production studios. And, as the distribution and discussion of the films "White Tiger" and "Stalingrad" shows, the audience of such films only in our country is huge, and the need for such films is objective.

Few people can be surprised by the agreement that a large advanced country needs its own production base of a cultural product, this is obvious. It is important to clearly understand: which cultural industry is adequate to the time, to which culture to direct resources.

The state machine is quite good at forming an idea of ​​what was needed, and not of what will be needed. Cumbersome state institutions digest past experience and think in terms of the past. The generals believe they know how to fight well, devising strategies for the warfare of a bygone era. Teachers skillfully teach what they have been taught, and curricula reflect past educational experiences.

Tradition is in many ways a positive proven experience that cements the ties of generations, but, following in the wake of state sanctions, progressive cultural innovations in the modern world are doomed to the pace of development that this state sets.

An illustrative example of this approach is the project to introduce tablets into Russian schools for students to replace textbooks. In 2011, the head of the Rosnano company presented a prototype of this product to the President of Russia V.V. Putin, announcing that it will be produced in Russia and in 2011 will be sent to Russian schools.

To date, this project has been closed, despite a sound idea and generous government funding. During the time that the development of funds and the preparation of production facilities were underway, this device became outdated, and many schoolchildren privately use much more progressive analogues for educational purposes.

The need for investment in culture

If we turn to the world experience in building cultural sovereignty, we can see that the policy in the field of high technologies and digital content is based on supporting not individual enterprises, but entire industries. So, in China, which still maintains a policy of prohibitions in the field of the Internet, in parallel since 2005, Guangzhou, a region focused on this industry and preparing to compete on an equal footing with global American companies, has been developing.
Probably, it is precisely such measures that today can be characterized as investments in cultural sovereignty. This is a conscious investment that must be distinguished from a conscious loss.

Culture must reproduce culture - this is a production process, and production costs cannot be avoided. If there are no entities within the country interested in investing in culture, then such entities will certainly appear from outside. And the state of knowledge of the work of the cultural industry allows us to assert the following: whoever invests in culture launches its reproductive circuit. These are conscious spending, counting on the formation of a dependence of consciousness on a system of images, on the emergence of a habit of perception and consumption of products of the cultural industry, which provide profit in the future - both in economic and political sense.

In fact, we see the following: there is a certain modern mode of perception of reality. Its patterns are known, studied and used by market agents - the manufacturer and the investor (customer). The government is also a customer. In Russia, we have a picture that a producer of cultural content, working for a market customer, can produce a competitive product, while working for a state customer, he admits failures.

This is followed by versions:
- incompetence of the state as a customer of a cultural product that meets the interests of the country's cultural sovereignty;
- an objective impossibility to understand the priorities of the development of culture and, as a result, a game of chance;
- a conscious policy of ordering deliberately unpopular content, pursuing its own goals.

Computer games shape the minds of young people

I would like to think that, by and large, the state does not systematically fall into the mainstream of the development of modern culture, but we have shown that state policy can be adequate in the approach to creating computer games. Many commentators on these innovations hastened to scoff at the attempts of individual government departments to create games based on their activities, but the trend is inevitable: the younger generation spends up to 35 hours a week (this is almost a full-time work week) at the computer, communicating on the Internet, consuming digital content, games. These games make up a significant share of teenagers' communication, success in them increases self-esteem.

Computer games are the gateway through which the consciousness of young people is formed today directly with the help of the content of these games. Therefore, it is not surprising that the state wants to have its own instruments of influence on the formation of the consciousness of young people. This desire is understandable, and the expert community with the appropriate professional competence and experience is able to show under what conditions the idea of ​​influencing young people through gaming content can be implemented effectively and in the interests of the Russian society.

Not the state itself, but the expert community, more broadly - civil society - this is the subject that has a certain interest in the development of the sovereignty of its contemporary, and not the outgoing culture; has a flexible structure, adequate to the rapid progress of the form and content and means of dissemination of cultural content, has knowledge of a person and an idea of ​​​​the methods of most effective concentration of attention on significant images of culture.

Finally, it is civil society as a conductor of modern, sovereign culture that can become a mediator in the dialogue between the authorities and the individual, the synthesis of their divergent interests in the development of a common culture.

The Sovereignty of Culture in the Fundamentals of the Cultural Policy of the Russian Federation

On May 16, 2014, the project "Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy" appeared on the Internet portal of Rossiyskaya Gazeta. It is planned to submit this document for signature to the President of the Russian Federation after the public discussion. In point II. "The purpose, content and principles of the state cultural policy" states that "the goal of the state cultural policy is the spiritual, cultural, national self-determination of Russia, the unification of Russian society and the formation of a moral, independently thinking, creative, responsible personality based on the use of the entire potential of national culture."
The sovereignty of society as a whole, culture (in particular) and the individual is here specifically and unambiguously noted as the goal of state policy.

The document covers all areas of cultural development, focuses on the need to solve acute problems with the creation of conditions for the reproduction of national culture. Only the conclusion looks paradoxical: “Achieving the goals set in the Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy and successfully solving the formulated tasks is impossible within the framework of the existing system of public administration.” This unexpected summary negates all the positive impression from the text of the document: it turns out that in order to approve these "Fundamentals ...", it is necessary - no less - a different system of public administration. This is a rather decisive, but at the same time (we will proceed from the realities) strategically impracticable proposal. It turns out that "the achievement of the goals set in the Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy and the successful solution of the formulated tasks is impossible...".

We are not inclined to fully share this point of view, although we recognize that modern conditions are also producing a new culture that will demand novelty in the management system as well. Today, before our eyes, many new (or updated) elements of the feedback system in the management system are being born, tested and become commonplace.

The mechanism for the realization of sovereignty in culture is also subject to renewal. Modern technologies of the indirect participation of the individual in general politics, in economic processes, in the creation of their own cultural infrastructure are infiltrated into ordinary life without revolutionary changes.

Social technologies and cultural sovereignty

Social technologies work, and they can be successfully used in the field of culture. Evidence of this is the change in the principles of allocating funds to support domestic cinema that occurred in 2013, which made it possible to create high-quality film products and increase the share of domestic films in the box office to 16%.

In 2013, the Ministry of Culture launched a system of open, public defense of film projects - pitching. In this regard, the competition system for protecting scripts, which is being developed by the Cinema Fund, has a good potential. There are successes in crowdfunding, for example, the national project "28 Panfilovites", which is being implemented in conditions of maximum openness.

The strategy for the formation of cultural sovereignty, therefore, falls not only on the shoulders of the state, which excludes a monopoly in the evaluation of a cultural product by any of the subjects (state, society, individual) of the joint process of cultural sovereignization. This model also assumes a special form of relations and mutual responsibility between the sub-customer - the manager of financial resources, and the contractor - the content producer.

Firstly, there is a need for a competent intermediary at the project selection stage - professional public associations.

Secondly, it is necessary to monitor the fulfillment of obligations. Finally, thirdly, we need an assessment of the compliance of the order with the end result.

The listed needs in the field of new relations can be realized with the use of existing mechanisms and institutions, as well as in the presence of a regime of maximum transparency of procedures.

The principal thing here is that the mechanism for implementing the idea of ​​a new strategy for the sovereignization of domestic culture should be an open public-private partnership.

Russia's cultural sovereignty today, in the face of ongoing sanctions and ultimatums, needs to be spoken loudly, clearly and responsibly. Why? This will be discussed further. But first - about the essence of the term itself.

concept "cultural sovereignty of the Russian Federation" was first enshrined in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015) as a factor contributing to “strengthening national security in the field of culture”. The mechanism for ensuring it is also indicated: "taking measures to protect Russian society from external ideological and value expansion and destructive information and psychological impact."

It should be emphasized that cultural sovereignty is not only an integral part, but also a necessary condition for ensuring state sovereignty.

Triad "sovereignty - identity - security"- the cornerstone of any statehood, an inviolable "border strip" that protects national states from transboundary expansion from global control centers led by the "world hegemon" represented by the United States. It can be safely assumed that in the conditions of the crisis of the modern world order, fraught with a real "clash of civilizations" according to S. Huntington's scenario, the role of the cultural factor in ensuring state sovereignty and national security will steadily increase, since it is culture that plays the role of the guardian of the civilizational code of the nation, its value base.

The deepest foundation of a nation's cultural sovereignty is historical memory. N. A. Berdyaev pointed out their organic relationship: “The nobility of any true culture is determined by the fact that culture is the cult of ancestors, the veneration of graves and monuments, the connection of sons with fathers. Culture is always proud<…>inextricable link with the great past. Culture, like the Church, values ​​its continuity most of all.”

Thanks to the decisions of President V.V. Putin and the initiatives of the Minister of Culture V.R. Medinsky, it was possible to overcome the narrow departmental, utilitarian, branch approach to culture and move to new, nationally responsible and value-oriented model of state cultural policy. For the first time in the entire post-Soviet period, its high historical mission was formulated, according to which “the state cultural policy is recognized as an integral part of the national security strategy”, “the guarantor of the country's territorial integrity”, and culture itself “is elevated to the rank of national priorities”.

Speaking at one of the expanded meetings of the Council for Culture and Art, the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin clearly pointed out the importance of cultural sovereignty: in the world, and in preserving the integrity of our state and national sovereignty. Because that if there is no culture, then it is not at all clear what sovereignty is, and then it is not clear what to fight for. In essence, here, in a pointed form, the fundamental role of culture in ensuring national sovereignty is affirmed.

The President reiterated this idea in his recent Address to the Federal Assembly of February 20, 2019, the essence of which is that “without sovereignty, there is no Russia.”

As Western mass culture, merging with big business, degenerates into the entertainment industry and the “pleasure economy”, and educational model cultural development is finally supplanted consumer-leisure model, the spiritually and morally healthy forces of humanity have an urgent need for a different cultural strategy. Such a strategy that would not be accompanied by a destructive moral regression, a cynical triumph of base animal instincts, a complete destruction of the “Divine Plan for the World”, as our great predecessors thought of the mission of Man on Earth.

Therefore, it is quite natural that culture is increasingly becoming a sphere of informational and psychological confrontation, "invasion without weapons," as they used to say back in the Soviet years. It is no coincidence that Western leaders have repeatedly acknowledged that the Cold War with Russia was won by Western rock culture.

Today, the organizers of information and psychological wars of a new generation - mental wars, "memory wars" - initiate not only falsification of history, but also falsification of cultural property. In the context of the spread of low-grade "surrogates" of mass culture, tailored according to the patterns of Western consumption standards, such "fake becomes not only a fake of genuine value, it displaces the latter and becomes even more in demand ...".

It is generally accepted that the US is the global producer of cultural counterfeiting. The result of many years of American policy of "cultural imperialism" is what domestic and foreign scientists call the general "Californization" and "McDonaldization" of the world, the culture of "total averaging" of the individual.

It is also important to emphasize that the cultural sovereignty of a nation is ensured not only by the degree of its protection from external ideological and value expansion, but also by the spiritual strength of the internal cultural space. And here, unfortunately, there are vulnerable "gaps" - what the writer Yuri Polyakov once aptly dubbed "father phobia at public expense."

Unfortunately, today's television and radio air (including central channels) is filled with meaningless and obsessive "hits" that have become a profitable business for a limited circle of "creators", their predatory producers and nimble promoters. The commercial factor actively impedes the formation of a new national musical and song repertoire of patriotic, military-historical themes.

As V. Mayakovsky once said, back in the pre-revolutionary period of his work, "the street writhes without a language - it has nothing to shout and talk with." Today, this multi-million people's "street" does not have a real song "language". After all, it is impossible to imagine our compatriots gathered at a friendly table, camping by the fire or in a tourist bus, performing instead of a soulful song, a “collective rap” that is absolutely alien to the national melody.

Another cultural “falsification” of the postmodernist fabrication is the endless “remakes” of classic films and literary adaptations, pseudo-repetitions of outstanding works of Soviet art and images of performers of the past, turning into ugly fakes, blasphemous, often offensive parodies that destroy the fund of national cultural memory.

The inability to create something new and original, equivalent in terms of the strength of the spiritual and aesthetic impact of the previous samples, is replaced by a massive dominance of falsifications. At the same time, a low-talented but aggressive pop culture, displacing genuine culture, weakens the spiritual and creative potential of the nation, its moral immunity, and, consequently, its sovereignty.

Today, the state, represented by the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, reserves the right not to provide financial support to "creative" projects that discredit their own state in favor of "Western partners." This should be recognized as a serious conquest in favor of the sovereign cultural policy of the state. Indeed, in order to understand the scale of the spiritual illness of some "creators", it is enough to list the "speaking" names of a number of "movie masterpieces" recognized by the West, claiming supposedly deep, "metaphorical" generalizations: "Tightness" and "Acid".

This is how the Motherland is seen by our "father-phobes" - the spiritual brothers of numerous foreign-style Russophobes. Some of them are really talented, but, unfortunately, the desire to please the “civilized West” at all costs, to shine at prestigious international competitions is much stronger. Moreover, some of them have a “spare Motherland” there - just in case ...

“Who are you with, masters of culture?” once the straightforward and wise Gorky asked. “Why are you, masters of culture? How much are you, masters of culture?” - as always, aiming and caustic, developing the Gorky message, Yuri Polyakov hits the targets.

Against this background, the recent public statement by Dmitry Bykov, who, like the “brilliant” director K. Bogomolov, who unfortunately stole, claims to be the new “ruler of thoughts,” shocked every honest person in Russia not only with his cynicism. The desire to morally rehabilitate the complete traitor General Vlasov and add him to the register of "remarkable people" is also a provocative challenge to our historical memory. This, among other things, is a notorious reputational blow to the moral prestige of the Young Guard publishing house and the authority of the ZhZL series, which has been operating since the time of M. Gorky. But it should be stated with all responsibility: no commercial success of the alleged "sensational" publication can be morally and socially justified. It is well known that in Russian the word "wonderful" has a purely positive meaning. Therefore, the publication in the series “The Life of Remarkable People” of an opus about a traitor hated by the people cannot be called anything other than a “mental sabotage” in the spirit of “memory wars”, only already unleashed not from outside, but from within the country. However, the sophisticated stylist D. Bykov, favored, contrary to the opinion of a huge readership, by another prestigious literary award, is, apparently, only at hand. After all, being one of the leaders of the "fifth column" in Russian culture in the eyes of the West is very prestigious and even honorable. Apparently, the eagerly awaited dividends will not be long in coming…

Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly noted that the sphere of culture is at the forefront of ideological, informational and psychological confrontation and global competition. Thus, during one of the meetings with representatives of the public on the issues of patriotic education of youth, he emphasized: “As our own historical experience shows, cultural self-awareness, spiritual, moral values, value codes are a sphere of fierce competition, sometimes an object of open information confrontation, well orchestrated propaganda attack<…>This is at least one form of competition.”

The substitution of values ​​and meanings is the main information and psychological weapon directed against Russian culture in the global information war against Russia. The Russian military-historical society is fully aware of this danger and is waging a resolute struggle against it. The unified strategy of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the RVIO as an authoritative public-state organization is yielding positive results. On a systematic basis, scientific conferences and round tables are held on countering the distortion of the history of the Great Patriotic War. Considerable attention is paid to the memorialization of places associated with the names of outstanding commanders and heroic defenders of the Motherland, objects of historical and cultural heritage. One of the priorities in the activities of the regional and municipal branches of the Russian Military Historical Society has been and remains the patriotic education of children and youth.

The most important function of culture is to protect the civilizational, mental code of the nation. In the context of the global humanitarian crisis, culture becomes a weapon spiritual defense. Under these conditions, the falsification of the history of the Fatherland, traditional cultural values ​​and meanings should be considered as a serious and immediate threat to national security. This by no means mythical threat must be put in place by a reliable public barrier.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015 No. 685 "On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation". S. 39.

Berdyaev N.A. Philosophy of inequality. M., 2012. S. 271.

Strategy of the state cultural policy for the period up to 2030. Approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of February 29, 2016 No. 326.

Fundamentals of state cultural policy. Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 24, 2014 No. 808. Strategy of the state cultural policy for the period up to 2030. Approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of February 29, 2016 No. 326. P.5.

Speech by V.V. Putin at an expanded meeting of the Presidium of the Council for Culture and Art. February 3, 2014, Pskov.

Saraf M.Ya. Security of the national-cultural space is a necessary condition for sustainable development // Information wars. 2010. No. 3 (15). P.96.

Filimonov G. Cultural and informational mechanisms of US foreign policy. M., 2012. S. 76.

Meeting with representatives of the public on the issues of patriotic education of youth September 12, 2012, Krasnodar.

O. E. Voronova, Member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Philology, Professor of the Department of Journalism of the Ryazan State University named after S. A. Yesenin, Member of the Russian Military Historical Society

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Tsarenko Sergey Alexandrovich/ candidate of architecture (theory, history)

Emphasizing that the triad "sovereignty - identity - security" is the cornerstone of statehood, and the deep foundation of the cultural sovereignty of the nation is historical memory, Russians and all Russians need to remember, first of all, the dynastic origin of our traditional statehood. The memory of this does not mean an indispensable return to the situation before March 1917 - one cannot enter that river, as they say, and subsequent events just showed the tragic weaknesses of the Russian royal house, albeit a betrayed one - however, it is about understanding the dynastic core any ethno-political and spiritual identity. The historical memory of Russian dynastic identity is an understanding of that simple and indisputable fact to which the oldest Russian chronicle "The Tale of Bygone Years" is dedicated: a multi-layered and, moreover, completely holistic text in the famous "legend of vocation" and messages closely related to it testifies that dynastic Russia was a (proto) Slavic (dynastically older in relation to the Slavic dynasties proper) ethnocultural grouping of mainland significance from two “Celtic” migration lines - from the Southern Baltic (northern, ruling the lands with a center in Novgorod the Great) and from the Danube through the Carpathians (southern, ruling lands with a center in Kiev; there, the “northern” Rus Olga, and not the fictional “Helga” of today’s writers, found the “mother of cities” - it was the Slavic “Cybele”, authentically KYYAVA, or KYY-VLA, i.e. The "Divine Mermaid", the local revered "incarnation" - the stream, now known as Kyyanka under the Starokievskaya Mountain; apparently, the Polish VѢ-RSHA-VA became the western sacred rival). Northern Rus' bore the class-ethnic nickname "Varyags" (with the initial stress on the first syllable), i.e. "defenders" (sacred homonym - "guardians of the Great Water", or "warriors of the Heavenly Stream"; actually the "surname" of the Rurikovichi, which characteristically, literally - "falcons"). As Adam of Bremensky wrote (XI century), the trade route "From the Varangians to the Greeks" began in Stargrad; This route was controlled, among other things, by Varyags from the island of Ruga or Ruyan (now Rügen). About both parts of the ancient Russians - the joint owners of water trade routes in the basins of the Volga and the Dnieper, of course, rival relatives - the medieval Arabs eloquently testified as two "types" of Rus' (as well as three "groups" of settlement of the Russians). Among them, Celtic and Germanic names, weapons, as well as oriental shrines and ornaments were fashionable - a tribute to the historical memory of their own ancient ancestors (from the Celts, Slavs, Alans, ancient Taurians and not only). There were no Scandinavian "idols" in the family pantheon of Vladimir the Baptist. No Scandinavians had anything to do with all this until the beginning of the 11th century. (despite the signs of archaic, ancient mainland vocabulary of pilotage in the names of the Dnieper rapids, often artificially interpreted as supposedly only Germanic, and of course, despite archaeological artifacts interpreted as "Scandinavian"). Only then, from the time of Yaroslav the Wise and the Swedish princess Ingigerd - Princess Irina, did the name of the Varangians spread to warriors of Swedish and other origin, about which, in fact, the author (or compiler) of the Tale of Bygone Years wrote: “ѿ [from time, i.e. e. not only and not so much on behalf of] Várѧg was nicknamed Rus, but the first besh [they used to be called, the chronicler emphasizes!] Slovenia. more and Pauline zvakhus. nȏ Slovenskӕ rѣch bѣ [the language of all those mentioned is Slavic]. Let me call you. zanezhe in Pole [Field - a specific forest-steppe region!] ӕzyk Slovenskyi bѣ im єdin [mentioned - from one Slavic people]”, - we quote with spelling in the edition of the Ipatiev Chronicle. And before that, after the legend of the preaching of the Apostle Paul in Illyria, the most important annalistic evidence was recorded: “Slovenesk ӕzyk and Ruskyi ѡdin”, - Slavs and Russians are one people ... And now in Russia for centuries they have been “proving” that the ancient Rus were supposedly Germans , and even off-continent - the Scandinavians, some kind of unprecedented "Swedish Rus'". And the German-speaking academicians from the 18th century “prove” by turning the content of the message from the Bertin annals, etc. (where the mentioned representatives of the Rhos people, in the understanding of the Western emperor, are precisely opposed to the “Sveons”, - by the way, rather to the “Balts”, who found themselves among the representatives of Rus' and thereby aroused suspicion), and the current “experts” who did not serve in the army , with arguments like “we have no order”, with an incorrect translation of our original source. And in the annals, there was talk of a princely outfit - an economic assignment, which was fixed as a term precisely in Russian army charters: it was said - by the chronicler on behalf of the unification of the northern tribes - we don’t have an outfit, we need a leader for the outfit (in those days - a dynast). Thus, the mainland dynastic dignity of Slavic Rus' is an objective fact, and the sacred historical name ROUS, or RSHA, i.e. “Solar Living Water” is the WORLD SPIRITUAL BEGINNING under the same root sacred names Rus' and RUSSIA. They have an undeniable ethnopolitical primogeniture on a continental and global level. The Baptist of Rus', accustomed to unite and develop (and not “divide and rule”), perfectly understood what universal priorities his people lay claim to. Today - the Russian people are multinational, uniting many, and only the descendants of the Russians, four cultures (Belarusian, Carpatho-Rusyn, Russian, Ukrainian). And if, as the article says, “the falsification of the history of the Fatherland, traditional cultural values ​​and meanings should be considered as a serious and immediate threat to national security,” then unconditionally categorical publications with an obsessive mention of the supposedly “Scandinavian” Rurik, as in the encyclopedia “Ancient Russia in the Middle Ages world” (Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014) should at least be independently reviewed by the scientific community and certainly not remain beyond criticism.

Recently, more and more often we hear talk about the need for a new privatization. Being a categorical opponent of privatization in terms of large industrial, infrastructure and energy facilities, I wanted to once again speak on this topic.

And this time to link the problems of privatization with the problems of preserving Russia as an independent state in a historical perspective. And also to consider the question of whether it is possible to maintain the level of sovereignty that Russia has today and whether it is achievable to obtain full state sovereignty in the future if a new privatization does take place.

To begin with, let me remind you of my definition of Full State Sovereignty. It consists of 5 components:

1. Recognition by the international community of the country as a subject of international law and international relations. Flag, coat of arms, anthem.
2. diplomatic sovereignty.
3. military sovereignty.
4. economic sovereignty.
5. cultural sovereignty.

Moreover, the presence and implementation in practice of all five signs of sovereignty in some connection (and to varying degrees) is, in essence, the semantic skeleton of all international relations. A classic example is the behavior of today's US in the international arena. When the weakening of their economic sovereignty, as a result of the financial crisis, leads to an increase in military activity, with the help of the military sovereignty that has not yet been oppressed by the crisis. In concentrated form, this is expressed by the formula: "Saving the dollar is war."

When we are told about the new privatization in Russia, we are told about the increase in the economic and managerial efficiency of the industries being privatized. About whether this is a myth or reality, we will talk in the following articles. For now, let's focus on just one component of the problem: the country's economic sovereignty.

Russia is a separate civilization.

Russia has been formed over the centuries as a separate civilization. With all its inherent, as a civilization, its own civilizational attitudes. Russia is the civilization of the Russian people, around which all other small peoples that entered the orbit of Russian civilization were formed and took shape. Russia is a mosaic of many peoples and cultures on the common basis of the Russian people and Russian culture. Such an alliance of peoples, created around the Russian people, revealed to the world a unique fusion of many cultures and ways of life, various religions, languages ​​and races. For centuries, the developing Russian civilization, as a civilization that creates conditions for the existence and formation of many peoples, demanded the creation of a powerful state capable of protecting the peoples included in it, connecting the geographical space into a single political, economic and cultural space (without Russian civilization, most of these peoples would probably just disappear from the stage of history).

This is seen as the meaning of the existence of Russia as a state, as a state-civilization. By the way, the very existence of Russia as a state-civilization gives the meaning of existence to many other newly formed states. For example, for the Baltic states. Created in opposition to Russia, on the initiative and with the support of our country's geopolitical adversaries, they play the role of a buffer holding back Russia's movement towards the coastline of the Baltic Sea. Their second task is, along with Poland, to divide Russia and Germany among themselves. The purpose of the creation and existence of these states was determined not by their peoples and not by their rulers, it has nothing to do with the true interests of these countries. But created by the opponents of Russia, they could not but be anything other than purely hostile to us, no matter who and no matter what they told us at the stage of their creation. If Russia is an example of realized successful multiculturalism and equality of peoples, then the buffer states, like the Baltic states, could not but be purely nationalistic. Well, and so on.

But now I would not like to dwell on this in detail.
Let's get back to privatization. Russia as a state-civilization has the only meaning of its existence - it is the preservation and development of the unique Russian civilization. The following follows from this postulate: when Russia, as a state, performs actions that contradict its sense of existence, it always endangers the existence of itself. That is, it endangers the peace and tranquility of all the peoples included in it. And vice versa, when the actions of Russia as a state correspond to its role as a state-civilization, then Russia is strengthened, and the peoples included in it live among themselves not only in peace, but also in prosperity. Based on this statement, we can come to the conclusion that we must consider all issues related to privatization through the prism not of the abstract "efficiency" of enterprises and industries, but through the prism of strengthening or weakening our state-civilization. We are obliged to look at proposals to "privatize" state property through the prism of following or not following Russia as a state to its civilizational destiny.

That's right - no more and no less.

The primary goal of any state (and even more so a state-civilization, which Russia is) is the creation, preservation and strengthening of the unity of the territory, the unity of culture, the unity of the common "rules of the game". The very rules of the game that exist only for their own. In our case - for citizens of Russia. This is what will distinguish them from citizens of other states not at the level of declarations, but in deeds. At the level of everyday, economic, semantic, if you like.

Once in the past centuries, with the development of technologies at the level of that time, distant imperial Petersburg with Kamchatka and Sakhalin at the household level was connected by culture, language, and traditions. This was the basis of political and economic unity. In our technologically and informationally advanced time, when it is closer to Hawaii from Vladivostok than to Moscow, the task of the state is to hold in its hands those sectors of the economy that, in addition to language, culture and traditions, become the basis of economic and political unity.

These are transport, energy, communications, natural resources. And a lever to access them. Russian citizenship should give the holders of power and sovereignty, which are the citizens of the country, tangible advantages over citizens of other countries. In the 21st century, in the conditions of the current level of technological and information development, the basis of the political and economic unity of the country, in addition to culture, language, traditions, should be transport, energy, communications, natural resources. And they will certainly become the basis of unity if we want to preserve our Russia as a civilizational global project familiar to us.

If we understand and are aware of the above, it is easy for us to decide on our attitude to the proposals for privatization. No privatization of anything from the listed list is unacceptable. No arguments about "increasing efficiency" and expanding the tax base should not even be considered, due to the fact that the unified civilizational and economic, and after it the political field of the country, is being destroyed. Our unity will collapse - and soon there will be no one to collect taxes from this very "expanded taxable base".

I would like to note that no one talks about “greater efficiency” in other areas that are traditionally considered the zone of exclusive competence of the state. For example, if private business offers to privatize a piece of the state border on the grounds that the PMCs who will be entrusted with protecting the border are more efficient and professional than the soldiers and officers of the Border Troops. And such "privatization" will reduce government spending on the protection of the state border, while increasing its efficiency. For some reason, I am sure that such a proposal will not find understanding among the leadership of the country and the vast majority of its citizens.

Also, the country's leadership will not find understanding with the proposal to give for "outsourcing" and the diplomatic service of the state. Although, perhaps, the JSC "Ministry of Foreign Affairs" will be more efficient in terms of budget expenditures than the state Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Well, a public company or even CJSC "MVD", in general, would have solved a bunch of long-standing problems of the law enforcement system: from corruption to "werewolves in uniform." After all, “everyone knows” that a private trader is always more efficient than an official. This means that private detectives would quickly put things in order in the country, which would distinguish them favorably from the current police officers. However, even here the state and society would send away all those who would propose such ideas.

And why? What do you think? I think because there is an understanding that there is a list of functions included in the list of the exclusive sphere of competence of the state. What if the state gives something to private traders from this list, it inevitably gives rise to a logical question: why do we need such a state then?
After all, it will be clear to any sane person that if a piece of the state border is privatized for reasons of "increasing efficiency", then this simply means losing control over the entire border of the entire country. No matter what formidable restrictions you would impose on this private trader during the privatization of the “kilometer of the state border” ...

It is such an efficiency... As a private trader it is more efficient, so it will be. OJSC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CJSC Ministry of Internal Affairs will also take care mainly of the profitability and efficiency of their work. As a result, it will be easier for them to negotiate with organized crime on the division of spheres of influence within the country, and with Russia's geopolitical "partners" in the international arena, than to defend the interests of Russian citizens. It will simply be cheaper and easier that way, which means, in the language of “privatizers,” it will be more efficient.

If you bring the "logic of efficiency" to its logical end, then this end will be unexpected. If the bearer of the sovereignty of the country, the Russian people, in the person of their state, gave away part of their sovereignty in favor of a private trader, then this sovereignty was not very necessary for him. And then the next question is within easy reach: why such a state? And as a result: why such a people?

Proceeding from this, no one is proposing to privatize a piece of the state border or create OJSC and CJSC "Ministry of Foreign Affairs" and "Ministry of Internal Affairs". But why, then, is the talk about the need to privatize the structural, state-forming sectors of the economy growing again? And all for the same reason - the privatization of such industries means the loss of the Russian state of its sovereignty. Do we need it? In no case. So the conclusion is the opposite.

The zone of EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY of the STATE should be everything related to the implementation of all 5 components of the Full State sovereignty.

In our specific conditions, in order to realize economic sovereignty, in the conditions of our distances, geographical and climatic features, the difference in territories in terms of general economic and resource content, the zone of EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY of the STATE must include: transport, energy, communications, control over natural and energy resources. This allows you to create common rules of the game for all subjects of the country's economy. This allows the state to perform its most important function of planning the development of the ENTIRE TERRITORY based on its general state and geopolitical tasks. The transfer of some of these functions into the hands of private and "effective" managers only leads to small-town selfishness and the growth of economic, and then political separatism. Because the interests of the development of the entire country can sometimes conflict with the interests of an individual company tuned to maximize profits here and now.

That is why, my deep conviction that privatization as an institution is good only where it does not affect the zone of the STATE'S EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY. This is first. And secondly, it does not lead to an increase in the stratification of the population, without aggravating the gap between the poorest and richest sections of the people. And thirdly, it actually removes from the state functions that are unusual for it. For example, the regulation of the economy at the level of small and medium-sized businesses, where it is quite enough for the state to play the role of an arbitrator. On the one hand, it creates all the conditions for development, and on the other hand, it plays the role of a “dispute resolver”.

If you look at the problem of privatization from this side, then what else do we need to privatize from the non-privatized?

Actually, we have no grounds for a new wave of privatization, since it is proposed to privatize exactly what is the zone of EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE. Which inevitably undermines the economic sovereignty of the country. But they talk and talk about privatization quite persistently.

Someone speaks of privatization as a political choice.

Someone about the need to improve efficiency.

Someone about the role of the new privatization in creating a new patriotic elite in the country.

Someone about the need for Russia to join the club of developed countries through privatization and integration into the international division of labor.

I will dwell on all this in detail in the following articles under the general title "On privatization and ..."

Nikolai Starikov