What skeptics dream about: what gave the world a current of skepticism. Skepticism in philosophy The essence of skepticism

The last great trend in Hellenistic philosophy was skepticism. It appeared almost simultaneously with Stoicism and Epicureanism at the turn of the 4th and 3rd centuries. BC e. Skeptics did not create schools as such, as the Stoics and Epicureans did, but the ideas of skepticism persisted and developed for about five centuries. Skepticism stood somewhat apart from other schools and opposed them all with its own philosophical doctrines, philosophers of other trends created theories, while skeptics only criticized and denied them. They called their opponents "dogmatists" or "asserting philosophers", and themselves - "refraining from judgment" (effects), only "searching" (seitetics) or "considering" (skeptics). The latter name stuck, and skepticism began to be called a philosophical position that denies the possibility of knowing the truth. In antiquity, this position was more often called "Pyrrhonism" after its creator, and its less radical form, which developed in the Academy, "academism".

Predecessors. The main forerunners of skepticism were the sophists, led by Protagoras. They prepared skepticism with their relativism and conventionalism. The Sophists, as well as the younger Eleatics, provided, in the opinion of the skeptics, models of argumentation. But other philosophers prepared skepticism as a critical part of their theories. Democritus, who portrays sensuously perceived qualities as subjective, and even Plato, the stern critic of sensuous knowledge, have placed weapons in the hands of skeptics. Recent; striving to spread their family tree even further, they considered Heraclitus and Xenophanes to be their ancestors.

Development. Ancient skepticism went through many changes and phases in its development. At first, it had a practical character, that is, it acted not only as the most true, but also as the most useful and advantageous position in life, and then turned into a theoretical doctrine; initially he questioned the possibility of any knowledge, then criticized the knowledge, but only received by the previous philosophy. Practical and radical skepticism was proclaimed by the Pyrrhonists, while theoretical and critical by the representatives of the Academy. Three periods can be distinguished in ancient skepticism:

1) Senior Pyrrhonism, developed by Pyrrho himself and his student Timon of Flius, refers to the III century. BC e..At that time, skepticism was purely practical: its core was ethics, and dialectics was only an outer shell; from many points of view, it was a doctrine analogous to the original Stoicism and Epicureanism; however, Pyrrho, who was older than Zeno and Epicurus, came forward with his teachings before them and, most likely, he influenced them, and not vice versa.

2) Academicism. Strictly speaking, during the period when a number of Pyrrho's students were interrupted, a skeptical trend dominated the Academy; it was in the 3rd and 2nd centuries. BC e. "in the Middle Academy", the most prominent representatives of which were Arcesilaus (315-240) and Carneades (214-129 BC).

3) Junior Pyrrhonism found its supporters when skepticism left the walls of the Academy. Studying the works of representatives of the Academy of a later period, one can see that they systematized the skeptical argument. The original ethical position receded into the background, epistemological criticism came to the fore. The main representatives of this period were Aenesidemus and Agrippa. Skepticism gained many adherents in this last period among the physicians of the "empirical" school, among whom was Sextus Empiricus.

Skepticism, which, although it remained true to its original position, underwent significant changes in the course of development: the demanding, moralizing skepticism of Pyrrho found its application after many centuries in positivist empiricism.

Founders. Pyrrho lived approximately in 376-286. BC e., was an artist and already in adulthood took up philosophy. The formation of his views was most influenced by the doctrine Democritus(he was a student of Anaxarchus of Abdera, who, in turn, was a student of Metrodorus, a student of Democritus), then he was influenced by Indian magicians and ascetics with whom he met when he took part in Alexander's campaign in Asia; in their indifference to life and suffering, Pyrrho saw the best means to achieve happiness. He developed this idea not only in theory, but was also guided by it in his own life. The position of indifference, the quintessence of the wisdom of the East, was that alien motive which, with the help of Pyrrho, was introduced into the philosophy of the Greeks.

Returning from Asia, he settled in Elis and founded a school there. By his life he earned universal respect, and thanks to him the inhabitants of Elis exempted the philosophers from taxes, and he himself, a skeptic, was elected the highest clergyman. Pyrrho left no works behind him, as he believed that knowledge could not be obtained. He became the patron of later skeptics, and they attributed their own ideas to him, just as the Pythagoreans did to Pythagoras. The students of Pyrrho rather inherited his style of life, his theory was developed only Timon of Phlius. He lived for 90 years (325-235 BC), studied at Megara, but, having met Pyrrho, moved to Elis. Later he settled in Athens, where he lived until the end of his life. Timon earned his living by teaching rhetoric and philosophy. He was a man of a different stock than Pyrrho. His skepticism had, as it were, a twofold source: on the one hand, a Pyrrhonian education, and on the other, his inherent sarcasm told him that everything should be suspected of a lie. Unlike Pyrrho, he wrote a lot, and not only philosophical treatises, but also tragedies, comedies and satirical poems.

Arcesilaus(315-241 BC), head of the Academy. which introduced skepticism into it. He was a younger coeval of Timon and a pupil of the Peripatetic Theophrastus. The Academy and Lyceum competed for a talented philosopher with each other. The Academy pulled him over to their side, but then Arcesilaus pulled the Academy over to Pyrrho's side. He represented a different type of personality than the respected Pyrrho and the sarcastic Timon; he was a type of skeptic - a man of the world, and because of this, grace should have been the dominant feature of his thinking. Arcesilaus was a man who knew how to arrange his life, was a lover of beauty, art and poetry, was known for his independent and chivalrous character.

Carneades was the head of the Academy about a hundred years later than Arcesilaus (214-129 BC). After Pyrrho, he did the most to develop skepticism. Many of the most powerful skeptical arguments go back to him, and in particular the critique of religious dogmatism. He represented another type of personality: this skeptic was busy fighting dogmatism and, in accordance with ancient customs, did not have time to cut his beard and nails. Carneades, like Pyrrho and Arcesilaus, did not write. But just as Pyrrho had Timon, Arcesilaus had Lacis, so he had his Kleitomachus, who wrote for him. There is no personal data about later skeptics.

Works. Of the works of skeptics, the works of a late representative of the school Sixth, nicknamed Empiricist, who lived in the third century. His two works, which have come down to us in their entirety, provide a clear and systematic survey of ancient skepticism. One of these works, The Pyrrhonic Propositions, was written in three books in the form of a textbook, where Sextus expounded the views of the skeptics, first comparing their general arguments in favor of the impossibility of knowledge in general, and then successively demonstrating the impossibility of logical, physical and ethical knowledge. The second work - "Against Mathematicians" - in eleven books has a similar content, but it is polemical in form and consists of two parts: five books are directed against the dogmatism of philosophers and six books are against the dogmatism of scientists and specialists in both the field of mathematics and astronomy, music , grammar and rhetoric.

Views. Initially, the foundations of skepticism were of a practical nature: Pyrrho occupied a skeptical position in philosophy, saying that it alone would provide happiness, give peace, and happiness lies in peace. It is the skeptic who, convinced that he is not capable of a satisfactory solution of any question, has no voice anywhere, and this restraint ensures his calmness. Pyrrho's teaching included two elements: the ethical doctrine of tranquility and the epistemological skeptical doctrine. The first testified to the principled position of Pyrrho in philosophy, the second was its proof. The first became a general characteristic of Hellenistic philosophy, and the second became the specialty of Pyrrho and his students.

Pyrrho posed three fundamental questions: 1) What are the qualities of things? 2) How should we behave towards things? 3) What are the consequences of our behavior towards them? And he answered: 1) We do not know what the qualities of things are. 2) Because of this, we must refrain from judging them. 3) This abstinence gives peace and happiness. For Pyrrho, the last position was the most important, but his followers shifted the center of gravity to the first position. It presents the rationale for the whole doctrine, and it was in this that the originality of skepticism lay, and not in the eudemonism, which was in the spirit of the times and to which other schools, especially the Epicureans, leaned. A separate problem that confronted skeptics at that time was the criticism of human knowledge, the opinion that knowledge is impossible in any form and in any sphere. In accordance with this task, skeptics brought up the critical, negative, destructive qualities of the mind and tried to cultivate these "skeptical abilities" in themselves. From the restrained position of Pyrrho, his followers moved to a defiant position.

They rejected scientific judgments, for they are all untrue. Only the skeptics did not try to question the judgments about the phenomena. For example, if I eat something sweet or hear a sound, then it is certain. But science and our ordinary judgments do not concern phenomena, but their real basis, that is, what is their cause. Honey is not what my sense of sweetness is. Knowing only one's own condition, there is no need to assume something about its likeness to anything, since, knowing only the portrait, there is no way to know whether it is similar or not to the original. The causes of phenomena - as opposed to the phenomena themselves - are unknown to us, and therefore judgments about them are always untrue.

The ancient skeptics justified their position not with the help of a psychological analysis of the human mind, since such an analysis would demonstrate the inability of the mind to know, but through a logical analysis of statements. Their general attitude was as follows: each judgment must be countered by a judgment that has "not great" force, "not great" truth. The result of their criticism, in the most general terms, was isosthenia or "equivalence of judgments." No proposition is logically stronger or truer than another. The method of their skeptical understanding is based on the fact that, wishing to question any statement, the skeptics countered it with a different, contradictory, but "equivalent" judgment. In addition to this general method, later skeptics developed certain special, enduring arguments to refute judgments, which they called "paths" or ways.

These arguments were once reduced to two (“two paths” were formulated, perhaps, by Menodotus); any judgment, if it is true, is such either directly or indirectly, but, firstly, direct truth does not exist due to the diversity and relativity of views, and secondly, indirect there can be no truth, since there are no immediately true propositions that could serve as prerequisites for proof.

Skeptics specially developed each of these paths: 1) immediate truth cannot be sought: a) not through perceptions; b) not through concepts and 2) indirectly: a) not through deduction; b) not by induction; c) not through the application of criteria.

I. A) Arguments against the possibility of knowing things with the help of the senses gave Aenesidemus in their classic ten tropes:!) The same things will be perceived differently by different kinds of creatures. A person perceives differently than an animal, because he has other sense organs, a differently arranged eye, ear, tongue, skin. It is impossible to decide whose perception best corresponds to the perceived thing, since there is no reason to give preference to a person. 2) The same things are perceived differently by different people. There is also no reason to prefer one over the other. 3) The same things are perceived differently by different senses. The same person perceives a thing quite differently depending on which sense organ is used, there is no reason to give preference to one sense over another. 4) The same things are perceived differently, depending on the subjective states of the perceiver. Therefore, even with the same feeling, one and the same thing can be perceived in different ways: for a patient with jaundice, honey seems bitter, and when he is healthy, it seems sweet. 5) One and the same thing is perceived differently, depending on its position and distance to the perceiver. An oar is straight in the air, but half-submerged in water has a break; the tower from afar seems round, but near it is multifaceted; we must consider each object from some distance, in some circumstances and in each position, and at a certain distance it will be perceived by us differently, and here there are also no grounds for admitting that this, and not another position, then, and not another distance gives the true image of the thing. 6) Things are not perceived directly, but through the medium that is between them and the perceiver, and because of this, not a single thing can be perceived in its pure form. 7) The same things cause different impressions, depending on how much they are and what their structure is: sand in a small amount is hard, and in a large amount it is soft. 8) All perceptions are relative and depend on the nature of the perceiver and on the conditions in which the perceived thing is located. 9) Things are perceived differently, depending on how often we have perceived them before. 10) A person's judgments about things depend on his upbringing, customs, faith and beliefs.

These paths can be reduced, and by later skeptics they were reduced to one - to the relativity of perceptions. The meaning of understanding is the same everywhere: one cannot be satisfied with a perception, since perceptions of the same thing differ from each other, and there is no such meaning for which one can be satisfied with one perception and not with another; perceptions are different because they are relative and dependent on both subjective (paths 1-4) and objective (5-9) conditions.

B) Arguments against the possibility of knowing things through concepts. Here is another argument. The object that we have to know through concepts is the species. A view either includes all the units that fall under it, or does not include them. The last assumption cannot be accepted, because if he did not include them, he would not be a species. But the first is also impossible, since, embracing all units, the species would have to have the characteristics of all of them, for example, a tree would have to be both a plane tree and a chestnut tree, have both needles and leaves, leaves - both round and pointed. And since each tree belongs to a certain type of trees, each would have to have all the qualities of the species, but the qualities are incompatible and contradictory to each other. Therefore, the species is somewhat contradictory, and therefore inessential. Consequently, not a single object corresponds to concepts, and we do not know anything with the help of concepts. Consequently, the method of cognition with the help of concepts, proclaimed by the majority of philosophers, in particular Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, must be discarded.

II. No method of indirect justification of judgments is satisfactory - neither deductive nor inductive.

A) Deduction refutes some of Agrippa's tropes. There are five of these paths: 1) contradictory views; 2) incompleteness of the proof; 3) relativity of perception; 4) use of insufficient conditions; 5) the presence of a false circle in the proof.

These provisions were formulated later than those of Aenesidemus, and cover more material in fewer tropes. Here the first trope corresponds to the last one in Aenesidemus, and the third trope to the other nine. The three remaining ones, having no analogues in the provisions of the Aenesidemus, are turned against the possibility of deduction and proof. The second and fourth present a dilemma. Looking for reasons for the consequences of any judgment, we interrupt further proof and in this case leave all the proofs on unfounded premises (4th trope), or we do not interrupt the proof, but then we are forced to go to infinity, but we cannot realize any infinity (2nd trope). trope). But this is not enough: in accordance with the fifth trope, in each proof we go in a false circle in the case when the conclusion is already contained in the premises. In accordance with this statement, if all people are mortal, then we conclude that Dion is mortal, but in the statement that all people are mortal, the judgment that Dion is mortal is already embedded.

These questions did not call into question the relation of consequence between premises and inference, but they concerned the premises themselves, which are never such, so that they can be taken as the basis of reasoning; they are specifically directed against the Aristotelian doctrine of immediately true premises.

B) Against induction, the argument of skeptics was as follows: induction is either complete or incomplete, but complete induction is impossible (since it does not have a final solution, therefore it is impossible), incomplete induction costs nothing (due to the fact that the case not provided for by it can nullify the results).

C) Therefore, we cannot obtain knowledge either directly or indirectly, either with the help of the senses, or with the help of concepts, or through deduction, or through induction. We are doomed only to enumerate the many existing judgments that contradict each other, and are not able to choose among them those that are true. No proposition is true in itself; Not there are external differences that would separate a true judgment from a false one. (This statement was directed against the Stoics and their cataleptic notions.) Also there are no external criteria, which would be the measure of the truth of judgments. The doctrine of criteria, which was developed by the Hellenistic theory of knowledge, according to skeptics, leads to extraordinary difficulties,

1. The criterion must be supplemented by evidence that it is true. However, in proving its truth, we either use it itself and then fall into the false circle of proof; or we apply another criterion, which, in turn, we derived, and so on ad infinitum, until we fall into the error of proof, into infinity.

2. There are various views on the criterion, and each school offers its own, but there is no criterion for choosing between them. A choice must be made, but who can be the judge, what power of reason should judge, and according to what standard? At the same time, there is no way to solve these problems.

III. Not satisfied with a general denial of the possibilities of knowledge, skeptics tried to refute particular theories and judgments both in theology and in natural science, both in mathematics and in ethics.

l. All theological problems are highly controversial, as they contain, as a rule, contradictory statements. Some dogmatic theologians consider the deity to be corporeal, others to be incorporeal; some consider it immanent to the world, others - transcendent. Neither of these views can be preferred.

Therefore, the concept of a deity is full of contradictions. If the deity is perfect, then it is unlimited, if unlimited, then it is motionless, if motionless, then it is soulless, and if it is soulless, then it is imperfect. If it is perfect, then it must have all the virtues. And some virtues (for example, patience in suffering is a manifestation of imperfection, since only imperfection can be subjected to suffering). Particular difficulties contain the concept of divine providence. If providence extended only to some people, then this would be unjust, since it is possible only for all. Universal divine providence is revealed as follows: God is either willing and able, or able, but not willing, or willing, but unable. The three indicated possibilities do not correspond to the divine nature, and the first one does not correspond to the facts, namely: the fact of the existence of evil in the world. God) are insufficient. However, the skeptics did not claim that there is no God: due to the fact that the evidence for the absence of God is as insufficient as the evidence for his existence.

There remains only one existence in things, the same as in the characterization of a deity: to admit that we know nothing about them, and to refrain from conclusions and judgments.

2. The basic concepts of natural science are no less contradictory than theological ones. As regards matter, there is great diversity in the views of its nature; the recognition of all these views as sufficient leads to absurdity, and the recognition of only a few leads to the need to single out a criterion and, consequently, to an erroneous circle or to infinity in the proof.

The concept of cause, which is most used by natural scientists, is also controversial. It can be interpreted in one of three ways: either as simultaneous with the effect, or as taking place before it, or after it. It (the cause) cannot be simultaneous, since it is impossible to create something if it already exists; it cannot manifest itself earlier, because in this case there would be no connection between cause and effect: there is no effect as long as the cause exists, and there would be no cause as long as the effect exists; the more so since the cause cannot manifest itself later than the effect, that would be even greater nonsense. If none of these three cases is possible, then the existence of causes is impossible. In a similar way, skeptics sought to show that neither a corporeal nor an out-of-body cause, neither a movable nor an immovable one, nor acting independently or in combination with others, is possible. Therefore, a cause is something that we think and talk about, but about which we really know nothing. On the other hand, the denial that causes act in nature also leads to absurd consequences. Nothing can be affirmed or denied.

Skeptics found similar difficulties both in the recognition and in the denial of other initial concepts of natural science that relate to movement, time and space.

3. The reasoning of mathematicians is also untrue, their concepts are also full of contradictions. A point is contradictory, a line is contradictory as a set of points, a line is a quantity devoid of width, a plane is devoid of depth.

4. In ethics, skepticism relied on the same arguments. First of all, on the diversity that takes place both in moral customs and in ethical theories; there is nothing that can be recognized by all as a blessing. Therefore, no one knows what the good is, because no one can define it; definitions that are given either have nothing to do with the good at all, or refer only to things that are connected with it (for example, when it is defined as a benefit), or are so abstract (when they define it as happiness) that everyone manages to interpret it according to own discretion. Finally, there is nothing that by its nature is good, so definite, as, for example, things that are either hot or cold by nature, since, for example, fire always warms everyone, and snow always cools everyone, and none of the so-called goods gives always and everywhere the feeling of the good.

Ultimately, the good, just like the evil, is unknowable, like God, nature, or a mathematical figure; everyone has a different idea of ​​them. The only acceptable attitude towards him is to refrain from judging. This concerns, in the final analysis, theoretical knowledge, a thing, and not a phenomenon: there is a doubt that this thing is good, but, undoubtedly, we take it for good.

In any case, it is necessary to somehow live and coexist with other people; skeptics did not recognize any principles of knowledge, but they had to have and had certain principles of life, namely: they were content with what each of them is led by natural inclinations and customs. In practical life, certainty is not required, rather reasonably understood plausibility.

It was in this probabilistic spirit that academic skepticism developed, as well as later Pyrrhonism; probability later crept into theory. Carneades argued that in fact no proposition is true, but it is equally untrue. There are levels of truth: 1) only true judgments; 2) true and consistent; 3) true consistent and confirmed. Carneades believed that it is not necessary to refrain from judgments, one can express them if they are true. Because of this, the nature of the teachings of the skeptics has undergone a change: it has lost its radicalism and has come closer to common sense.

The meaning of skepticism. Despite this, the tasks that the skeptics set themselves were of a negative nature. Their work was not about establishing the truth, but about revealing lies and demonstrating the untruth of human judgments, their role in philosophy was rather positive and even significant. They discovered many errors and errors in accepted philosophical views; used and systematized everything that was in the critical thought of Greece, increasing their fame. They were the "theoretical conscience" of their era, they raised the level of evidence in science as a whole. Developing their views with scrupulous systematicity over the course of several centuries, they collected a true treasure trove of skeptical ideas and arguments, from which much was learned by later eras.

Opposition, directed against skepticism, due to the difficulty of a direct attack, fought it, as a rule, in a roundabout way: 1) sought to demonstrate the lack of consistency in a skeptical position; to show that the skeptic's life cannot develop according to his theory; 2) accused the skeptics of using hidden, dogmatic principles, without which their argument would lose its force; 3) brought to light the apparently pernicious moral consequences of skepticism.

Influence of Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonism came out of antiquity and, in addition to its own school, influenced others. In addition to the Academy, in its “middle period” (3rd and 2nd centuries BC), under his influence was the “empirical school” of healers who applied the fundamental idea of ​​skeptics in medicine: they recognized that the causes of diseases were unknowable, and therefore limited themselves to registering painful symptoms.

Ancient skepticism was the highest point in the development of skepticism; in later times it was added only in particulars, and never developed further. He was not so influential, but consistent skepticism found its supporters. In the Middle Ages, skepticism acted as an auxiliary doctrine serving dogmatic thought: in order to strengthen faith, some scholastics skeptically humiliated knowledge. In its purest form, skepticism manifested itself in modern times during the Renaissance directly in France in the 16th century. in the eyes of Montaigne. In fact, since that time, skepticism has had supporters in all ages (Bayle - at the beginning of the 18th century, Schulze - at the end of the 18th century), in all cases these were individual thinkers who did not have a large number of supporters and influential skepticism. schools. The ideas of ancient skepticism were used not only by supporters of skepticism, but also by critics: Descartes, Hume And Mill updated the interpretation and argumentation of skeptics, but did not draw such extreme conclusions as they did.

Skepticism in philosophy is a separate direction. The representative of the current is the person who is able to consider from a different angle what the vast majority of people believe in. Sound doubt, criticism, analysis and sober conclusions - these can be considered the postulates of philosophers - skeptics. When the current was born, who was its bright adherent, we will tell in this article.

Today, skeptics are associated with people who deny everything. We consider skeptics to be pessimists, with a slight sneer we call them "unbelieving Thomases". They do not believe skeptics, they believe that they are just grumbling, they set the task of denying even the most obvious things. But skepticism is a powerful and ancient philosophical trend. It has been followed since antiquity, in the Middle Ages, and it received a new round of development in modern times, when great Western philosophers rethought skepticism.

The concept of skepticism

The very etymology of the word does not imply constant denial, doubt for the sake of doubt. The word comes from the Greek word "skepticos" (skeptikos), which translates as exploring or considering (there is a version that the translation means to look around, look around). Skepticism arose on a wave when philosophy was elevated to a cult, and all the statements of scientists of that time were perceived as the ultimate truth. The new philosophy aimed to analyze popular postulates and rethink them.

Skeptics focused on the fact that human knowledge is relative and the philosopher has no right to defend his dogmas as the only correct ones. At that time, the doctrine played a huge role, actively fighting dogmatism.

Over time, there were also negative consequences:

• pluralism of social norms of society (they began to be questioned, rejected);
• neglect of individual human values;
• favor, benefit in the name of personal gain.

As a result, skepticism turned out to be a controversial concept by nature: someone began to search in depth for the truth, while others made total ignorance and even immoral behavior an ideal.

History of origin: nirvana from Pyrrho

The doctrine of the philosophy of skepticism originated in ancient times. The progenitor of the direction is Pyrrho from the island of Peloponnese, the city of Elis. The date of occurrence can be considered the end of the 4th century BC (or the first ten years of the 3rd). What was the forerunner of the new philosophy? There is a version that the views of the philosopher were influenced by the Elidian dialectics - Democritus and Anaxarchus. But it is more likely that Indian ascetics, sectarians had their influence on the mind of the philosopher: Perron went on a campaign with Alexander the Great to Asia and was deeply shocked by the way of life and thinking of the Indians.

Skepticism was called Pyrrhonism in Greece. And the first thing philosophy called for was to avoid decisive statements, not to draw final conclusions. Pyrrho urged to stop, look around, think, and then generalize. The ultimate goal of Pyrrhonism was to achieve what is commonly referred to today as nirvana. As paradoxical as it sounds.

Inspired by Indian ascetics, Pyrrho urged everyone to achieve ataraxia by renouncing earthly suffering. He taught to refrain from any kind of judgment. Ataraxia for philosophers is a complete rejection of judgments. This state is the highest degree of bliss.

Over time, his theory was revised, made their own adjustments, interpreted in their own way. But the scientist himself believed in it until the last days. He adequately and stoically endured the attacks of his opponents, and went down in the history of philosophy as a man of strong spirit.

Ancient Followers

When Pyrrho died, his ideological banner was picked up by his contemporary Timon. He was a poet, prose writer and is preserved in history as the author of "sills" - satirical works. In his sillas, he ridiculed all philosophical currents, except for Pyrrhonism, the teachings of Protagoras and Democritus. Timon widely propagated the postulates of Pyrrho, urging everyone to reconsider values ​​and achieve bliss. After the death of the writer, the school of skepticism stopped its development.

An anecdote is told about Pyrrho. Once the ship on which the scientist traveled got into a storm. People began to panic, and only the ship's pig remained calm, continuing to serenely slurp from the trough. “This is how a true philosopher should behave,” said Pyrrho, pointing to a pig

Sextus Emprik - physician and follower

The most famous follower of Pyrrho is Sextus Empiricus, a physician and learned philosopher. He became the author of the popular expression: "The mills slowly grind the gods, but they grind diligently." Sextus Empiricus published the book Pyrrho's Propositions, which to this day serves as a textbook for everyone who learns philosophy as a science.

Distinctive features of the works of Empiric:

• close relationship with medicine;
• the advancement of skepticism in a separate direction, and to mix it and compare it with other currents, the philosopher considered unacceptable;
• the encyclopedic nature of the presentation of all information: the philosopher expressed his thoughts in great detail, did not bypass a single detail.

Sextus Empiricus considered “phenomenon” to be the main principle of skepticism and actively investigated all phenomena empirically (which is why he got his pseudonym). The subject of the scientist's study was various sciences, ranging from medicine, zoology, physics, and even the fall of meteorites. The works of Empiricus were highly praised for their thoroughness. Later, many philosophers willingly drew arguments from the writings of Sextus. Research was awarded the honorary title of "general and results of all skepticism."

A new birth of skepticism

It so happened that for several centuries the direction was forgotten (at least there were no bright philosophers at that time in history). Philosophy was rethought only in the Middle Ages, and a new round of development - in the era (New Time).

In the 16th and 17th centuries the pendulum of history swung towards antiquity. Philosophers appeared who began to criticize dogmatism, which is widespread in almost all spheres of human life. In many ways, interest in the direction arose because of religion. She influenced the person, set the rules, and any "step to the left" was severely punished by the church authorities. Medieval skepticism left Pyrrho's principles unchanged. The movement was called the new Pyrrhonism, and its main idea was freethinking.

The brightest representatives:

1. M. Montaigne
2. P. Bayle
3. D. Hume
4. F. Sanchez

The most striking was the philosophy of Michel Montaigne. On the one hand, his skepticism was the result of a bitter life experience, a loss of faith in people. But on the other hand, Montaigne, like Pyrrho, urged to seek happiness, urged to abandon selfish convictions and pride. Selfishness is the main motivation for all decisions and actions of people. Having abandoned it and pride, it is easy to become balanced and happy, having comprehended the meaning of life.

Pierre Bayle became a prominent representative of the New Age. He "played" on the religious field, which is rather strange for a skeptic. Briefly describing the enlightener's position, Bayle suggested not trusting the words and beliefs of the priests, listening to one's heart and conscience. He advocated that a person should be governed by morality, but not by religious beliefs. Bayle went down in history as an ardent skeptic and fighter against church dogma. Although in fact, he always remained a deeply religious person.

What is the critique of skepticism based on?

The main ideological opponents of skepticism in philosophy have always been the Stoics. Skeptics objected to astrologers, ethicists, rhetoricians, geometers, expressing doubts about the truth of their beliefs. “Knowledge requires certainty,” said all the skeptics.

But if knowledge and certainty are inseparable, how do skeptics themselves know this? opponents objected. This logical contradiction gave a chance to widely criticize the current, challenging it as a species.

It is skepticism that many cite as one of the reasons for the spread of Christianity around the world. The followers of the philosophy of skeptics were the first to question the truth of belief in the ancient gods, which gave fertile ground for the emergence of a new, more powerful religion.

Note: the article was originally written as an "educational program" and therefore does not pretend to the depth and completeness of the presentation of the problems raised. To do this, you need to write a monograph ...

Skepticism is the absence of [any] faith.

1. History of skepticism

Four years before the birth of Alexander, Pyrrho, the first of the skeptical philosophers, was born in Elis, in the northwest of the Peloponnese, from Macedonia.

Pyrrho's skepticism was not an end in itself. Indifference and depreciation of all generally accepted values ​​of human existence in Pyrrhonism does not lead either to hermitism, or to marginalism or shocking of the townsfolk, as happened in other philosophical schools and religions. Pyrrho even accepted the position of high priest and was awarded a bronze statue for services to the city; the Athenians gave him honorary citizenship. Pyrrho considered the main goal of philosophizing to be the achievement of eudaimonia  (happiness), for which, from his point of view, it was necessary to find answers to three questions:

1. What are things by nature?
2. How should we treat them?
3. What does this mean for us?

Pyrrho's answers are:

Things are indistinguishable and indifferent, unstable and do not allow a definite judgment about themselves; our sensations and ideas about them cannot be considered either true or false. Therefore, one must free oneself from all subjective ideas, not incline either towards affirmation or negation, and refrain from any definite judgments. From such an attitude arise first afasia (a state in which there is nothing more to say about things), then ataraxia (serenity, equanimity), and then apateia (dispassion).

When getting acquainted with such an approach, the question arises: can a skeptic have a worldview (and is skepticism itself a worldview)? This will be covered in detail in the future, but now it makes sense to give the answer in the presentation of Sextus Empiricus, who wrote the Three Books of Pyrrhonic Propositions - the most complete exposition of the teachings of ancient skepticism:

“It is the same with us with the question of whether the skeptic has a world view. If by world view someone means a tendency to many dogmas that are consistent with each other and with the phenomenon, and says that dogma is agreement with something not obvious, then we Let us say that we do not have a world view, but if we call a world view a method of reasoning that follows some proposition in accordance with the phenomenon only, then we will say that we have a world view in view of the fact that this proposition shows us how, apparently, it follows correctly. live...

We answer similarly to the question of whether the skeptic should study nature. Namely: we do not study nature in order to speak with firm certainty about any dogma determined by the study of nature; for the sake of being able to oppose to every situation an equivalent, and for the sake of equanimity, we strive to study nature. In the same way we proceed to the logical and ethical part of the so-called philosophy. Those who say that skeptics deny the phenomenon seem to me ignorant of what we are talking about. As already said before, we do not discard what we experience as a result of the representation and which involuntarily leads us to recognize it. But this is the phenomenon. Also, when we doubt whether the subject is what it is, we assume that it is. What we are looking for is not this phenomenon, but what is said about the phenomenon, and this differs from the search for the phenomenon itself. It seems to us, for example, that honey is sweet, and we agree with this, because we perceive sweetness by sensation. But whether there is a sweet such as we speak of it, we doubt; but this doubt does not concern the appearance, but what is said about the appearance. If, however, we definitely raise doubts against a phenomenon, then we do this not because we want to deny this phenomenon, but in order to point out the recklessness of the dogmatists.

Pyrrho's closest students were Timon of Flius (320–230 BC), Hecateus of Abdera, and Epicurus' teacher Nausifan. Pyrrho also had other students, but nothing was left of them except for their names.

After the death of Timon, the development of the school of skepticism is interrupted for about two hundred years. The ideas of skepticism were adopted by the Platonic Middle Academy represented by Arcesilaus (315–241 BC) and by the New Academy represented by Carneades of Cyrene (214–129 BC). But academicians cannot be called skeptics proper: they generally denied the possibility of adequate knowledge, in contrast to skeptics who say that the attainability of truth cannot be unambiguously denied. Later, the position "we do not know and will never be able to know" was called agnosticism.

In the first century BC, skepticism was revived by Aenesidemus of Knossos. The last skeptics were Saturninus and Sextus Empiricus (II-III centuries AD).

In the Renaissance, along with attempts at independent thinking, ancient Greek systems are reborn, and with them skepticism, although it has never reached its former significance. The earliest skepticism appeared in France. After Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) with his "Experiences" a whole series of imitators arose: Sharron, Sanhed, Girnheim, La Mothe Le Vail, Gue, the English Glanville and Baker ... But something fundamentally new from a philosophical point of view, we We do not meet Montaigne and others.

P. Bayle (1647-1706) is also usually given a large place in the history of skepticism; Deschamps even dedicated a special monograph to him ("Le skepticisme erudit chez Bayle"); but Bayle's real place is in the history of religious enlightenment, and not in the history of skepticism; his skepticism is important to him mainly as a weapon against theology.

In the new philosophy, starting with Descartes, there is no place for absolute skepticism, but relative skepticism, i.e. denial of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is extremely common. Studies of human knowledge, beginning with Locke and Hume, as well as the development of psychology, inevitably had to lead to an increase in subjectivism; in this sense, one can speak of Hume's skepticism and find skeptical elements in Kant's philosophy, since the latter denied the possibility of metaphysics and the knowledge of objects in themselves.

Elements of skepticism are found in such authors as Pierre Abelard, Nicholas of Cusa, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Agrippa Nettesheim, Jean Bodin, Rene Descartes, Voltaire, Denis Diderot, and among the positivists of all three waves.

I note that the skeptics were by no means only Europeans - for example, the Chinese Chuang Tzu and the Muslim al-Ghazali are among the skeptics. Nagarjuna drew Buddhist conclusions from skepticism, founding the whole Madhyamika school, which is still influential in Buddhism to this day.

But the history of philosophy is somewhat not the subject that I would like to talk about now, and therefore, having paid tribute to historical figures, we will proceed directly to skepticism.

2. Principles of a skeptical worldview

I will give them in a free interpretation.

Firstly, it cannot be argued that feelings give us knowledge about reality. Everything that we perceive passes through our sense organs, then it is processed by the corresponding structures of the brain, the subsequent perception also takes into account the unconscious structures of the psyche, and so on; and with all desire it is impossible to state what we perceive what is actually . A person is aware of only a small fraction of what his organs perceive (a classic example: descriptions under hypnosis are much more detailed than if a person simply remembers something; and then what can we say about something that is not processed by consciousness at all?). And then his personal interpretations are superimposed on all this, leading even further from reality into subjective reality (remember the famous Zen "flag flutters"?).

If we leave the level of "kitchen argumentation", then the approach becomes more understandable: for example, everyone knows from school that an electron exhibits wave properties under certain experimental conditions, and corpuscular properties under others. So the theses "electron is a wave" or "electron is a particle" contradict the facts, and the statement "is both" is simply methodologically illiterate.

Secondly, induction is not a reliable conclusion. D. Hume has a classic discussion on this topic using the example of billiard balls: many are sure that, based on numerous observations of mechanical collisions of balls, one can to know how they will move in a given situation. More generally, the laws of cause and effect tell us which effect necessary happens if there is a specific reason. However, can we really know such laws of causality? Speaking of cause, we mean that something follows one after the other, that there is a contact between both phenomena, and what happens as a result of contact occurs necessary. Thus the concept causes characterized by consistency, contact and necessity. There are no problems with consistency and contact: this applies to direct experience. But how do we know that what is happening is happening necessary? Can we somehow perceive necessity per se? No. Hence, we cannot possibly have knowledge of the necessity.

We we know only what we have experience with.

Important: here is where Kant and Hegel radically differ. The thing is in itself, regardless of our knowledge about it (Kant); Or is a thing a knowledge of it (Hegel)? Hegel said that we know a thing that is exhausted by the very knowledge of it (panlogism). Kant said that we do not know and cannot cognize a thing, but we know only phenomena. Schopenhauer continued Kant's thought: phenomena in themselves, outside the cognizing subject, have no existence: they, phenomena, in themselves are a priori forms of cognition of our consciousness. Consequently, the cognition of phenomena is the cognition of one's own cognitive forms, and the whole process of cognition is reduced to the cognition of oneself in the world as one's own representation (in the ontological sense: the will cognizes itself).

So What we know? Reality (thing in itself)? Reality, which is a phenomenon (and does not have being in itself)? Own performance? Myself?

In short, if we differentiate between reality and actuality, then we must, firstly, know that there is no reality in itself, without a subject, and, secondly, that the phenomenon (reality) is a representation. It was implied by many that the phenomenon (object) is the prerogative of the thing (being), and the representation is the prerogative of consciousness. But they, appearance and representation, identical! Being as something passive does not appear to us at all in the phenomenon, but, on the contrary, the subject represents the world through a priori forms (the same space and time, for example). And at the same time, all this (reality) is only in consciousness (which is the essence of representation), but in no way outside consciousness (otherwise we come to Hegelian panlogism: there is a representation and, plus, there is a phenomenon, and if there is a phenomenon, then it is thereby being , and is ideal). That is, we cannot say that we know reality, because reality itself is knowledge (representation). And the result is a tautology: we know what we know (knowledge).

Of course, ontology has now been discussed. Returning to epistemology: thus, in the context of the conversation, we have knowledge exclusively about the presence stable sequences, but by no means need.

Quite ostentatious: impossible refute the thesis: "everything that you are witnessing happened completely by chance, and the existence of a connection between cause and effect is an illusion created by the improbability of such a coincidence."

Perhaps, at first glance, this will seem wild to someone - but upon careful analysis, it becomes clear that Hume's logic is irrefutable, and the assertion that there is a need for cause-and-effect relationships is nothing more than article of faith.

One can object: why is it an object of faith, and not an a priori, as Kant and Schopenhauer claim? Indeed, Hume was the first to truly shake the foundations of determinism. But he looked at the problem, so to speak, objectively, reducing everything to a banal habit. Kant, on the other hand, got into his own mind, he asked himself the question: why does a necessity, which by no means can be derived from experience, have a representation in our minds? And he concluded that necessity, like causality itself, is an a priori form of knowledge. For our knowledge is relative, correlative, categorical. We think in terms of relationships and perceive only in terms of relationships: in order for something to be objectified, it must necessarily be related to something else. Something irrelevant, absolute doesn't make sense in consciousness. Therefore, cause, effect, and necessity itself (even temporal succession! but this is not relevant here) are a priori forms of cognition. In order to understand and explain something to another, we must make a certain correlation, and therefore in the process of knowing the world we determine it ourselves (the most obvious example of determination is any scientific formula, even any definition). Well, etc. And, by analogy with the previous example, to assert that there is supposedly causality in the mind and - plus - outside of consciousness - means, again, to return to the notorious panlogism (not to mention the fact that a certain peasant clucks his tooth badly and waves a razor-sharp blade ).

Strictly speaking, I see no reason for a dispute here: of course, a priori forms of cognition appear with us even before consciousness learns to think in the literal sense of the word - from birth. Physiological example: the image on the retina is inverted; after a while, the baby correlates his sense of the tangible and the visible, and the image "turns over." So talk about that name believes into space or time is simply meaningless, since we have no possibility of perception outside of these forms. But here, let's say, to declare that space and time "really exist" is already a matter of faith, a counterexample is well known to everyone from the film "The Matrix".

It is important to understand here that skeptics declare, And what do not declare. Skeptical is the thesis "we not aware of the need the existence of a causal relationship." Skeptics do not declare what kind of connection does not exist. The induction thesis under consideration is epistemological, not ontological. This is not understood by many ignorant critics of skepticism, who say something like this: "since you do not believe that you will inevitably break yourself by jumping out of a window on the 15th floor, is it weak to jump?"

Third, the skeptic never forgets that deduction does not generate new truths - deduction does not give new knowledge. Deduction is a conclusion drawn according to certain specific rules from a certain set of statements. This conclusion Always will be true (in the logical sense) if the premises are true and the rules of inference are valid. Ergo - deduction is tautological, it does not new knowledge.

In addition, the same position can be justified in another way: the certainty of subordination to the general rules of the object of reasoning directly follows from the a priori truth of the general statement of the syllogism, which has no basis if not investigated All set members. So, from the premises "All people are mortal" and "Kai is a man" it really follows that Kai is mortal - according to the rules of formal logic. But this - formal the conclusion which implies that "all men are mortal" is true. And for this you need to have data on all people, which is impossible, if only because not all of them have yet been born.

Strictly speaking, the already mentioned problem of induction takes place here: the conclusion that applies to the entire class is based on a limited number of special cases.

Fourth, deduction does not prove its own statements. The fact is that deduction necessarily presupposes the truth of the premises of reasoning. But the validity of the premises also cannot come from nowhere. And here we have a trilemma: either the process of substantiating substantiations proceeds ad infinitum, or a logical speculation of the type circulus in demonstrando takes place, or one has to break the chain postulatively at some point. Hence, no one the original principle cannot be justified deductively.

"According to Gödel's theorem on the incompleteness of closed formal systems, given their sufficient complexity, some of the sentences of these systems, being true, will not have proofs within the framework and means of these systems. But another interesting conclusion follows from the incompleteness theorem - if we extrapolate Gödel's true, but unprovable sentences on existing philosophical categories, then such (unprovable) truths will act as metaphysical ones, i.e. they can only be accepted (axiomatized) by opening and expanding the system. "Truths can be repeated by everyone and many times. Thus, the metaphysics of unprovability takes place in any system that has reached a certain level of complexity. And this metaphysics, due to unprovability, can only be rejected or accepted - axiomatized (underlain by subsequent theorems-conclusions)."

Fifth, any judgment can be countered by an opposite judgment equal in strength to it. Perhaps this is the most difficult thesis for non-skeptics to perceive, since they are trying to understand it based not on the principles of skepticism, but on their own everyday experience. Therefore, I will explain with a very everyday example.

Everyone is sure that he has a toilet in the toilet. And for the vast majority of the population, the thesis: "The statements "there is a toilet in the toilet" and "there is no toilet" are equal in strength" will cause sincere surprise: "how is it, he is standing there!".

A real case: one of my acquaintances stopped by to visit his mother, went to the store, met a couple of childhood friends, drank beer with them. He returns home, of course - the first thing he does is go to the toilet, after a beer ... And there in the floor there is a hole instead of a toilet bowl. Although an hour and a half ago was in place. Can you imagine the cognitive dissonance? The house is undergoing planned repairs, plumbing is being changed. He did not know. I came across this - the doorbell rings, an unshaven man enters, pulls out the toilet bowl and drags it away without even saying hello. First, they will remove from the entire riser, and only then put new ones.

But the skeptic would not be surprised, because he understands that the presence of a toilet in the toilet is only a stable sequence "opened the door - saw the toilet", and not at all a causal relationship that obliges the toilet to be in place whenever the door is open.

Of course, the example above is mostly a joke to make it easier to remember. Philosophy - and this is often forgotten - has nothing to do with everyday situations and so on. Philosophy deals with knowledge From general to specific as formulated by Schopenhauer. Therefore, a correct example of equivalent judgments is, for example, the thesis "God exists." This judgment can be opposed to the judgment "there is no God" - both of them are unprovable in principle: neither facts nor any empirical arguments can be consistent in proving the existence or non-existence of a transcendental entity. The same can be said about the already analyzed thesis about the presence or absence of causal relationships. One can also recall the well-known thesis of B. Russell that all objects, when no one sees them, turn into pink kangaroos. Here, try to prove that they do not turn ...

3. Criticism of skepticism

Since skepticism is not only difficult, but impossible to understand with a brain that is accustomed not to think, but believe, skepticism has been criticized for a long time and constantly. True, criticism usually refers not to skepticism, but to what, according to critics, they themselves consider skeptical theses - for example, the same Hume was repeatedly accused of allegedly denies causality.

Perhaps the first critic of skepticism can be called Augustine. From his point of view, there are four areas in which certain knowledge can be found: self-reflection, introspection, mathematics, and logical principles. However, note that the thesis "you cannot doubt your own existence" means only the existence of the subject - which, indeed, cannot be questioned, but not directly related to skepticism. IN any case, one has to start either from “I am” or from “the thought is”: after all, “there is no thought” is also a thought, and if there is a thought, then it is not “in itself”, but it belongs to someone. It is clear that there are great (and not yet resolved) difficulties with the exact philosophical definition of the terms "I", "thought", etc., but this is another question. Skepticism, I repeat, is an epistemological position, not an ontological one, and "the existence of the 'I'" is an ontological question.

Trust in introspection as an adequate reflection of reality means trust in your memory and your interpretations - which is not justified in any way. Mathematics is conditional rules, axioms, etc., not directly related to reality. Well, logical formal principles in this respect are completely similar to mathematics.

But, characteristically, Augustine was perhaps the most adequate critic of skepticism. Let's see what others have come up with...

To begin with, let's get acquainted with the article "Skepticism and Skepticism" by Professor Yu. Muravyov, published in the journal "Skepsis". It can be called quite indicative: it was by no means written by an amateur, but by a doctor of philosophical sciences, placed in a journal that positions itself as skeptical, i.e. reflects a common modern view of the skepticism of those who are interested in it.

At the beginning of the article, Yu. Muravyov notes that the purpose of the work is to indicate the meaning of the term "skepticism" most accurately. To begin with, the author correctly notes that in modern times many people have the wrong idea that the ancient skeptics only "prepared the ground" for Montaigne, Descartes, Hume, and others, and then immediately proceeds to attack Yu.V. Tikhonravov, founder active skepticism. There will be a separate section on this direction, but here it matters, firstly, the very fact of the attacks: the fact that they are started "on the move", immediately after the entry, and then repeated again, indicates that this is not just a methodological discrepancy , and negation due to emotional rejection. Secondly, this is also confirmed by the essence of the claims: "Ideology is always active - it is a system of ideas aimed at protecting the interests of people. What interests does the such skepticism? If none, then who needs such skepticism?"

I will quote Ruslan Khazarzar as an answer (on a somewhat different occasion, but nonetheless): "... ideology, like any dogmatic positive, is incompatible with skepticism. ... (here, for brevity, I will refer to Schopenhauer) true philosophy is useless. (Not to mention that, from the point of view of philosophy, the benefit itself is a little meaningful thing.)"

But the further, the more wonderful, as the classic wrote, and prof. Muravyov writes: "we distinguish at first skepticism And skepticism He quotes E. L. Radlov as the “best and classical in terms of clarity” explanation: “In essence, only two types of skepticism should be distinguished: absolute and relative; the first is the denial of the possibility of all knowledge, the second is the denial of philosophical knowledge. Absolute skepticism disappeared with ancient philosophy, but relative skepticism developed in the new in very diverse forms. The distinction between skepticism, as a mood, and skepticism, as a complete philosophical trend, has undoubted power, but this distinction is not always easy to make. Skepticism contains elements of denial and doubt and is a completely vital and complete phenomenon. For example, Descartes' skepticism is a methodological device that led him to dogmatic philosophy. In all research, scientific skepticism is the life-giving source from which truth is born. In this sense, skepticism is quite the opposite of dead and deadening skepticism.

To be honest, when reading the text, the well-known expression “to be slightly pregnant” pops up in memory: skepticism, it turns out, can be a “mood”. A good approach to a philosophical position, you can't say anything... Well, the fact that skepticism "as a methodological device" can lead to dogmatism sounds worse than a "war for pacifism."

In general: no skeptic will develop criteria for truth (and if they are not implied, it will not be clear what was "born" - truth or not). The skeptic who speaks of the truth is thereby already not a skeptic. For truth (as opposed to convention) is always dogmatic. Moreover, a serious philosopher will not work out "criteria of truth." Truth that needs criteria is no longer truth, but something else.

Radlov's article is purely custom-made, written for the encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron. It quite correctly reflects the views of the intelligentsia of that time on knowledge and truth, but nothing more. The so-called "new philosophy" gave skepticism a rather narrow and specific place - opposition to theological views and conclusions, thus completely depriving it of its ideological status. And, of course, Descartes, Hume, Kant and further evolutionists used "local skepticism": metaphysical knowledge is impossible, being itself is unknowable (Spencer). So E.L. Radlov quite realistically outlined the place of skepticism that he began to occupy from the beginning of the Enlightenment; but the conversation is not about the history of philosophy, but about skepticism per se!

And then Muraviev declares that "skepticism grows out of skepticism" and even that "skepticism can lead to the denial of science." Original. However, if one understands skepticism as many non-skeptics understand it, then since anything can be deduced from a wrong premise...

After that, the critic again turns to "skepticism as a mood", to "local skepticism in a certain area" (moral, medical, and even some computer) and so on, is once again indignant at Yu. Tikhonravov, discusses the ordinary understanding of the term (what is the relationship in the kitchen" have to philosophy?!) and so on, up to the discussion of the term "indifference". Then comes the bold statement: "Now we know what skepticism is, how the various meanings of the word differ, and what are the shades of meaning of all the accompanying theories." I swear that if I wasn't a skeptic myself, I would Nothing I would not understand skepticism from the reasoning of the author of the article, except for "there is a certain Tikhonravov, who is like a bone across my throat, and many understand the term" skepticism "in different ways." Well, perhaps "Yu. Muravyov doesn't understand how one can be a skeptic" - there are passages in the text about the alleged impossibility of choosing alternatives by a consistent skeptic (but more on that in a separate section). And that's it.

Note: I describe this article in such detail because the article reflects the position of someone who does not accept skepticism organically, at the subconscious level: "What can be built on such a shaky foundation as doubt?" It is not surprising that such views lead, for example, to the following: "the limit of all-conquering skepticism is morality." Like this. "Demands, whatever you pass away, that is what puts an end to skepticism and doubt." And one more thing: "A morality based on the "rights of man" is, indeed, the boundary against which skepticism will rest and which will be stopped." To me, as a skeptic and immoralist, this is simply ridiculous. Friedrich Nietzsche laughs with me... In general, any reasonable person at the mention of "human rights" will only grimace in a contemptuous grin - there must be rights well-deserved. But let's not digress: I just want to point out how deeply dogmatism, including ethical dogmatism, sits in people. Just think about it: a professor, a doctor of philosophy, declares that one can philosophize only in such a way that - no, no! - not to hurt some ephemeral "human rights", which term is related at best to jurisprudence (usually to the demagogy of public relations), but not to epistemology, which is what we are talking about.

The further one reads this "critical article", the more one wonders: "Skepticism has always been ridiculed both in mainstream philosophy and in public opinion." These are the ones we have, if I may say so, doctors of sciences: they bring as an argument the social order of the ruling elite, and at the same time the argumentum ad populum ... Any psychologist, having read such, will make an unambiguous conclusion: even the brains of a professional in the field of philosophy refuse to work, which means a very deep psychological incompatibility - in other words, an attempt to try on skepticism on oneself causes a powerful cognitive dissonance, which is overcome by rationalizations that cannot withstand the slightest criticism - but the imyarok does not notice this, because all the "power" of the brain goes to the selection any arguments against skepticism regardless of their level of justification.

It is especially amusing that in places there are quite adequate places in panic criticism, we say: "...rethought skepticism thus prescribes to us not at all the rejection of intellectual obligations, but only the rejection of the illusory understanding of these obligations." Exactly. But where the "rethinking" came from is not clear, what has been said refers specifically to classical skepticism, known since antiquity. Is the new the well-forgotten old?

I note that in the same issue of "Skepsis" an article "Ideological fashion in science and skepticism" was published by another doctor of philosophical sciences - Yu.I. Semenov. I do not analyze it here for a simple reason: for six journal pages, the professor writes something with which I either completely agree or see no reason to object; but about skepticism as such - there there is nothing. Discourses about skepticism appear only at the very end, and mutually exclusive declarations are made: "Even if this or that concept is generally true, turning it into a dogma in which one must blindly believe inevitably, sooner or later, takes it beyond the limits of science" incompatible with "the skepticism of a scientist not only does not exclude, but, on the contrary, implies the belief in the truth of certain provisions, certain concepts."

Skepticism - I repeat - does not operate with the concept of "truth" simply by definition.

But for the sake of completeness, we will not limit ourselves to one publication from a little-known journal that has long ceased to exist; Let's look at the arguments and other critics of skepticism.

Here, for example, Alexander Men: (History of religion, vol. 6, ch. 6.):

“A person who has doubted everything can no longer worry too much in this world. He goes through life like a guest, like a stranger; he is indifferent to her worries and values ​​​​his peace most of all. He will not let himself be drawn into fruitless disputes that They confuse the soul. He is well in his shell. He can condescendingly laugh at the ravings of the "dogmatists."

True, while protecting the serenity of the soul, the skeptic is ready to come to terms with the "opinions" of people. So, Pyrrho, although he believed that nothing definite could be said about God, nevertheless did not refuse the title of priest in his native city.

They say that somehow, fleeing from a dog, Pyrrho climbed a tree, but then he said that he acted impulsively, and not obeying reason. Once the philosopher was walking past a swamp with his teacher Anaxarchus, and he fell into the water. Pyrrho, seeing this, calmly left, believing that it was better to maintain equanimity than to disturb himself by helping the fallen. Perhaps all of these are anecdotes invented by the enemies of the philosopher, but they truly reflect the character and attitudes of Pyrrho.

But more often than not, skepticism seemed absurd. He was opposed by a deep, though sometimes vague, conviction that truth was achievable. The path of Pyrrho led to a dead end, while man was looking for a way out, looking for solutions to the fundamental problems of life.

The Christian philosopher tries to be sarcastic, but at the same time he can't refute skeptical position, and refers - as an argument! - on a kind of "vague conviction" in the attainability of truth. At the same time, it is de facto implied that there are some “radical life problems” that are the same for everyone, and their solution is without fail found by the achievement of some truth. But, let me, how exactly Is it proposed to distinguish truth from non-truth?

Nevertheless, for the vast majority of people, including philosophers, even an attempt to suggest that "there is no truth" causes an unconscious rejection. What is especially funny is that such behavior is typical for Western, European civilization; Eastern with its traditions of Buddhism is much more adequate in relation to skepticism.

A very good overview of the role of skepticism is offered by Alexei Panich in his work "On the benefits and harms of skepticism for philosophy":

"In the East Slavic cultural tradition, skepticism was very unlucky. Professional philosophers pay almost no attention to skepticism; in everyday consciousness, the image of a skeptic has taken root as a strange and unsympathetic creature who does not believe in anything, questions everything, and therefore has no ideals and generally no, so to speak, life solidity.

From the point of view of Soviet philosophical historiography, skepticism was constantly "out of focus", stubbornly not fitting into the "general line" of opposition between materialism and idealism.

According to the classic saying of Protagoras, "man is the measure of all things - existing, that they exist, and non-existent, that they do not exist." In the subsequent development of ancient philosophy, this thesis, one might say, was both justified and not justified at the same time. Justified - because the ancient philosophers, indeed, did not talk about anything else with such passion as the problem of the existence or non-existence of everything in the world: movement, atoms, the beginning, emptiness, gods, signs, truth, evidence, etc. and so on. It was not justified - because the result of this "explosion" of philosophical activity was the nomination by various schools of mutually exclusive and equally conclusive statements on any of the above issues. This is where the doctrine of skepticism arises, as Sextus Empiricus testifies:

The first of these is “ontological” skepticism, according to which, in reality itself, there is a certain area that is not related to either existence or non-existence, but occupies a certain intermediate position between them. As for the second aspect, to which this message is devoted, we are talking here about a more familiar and understandable "epistemological" or "epistemological" skepticism. First of all, it should be noted here that skepticism, as Sextus Empiricus understands it, does not call for the rejection of knowledge at all, but only for the rejection of the absolutization of any kind of knowledge, so that it is absolutely impossible to equate skepticism and agnosticism or for example, "nihilism" (this aberration arises only when skepticism is perceived through the prism of "bipolar" cultural consciousness).

However, a consistent skeptic cannot even know for sure that he cannot know anything for sure - so that agnosticism can only be attributed to skepticism purely hypothetically.

Strictly speaking, it cannot be attributed at all, since the position of ignoramus et ignorabimus incompatible with skepticism for that reason. Belief in existence or belief in non-existence - it's all the same faith.

"Kant also begins his Critique of Pure Reason with the already traditional principle of 'maximum doubt', and also argues that following this principle leads him, in the end, to an absolutely solid and unshakable philosophical 'foundation': criticism, writes Kant, is negative. , but since it shows us the true limits of the practical application of reason, "then in reality it brings a positive, and very significant, benefit" - namely, by placing reason in the firm and fundamental limits of human experience. At the same time, Kant himself assures that from the philosophy of skepticism he only the "method" is borrowed, but not the philosophical "system" itself. Skepticism, writes Kant, "is a resting place for the human mind, where it can ponder its dogmatic wandering (...), but this is not at all a place for permanent residence; such a residence can be where the complete certainty of the knowledge of the objects themselves or the boundaries in which all our knowledge of objects is contained is achieved.

The difference between Kant and the ancient Pyrrhonists, in essence, lies only in the fact that all this deepest skepticism is combined in Kant with an equally fundamental and deep dogmatism: secondly, because Kant, moreover, introduces a priori the necessary practically "regulative ideas" of pure reason, which primarily include the idea of ​​"I" (soul), "the concept of the world in general" and, finally, "the concept of reason about God."

Well, what is your "combination" of skepticism with dogmatism? That is the tragedy of mankind, that even great thinkers for the most part unable to drop templates. The same Kant, having brilliantly refuted the scholastic "proofs" of the existence of God, immediately caught himself and invented his own categorical imperative.

Quite clearly and indicatively, A.O. Demin ("New Pyrrhonida"):

"For a skeptic, there is nothing more difficult than to reflect on a free topic. His thought does not have an engine within itself. Nothing internal prompts him to speak out about things, because the statement, by its nature, contradicts the skeptical worldview, since it singles out one or another part from the indifferent continuum of reality, The skeptic loves to argue, to invent an aporia, to put the enemy in a puddle, while he himself does not like to sit in a puddle, he is proud as a hundred devils.

A skeptic is not able to choose between good and evil, and most importantly, to act in accordance with such a choice.

The skeptic, tired of the debilitating balance between ideologies, is a potential adherent of any banner, any authority, just to "not think."

Skepticism is longing for the obvious. About what would convince to the point of conviction. What would be a sufficient reason for a judgment without requiring, in turn, a sufficient reason for itself. Which would be equally acceptable to anyone discussing any subject. This is the stay of the mind away from dogma. Souls are far from faith.

The threshold is not a place to live. You need a house to live. The skeptic cannot build it. This is the business of the confident and convinced, to which he does not belong by definition. The time to choose between desert and temple, skepticism and dogma is not far off."

To be honest, I'm just lazy to analyze the psychology of a critic - sapienti sat. But pay attention to - how revealing! - calls to faith and dogmas. And at the same time, on a misunderstanding of how you can choose something, not believing in the "truth" of the choice.

Menschliches, Allzumenschliches...

Nikolai Berdyaev also speaks in the same direction in his "Philosophy of Freedom":

The glorified scientific conscientiousness, scientific modesty, scientific self-restraint of our era is too often only a cover for weakness, timidity, lack of will in faith, in love, indecision in election.

Skepticism is first of all a defect of the will.

Pascal was an intellectual skeptic, but he was also a believer; overcame strong-willed skepticism, freely chose an object of love for himself. The demands that skeptics usually make on faith are striking in their absurdity, in their misunderstanding of the nature of faith. Skeptics demand guarantees from faith; abolish the essence of faith, they want knowledge.

Skeptics must first of all renounce their claims to faith, then only can one talk to them about faith. Many people say that they would like to believe, but they cannot.

The object of knowledge, its eternal goal - being and its secrets - are lost in rational and critical philosophy.

The dominance of epistemology is a painful reflection, split, self-doubt. After all, the power of epistemology is a product of skepticism. A living and strong faith excludes the possibility of painful reflection, and, consequently, epistemology that corrodes the will. Eternally reflective epistemology is lack of will, and the will must put an end to this. The creative will must again give place to ontology, the study of the mysteries of being without this eternal looking back, splitting, reflection, without eternal doubt about the possibility of cognition and the reality of being. The state of our will, our integral spirit must be initially firm, stubborn, unshakably confident, excluding any skepticism, any reflection, any corrosive doubt.

Intellectually, rationalistically, one cannot overcome skepticism and skeptical reflection, one can only strengthen them. Skeptical reflection is overcome by a holistic spirit and strong will. Strong-willed skepticism is dangerous, and it puts intellectualism at the mercy of...

Skepticism, reflection, eternal looking back at oneself may be recognized as shameful and by the will to a new organic era may they be ousted from the face of the earth. ... Only faith knows that the reflection of critical epistemology on whether being is real and whether it can be known is a lie."

The abstract of this stream of consciousness can be formulated very briefly: a departure from skepticism is intellectually untenable (Berdyaev himself admits); but skepticism is so terrible for those accustomed to faith that it must be overcome without fail by an effort of will and believe in something "without this eternal looking back." Well, how can one not remember Martin Luther: “Reason is the greatest enemy of faith, it is not an assistant in spiritual matters and often fights against the divine Word, meeting everything that comes from the Lord with contempt”?

As a very clinical example of such a critique of skepticism, I will quote Andrew Cohen:

"But this secret has another side. If a person does not believe that perfection is really achievable, really feasible in this earthly life of his, he does not take it seriously. In the absence of seriousness, he allows himself to remain careless, without disturbing himself with the need solve the key issues of their lives. The number of those who really want to achieve the Goal of the spiritual path is negligible. What hinders a person, what deprives his aspiration of seriousness and depth? The fact that with absolute aspiration it is necessary to take an unbiased look at all your in order to see their beliefs and stereotypes in their true light, a person must become unusually open, vulnerable, sincere and defenseless.This openness is the cornerstone in achieving success in the spiritual path.Becoming vulnerable and defenseless, a person feels his inextricable connection with all people, with and the only way to gain this unity is trust - liberation from all unbelief, skepticism, cynicism. To achieve the ultimate Goal of the spiritual path, Liberation, perfection, is possible only with openness and trust. Trust is the only path leading from egocentrism to unity with Truth.

Openness and trust, which a sincere striving for Perfection requires from a person, are fraught with danger, danger and risk. The real experience of God, the Absolute, the Truth is so all-destroying and immense that many, even sensing the proximity of the Truth, prefer to keep a respectful distance from It. And this distance is the conviction of the impossibility of real cognition of the Truth and that Unity with all Being that It brings.

Unbelief prevents a person from having to take a serious look at all aspects and all the secret corners of his life. The understanding of this is hidden from man. His cynical reasoning, his skepticism about what is Absolute and Perfect, isolates a person from any possibility of contact with what is Perfect and Absolute.

It breaks a tear... But the question "how do you know that the Truth is exactly it, and not an illusion" is unobtrusively ignored so unobtrusively. "What is characteristic" © V. Korneev.

And finally - another copy in our panopticon of critics of skepticism - A. Khotsey with his article "Is there a god?" (Philosophical analysis of the problem)" . Perhaps, in this, so to speak, philosophical work, all the clichés of what is attributed to skepticism to the extent of its underdevelopment are collected, and then refuted with pathos.

Well, let's say from the very beginning: The trend that denies the existence of truth is called "skepticism"."

Skepticism does not deny the existence of truth. He is skeptical of her. Quite for the alternatively gifted - skepticism says: "Maybe this is true, but at the moment we have no reason to categorically state this."

"After all, truth is an unequivocal proposition."; again I ask the question "is the electron a wave or a particle?"

"Skepticism later revived under the name of agnosticism."Agnosticism, in contrast to skepticism, asserts that not only can we not know something with absolute certainty, nor we will never know.

"… in defense of the theses of skeptics and agnostics, only conclusions, generated by apparent, that is, misunderstood, contradictions of the world, come forward. Yes, everything is so: the real world is both finite and infinite at the same time; space is indeed both discontinuous and at the same time continuous. Thinking is capable of discovering these characteristics of the world, but for skeptics it has not yet been able to digest them and combine them correctly. This was the first stumbling of philosophy about the complexity of the world order and its first infantile fall, expressed in doubt about the ability of the mind to know anything at all as true. … These contradictions are in fact, I repeat, false. They were formed as a result of incorrect mental operations, as a result of confusing different objects of thought. About which I, perhaps, will write in more detail someday, but much later."

Pay attention to the classic "you are never right, it's obvious, and I won't prove it to you." And no less classic: "But, of course, I can prove it without problems, but only somehow later. Quite later."

And the statements that the world-de simultaneously has the property of X and not-X are also classics. The same dialectic of Hegel, about which K. Popper wrote: "Obviously, such a position lays the foundation for an extremely dangerous variety of dogmatism - for dogmatism, which no longer needs to be afraid of criticism. After all, any criticism of any theory should be based on the method of detecting contradictions - within the framework of the theory itself or between theory and facts ... I would call this method reinforced concrete dogmatism."

As a matter of fact, Hotsei bases all his "criticism" on the assertion " Skepticism asserts its thesis as the truth, which obviously contradicts skepticism at the level of definition.

This example is given by me as an illustration of the incompatibility of dialectical materialism with skepticism. Unfortunately, many scientists who were actively working back in the days of the USSR automatically accept diamat as a dogma - due to the fact that simply did not think over its essence. According to the apt expression of I. Lokatos, scientists understand epistemology in the same way as fish understand water. I recommend R. Hazarzar's study on this topic "A Skeptical View of Dialectical Materialism".

Summary: no one of the critics of skepticism, he does not criticize the epistemology of skepticism proper; all their theses refer to that imago that stands before their eyes and which they call skepticism.

Of course, far from all the critics were analyzed above; but I have chosen them in such a way as to show the most characteristic train of thought of their "subclasses". Personally, I have never come across a critique of skepticism written by someone who understands, which is skepticism, and containing justified claims. Of course, I am not saying that there is none in principle; If you know her - send me a link, I will be grateful.

4. Classic skepticism and praxis

In this section, we finally move away from thoughtful philosophy and discuss more pressing issues - psychological and methodological. One of the most common "counterarguments" presented to skeptics is precisely "the impossibility of acting without a choice." To put it simply: if the skeptic acts in any particular way, then by doing so he contradicts skepticism itself, which asserts the equivalence of opposite judgments.

Ancient skeptics explained this by the imperfection of man - see above the historical anecdote about Pyrrho, who climbed a tree to escape from a dog. But in fact, such a claim is an ordinary substitution of the thesis - which, however, is clear to us, who already live in the 21st century, having knowledge of modern psychology.

It's simple: skepticism can not be a worldview. Worldview is the acceptance of some specific model the world and understanding your place in it. But any certainty that is not directly perceptible does not fit in with skepticism. It would seem that this is a contradiction that overthrows skepticism - and so it is, but only in the field of ontology. Of course, "fully and consistently extended to everything" skepticism is simply impossible - except perhaps in the form of a parrot, following the classic: "I only know that I know nothing", and even then it will be an agnostic parrot, not a skeptic.

But - as I mentioned earlier - the cognitive field of skepticism is epistemology. And on the question of ontology, the skeptic can take any position (except those that require him to believe) on practice, but it will not believe into her.

Let me give you a good example: imagine yourself in the role of Buridan's donkey (unless you replace the hay with a barbecue with beer). I think that you will not die of hunger, but will choose any portion, despite all their equivalence, even if the choice is justified by tossing a coin (or not at all). At the same time, you will honestly agree that yes, the portions looked exactly the same to you. But that's no reason to starve to death!

In the same way, a skeptic chooses a certain action not on the basis of a "strict logical preference", but due to many reasons that are not reducible to philosophical - let's say, coming from the unconscious. Here, try to philosophically substantiate the preference for your favorite color or type of drink. At the same time, without departing directly from philosophy to psychology, etc. Well, how did it work?

Thus, the claim to "the impossibility of choice" is a substitution of the philosophical cognitive field for a psychological one, and "contradiction" is a fiction.

In other words: it is impossible for a skeptic to make a choice on purely epistemological questions; but to reduce everything to pure epistemology is, to put it mildly, strange. Let's say, "purely epistemologically" it is impossible to assert that if you stop breathing, you will certainly die. But in practice, even the most skeptical skeptic simply cannot stop breathing: an unconditioned reflex will work, physiology will “make a choice”.

And in general, to say that a skeptic ceases to be a skeptic at the moment of any choice is the same as to say that tossing a coin is not skeptical: after all, one heads / tails will definitely fall out if the coin falls. The equivalence of statements from the point of view of epistemology in no way means the equivalence of the actions that follow from them from other points of view, in particular, psychology (we will talk about this in the next chapter).

By the way, a similar claim on a slightly different occasion was also made in antiquity, I will reproduce it in the form of a dialogue:

“Death is no different from life.

“Then why don’t you commit suicide?”

- What for? I said it's still the same thing.

In general terms: skepticism is no more a worldview than atheism or even, more clearly, the use of Occam's razor. "It is enough that any worldview necessary contains an ethic (not to be confused with morality) that is in no way derived from skepticism.

Thus, skepticism "plays" only in the epistemological field, while the attempts of ancient skeptics to develop a worldview of skepticism were doomed to failure a priori. Even if we follow a purely conformist position "since there is no reason to choose something, then we will follow what is accepted in this society", then every second there are problems of choice at a purely everyday level - "what to buy for lunch?" and the like. In addition, the conformist position means avoiding responsibility for one's actions - which is obviously incompatible with the development of personality, and looks strange for any philosopher.

But even in terms of epistemology, there are a lot of myths that surprise non-skeptics. An example is scientific methodology.

Many argue that scientists supposedly believe into their theories. However, this, to put it mildly, is not so - that is why science operates with theories and hypotheses, and does not declare "scientific Truth with a capital letter", like religion. Scientific theories are based on axioms and experience. Analytical judgments are deduced from the axioms. From the empirical flow - synthetic (also through the formalization of experimental data). The hypothetical nature (or conventionality) of scientific theories follows from the unprovability of axioms and from the problem of induction (see above). scientific theories hypothetical, but their verification convinces scientists of correctness of the convention And performance scientific theories.

Diamaters show blatant incompetence in philosophy, declaring that "practice is the criterion of truth": truth can not have criteria, she herself - a-priory - universal and immediate criterion Total. However, practice is the criterion performance. Science does not claim that "something is true", but: "something works" (more precisely, it has worked steadily until now). As was excellently formulated by N. Bohr back at the Copenhagen conference: "We do not cognize reality, we only build mathematical models of reality." Phlogiston serves as a very good illustration: as is well known, the hypothesis of its existence was refuted, and yet the equations of thermodynamics derived at that time are still used (and will be used further). It's simple: it doesn't matter if there is some entity (caloric), for science it is important numerical description of the phenomena of reality. And nothing else.

For further consideration of the problem, we will finally formulate what is meant by "faith" in this article. From my point of view, the simplest description is mathematical, at the high school level.

The probability that something will happen can be described as a segment, from "0" - it will never happen, to "1" - it will certainly happen. In this case, faith can be called a set of two elements: (0, 1), i.e. either "something definitely is (was, will be)", or "something definitely has no place to be". Everything else, namely the segment with the extreme points excluded: ]0;1[, by faith is not, since there is doubt: probability of an event (or its absence) not equal 100%. Of course, this definition is precisely epistemological; say, the religious concept of faith is much broader, but we are now discussing precisely on the epistemological field, and on no other.

Now let's look at some of the more specific "arguments" made by believers (usually monotheists) to science that science supposedly contains faith.

Let's say scientists are accused of having faith into the existence of the laws of nature (the principle of causality). But - there is no faith! There is an honestly limited subject of study: a set of all fundamentally possible objective experimental facts. Science is not interested in everything else, just as it is not interested in quasi-philosophical nonsense about the "existence" of this very subject of its study.

Another accusation: faith in the unity of these laws throughout the space-time continuum, manifested both in natural conditions and in the laboratory; both in observations and in experiments (the principle of universality). And again - a finger to the sky ... This provision is introduced into the axiomatics of many theories, but on an equal footing with all other axioms. Axioms - contrary to a common but incorrect expression - are not "taken on faith", but are only used as starting points and only until satisfy the experimental data. The above is currently, relatively speaking, working hypothesis, which is confirmed everyone experimental data in all areas of science, which allows us to consider these axioms as a basis.

Simply put, the axiomatics of some scientific theory is the solution inverse problem: "find the minimum set of statements from which the experimentally obtained data set follows."

Even the word o means "researcher" (also - "inclined to examine, to think"), and any truly scientist is a skeptic in his field of work. I note that some people like the term "scientific faith", which supposedly means something fundamentally different from "religious faith" or "everyday faith", but I personally do not see anything in this usage, except an attempt save the faith in any way - in other words, manifestations of the same, already mentioned above, unconscious fear of skepticism(i.e. before the lack of faith).

Separately, it is worth mentioning the "argument" about believing scientists. Like, if there are believing scientists, then science and faith are compatible. Although... dismantling this means disrespecting the reader, implying that he does not own elementary logic. So I will confine myself to pointing out this substitution of the thesis.

So, the problem of non-derivability of practical actions from skepticism alone is formulated and described; it's time to start solving the problem. But information about skepticism would not be complete without an analysis of the new direction of skepticism, which will be described in the next chapter.

5. Active skepticism

Such a seemingly contradictory current in skepticism is the development of Yuri Tikhonravov: the first work on this topic was published in August 2000 (however, see - perhaps the forerunner of active skepticism is Crowley?). Here's a great quote:

"Modern skepticism is defined as a refusal to take anything for granted. But a person cannot only doubt, he must also act. Is it possible to act without taking anything for granted?

Opponents of skepticism say no. They argue that if skeptics really do not believe in anything, then they deprive themselves of any opportunity to act. If skeptics act, then they really believe in something, but at the same time they are deceiving - either only others, or themselves. Is it so?

Skepticism cannot avoid questions about what should be done in certain cases, questions of ethics and politics. However, on what basis can he base his practical recommendations? Probably, you need to know what consequences certain actions will lead to. And for this, you probably need to know that the same actions in similar conditions lead to the same results. Such knowledge, in turn, presupposes the idea of ​​causality, a special case of which is the connection between an act and its result. Therefore, skepticism must rely on the notion of causality to serve as a basis for the skeptic's actions.

Therefore, skepticism, which, based on the concept of causality, gives practical recommendations, is inconsistent, because it accepts something unfounded on faith. But, on the other hand, if he does not give any practical recommendations, he is also inconsistent, since he leaves the most important questions of human life at the mercy of various kinds of beliefs.

We have to admit that modern skepticism is doubly inconsistent - it does not give any practical recommendations, but it uses a belief in causality. It is not uncommon to find skeptics claiming that their goal is to form a rational picture of the world based on a strictly scientific establishment of causal relationships. As a result, skepticism limits itself to revealing minor miracles, constantly replacing one dubious interpretation with another, and at the same time says nothing about life and work. Isn't it time to correct this dangerous mistake?

Consistent skepticism dictates that the individual develop his cognitive abilities and overcome his limitations in order to increase his chances of making the right choice. If we lack the ability to know the truth, then we must constantly improve ourselves in order to know it. Extensive improvement involves the constant accumulation of knowledge and the maximum possible increase in the duration and variety of life experience. Intensive improvement involves going beyond the limits of those means of knowledge that a person has by nature. It is not only about the continuation of the human senses in technology, but also about the critical use of various methods of individual development, the rethinking of which could constitute a skeptical yoga.

Consistent skepticism dictates the need to coordinate one's experience with the experience of others and one's activity with the activity of other people. Critical comparison of one's point of view with as many other points of view as possible increases the chances of finding the truth. In addition, the attention of one person can be sufficiently focused on only one relatively small problem, and for the knowledge of all vital problems, a division of labor within the framework of a social whole is necessary. Therefore, skeptics around the world should unite in a single society, the main focus of which will not be the revelation of paranormal phenomena, but the ways of developing knowledge - from magic to genetic engineering, from transcendental meditation to social revolution.

Simply put, just because the skeptic believes that we have no right to say that we know the truth, it does not follow that we will never know it and that "Knowing infinity takes infinite time, so work, do not work - everything is one "(c). Yes, the skeptic does not believe in causality, but since his empirical experience allows him to isolate reality from the phenomena stable sequences, then increasing knowledge reduces uncertainty. Skepticism does not protest against the theory of probability, but only against dogmatization whatever. For example, all skeptics will agree that when jumping from an airplane flying at an altitude of several kilometers, without a parachute, it is almost impossible to survive. But there are several cases when pilots survived (falling on a flat slope with a large layer of snow). Yes, this is the rarest exception - but never say never... From the fact that "no one has ever seen this" it does not follow "this can never happen".

Thus active skepticism naturally cooperates with science. What is also useful for science: scientists are also people, and have a tendency to believe in something as an indisputable truth that contradicts science, since belief in something automatically means no need for further study- why, when the truth is already known? This question is well dealt with by Kuhn, so I won't repeat myself. Although let me remind you of a well-known fact - many very venerable physicists (including Einstein) rejected the theory of quantum mechanics for a long time - it was too different from the usual paradigm. And not long before that, there was a similar attitude towards the theory of relativity...

Separately, I note that "skepticism" in modern times is often replaced by the so-called. scientism - faith in science. So, in 1976, the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of Paranormal Phenomena (CSICOP), headed by Paul Kurtz, was organized. This organization is engaged in exposing charlatans who claim their paranormal abilities. There is also the James Randi Educational Foundation, James Randi's educational foundation. And this fund is giving a prize of $1,000,000 (one million dollars zero-zero cents) to anyone who demonstrates their supernatural abilities. The Foundation has been offering this prize since 1998, but so far no one has been able to lay claim to this amount (oddly enough, judging by the number of ads from "magic salons", etc.). Of course, such activities are necessary for science and society; but this - not skepticism. The fact that the purpose of such activity is precisely the desire refute, but not explore, is clearly shown by the fact that in most articles criticizing astrology a "killer" counterargument is given: they say, since astrologers use the location of the Zodiac, which does not coincide with the modern one, then what can we say about them? But let me - astrology has never claimed astronomical laurels. I am not an astrologer, but I also understand that astrology is an occult discipline, which, in other words, studies the laws of causality depending on hypothetical cyclic processes in the Universe: all reality, and the location of the astrological planets are only "markers" that allow you to operate with any stable objects to which statistics can be tied. The zodiac is a full cycle, which is historically divided into 12 sectors. What they are called and where the constellations that once gave them names are now located - it does not matter. From this position, the stupidity of the other two "counterarguments" is obvious - and how do astrologers credit the Sun and some asteroids (say, Proserpina) and even non-existent objects (Lilith - "Black Moon") as "planets", well, the most "classical" argument, usually pronounced with sarcasm: how exactly do planets affect humans? - then comes the calculation of gravitational, etc. interactions at such a distance...

I personally don't believe in astrology - as a skeptic, I don't believe in anything at all; but such a methodology of criticism unequivocally indicates that the goal is to refute at all costs - even if it is not astrology that is refuted, but one’s own crooked understanding (or a conscious juggling is carried out), which unscientific. However, "people hawala" (c). But I repeat that "this cannot be, because it can never be" is not skepticism.

Unfortunately, active skepticism (more precisely, its author) fell into the same error as its ancient predecessors. Sure, it's a nice company, but...

Another quote: "Consistent skepticism dictates that all versions be treated equally - do not believe in any of them, but do not reject any. According to one version, the connection between human behavior and its results has the character of an impersonal regularity, according to another the third is karma, the fourth is the will of God or gods, pre-established harmony, etc. Each of these versions has an equal right to exist, any one can turn out to be true, as well as false. , but also against any of them, therefore it is necessary to treat the choice of non-skeptics not only with maximum tolerance, but also with exploratory attention, for they test their choice with their own lives.

There is such a trait among philosophers: to strive to invent a "General Theory of Everything". It would seem that he created a completely worthy position, giving skepticism a new impetus to development, replacing inactivity with development. But no - we must without fail try to mold some kind of "whole worldview". And here miracles begin. To quote the article "Ancient and New Skepticism":

"... the strategic imperatives of behavior:

1. since a person must learn what he does not know due to his imperfection, he must improve himself in every way;
2. since it is difficult to determine what results certain measures may lead to, improvement must be cautious, that is, critical of oneself and attentive to any points of view.

Agree that this, directly following from the skeptical approach to epistemology, is quite reasonable and does not raise objections. However, what follows is an attempt to formulate ideology, and here it is already necessary to inevitably leave the epistemological field, which cannot but cause consequences. Everything is shown clearly:

"Man lives to find out why he lives". Excuse me, is the thesis" X necessary has a goal Y" - skeptical?! This is not to mention the fact that there are many people who simply do not care about such issues (they manage with Malthusian needs), and there are also a fairly large number of those who understand senselessness phrases "the meaning of life" in relation to oneself: "meaning" is an external concept.

"A person cannot find out the true meaning of his life or distinguish the true meaning from the false one, because he is too imperfect."- and again the philosopher's skepticism disappeared somewhere, moreover - he does not notice this! Once: issued ideology , there is no time for their own philosophical constructions ... Immediately two postulates that are accepted a priori: "cannot" (this is agnosticism, not skepticism), and the reason definitely is a kind of "imperfection" (I would say that this is theology, not philosophy, but let's not digress).

"To be able to really know the true meaning of one's life, a person must continuously improve."- I have already written about the" meaning ", and here is also the "genuine"; " Improvement consists in expanding the boundaries of your actual and possible experience. Real experience is what we already know. Possible experience is what we can know based on our abilities. Therefore, a person must continuously learn new things and develop his abilities of knowledge."How do you imagine expanding the boundaries of what we already know? And this, pay attention, is written by a professional philosopher ... Perhaps I am just picking on words, but in summarizing theses, as in definitions, be responsible for every word.

And lastly: " The main ability of knowledge, to which a person should strive first of all, is a collective ability, and it is expressed in the coordination of the experience of all those who are capable of acquiring it."And why is that, in fact? I will quote from the Doctrine of Active Doubt":

"Coordination of one's own experience with others helps self-knowledge, coordination of one's own efforts with the efforts of others helps to find the most correct way to achieve the desired goals." Again - no one denies the importance of collective-subjective perception (all science rests on this), but where did the skeptic get a certain "most sure way", pray tell?

In general, the "Doctrine" is an attempt to link skepticism with liberal ethics:

"Chuang Tzu also warned against the devastating desire to argue and convince anyone of anything. ... Whoever you're trying to convince may actually be right - we don't know that for sure. He may be lucky, and he guessed the truth without evidence, and you will seduce him from the true path. For the community of learners, it is important that there be as many different points of view as possible. The more these points, the greater the chance that any of them will be true. In addition, many assumptions, when taken on faith, have the property of transforming the view of the world and giving rise to a special inner experience. Even if these assumptions are not true, their productivity certainly helps to move towards the truth, bringing to view those areas that are not visible from other points."It would be clearer to shorten the thesis: any nonsense is a value, that is, there is value of private opinion. Without any justification. Yes, the skeptic always remembers isosthenia; but statements like "I have three legs, only the third is invisible and imperceptible in any way" - this is no longer isosthenia, but schizophrenia.

Further, liberalism is pumped: " ... we can experiment with ourselves as much as we like, but we have no right to risk the well-being of others, because each other has a special point of view, and it is precisely this that we may not have enough to comprehend the truth". Of course, no one proposes a massacre; but to the statement "a name can have knowledge that brings it closer to the truth" (I will no longer point out the inappropriateness of "truth" in the context of skepticism, I'm tired) it can be quite canonically objected that the murder of the designated individual can give the experience that was lacking before reaching this very "truth". And on what basis should a skeptic unequivocally choose the first option? From my point of view, there is an attempt to fit skepticism to the so-called "universal values". Although from the very definition of skepticism It unequivocally follows that a skeptic is by all means an immoralist: any postulate of morality (dogma) cannot withstand skeptical criticism.

The desire to "fit to the familiar" is especially evident in the "soteriological program":

"Salvation is any increase in freedom. The subject of soteriology is such an increase in freedom that takes a living being beyond its usual boundaries. We hesitate to be saved, to be as free as possible. And doubt really saves."

Here personally I, for example, do not see any necessity "to be rescued". The question is, why use the term "salvation", and not just "increase in freedom", if not so that those who are accustomed to operate with such a category (Christians, etc.) can more easily convert to a new faith? Yes yes exactly faith- because it can no longer be called skepticism. In this "program" there is even the famous Orwellian doublethink, characteristic of any religion: compare the declarations " Doubt keeps us from risking faith." And " And if you have to [take it on faith], then only the most necessary minimum". Here we have such a slightly pregnant philosopher ...

Further, it is written in detail that skeptics, realizing that not a single crazy idea can be rejected on the move (what if it is true?) Should check them to the best of their abilities and abilities. But it's no secret to anyone that the vast majority of "paths of salvation" known to mankind are nothing more than faith. A skeptic who believes in something stop being a skeptic. The practice of any religion, etc. without faith- this is only an external observance of rituals, which will not give anything to test the "truth of religion" by definition.

In summary: trying to make an ideology out of skepticism, Yu. Tikhonravov de facto came to the substitution of skepticism as an epistemological base for an ultra-liberal worldview "everything is possible that does not interfere with others"; at the same time, declaring that faith is contrary to skepticism, he becomes unable to see this very faith in his constructions. As the saying goes: if the facts contradict the theory, so much the worse for the facts.

In the "Social Doctrine of Active Doubt" this is already plain text: " The skeptic is interested in questioning everything and accepting as few assumptions as possible.". Like this: skepticism no longer contradicts taking something on faith ... That's it, there was a skeptic and all left. You can not read further.

Summary: ancient skepticism, which gravitated towards a passive life position, is not an inevitable life position of a skeptic; active skepticism is also possible. Unfortunately, the creator of the direction himself killed his development, transforming it into an ideology containing faith.

So let's try to formulate the position of a modern skeptic on our own.

6. Modern skepticism and praxis

As you have read above, the basic tenet of skepticism is lack of faith. It should be noted here that very often people think dichotomously: "either-or". The most obvious example is the understanding of atheism. Atheism is "non-theism", godlessness (literal translation), and not "anti-theism" at all. A theist is one who believes into some god; an atheist is one who does not believe. However, "not believing in existence" is not the same as "believing in non-existence". Of course, there are atheists who precisely believe that there is no God ("Gagarin flew into space and did not see God" (c)), but there are also skeptical atheists. Skeptic refrains from approving: he does not say that "there is a god", but he does not say that "there is no god". Since God is transcendental, it is impossible to prove his existence. a-priory; assertions yes/no equally unprovable. Full  , in terms of Pyrrho.

However, what follows from this in practice? If we accept the hypothesis "God exists" as a working one, then this means following a certain particular religion. Religion implies faith, which is incompatible with skepticism. The working hypothesis "there is no god" does not make any changes in the way of life. Therefore, the skeptic is by all means a de facto atheist-practitioner, although he will never say: "There is definitely no God."

In addition, when choosing one isosthenic statement over another, one must take into account stable sequences associated with a particular choice. A modern skeptic, having jumped from a dog to a tree, will not be justified by instincts, unlike the same Pyrrho: of course, the theses corresponding to the events "an angry dog ​​will run past" and "will bite" are isosthenic, and we cannot guarantee a 100% probability of neither one of them. However, having a consistent sequence of "when a dog bites, it hurts" allows for a very definite choice between "avoid danger" and "stay still".

Thus the skeptic's practical choice is based not on skepticism; but this - I repeat - does not contradict skepticism, since it is valid only as an epistemological concept, and the problem of choice is the area of ​​motivational psychology.

In fact, skepticism is not only the only concept that doesn't claim to be right: skeptics honestly admit that they can be wrong; but also the only one intellectually honest concept. Any non-skeptical position is answered by some object faith, which justify impossible(remember Gödel's theorem). The question is: on what basis is such a position chosen? Of course, the choice can have many reasons ("it's accepted", "I like it better", etc.), but none of them can be called logically justified.

Moreover, skepticism universal position. Let's say a materialist scientist and an idealist scientist will use in their scientific work the same scientific methodology, while maintaining a de facto skeptical view of what was once considered the "basic question of philosophy."

Another example. You can hear objections of this kind: aha, you say that you question everything, but you yourself use logic! Therefore, you certainly believe in it!

Of course, skeptics use logic. But absolutely not because it is de true. In order to talk about truth of the same logic, it is necessary, at least, to allow the truth of our thoughts(This was understood even by the founder of logic, Aristotle). And truth does not tolerate assumptions, because otherwise it is a convention or something else. Skeptical criticism is based on classical logic because, firstly, there is no logic at all impossible draw conclusions from reasoning, and secondly, because classical logic is conventionally accepted by the vast majority of theories that attempt to describe reality. Ready to offer something better? Consider. At this point in time, it is the use of classical logic that reduces the uncertainty of the world most effectively, eliminating self-contradictory hypotheses. Skeptic ready to use conventions but he doesn't consider the convention truth.

Let us analyze one more example: the so-called moral-ethical relativism. I have already explained that the skeptic is by definition an immoralist. It should be noted here - often confused - that immorality does not mean an "immoral individual". Conventionally, an "immoral type" is understood as a "sociopath in a mild form" who constantly violates the moral principles of society. The immoralist does not necessarily do this at all - his behavior may not differ from the environment, the meaning here is motivation. If a moralist follows the rules of morality because “it is supposed to be so,” then the immoralist himself develops his own ethics, and it may well coincide in some way with the morality surrounding him. Or it may not coincide - the question is the expediency of moral attitudes in themselves, and not as "mandatory patterns of behavior."

By moral and ethical relativism is understood the position of a chameleon - such an individual does not have firm life attitudes, "the core of the personality": he is always ready to accept the rules of the game imposed on him, to bend under a stronger one. Figuratively speaking, the skeptics outgrew morality, consciously went beyond its dogmatic limits; so-called "moral relativists" not grown up to morality.

The question is, if skepticism is intellectually honest, does not represent any complex theory, and, it would seem, is very easy to understand - then why are there so few skeptics?

The reasons for this are almost physiological: the vast majority of the people simply not used to thinking and the ability to think is the result constant practices. Any amazingly high IQ, no matter how impressive erudition is not the ability to think systemically. A person gets used, starting from early childhood, follow patterns. How often have you met parents explaining to a small child everything that he wants to know? Most often, the answer is some form of "grow up - you'll understand." And while the little potential sapiens grows, he gets used to the fact that he has to act in many ways. by templates"That's how it is accepted, and the explanation, perhaps, will come later." And thus, an ordinary homo is formed, who is firmly convinced that there are (and significant!) Areas, and which no need to think. You just need to act "like everyone else", that's enough. The lack of intelligence is compensated by knowledge of etiquette... However, there are significant groups of the population where it is also not necessary to know etiquette, except for "hello" and "goodbye" (more precisely, local equivalents of such terms).

Also, one should not forget that the formation of the psyche at an early age mostly follows the principle imitations Children copy the behavior of their parents. The mechanism is fixed evolutionarily: since individuals have survived to reproductive age and found a partner for reproduction, their behavior is justified "from the point of view of evolution." And now remember that the structure of the psyche is formed for the most part even at preschool age. Thus, by the time when an individual's thinking is formed to a sufficient extent so that he can form his own models of reality, he already has "taboo areas for thoughts" that are not justified by anything other than "it's customary." Worse, the very presence of such regions indicates that they are allowed, and, faced with something new, such an individual most often will not comprehensively explore the phenomenon, but will only bring it into the "card index of templates".

But that's not all, as they say in advertising... The concept of causality is, of course, an abstraction. The problem is that this is probably very first an abstraction that the brain produces unconsciously, long before the very concept of abstraction becomes known. "Click the mare in the nose - she will wave her tail" (c) K. Prutkov.

The proud name of homo sapiens nevertheless obliges to something, and people - oddly enough, if they are observed in the masses - still have a need to know. But due to environmental factors need to know mutates very quickly desire to know. And this is a completely different question... Cognition presupposes one's own work, mostly intellectual, a collision with the Unknown, independence. To to know, it is necessary to take a step from the already known, brightly illuminated by science, - into the Darkness. Break away from the Orderly and try to find something new in Chaos, which contains an infinity of forms...

Isn't it much easier to be satisfied with the fact that some knowledge is true and no longer requires study and search for alternatives? After all, if someone Knows the Truth, then he can calmly lie on the sofa named after Oblomov and husk seeds: he simply does not have the need for intellectual development and search. And, mind you, everything is much simpler this way ... You can even chuckle condescendingly at the skeptics - why are they swarming around when I already Know Everything? Well, if not Everything, then the answer to the Most Important Question. And the fact that this is not even the most, not the main, but not a question at all - is it possible to think such a thing? ..

Not everyone is able to accept isosthenia as a basic epistemological function of the worldview due to the complexity of application for standard brains. Accordingly, dogmatism is used in one form or another - we know everything right away, for the rest of our lives. And there is simply no room for skepticism.

But it's not just intellectual dishonesty. Since cause-and-effect relationships, faith in the Truth (Absolute), etc. lie in the "base", then loyalty to these attitudes is practically pre-conscious, subconscious: over this never think. The already considered concept of "meaning of life" is the most obvious example. Skepticism requires an ultra-stable psyche so that the unknown and uncertainty do not “press” on it too much. In occult terms, only a born Chaosist can be a skeptic "in its entirety", and not in any particular area: to be a skeptic is to perceive the dynamic structure of Chaos, himself isolating forms from it, understanding their subjectivity and illusory nature. Being a skeptic means be fully responsible for your choice: if there are no "most correct criteria", but only isosthenia, then the subjective choice implies, first of all, responsibility for one's subjective point of view- and blame it on someone else or on some "objective laws", on God, on fatum, on determinism, and so on. - it just won't work.

And it is from this responsibility that faith saves people, no matter what it refers to. If there is no faith in something unshakable, then you can only rely on yourself personally, and any layman, as if he declared his own usefulness, subconsciously understands his own insignificance and worthlessness - see for yourself how many mass entertainments the modern culture of any "civilized country" offers : commoners simply afraid to be alone with themselves.

As an illustration, I will cite excerpts from one discussion in FIDO on the topic of the meaning of life. I omit the authorship, but I consider it appropriate to note that the quotes belong to a practicing psychotherapist, who, it would seem, should understand all the intricacies of the psyche ... But here is what he writes to me in response to the theses about the meaninglessness of the term "meaning of life" and the absence of the need for faith , and also that I have my own Path, but there is no certain Purpose [of life]:

"... why is your Way bad? What could be wrong with the life of an intelligent mold that smokes the sky?, as you wrote there, consume oxygen and exhale various muck? However, not even mold, it then has a meaning (i.e., meaning) within the framework of at least the existence of a biocenosis, being a necessary link in its composition. And you, with your reasonable attitudes, are generally something indecent (unnecessary), converting food into fertilizer, ammonia, hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide. However, in this role you perform a certain function. Therefore, your life has a certain meaning, you play the role of a SMART SHIT COMBINE!!! Although, to which I am actually surprised, the consistently held worldview position of the materialist-atheist-rationalist should lead to such a result."

"You're not going anywhere, you've got nowhere to go! You have no purpose, your life is meaningless! What is the best way to drift by the will of the waves, wind and current towards inexorable death or raise the Sail of Faith, lean on the Oars of Religious Experiences and Sail to the Land of Hope beyond the Horizon, not having a 100% guarantee that it exists?"

Pay attention to how clearly in this quote sounds the horror of a person before the fact that, it turns out, he is not the "crown of the universe", before the absence of the Highest Goal, which must be followed ... Then I will quote my own answer at the same time:

"Don't go with the wind. Don't go against the wind. Become the wind (c) Do not drift at the behest of the waves and wind, but go your own way, only taking into account the winds of the wave; not be afraid of death, but live forever - as long as it works out; or sit on the barge of the Ready Religious Worldview and sail to where the long-dead captain once set a course, consoling himself with hope - what if there is something there? After all, no one has ever returned from there, which means that it is so good there that no one wants to return!

And even better - raise the Sail of Faith in Santa Claus, put on the oars of Children's Dreams and Sail to the Land of Hope, In Which Santa Claus Lives, who every day gives sweets to those adults who have sailed to it, and even if there is no 100% guarantee, but so I want you to be given gifts only for good behavior, and nothing more was required of you!"

From my point of view, these are very revealing quotes... And, I repeat, the theses about the need for faith belong to an individual with a high intellect and a specialist in psychology. What then to ask from ordinary inhabitants? Such people simply identify their perception with the world, not dividing reality and reality (the reflection of the world in their minds identically fixes the properties immanent to the world), reshape the universe in their own image and likeness, introducing unnecessary entities instead of looking into the eyes of the Abyss. They can't stand that look...

Therefore, the most common "objection" against skepticism is the "everyday common sense" of the level "as it cannot be proved - you can feel it!". But I have too much respect for myself and the readers to conduct discussions at the level of the kitchen plinth.

Perhaps, we have only one "practical" question left: "and what bonuses does skepticism give in practice, in everyday life?"

I will answer with the words of Arthur Schopenhauer: "My philosophy did not give me any income at all, but it saved me from very many expenses."

“I have a position. In epistemological terms, this is skepticism.

Why do I need this position? How could it be... simpler... Good luck!

If only because anyone who naively decides to justify the system by its own means will run into the problem of induction. To justify by other people's means is even more stupid. Yes, and here you run into the same problem. That is, in both cases you will be beaten. And rightly so.

And I like skepticism subjectively. There are claims - complain."

Ruslan Khazarzar

Special for NEXUS
March, SeptemberXL A.S.

σκεπτικός - considering, investigating) - a philosophical direction that puts forward doubt as a principle of thinking, especially doubt about the reliability of truth. moderate skepticism limited to the knowledge of facts, showing restraint in relation to all hypotheses and theories. In the ordinary sense, skepticism is a psychological state of uncertainty, doubt about something, forcing one to refrain from making categorical judgments.

Sextus Empiricus in his work "Three Books of Pyrrhonic Propositions" noted that skepticism does not consider doubt as a principle, but uses doubt as a polemical weapon against dogmatists, the principle of skepticism is a phenomenon. It is necessary to distinguish between ordinary skepticism, scientific and philosophical skepticism. In the ordinary sense, skepticism is the abstinence from judgments due to doubts. Scientific skepticism is the consistent opposition to teachings that lack empirical evidence. Philosophical skepticism is a trend in philosophy that expresses doubt about the possibility of reliable knowledge. Philosophical skepticism regards philosophy, including skeptical philosophy, as a kind of science-like poetry, but not science. A distinctive feature of philosophical skepticism is the statement "Philosophy is not science!".

Antique skepticism

Antique skepticism as a reaction to metaphysical dogmatism is represented primarily by Pyrrho ( influenced by early Buddhism [not in source] ), then the secondary academy (Arkesilay) and the so-called. late skepticism(Aenesidemus, Agrippa, Sextus Empiric). Aenesidemus points out ten principles (tropes) of skepticism: the first six are the distinction of living beings; of people; sense organs; states of the individual; positions, distances, places; phenomena by their connections; the last four principles are the mixed being of the perceived object with other objects; relativity in general; dependence on the number of perceptions; dependence on the level of education, customs, laws, philosophical and religious views.

Criticism of skepticism

The skeptic says that knowledge requires certainty. But how can he know about it? Theodor Schick and Lewis Vaughn write about this: "If skeptics are not sure that knowledge requires certainty, they cannot know that it is." This gives good reason to doubt the assertion that knowledge requires certainty. According to the laws of logic, relying on this statement, one can doubt skepticism and challenge skepticism in general. However, reality does not consist solely of the laws of logic (in which there are unresolvable paradoxes that nullify all of the above), so such criticism must be treated with caution. (Example: there are no absolute skeptics, so it is not at all necessary that a skeptic will doubt the obvious things)

Skepticism in Medieval and Modern Philosophy

The most important representatives:

Notes

Literature

• V. P. Lega. Sextus Empiric: Skepticism as a way of life // Mathesis. From the history of ancient science and philosophy. M., 1991, p. 210-219
• Yuri Semyonov "Ideological fashion in science and skepticism"

Links

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Synonyms:

See what "Skepticism" is in other dictionaries:

- (from Greek skeptikos examining, investigating) philosophy. a direction that questions the possibility of knowing reality or some fragment of it. S. can touch the boundaries of knowledge and argue that no knowledge at all or no absolute ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

- (Greek, this. See the previous next). The state of doubting people. The teaching of those who are of the opinion that man cannot comprehend the truth. Dictionary of foreign words included in the Russian language. Chudinov A.N., 1910. SKEPTICISM [Dictionary of foreign words of the Russian language

skepticism- a, m. SCEPTICISM a, m. skepticisme, German. Skepticismus c. skeptikos examining, examining. 1. A philosophical direction that expresses doubt about the possibility of the reliability of objective truth, the surrounding world. ALS 1. Calls skepticism ... ... Historical Dictionary of Gallicisms of the Russian Language

- (from the Greek skeptikos examining, investigating), a philosophical position characterized by doubt about the existence of any reliable criterion of truth. The extreme form of skepticism is agnosticism. The direction of ancient Greek philosophy: early ... ... Modern Encyclopedia

- (from the Greek skeptikos examining investigating), a philosophical position characterized by doubt about the existence of any reliable criterion of truth. The extreme form of skepticism is agnosticism. The direction of ancient Greek philosophy: early ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

SKEPTICISM, skepticism, pl. no, husband. (from Greek skepsis looking) (book). 1. An idealistic philosophical direction that denies the possibility of human knowledge of the existing world, objective truth (philosophical). ancient skepticism. 2.… … Explanatory Dictionary of Ushakov

SKEPTICISM- SKEPTICISM (from the Greek σκέπτομαι, “I examine”, “explore”, σκέψις, research), one of the influential trends in ancient philosophy in the period from the 3rd century. BC e. by 3 in. n. e. Traditionally, the history of skepticism is presented as divided into two ... ... ancient philosophy

Skepticism- (from the Greek skeptikos - examining, investigating), a philosophical position characterized by doubt about the existence of any reliable criterion of truth. The extreme form of skepticism is agnosticism. The direction of ancient Greek philosophy: ... ... Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary

Mistrust, Pyrrhonism, skepticism, incredulity, lack of faith, nihilism, suspicion, skepticism Dictionary of Russian synonyms. skepticism skepticism, lack of faith see also incredulity Dictionary of synonyms of the Russian language. Practical help… Synonym dictionary

S. is called one of the main philosophical directions, the opposite of dogmatic philosophy and denying the possibility of building a philosophical system. Sextus Empiricus says: the skeptical direction essentially consists in comparing data ... ... Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron

Skepticism- Skepticism ♦ Skepticisme In the technical sense of the word - something opposite to dogmatism. To be a skeptic is to believe that every thought is doubtful, and we cannot be absolutely sure of anything. It is easy to see that for the sake of self-preservation ... Philosophical Dictionary of Sponville

Books

• Ancient skepticism and the philosophy of science. Dialogue through two millennia, Gusev D.A. Hellenistic skepticism, represented not only by Pyrrhonism, characterized primarily by "internal emigration", a kind of "existential" turn of philosophical thought, ...

The goal of all philosophical schools that we have considered so far has been the search for the foundations of knowledge and the construction of a certain philosophical system on these foundations. Skepticism(IV century BC - II century AD) stands out from this series in that it does not offer any system of knowledge, but, on the contrary, insists on the impossibility of building such a system. Instead, skeptics offer a certain philosophical practice, which is based on refraining from judgment about the true nature of things. The tool for this practice is dialectical method, which allows you to challenge dogmatic philosophical positions, and the goal is serenity and peace of mind, which skeptics call happiness.

Skepticism can be divided into Pyrrhonism And academic skepticism. Pyrrhonism, or the skeptical doctrine itself, originates from the philosophy Pyrrho of Elis (approx. 365 - 275 BC) , who insisted that our sensations cannot be recognized as true or false, and things themselves are unstable and not subject to definition. As a rational attitude to things, Pyrrho proposed the principle refraining from judgment (epoche), which was applied in the intellectual and ethical spheres. Pyrrho's closest student was Timon of Phliptos (320-230 BC) , who wrote "Sillas" - a collection of satirical poems that describe famous philosophers.

The philosophy of Pyrrho had a significant influence on the Platonists of the Middle and New Academy. The teachings of the sholarch of the Middle Academy Arcesilaus of Pitana (c. 315 - 240 AD BC.) became the basis for the skeptical turn of academic philosophy, which was expressed in the interruption of tradition - Arcesilaus no longer discusses the Platonic teaching in the form in which it is presented by Plato, Sievsius and Xenocrates, but proclaims as the main task of philosophy a return to Socrates and the use of the Socratic method of conducting philosophical

discussions. The philosophy of Arcesilaus was continued and developed Carneades of Cyrene (c. 214 - 129 BC) ; he introduced the concepts of probability and persuasiveness as a relative criterion of truth.

Pyrrhonism revives in philosophy Aenesidemus (c. 1st century BC), Agrippa (1st century BC - 1st century AD) And Sexta Empiricus (2nd half of the 2nd century AD) . Skeptical philosophy received its maximum development and certainty in the works of Aenesidemus and Agrippa, while Sextus Empiricus acted as a systematizer of the teachings of his predecessors. It is from his books "Pyrrho's propositions" (3 books) and "Against the scientists" (11 books) that we draw today the most complete information about the views of skeptics. Skepticism, as a method of questioning the truth of statements and beliefs, had a long history and was accepted by modern philosophers. Skeptical criticism of "dogmatic" philosophy was one of the reasons that led to the philosophical syncretism of the 1st century. AD On the other hand, this criticism of the notions of the criteria of truth, developed back in classical and Hellenistic philosophy, "cleared the way" for a new type of discourse based on the notion of Revelation and characteristic of the era that began after the birth of Christ.

The "academic" skepticism of Arcesilaus and Carneades

The ideas of Pyrrho found their development in the Middle and New Academy, namely, in the teachings of its sholarchs Arcesilaus and Carneades. A common feature of academic skepticism was a move away from the topics discussed in the Ancient Academy and a return to Socratic discourse and mode of questioning. The academics of that time tended to understand Plato's texts not in a dogmatic-doctrinal way, but as lessons on the problematization of beliefs that seem unshakable to us. Probably, the "main" in Plato's legacy at this moment is the dialogue "Theaetetus", dedicated to the nature of knowledge, criticizing, as we remember, its sensationalistic definitions (so popular in the era of Hellenism) and not giving an unambiguous answer to the question posed.

Arcesilaus and Carneades did not leave behind written works - we know about their views from the descriptions of Sextus Empiricus and Cicero. Academic skeptics did not offer their own doctrine or defend their own beliefs about reality—their goal was to show that any philosophical statement can actually be challenged. To do this, skeptics used dialectical method, asking a real or imaginary interlocutor about his beliefs, as Socrates did, and dismantling these beliefs using his own premises. During the discussion, the skeptic not only proved to the opponent that he did not know the truth, but also brought him into a situation in which he could not answer anything in the affirmative - this situation was called aporia. The dialectical method, which was used to refute the dogmatic philosophical positions of opponents, was a key element of academic skepticism.

Such a philosophy, which did not defend its own theory, but only looked for flaws in the opponent's thought, could not exist on its own, without a context to which it could oppose. In their reasoning, Arcesilaus and Carneades disputed the theses of the Epicureans and, especially, the Stoics. The main subjects of the dispute were the existence of a criterion of truth, the possibility of relying on the evidence of sensory perception and the sending of ethical actions. Arcesilaus denies the existence of a criterion of truth, doubts the reliability of sensory impressions, and denies the possibility of knowing natural things. Carneades also denies the existence of criteria for truth and the possibility of knowing nature, but introduces the criterion convincing (pithane) impression, which the skeptic can be guided by when choosing one or another action. This criterion has three stages: at the first stage we evaluate the credibility of the impression, at the second we form an idea about this impression, at the third we analyze the context of this idea and study our own idea in connection with other objects, and this study can lead to the fact that the truth of our idea will be broken.

Both Arcesilaus and Carneades had to answer the question of how a skeptic can act without being convinced of the necessity of this or that goal and of the truth of this or that impression that gives impetus to action. They argued that the skeptic, like any other rational being, has rational impressions, and these impressions influence his actions. But given the complexity of human nature, the skeptic is likely to have multiple impressions of the same situation or subject that may contradict each other. Contradictory impressions will cause conflicting impulses, which, it would seem, should lead to the impossibility of any action. But the skeptic, acting in accordance with his impressions, nevertheless relies primarily not on impressions, but on intelligence, choosing the most plausible from conflicting impressions, and the most rational from impulses. It is reason, not impressions, that guides the skeptic.